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1CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION - ISSUES AND THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS
A common preoccupation of both students and practitioners of 
politics has for long been the extent to which policy issues are relevant 
to electoral behaviour in representative systems of government. Although 
the focus of the debate has shifted over time, political scientists 
continue to argue whether theories of liberal democracy presuppose that 
electoral decisions are made on the basis of considered judgements about 
how a country is to be governed and whether, in fact, people actually do 
cast their votes with such considerations in mind.
The main concern of this study will be with the behavioural 
aspect of the controversy. Its aim is to examine the relationships 
which existed between policy issues and the voting behaviour of the 
Australian public at a Federal government election. The application of 
certain logical preconditions for the existence of "issue vo ting", which 
have been advanced by American and British researchers, will be tested 
in the Australian context. Owing to the limitations of the data available 
for analysis, the results will not support any thorough-going revision of 
the assumptions implicit in contemporary theories of liberal democracy'*', 
but the outcome will be of relevance for those interested in establishing 
whether popular elections present real is t ic  opportunities for rational 
decision-making.
The debate concerning the place of rationality in voting behaviour 
has been conducted in the pages of academic journals of political
1. Indeed, the author is not qualified to undertake such a task. 
See Pateman's criticism of "political sociologists wearing 
political theorists' hats", C. Pateman, Participation and 
Democratic Theory, (Cambridge, 1970), p.3.
2science and w i l l  not be traced in deta i l  here. An out l ine of  i t s  
main themes, however, is necessary to place the subject-matter of 
th is  thesis w i th in  i t s  conceptual context. The controversy, in i t s  
most recent form, was sparked by members of the behavioural i s t  school 
of p o l i t i c a l  science, whose research during the 1950's demonstrated 
widespread ignorance of  po l icy  issues and lack of in te res t  in p o l i t i c a l  
a f fa i r s  amongst the American voting publ ic. Their conclusion, that 
ordinary c i t izens were incapable of making the rat ional judgements expected 
of them by the l ibe ra l  democratic notion of periodic accountabi l i ty  of 
the government at popular e lect ions, was hotly  debated at both the norm­
ative and empirical leve l .  Their assertion was by no means new to 
l ibe ra l  democracies. I t  had appeared in the nineteenth century in the 
form of opposition to the extension of  the franchise by those who feared 
the rule of the uneducated mob whose i r ra t io n a l  prejudices could be played 
upon by demagogues and unscrupulous orators. But, i t  was given new 
status by the behav ioura l is ts ' claim to have discovered, in the sample 
survey technique, a tool which enabled the object ive study of  publ ic 
opinion. Their descript ion of the ordinary c i t izens '  approach to 
electora l decision-making was challenged by those who disputed the 
v a l i d i t y  of th e i r  techniques, p a r t i c u la r ly  the notion that survey research 
was "value- f r e e " , and by those who believed that they had misunderstood 
the normative judgements of theor is ts  as to the ideal form of  operation 
of the l ibe ra l  democratic system.
2
2. For the debate in f u l l ,  see B.R. Berelson, et a l . ,  Voting (Chicago, 
1954); W. Berns, "A Cr i t ique of Voting", in H.J. Storing (ed.) ,
Essays on the S c ie n t i f i c  Study of P o l i t i c s  (N.Y., 1962); L. Davis,
"The Cost of Realism: Contemporary Restatements of Democracy",
Western P o l i t i c a l  Quarter ly , XVII (1964), pp.37-46; J.L. Walker,
"A Cri t ique of  the E l i t i s t  Theory of Democracy", American P o l i t i c a l  
Science Review, 60,2 (1966), pp.285-95; R.A. Dahl, "Further 
Reflections on the E l i t i s t  Theory of Democracy", American P o l i t i c a l  
Science Review, 60,2 (1966), pp.296-305; V.0. Key, J r ,  The Responsible 
Electorate (Cambridge, Mass., 1966); C. Pateman, ib id .
3An example of the debate which is of particular relevance to this
study followed the publication of Voting by Bernard Berelson and
others, one of the init ia l  works on American voting behaviour which
used the results of survey research to challenge assumptions the
authors believed to underlie expositions of ",c la s s i c a l "  democratic 
3
theory . In place of earl ier  theorists'  expectations that voters
would be interested, informed and capable of making rational judgements,
Berelson erected a "more realistic" theory of democracy which emphasised
apathy and low levels of participation in a heterogeneous society as
guarantors of a stable and, ip so  fa c to  successful, liberal democratic
system. His theoretical approach was not original, as i t  relied
heavily upon the contribution of Joseph Schumpeter who, prior to the
release of the behaviouralists' findings, had advanced a definition of
liberal democracy as a political m ethod , which he fe l t  to be more in
keeping with the realit ies of representative systems, and which followed
on from the e l i t i s t  theories of government advanced earlier in the
4
century by Mosca and Michels . Schumpeter defined the democratic method
as, " th a t i n s t i t u t i o n a l  arrangement fo r  a r r iv in g  a t  p o l i t i c a l  d ec is io n s
in  which in d iv id u a ls  acqu ire  the  power to  decide by means o f  a compet-
5i t i v e  s tru g g le  fo r  the p e o p le 's  v o te ”. In f i t t ing  his own research 
to a functionalist theory of liberal democracy, Berelson assimilated 
his findings on the characteristics of the "average" American voter 
to Schumpeter's conception that elections were no more than opportunities 
for the people to choose their  rulers.
3. Berelson, o p . c i t . ,  Chap.14.
4. J. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, (N.Y., 1947).
5. i b i d . ,  p.269.
4Berelson and other political sociologists who followed him were 
crit icised mainly for their  failure to recognise that their own studies 
were not value fr e e "  and contained normative assumptions about the 
characteristics of citizens expected in a functioning liberal democratic 
system . Even survey research techniques were fall ib le ,  in that survey 
results reflected the biases of their  designers. Some criticism was 
also directed at the behaviouralists' misreading of the theorists of 
liberal democracy and, recently, this was extended to the whole notion 
of " c la s s ic a l"  democratic theory which Pateman dismissed as a myth^. 
Political theorists did not, as Berelson had hoped, bring their theories 
of democracy into line with the findings of American sample survey research. 
They were sufficiently sceptical of the assumptions underlying the 
behaviouralists1 work not to accept the new model of the unenlightened 
voter purely on the basis of sociologists' evidence that i t  corresponded 
with objective reality. In the mid-1950's, Downs defied the empiricists 
with An Economic Theory of Democracy, which described voting behaviour 
as a rational form of decision-making in which voters made their choices 
from a desire to "maximise u t i l i t y  i n c o m e s in other words, they
g
combined maximum gains with minimum costs (in the form of effort expended) .
Although this model could explain voters' apparent lack of involvement
and low interest in political affairs ,  i t  led Downs to predict behaviour
patterns which were often quite contrary to those expected on the basis
g
of survey findings .
As time passed, i t  was the survey researchers who modified their 
techniques, accepting that alterations in their research design and in
6. Berns, o p .c i t .  and Walker, o p .c i t .
7. Pateman, o p . c i t . ,  pp.17-20.
8. A. Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (N.Y., 1957).
9. See Chapter 6.
5the form of questions they asked could radically alter  the results they
obtained. The basic finding of widespread ignorance in the electorate
about the affairs of government was not altered, but greater emphasis
was placed on the ambiguities in information which reached the voters,
the strains which were, sometimes deliberately, imposed on their perceptual
capacities by political ac to rs^ ,  and the relatively greater knowledge
shared by people on the issues which actually concerned them‘d .  Little
empirical support was forthcoming, however, for the notion that electors
made rational decisions in casting their votes. V.0. Key's Responsible
Electorate, in which he presented empirical evidence for his "perverse
12and unorthodox argument . . .  th a t  v o te rs  are n o t fo o ls "  , stood very much 
on its  own. I t  was not until af ter  the introduction of a s ta t is t ica l  
technique which utilised simultaneous equations to build models of the 
causal pathways in voting decisions that rationality was again seriously
13canvassed amongst political sociologists as a feature of voting behaviour .
The debate over rationality has been conducted primarily in terms 
of whether voters consider issues (mainly policy issues, but sometimes 
issues of style in government) in the course of their voting decisions. 
"Issue vo tin g "  has been identified with rational voting. As irrational 
responses linking issues to the final voting outcome have not been 
thought to qualify as examples of " issu e  v o t in g ", the assumption of
10. See Chapter 7.
11. See Chapter 8.
12. Key, o p . c i t . ,  p.7.
13. For the f i r s t  published demonstration of the use of this technique 
see A. Goldberg, "Discerning a Causal Pattern among Data on Voting 
Behaviour", American Political Science Review, 60 (1966), pp.913-22 
For an application of the same technique to the question of ration­
ality in British voting behaviour see M. Just, "Causal Models of 
Voter Rationality", Political Studies, 21, 1 (1973), pp.45-56.
6identity, as far as i t  goes, is quite legitimate. Most of the l i t e r ­
ature has, however, overlooked the possibility that i t  can be completely 
rational to cast a vote on the basis of considerations other than issues. 
Partly, this has been due to confusion over the most suitable meaning 
of "r a t i o n a l i t y "  and partly i t  has arisen from an understandable 
preoccupation with the influence of socialisation processes on the 
formation of an individual's political belief system.
The early conceptions of rationality implicit in the writings of 
14Berelson, Angus Campbell and others presupposed a certain type of
political system and classified actions as "r a t io n a l "  according to
whether they fit ted the apparent requirements of the system. Thus, in a
representative liberal democracy where governments were chosen at
popular elections, i t  was rational for voters to assess the candidates
on the basis of their stances on public policy issues. Shapiro pointed
out the fallacies in an approach which sought to define rationality as a
function of normative judgements about the operative requirements of a
political system. He recommended that rationality, as a quality of
political man, be conceived of in terms of the calculus employed by the
15individual in deciding among alternatives. In the same vein of thinking, 
Downs used an economic calculus which referred to a rational man as one
"who moves toward h is  goals in  a way which, to  the b e s t  o f  h is  knowledge,
uses the le a s t  p o s s ib le  in p u t o f  scarce resources p er  u n i t  o f  value
16o u tp u t"  . The simple requirement for this sort of deductive rationality
" is  sim ply  th a t  the in d iv id u a l  choose those a c tio n s  which he b e lie v e s  to  
be c o n s is te n t  w ith  h is  d e s ir e d  g o a l s ' ' ^ . If a voter believed that being
14. A. Campbel1, e t  a l .  , The American Voter, (N.Y., 1960).
15. M. Shapiro, "Rational Political Man", American Political Science 
Review, 63 (1969), p.1106.
16. Downs, o p .c i t .  , p.5.
17. Shapiro, o p . c i t . ,  p.1108.
7a tee to ta lle r was one of the qualities necessary for governing a country 
well, and i f  he cast his vote consistently with that be lie f, then his 
action would be quite rational, even i f  he had been mistaken in that 
the candidate he thought to be a non-drinker did, in fact, drink alcohol. 
Clearly, this type of rational decision could precedea voting act with 
no reference having been made to any of the issues being debated in the 
public arena at the time.
Whilst economists have restricted themselves to the c r ite r ia  of
deductive ra t iona lity , sociologists and psychologists have also been
concerned with inductive ra t iona lity , the capacity to assimilate information
from the evironment and, i f  need be, to adapt one's be lie f system to the
18implications of that new information . Irrational behaviour, according 
to these c r ite r ia ,  has frequently been observed in the unconscious use of 
perceptual balance mechanisms, whereby people selectively perceive, or 
misperceive, information from the outside world which is contradictory to 
beliefs they already hold in order to avoid the necessity of altering these 
beliefs. I t  is precisely this type of behaviour which has led to many of 
the characterisations of voting decisions as irra tiona l. As an i l lu s t r a t ­
ion, i f  the voter in the example used above had ignored a television 
f ilm  report of the candidate drinking beer at an election meeting, 
because he himself was a tee to ta lle r and had strong feelings of loyalty 
towards the candidate's po li t ica l party, then we would have to say that 
his decision to vote for the candidate, on the groupds of opposition to 
alcoholic consumption, was irra tional according to the c r ite r ia  of induct­
ive ra tiona lity .
Many observations about the ir ra t io n a l i ty  of voting decisions have, 
quite correctly, been based on the fa ilure of individuals to respond to
18. A. Goldberg, "Social Determinism and Rationality as Bases of Party 
Identif ica tion", American Polit ica l Science Review, 63 (1969), 
pp.5-25.
8information from the environment, preferring instead to be guided by 
the dictates of strongly held beliefs, such as partisanship. Dependence 
on partisanship as a cue in deciding how to vote cannot in i t s e l f ,  
however, be classed as irrational.  Messages from a voter's environment 
may well coincide with his partisan leanings. Goldberg argues that party 
aff i l ia t ions,  rooted in group norms absorbed during the process of 
political socialisation, could be rational guides to action:
" I f  one co n sid ers  the o r ig in s  o f  group norms, one exp ec ts  
th a t  a t  th e i r  in c e p tio n  they were r a tio n a l means to  group ends.
I t  may n o t then he su rp r is in g  to  f in d  th a t they con tinue to  he 
r a tio n a l  guides to  a c tio n , even when learned  on p r im a rily  
a f f e c t i v e  bases. I t  m ight n o t he untoward, then , fo r  research  
to  he addressed  to  a w orld  o f  r a tio n a l v o te r s  seek in g  to  reduce  
in fo rm a tio n  c o s ts  hy fo llo w in g  group norms, which have in  the  
p a s t seemed e f f e c t i v e ,  w ith  due allowance made in  the a n a ly t ic a l  
model fo r  the lea rn in g  and a d a p ta tiv e  p rocesses incumbent upon 
the  v o te r  in  a ttem p tin g  to  cope w ith  a changing p o l i t i c a l  
environm ent".19
We should not be led, as were the early behaviouralists, by the 
deterministic nature of the processes involved in the acquisition of 
partisan loyali ties,  to a mistaken conclusion that reliance on partisan­
ship as a guide to voting behaviour is irrational.
Knowledge of the requirements for rationality, in both the 
deductive and inductive sense, has provided a framework for assessing 
the voting decisions which will be studied in the Australian data. 
Although i t  has been recognised that voting decisions can be rational 
without having had recourse to the consideration of issues, i t  is with 
the existence of " issu e  v o tin g "  that this thesis is primarily concerned. 
Before embarking on the analysis, i t  is necessary to establish the 
meaning of such concepts as " is su e  v o tin g "  and to fix an operational 
defintion for the term " is su e "  i tse lf .
A word commonly employed in the English language, the term 
" issu e"  becomes annoyingly ambiguous when its usage is submitted to
19. ib id .  , p.21.
9close analysis. The essential meaning of the word is clear: an "i s s u e "
is a " d isp u te  over a l te r n a t iv e s "  or "the p o in t  in  q u e s tio n " .  Confusion
has arisen, however, through the indiscriminate use of the term in
relation to electoral situations. And i t  is with the nature of
election issues that we are concerned here.
In early discussions of the liberal democratic system and its
assumptions of rational decision-making on the part of the voting public,
election issues were widely regarded as disputes over matters of
government policy. In 1951, David Butler defined issues as " m a tters  o f
20p o lic y  on which people d isa g ree"  . Election campaigns continue to be 
conducted on the presumption that voters will take into account the 
differing policy stances of candidates. Under the British system of 
cabinet government, at least,  campaigns are launched with speeches by 
the party leaders giving detailed accounts of the policies deemed to be 
attractive to the voters, some of which are taken up by the media and 
presented as the " is su e s"  which differentiate the competing parties.
However, formal policies are often not the only points in dispute 
at election time. The personalities of candidates or the organisational 
attributes of political parties may be the subjects of public debate. 
Berelson and his associates did recognise this possibility in defining 
the issues of an election as:
" . . .  s ta tem en ts  th a t  a lle g e  d i f fe r e n c e s  between the  contending  
p a r tie s  or cand ida tes w ith  re fe ren c e  to  such m a tte rs  as 
dom estic  and in te r n a t io n a l  p o l ic y , the  n a ture  o f  a p a r ty  's  
support, or the c a p a b i l i t ie s  o f  the  nom inees".21
Their subsequent emphasis on issues as being articulated by the party
leaders, however, ignored the possibility that disputes could exist at
some level within the electorate or amongst representatives of the media
20. U.N.E.S.C.O., Dictionary of the Social Sciences, 1951, p.105
21. Berelson, o p . c i t p. 182.
10
which were not mentioned by any of the competing candidates. Questions 
of personality or party unity, particularly, may be studiously avoided 
by candidates who fear that stressing their differences from their 
opponents on these matters may bring adverse reactions, in the form of 
intra-party s t r i fe  or the dredging up of past indiscretions.
Two questions are immediately raised by Berelson's definition and 
the objection made as to its  scope: f i r s t ly ,  should a l l  allegations of
differences between the contestants be accepted as issues?; and, 
secondly, i f  some matters of contention are not articulated by the 
candidates, how visible must they be before rating as election issues?
In grappling with these and other questions concerning the breadth of 
dispute necessary for a disagreement to be classified as an election issue, 
I have opted for a minimally restrictive approach which takes the 
operative criterion to be the existence of debate at any one of the three 
following levels: the political actors (candidates or party spokesmen), 
the mass media, members of the electorate. The possible ways in which 
issues may be debated at each of these levels will be considered in more 
detail in the following chapter, when the focus of discussion will be 
narrowed to those issues of particular relevance to the election chosen 
for analysis here.
So far, we have raised the possibility that issues may cover a 
broader field than merely disputes over matters of government policy.
The typology most frequently used for classifying issues has been 
Butler and Stokes' division between p o s it io n  issues, involving a l te r ­
native courses of government action on which different parties took 
different sides (for example, the introduction of national service) and 
valence  issues, which represented common goals or values on which the
22parties were in agreement (for example, the elimination of poverty)
With regard to the second type of issue, parties could be expected to 
stress community consensus and to pursue an issue-matching strategy.
The example used may suggest that valence issues comprise common policy 
goals, but the term would also encompass questions of style in govern­
ment, for example, the accepted qualities for a good Prime Minister, or 
the need for the country to be governed by a united party.
Despite the values incorporated in valence issues being, by
23definition, consensual community goals , Butler and Stokes failed to
recognise that parties would s t i l l  be in dispute over the means to
achieve agreed ends, i f  the goals acquired the status of election issues.
Although each contestant might try and match the extent of his opponent's
commitment to a common goal, there would be no point in the electoral
contest unless an element of the "we can do i t  b e tte r  than they can"
24dispute remained . Thus, whilst agreeing that the elimination of poverty 
was a good thing, contestants would disagree over possible strategies to 
be pursued; and, in agreeing that a Prime Minister should be a strong 
leader, parties would disagree as to whose candidate fulfi l led the criterion. 
As a conflict situation developed, Butler and Stokes would no doubt change 
their categorisation from that of a valence issue to a position issue.
11
22. D. Butler & D. Stokes, Political Change in Britain (London, 1971), 
p.218. In a prior work, Berelson advanced a typology of issues 
which distinguished between position issues, comprising questions 
of the type: "In whose in te r e s t  should the government be run?" and 
style issues, comprising questions of the type: "In whose s ty le  should 
the government be run?"; Berelson, o p .c it .  p .184. Berel son's typology 
did not prove suitable for the classification of issues in this study.
23. Butler & Stokes, o p .c it .  , p.235.
24. Goot recognised the possibility of the existence of this type of 
disagreement on valence issues, but s t i l l  maintained that, "there 
are other issues on which a l l  parties  and a l l  voters are in  
agreement"3 M. Goot, Policies and Partisans (Sydney, 1969), p. 158
12
If this was necessary, however, their typology could no longer be
regarded as suitable for the classification of election issues, which
always contain an element of dispute.
The presence of conflict as a defining characteristic of an
election issue need not necessarily take the form of a cleavage in
opinion within the electorate. Although candidates disputed their
relative merits to govern in a commonly accepted style, voters might
be united in believing that only one candidate possessed the necessary
25qualities for leadership. Hypotheses associating different types
of issues with patterns of cleavage or consensus in electoral opinion
have met with varying degrees of success when tested against survey
26measures of opinion distribution. Berelson's notion that an issue's
" l i f e  h i s t o r y "  could be traced through progressive stages reflected in
the changing pattern of voter's attitudes has been treated with the
27greatest scepticism. Berelson believed that issues moved through the 
political spectrum in a gradual sequence from universal rejection to 
partisan disagreement (conceived as a political "gateway "  phase), to 
universal acceptance.
Apart from questioning the validity of the uni-directional move­
ment that was implied by this model, Goot could find no evidence of the 
sharp cleavage of opinion along party lines which, according to Berelson,
would characterise an issue in the political "gateway" between the two
28phases of rejection and acceptance. In fact , the Gallup Poll data 
analysed by Goot suggested that bipartisanship was the predominant opinion
25. This should only be considered as a theoretical example, for 
conflicting partisan loyalties would ensure that such unanimity 
within the electorate rarely, i f  ever, occurred.
26. See Chapter 4.
27. Berelson, o p . o i t . 3 pp.207-10.
28. Goot, o p . c i t . j  pp.97-100.
13
distribution amongst Australian voters, even when issues came within the
29category of "sp ec ific  proposals hanging in the balance".
Butler and Stokes' research into attitude change in Britain also
produced powerful arguments against the " l i fe  h isto ry"  thesis. They
found a marked fluidity in respondents' opinions on Common Market entry
and nationalisation of industry over a three year time span. Although
overall figures for the sample gave the impression of cumulative changes
in opinion, short-term alterations in individual's attitudes did not add
up to any meaningful pattern of movement in individual opinions over time
such as would be the case i f  these issues had a " l i fe  h istory"  of the
30sort posited by Berelson.
The hypothesis advanced by Berelson that issues are f i r s t  articulated
against a background of public rejection or, at least, apathy, would be
almost impossible to test.  There have been speculative arguments about
31the existence of latent opinion , but the validity of any efforts to
measure attitudes on issues of which the electorate had no knowledge (in
Berelson's terminology, before the "gateway") would be highly questionable.
The unwillingness of many people to give a "don't know" response would be
likely to produce an ar t i f ic ia l  estimation of opinion. I t  is quite possible,
however, that issues debated in the mass media during a campaign (hence,
election issues) may be l i t t l e  known to the voters and/or of no relevance
to them in their personal lives.
In order to avoid making any assumptions about the conditions
32governing whether an issue is ,  or is not, poli t ically relevant , the
29. These are Berel son's words to describe issues in the "gateway" 
phase, as cited by Goot, o p .c i t . 3 p.97.
30. Butler and Stokes, o p .c i t . 3 pp.221-7.
31. V.0. Key, Public Opinion and American Democracy, (N.Y.,1961), Chap.11.
32. See discussion in Goot, o p .c i t . 3 p.100.
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defintion of an election issue to be employed here will not be linked to 
the appearance of any particular attitude distribution within the 
electorate. The operational definition most suited to the purposes of 
this thesis is as follows:
"An e le c t io n  is su e  i s  a d isp u te  over a l te r n a t iv e s  (no t 
n e c e s sa r ily  p o lic y  a l te r n a t iv e s )  r e la te d  to  the competing  
claim s o f  the  cand ida tes fo r  government o f f i c e w h i c h  
occasions some debate amongst the c o n te s ta n ts  ( in d iv id u a l  
candida tes or p a r ty  spokesmen) r e p r e se n ta tiv e s  o f  the media3 
or members o f  the v o tin g  p u b l i c . "
This definition will be uti l ised in the next chapter, which will describe
the particular issues chosen for inclusion in the analysis.
Before setting out the hypotheses concerning the existence of
" issu e  v o t in g "  which will be tested in the thesis, i t  would be as well
to be aware of the p i tfa l ls  involved in the analytic techniques to be
employed. Since the work of the American behaviouralists in the mid-1950's,
the relationships between issues and voting behaviour have continued to be
studied through the use of sample survey techniques, where the opinions
of a sample of voters are obtained, usually in an interview situation, in
response to a standardised set of questions. Although the designers of
such studies no longer claim that their research has been conducted under
conditions of complete objectivity, periodic criticism has been directed
at the adequacy of the tools of measurement and at the uses to which survey
33data have been put. Frequently, follow-up research has demonstrated
inconsistencies between predictions derived from measurements of verbal
34attitudes and subjects' subsequent behaviour. The sample survey i tse l f  
is notorious for the susceptibility of the resultant data to alterations
33. For the la t te r  type of criticism see L. Festinger, "Behavioural Support 
for Opinion Change", Public Opinion Quarterly, 28, 3 (1964) pp.404-17.
34. Most of these observations have been made during research into the 
effects of ethnic prejudices on overt behaviour, which has not included 
voting behaviour (this form of behaviour cannot usually be directly 
observed due to the secret ballot requirements of Western liberal 
democratic systems). See the li terature cited in H. Ehrlich, "Attitudes, 
Behaviour and the Intervening Variables", American Sociologist, 4 (1969), 
pp.29-34.
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in the wording of questions and to differential emotional reactions of 
the respondents to their interviewers. Allowances for this type of 
variabil ity, and for sampling errors, can be made in the analysis of the 
data, but the researcher must, at all times be aware of the limitations 
in his measuring tools.
Those who have spoken out in defence of survey techniques recognise
the highly complex nature of the attitude construct i t s e l f ,  the existence
35of many intervening variables between attitudes and overt behaviour ,
and the greater predictive accuracy of opinion measurement where the
behaviour concerned takes the form of acting out a tightly structured,
36institutionalised role. They maintain strongly, however, that the
public opinion survey, used with care and discrimination, represents a
valuable analytic tool for studying the determinants of overt behaviour,
such as the act of electoral choice.
With the above caveats in mind, I propose to util ise in this study
data collected in a sample survey of the Australian electorate conducted
shortly after the Federal election of 25th October 1969 for research work
at the Australian National University. The inclusion in the survey of a
number of items which had been the subject of public debate prior to the
.election, together with a large body of information on the political
atti tudes,  l i fe  history and socio-economic background of each respondent,
has provided the f i r s t  opportunity for a study of issues and their impact
on an Australian election on the scale of studies already conducted in the
37United States and Great Britain. The data, comprising interviews with 
1,873 voters from all states of Australia, and the questions asked of the
35. ib id .
36. I.Crespi, "What Kinds of Attitude Measures are Predictive of Behaviour?" 
Public Opinion Quarterly, 35, 3 (1971), pp.327-34.
37. For example, B.R. Berelson, o p .c i t . ;  A. Campbell, o p .o i t . ; D. Butler 
and D. Stokes, o p .c it .
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respondents will be described in greater detail in the following chapter.
The analysis will proceed on the basis of testing the null 
hypothesis, that issues raised in connection with the 1969 Federal 
election had no relationship to the voting decisions of Australian 
electors. Specifically, i t  will test  the application of certain cond­
itions which have been laid down in the course of earl ier research as 
constituting prerequisites for the existence of issue voting. These 
conditions are as follows:
(a) voters must be able to express an opinion on the issue;
(b) voters must have some minimal commitment to that opinion;
(c) voters must perceive that one party represents their own
oo
position on the issue better than do the other parties.
The ability of voters to express an opinion on each of the issues
concerned will be ascertained from replies to fixed-choice questions in
the survey (the relevant items are set out in full in Appendix I).
Allowance will need to be made for possibly inflated estimates of actual
opinion obtained from this type of fixed-choice item where respondents
may choose randomly amongst the alternatives, preferring to appear to
have an opinion than to admit ignorance by answering "don't know". Items
asking voters the intensity of their feelings will be used to test  the
extent of commitment to opinions. An additional estimate of concern will
be obtained from responses to an open-ended item which asked voters to
nominate the most important problems they thought the Federal government
should do something about. Responses to this type of question have been
increasingly used in survey research to assess the salience of issues
39from the voters' point-of-view. Unfortunately, i t  will only be possible
38. See Campbell, op .a it .  , pp.170-187; Butler & Stokes, op .o it.  , pp.411-431.
39. D. RePass, "Issue Salience and Party Choice", American Political 
Science Review, 65 (1971), pp.389-400.
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to test for the application of condition (c) with regard to one issue, 
the Vietnam war. The accuracy of voters' perceptions of party policies 
on this issue w ill be assessed, together with the ir a b il i t ie s  to link 
the ir own opinions with the policy of one of the parties contesting the 
election. A successful demonstration that conditions (a), (b) and (c) 
had been met, using the techniques described here, would provide necessary, 
but not su ff ic ien t, evidence that voting behaviour had been influenced by 
the respondents' issue opinions.
A further pre-condition, i f  issue voting was to affect the outcome
of an election in a two-party system, was set out by Butler and Stokes in
relation to the British electoerate. They maintained that opinion
distributions would need to be skewed, rather than evenly divided, i f  the
40existing party balance was to be altered. Although Australia is not
s t r ic t ly  a two party system, the proportion of votes regularly obtained
41by the Labor Party and the Liberal/Country Party coalition is so f ine ly 
balanced that i t  would be feasible to apply Butler and Stokes' hypothesis 
to the distribution of votes at Federal elections. The distribution of 
opinion on each issue surveyed w il l  therefore be matched against the 
criterion of skewness in the course of the study. One chapter w i l l  be 
devoted to estimating the degree of partisan cleavage in the electorate 
on each issue through comparing the distribution of opinions characteristic 
of respondents voting for opposing parties.
The existence of a correlation between holding a particular opinion 
on an issue and voting for a particular party at the 1969 election would 
not, by i t s e l f ,  constitute evidence that that issue had influenced voting 
decisions. Partisan loya lties, or socio-demographic variables may have
40. Bulter and Stokes, o p .c i t .  , pp.234-236.
41. The reasons for treating these two parties as a single po lit ica l 
entity in the analysis of voting behaviour w i l l  be outlined in the 
following chapter.
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been the determining factors. In order to account for this possibility, 
the relationships between issue opinions and party identification, and 
between opinions and the socio-demographic variables of education level, 
occupation, age and sex will be examined.
Most interest in the explanation of voting behaviour has been 
centred on the forces prompting change, rather than stabili ty.  The 
stabilising influence of partisan loyalties (see Chapter 6) suggests that 
the most likely area for the occurrence of issue voting lies with those 
voters*who decided to switch from one party to another between elections. 
The study will, therefore, examine the issue opinions of those respondents 
who switched their vote between 1966 and 1969, comparing the relative 
defection rates from each of the major parties registered amongst those 
holding different views on the election issues.
Finally, the study will employ a multi-variate analysis technique 
to ascertain the relative contributions of each issue and of partisan 
affil ia tion to voting behaviour at the 1969 election. If a particular 
issue is found to account for a large proportion of the variance in 1969 
vote, then i t  can be concluded that opinions on the issue were related to 
voting decisions. However, the techniques employed in the analysis will 
not permit any conclusions as to the causal processes involved in making 
these decisions. The term "issue voting" in this thesis will be used to 
indicate merely the presence of a relationship between certain issue 
opinions and voting behaviour, without inferring that any one issue caused 
the respondent to vote for the party of his choice.
I t  is unlikely that the analytic procedure outlined so far will 
provide sufficient information to make a final judgement on the rationality 
of voting decisions in 1969. Evidence of the operation of perceptual 
balance mechanisms in respondents' perceptions of party policies on the 
Vietnam war would enable the classification of decisions which relied upon
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misperception of information from the environment relating to this issue 
as irrat ional,  according to the cri teria of inductive rationality.  More 
information than could be obtained within the format of the Australian 
Survey Project (ASP) questionnaire on the subjective motivations behind 
individual voting decisions would be needed in order to establish whether 
voting behaviour met the cr i teria for deductive rationality.  A finding 
that some degree of issue voting took place in the 1969 election would, 
however, at least open the way to the possibility that rational decision­
making constituted an element in voting choice. Although i t  is unfort­
unate that the data available for analysis will not allow any definite 
conclusion as to the degree of rationality in Australian voting behaviour, 
the hypotheses which will be tested here should add up to a more compre­
hensive picture of the role played by issues in the voting decisions of 
the Australian electorate than has hitherto been produced.
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CHAPTER 2
THE ELECTION, THE ISSUES, THE SURVEY
Having posed the problem of issue voting within the context of 
1iberal-democratic theory and practice and having outlined a study designed 
to tes t  certain relevant hypotheses about Australian voting behaviour, 
i t  is necessary to narrow the focus of discussion to the more specific 
aspects of the study. My basic concern in this thesis is to establish 
how, and to what extent a set of variables - public policy issues - could 
be said to have influenced the voting decisions of Australian electors at 
a particular election, that being the Federal election held on 25th 
October, 1969. Being unable to study the behaviour of all the voters who 
participated in that election, I have opted for a representative sample as 
the subjects of the investigation. The choice of election has been 
governed solely by the availability of data gathered in the course of the 
Australian Survey Project. The implications of this choice must be 
recognised at the outset, however. The circumstances of the particular 
election chosen for study in themselves constitute a set of variables 
which influenced the subjects' behaviour at the polls and findings cannot 
be generalized to cover subsequent, or preceding elections. In addition, 
the characteristics of each issue included in the study were shaped by 
the events of 1969 and earlier. Although the issueshave been classified 
as "independent variables" for the purposes of study design, their final 
form was dependent upon the outcome of political events occurring at both 
domestic and international levels.
Before proceeding to test the data for hypotheses about issue voting, 
the nature of each of the variables involved in the study must be clarified. 
This chapter will therefore be taken up by a description of the circum­
stances in which the 1969 Federal election was held, of the issues which 
were in dispute at the time, and of the particular issues chosen for study 
in the ASP survey. As the nature of the survey's sample of voters was of
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vital importance for the re l iab il i ty  of the results, the rationale for 
i ts  selection will be discussed and its  validity as a sample of the total 
population assessed.
The 1969 Federal Election
The Federal election held in October 1969 at the conclusion of a 
three year term in office for the Liberal/Country Party coalition was 
conducted in an atmosphere of unusual concern about the personalities and 
leadership styles of the main contestants for the role of Prime Minister. 
Neither the incumbent Prime Minister, John Gorton, nor the Leader of the 
Opposition, Gough Whitlam, had previously led their parties at a Federal 
election, although John McEwen, leader of the Country Party, was an exper­
ienced campaigner. Gorton had been elected by his party to replace Harold 
Holt after the la t te r ' s  disappearance in the sea off Portsea in December 1967 
Although a Senator, Gorton had beaten other contestants for the leadership, 
such as Paul Hasluck, primarily because of a belief within the Liberal Party 
that his image would be appealing to the electorate. Pressure from the 
Country Party, together with an incomplete electoral redistribution, had 
prevented Gorton from confirming this reputation by staging an early election 
in 1968.
Whitlam's succession to the leadership of the A.L.P. had followed the 
disastrous electoral defeat inflicted upon Labor in 1966 when the party had 
been led by Arthur Calwell. As Deputy Leader under Calwell, Whitlam had 
served a long apprenticeship, during which he had precipitated moves for a 
reorganisation of the party'*' and begun to work on a series of policy
1. In 1967, the A.L.P. Federal Conference accepted a proposal from Cyril 
Wyndham, the party's Federal Secretary to enlarge the composition of 
both Conference and Executive by the addition of "ex o f f i c i o " represent­
atives of the parliamentary party. The Federal Executive was expanded 
to include the two House of Representatives and two Senate Labor leaders. 
Commencing in 1969, the Federal Conference was increased by 10 delegates 
the four Federal parliamentary leaders, and the six State parliamentary 
leaders. For a detailed account of the reorganisation and its  effects 
see S.C. Read, The 1969 Federal Conference of the A.L.P.: Its Impact on
the Shape of the Election Campaign and the Outcome of the Election. 
Unpublished M.A. Qual. sub-thesis, A.N.U., 1971.
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in i t ia t iv e s  fo r  inclusion w ith in  the Federal platform. His tenure o f the
party 's  leadership position had not been w ithout drama as he had only
narrowly defeated le ft-w in ge r Jim Cairns in 1968 a f te r  laying his newly
won leadership on the l in e  in support o f r igh t-w inger R.W. Harradine's
2
r ig h t  to speak out against members of the A.L.P. Federal Executive .
The Liberal/Country Party was at a h igh-po in t in terms o f i t s  seats 
w ith in  the House o f Representatives when i t  went to the po lls  in 1969.
The co a l i t io n  held 81 seats( Liberal 60; Country Party 21) against Labor's
3
42, w ith 1 Independent member . Three by-elections during 1969 had not 
a ltered the party to ta ls ,  although strong swings to Labor had been recorded 
in the Liberal seat o f Curtin and the Country Party seat o f Gwydir, w h i ls t  
the A.L.P. had not lo s t  as much ground as expected in Bendigo, where a 
popular Labor member had re t i re d  fo r  health reasons. Although these trends 
might have been taken as a warning tha t the Government stood to lose some 
of i t s  large m ajority  at the forthcoming e le c t io n ,  the normal tendency fo r  
swings against the governing party to be recorded at by-elections may have 
prevented the warning being seriously considered.
There were ind ica tions , however, tha t some members o f the Liberal 
Party were worried about the Government's prospects. The personality  o f the 
Prime M in is te r, which had o r ig in a l ly  won him that ro le , was beginning to 
be seen as a handicap to the party. He had acquired a reputation fo r  one- 
man decision-making which was made p a r t ic u la r ly  offensive by the high-handed
2. R.W. Harradine, a r igh t-w ing Tasmanian trade un ion is t had accused some 
members o f the Federal Executive o f being "f r ie n d s  o f  Com m unists" in 
1968. The ensuing dispute over d is c ip l in a ry  measures to be taken against 
Harradine rekindled much o f the " a n t i-G ro u p e r "  h o s t i l i t y  o f  the 1950's 
w ith in  the party.
3. The number of e ffe c t ive  seats w ith in  the House had increased from 123 
to 124 during 1968 by the granting o f voting r igh ts  to the Member fo r  
the N orthem Terr ito ry , who represented the Country Party. An additional 
seat, added by a Federal e lectora l re d is t r ib u t io n  took the numbers to 
125 a f te r  the 1969 e lec t ion .
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manner he employed in dealings with Government ministers, senior public
4
servants and Liberal Party officials at both State and Federal levels.
Rumours r ife in Canberra in eary 1969 about Gorton's personal l i fe-s ty le ,  
particularly his drinking habits and relationships with young women, were 
exacerbated by the public attack against him by E. St.John, Liberal MP for 
Warringah, which was prompted by the circumstances of a late night v is i t  
Gorton paid to the U.S. Embassy in the company of a female journalist.
Although St.John subsequently resigned from the Liberal Party, his allegations 
of Prime Ministerial indiscretion were widely featured in the mass media.
The f i r s t  indications of a drop in public support for Gorton came in a 
Gallup Poll taken in August, and the trend had intensified by the time the 
election campaign was under way.
TABLE 2.1 GALLUP POLL OF PRIME MINISTER'S PERFORMANCE5 
Extent of approval of the way Gorton was handling his job as P.M.
April 1969
7o  approve 
64
% disapprove 
19
% undecided 
17
August 1969 58 25 17
October 4th, 1969 44 32 24
October 18th, 1969 46 32 22
Apart from his personal style of leadership, some of Gorton's beliefs 
created tensions between himself and supporters of the Government. Relations 
between the Prime Minister and the Liberal Party's State branches were 
hampered by his belief that greater power in areas such as education, social 
welfare and control of natural resources should be concentrated in the hands
4. These characteristics of Gorton's Prime Ministership were commented upon 
in Press reports duing the year. As a Research Officer in the Liberal 
Party Federal Secretariat in 1969, I personally observed reactions of 
State party officials to Gorton's leadership.
5. Australian Gallup Poll , No.203, April, 1969; No.205, August 1969;
No.206, 4 October 1969; No.207, 18 October 1969.
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of the Federal Government. Gorton was accused by members of his own 
party of pursuing a centralis t philosophy when he sort to revise the 
Liberal Party platform on federalism. His experimentation with the idea 
of abandoning the Government's concept of "forwai'd d e fen ce"  in favour of 
a " fo r tr e s s  A u s tr a lia "  policy aroused the ire of the more traditional 
Liberals, as well as straining relations with the Country Party and the 
D.L.P.
Whilst Gorton's personal style and philosophy were imposing great 
strains on the unity of the Liberal Party and of the coalition as a 
whole, Whitlam was beginning to reap the benefits of his efforts to weld 
the Labor Party into a united force which would be acceptable to the public 
as an alternative government. Apart from his rash gamble over Harradine, 
Whitlam had been working to convince all factions within the party that 
the only hope for effecting the ideals of the Labor movement lay in 
winning Federal office under his leadership. Not only did Whitlam need 
to gain the allegiance of those party members who had opposed him in the 
past, but he had also to convince representatives of the mass media that 
the A.L.P. was a united party equipped with a set of real is t ic  electorally 
attractive policies.
A measure of Whitlam's success in achieving both of these objectives
lay in the media's reception of the A.L.P. Federal Conference, held in
£
July 1969 . This was not the f i r s t  Conference to which representatives of 
the Press had been invited, but i t  was unique in not producing the factional 
in-fighting that journalists had come to expect. The uproar which had been 
predicted over Harradine's admission as a Conference delegate failed to 
materialise^, and compromise solutions were negotiated on such other
6. For a detailed account of the media reaction to the 1969 A.L.P. Federal 
Conference see S.C. Read, o p .c i t .
7. Harradine's credentials as a delegate were rejected by the Federal Conf­
erence in its  f i r s t  session. Harradine himself did not arrive in Melbourne 
until the second day, when he was dissuaded from attempting to force an 
entry to the meeting by other Tasmanian delegates,
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contentious issues as State aid to non-government schools and the 
Vietnam war. The public proceedings of the Conference were dominated
g
by Federal and State parliamentarians, giving a soph is tica tion  to the
debates which had been absent in the past. The re -w r it in g  of a major part
o f the Federal platform was approved by the delegates, most o f the
revis ions being in keeping with po lic ies  which were personally espoused by
Whitlam and had been the subject of much personal e f f o r t  by him on the
party 's  various policy committees.
The s p i r i t  of compromise which prevailed a t the Conference was
undoubtedly a t t r ib u ta b le  to the delegates' concern with the approaching
Federal e lection and th e ir  re a l isa t io n  tha t, in Whitlam, they had a leader
who could appeal to the general e lectorate. The overwhelmingly favourable
media response to the Conference assured Whitlam of his party 's  lo y a lty ,
including even the temporary alleigance of the left-dominated V ic torian
branch. The confidence o f the A.L.P. continued to r ise  as members o f the
Parliamentary Press Gallery were persuaded by Gorton's inept handling of
the Prime M inistership and Whitlam's mastery o f his party to show Labor in
9
a more favourable l ig h t  than ever before. Gallup Polls published as the 
e lection  approached suggested that the Government was losing public support: 
TABLE 2.2 GALLUP POLL - ELECTORAL PROSPECTS8 910 
Percentage of e lectorate favouring each party to win an e lection
April 1969
L.C.P.
51%
A.L.P.
40%
D.L.P.
7%
Other
2%
June 1969 50 40 7 3
August 1969 48 43 5 4
October 4th 1969 44 47 6 3
October 18th 1969 44 46 7 3
8. Of 46 credential led delegates to the Federal Conference, 25 were Members 
o f Parliament (14 Federal and 11 State).
9. G. Freudenberg, Whitlam's Press Secretary, regarded the winning-over of 
Ian F itch e tt  from the Sydney Morning Herald as the tu rn ing -po in t in 
Labor's build-up to the e lec tion . Personal in te rv iew , Parliament House, 
Canberra, 11 December 1970.
10. Austra lian Gallup P o l l , Nos.203-207, A p r i1-October, 1969.
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Neither party waited for the three-week " o f f i c ia l "  election campaign 
to announce its  policies to the voters. Whitlam had been explaining his 
policies, particularly the complex proposals for a national health and a 
national superannuation scheme, throughout the year, even prior to their 
acceptance by Federal Conference, on the presumption that an Opposition, 
with fewer resources at i ts  disposal, needed more time than a Government 
to communicate its policies to the electorate. Even if  voters were not 
familiar with the details of Labor's proposals by the time of Whitlam's 
policy speech, the publicity given to the Federal Conference had shown the 
party to be equipped with a set of positive proposals for domestic reform.
The 1969 Budget gave a clear indication of the direction in which 
Gorton intended his policies to be weighted. Government spending on 
education, health benefits and social welfare was increased, whilst the 
defence budget suffered a cut. Gorton's desire for a more real is t ic  
defence policy in place of the anti-Communist paranoia of the past was 
reflected in a speech by External Affairs Minister, Gordon Freeth, in 
August which failed to show alarm at an increase in Soviet naval strength 
in the Indian Ocean. The D.L.P. and some sections of the Country Party 
reacted to this speech in such a hostile manner that Gorton was forced to 
back away from any suggestion that the Government might regard the Soviet 
Union as contributing to the stabili ty of the Indian Ocean region. The 
Prime Minister did not back down, however, from his determination that 
matters of domestic policy should be given prominence in the Liberal Party 
campaign for the election.
The opening weeks of the ”o f f i c i a l " election campaign saw the two 
party leaders countering each other's arguments on such domestic issues 
as government aid for education, schemes for reimbursing medical costs, 
income tax reform and abolition of the means test  on pensions. Although 
the promises contained in the two policy speeches reflected the differences 
in underlying philosophy of the opposing parties, the contrasting styles
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in which the speeches were delivered caught most of the attention. Whitlam 
took the in i t ia t iv e ,  delivering a masterly speech to a boisterously 
enthusiastic crowd at the Sydney Town Hall on October 1st. Gorton followed 
a week la ter with a pre-recorded television address before a small gathering 
of Liberal/Country Party ministers and the ir wives who applauded po lite ly  
in a s t i f f ,  formal atmosphere to which Gorton, clearly, was not suited.
Whitlam's confidence in his a b i l i ty  to outshine Gorton, both on 
television and in public appearances, was substantiated in the course of 
the campaign. Gorton's concern with domestic policies placed him in the 
role of continually trying to refute Labor's proposals which, for the 
f i r s t  time, were carefully researched and costed. His unhappy relations 
with the State branches showed through in the poor organisation of the 
Liberal campaign at the State level. Aided by the reactions of the mass 
media and the October 4th Gallup Poll findings, Gorton gave in to pressure 
from his advisers in the last week of the campaign and attempted to regain 
the in i t ia t iv e  by switching the emphasis to defence and foreign policy. 
Labor's commitment to withdraw Australian troops from Vietnam, to abolish 
conscription and to halt the stationing of forces in Malaysia/Singapore 
were painted as pro-Communist and detrimental to the future of both the 
American alliance and of friendships within the South East Asian region.
By polling day on October 25th the Australian electorate had been 
bombarded with information on domestic and foreign policy differences 
between the parties, in addition to journa lis tic  interpretations of the 
two contestant's personal qualities and styles of leadership. The events 
recounted in the preceding pages set the parameters of the public debate, 
determining which issues were given prominence by the party leaders and 
by the mass media, and which were not. Differing assessments by party 
leaders, media commentators and the electors themselves as to which, i f  any, 
of the issues influenced the election result make i t  essential that we 
examine more closely, at this point, the issues which comprise the main focus 
of the study.
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The Issues
According to the criteria  established in the preceding chapter, an 
election issue is a point of dispute between contestants, which occasions 
some debate amongst the candidates, representatives of the media, or 
members of the voting public. The fact that competing parties or candidates 
adopt opposing stances in their policies or attitudes towards government 
does not necessarily mean that these areas of difference have the status of 
" is s u e s ”. They may pass unnoticed within the context of a particular 
election, whereas issues, being the "p o in ts  in  d is p u te ", arouse some level 
of public debate.
The debate associated with an election issue may be analysed from 
three perspectives - that of the politicians contesting the election; the 
mass media reporting i t ;  or the voters themselves. Because an issue may 
be the subject of debate at one of these levels and ignored at another, 
i t  is particularly hard to make a decisive judgement as to which points of 
difference between the contestants constituted the issues of an election.
The parties, party leaders or individual candidates seeking office choose 
which points they wish to stress in distinguishing themselves from their 
opponents. Typically, they in i t ia te  debate across a wide range of areas, 
hoping that different issues will appeal to different sectors of the 
electorate. By selective reporting of the candidates' ac tiv i t ies ,  the news 
media may narrow the focus of debate so that some issues receive greater 
exposure than others. Press editorials and feature artic les ,  together with 
current affairs programmes on radio and television, have been the arenas 
for attempts by proprietors and journalists to shift  the emphasis towards 
the points of difference between the parties which they themselves regard as 
important. At times, the media may emphasise differences in policy or style 
which the candidates have not attempted to communicate to the voters. This 
may arise where party leaders fear to stress a particular policy which has 
aroused dissension within the party in the past, in case i t  does so again,
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or where the leaders, from personal taste , have attempted to conduct 
campaigns biased towards one type of po l icy issue to the exclusion of 
others. The media can be p a r t i c u la r ly  e f fec t ive  in making an issue of 
the leader's personal a b i l i t i e s ,  where each leader would hes t i ta te  to 
i n i t i a t e  debate on the capacities o f  his opponent in case i t  should 
back- f i re .
There is always a normative qua l i ty  in the judgements o f  both the 
p o l i t i c ia n s  and the media commentators as to which areas const i tu te the 
issues of  an e lec t ion.  Although they may possess some information on the 
e lec tora te 's  tastes (gleaned from opinion research or from pure hunch), 
the points chosen fo r  debate are those which the part ic ipants  feel the 
voters should consider in making th e i r  choice between the part ies.
Whether the points of dif ference between the part ies which the
voters regard as important ac tua l ly  coincide with those issues being debated
in the p o l i t i c a l  arena is another matter. As voters are dependent on the
mass media fo r  th e i r  knowledge of p o l i t i c a l  events, they are un l ike ly  to
perceive dif ferences between the part ies or candidates which have not
occasioned the attention of  the media'*’ '*'. They may, however, al locate
d i f fe re n t  p r io r i t i e s  to the range of  issues receiving such coverage than
would be suggested by the emphasis e i the r  of the p o l i t ic ia n s  or the elect ion
commentators. A point o f  contention between the part ies may receive v i r t u a l l y
no attention from the voters, whereas the circumstances of everyday l i f e  may
lead the same people to regard some other dif ference as v i t a l  to th e i r
future well -being. For th is  reason, some researchers have id e n t i f ie d  elect ion
issues as those areas o f  government pol icy about which the voters themselves 
12express concern . Such a d e f in i t io n  may well lead the researcher closer to
11. Possible exceptions to th is  would occur i f  voters had experienced both 
part ies in o f f ic e  so they could form th e i r  own comparisons, or i f  
voters were frequent attenders at public meetings staged by both part ies.
12. See, for  example, D.E. Re Pass, o p .a it .
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finding the particular issues which did influence electoral decisions, 
but i t  tends to underestimate the role of the politicians and of the media 
in setting the parameters of political debate during an election campaign.
As I have no wish to pre-judge the nature or even existence of influence 
processes which may link issues to voting behaviour, I have opted for a 
wider definition which identifies as an issue any point of difference 
between the contestants occasioning debate amongst politicians, media 
commentators and/or the general public.
It  became evident during the 1969 Federal election campaign that 
all those participating in the debate, either as actors or as spectators, 
did not necessarily agree as to what the election issues were. Gorton and 
Whit!am, as the two contestants for the office of Prime Minister, were 
the most visible exponents of party policy. Traditionally, i t  has been 
held that the party leaders articulate the issues which will dominate 
their respective campaigns in their opening policy speeches. An analysis 
of the speeches delivered by Whitlam and Gorton, respectively, on 1st and 
8th October did not, however, prove to be of particular value in isolating 
those points upon which the leaders wished to base their campaigns. In an
effort to attract the attention of as many voters as possible, each speech
covered the entire field of Federal government administration and, in 
addition, included numerous observations on the style of government associated 
with the competing parties. Promises, or accounts of past achievements, 
were listed across a broad front, including both domestic and foreign policy 
areas - the range of problems can be assessed from a breakdown of each 
policy speech set out in Appendix II. The speeches were intended as much 
for media consumption as for communication direct to the electorate and
should be seen as attempts to enumerate as many areas of difference which
might be relevant for electoral choice as possible, in the hope that some, 
at least,  would be taken further by the media.
In their public appearances during the remainder of the campaign, the
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two leaders did choose to focus their attention on certain issues which 
they fe l t  to be the ir strong points. To varying degrees, they were 
influenced in this choice by the reactions of the media, the ir opponent's 
actions and the ir adviser's assessments of the way voters would react.
Having chosen, from personal conviction, to stress domestic policies in 
his campaign, Gorton found himself answering the criticisms of Labor 
spokesmen on the inadequacies of past Liberal/Country Party in it ia t ives  
in this area. Gorton's preference for making education, health and 
social welfare the talking-points of the campaign was not, apparently, 
shared by many Liberal parliamentarians who f e l t  that defence and foreign
policy were the v ita l issues and conducted the ir local campaigns on this
, . 13basis
Both prior to, and during the " o f f ic ia l " campaign, i t  was evident
that some newspaper proprietors and journalists had very d ifferent
conceptions of which differences between the opposing parties should be
given particular emphasis from the tastes of the party leaders. Although
the speeches of both leaders on the subject of domestic policies were
reported, newspapers such as the Sydney Morning Herald and the Daily
Telegraph made use of ed itoria l space and feature artic les to stress party
differences on defence and foreign policy. The sectors of the media which
acted on the ir own in i t ia t iv e  in this fashion were uniformly in support
of Liberal/Country Party policy on the issues they canvassed. Labor
spokesmen, Whitlam in particular, were anxious not to highlight the party's
defence policies as they had been the subject of so many delicate compromises
14that the risk of sparking further intra-party con flic t was too great .
13. D. A itk in , "The Federal Election", Pol i t i c s , V ,l, (1970), pp.45-53.
14. This fear proved to be well-grounded as the only element of disunity 
during Labor's campaign was provided by Arthur Calwell on the subject 
of the Vietnam war. Calwell spoke out against the o f f ic ia l  party 
policy of withdrawal after the United States had been notif ied , and 
called for public demonstrations in favour of the immediate withdrawal 
of troops. However, Calwell's outburst had l i t t l e  impact as i t  was 
promptly repudiated by the left-wing Victorian branch which publicly 
expressed its  support for the policy enunciated by Whitlam.
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However, the attention of the Press ensured that differences in the
government and opposition approaches to defence and foreign affa irs
could be classified as issues in relation to this election. A content
analysis of five daily newspapers (Australian, Age, Sydney Morning Herald,
15Daily Telegraph and Canberra Times ) during the three weeks of the o ff ic ia l
campaign showed the areas receiving most frequent mention to be defence
(including Vietnam, conscription, troops in Malaysia, Soviet influence in
the Indian Ocean and the U.S. alliance), health schemes and government aid
to education, with the Daily Telegraph being the only newspaper to devote
1considerable space to the cost of Labor's election promises .
The contrast between the issues as seen by the party leaders and 
the issues canvassed in the Press did not persist unaltered throughout the 
election campaign. On the insistence of his advisors, Gorton changed the 
emphasis of his campaign in the last week to attack Labor's defence and 
foreign policies through use of the "Red s c a re "  tactics which he, personally, 
had not wished to employ. His action il lus tra ted  the persuasive power of 
the Press over a party leader at a time of apparent decline in the 
popularity of that po lit ic ian  and his party. The Press, in particular, had 
made i t  clear that Gorton was not handling the debate over domestic policy 
with the ease that Whitlam displayed. Gorton's re la tive ly  lack-lustre 
performance as leader of the government coalition had i t s e l f  become a point
15. These newspapers were chosen because of the ir large circulation and 
because of the ir ava ila b il i ty  at the time the research was carried 
out. The l i s t  did not, unfortunately, provide a cross-section of all 
the main newspaper proprietors (although the Fairfax, Packer and 
Murdoch groups were represented), nor did i t  include representatives 
of the daily Press in the smaller States.
16. The fact that the Daily Telegraph was the only newspaper to devote
much space to the possible costs of Labor's election promises represented 
a s ignificant advance in the party's public relations. In previous 
elections, campaign promises had not been carefully costed beforehand, 
so that exorbitant costs to the taxpayer were quickly seized upon by 
the Press as a major issue.
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of difference between the parties and threatened to become a prominent 
issue in the media campaign, without any overt help from Whitlam.
The resultant change in the nature of the Liberal campaign 
demonstrated the degree of interaction existing between politicians and 
the media in their respective attempts to set the issues for an election.
In this case, a party leader responded to a fear that his opponent was 
beating him on the policy issues he had himself chosen by introducing 
different issues to the debate and thus also avoiding the possibility that 
his own leadership style might become an issue harmful to his prospects 
at the election.
The particular choice of issues by the party leaders and by the media
in the 1969 election campaign involved assumptions about the nature and
the extent of electoral reaction. The party organisations and Members of
Parliament each in their own ways collected information about the
problems which were concerning voters throughout Australia^. Gallup
Polls conducted in June, August and October attempted to identify the
issues as seen from the voters' perspective. The results of these polls
showed that the Vietnam war, education and pensions were most frequently
nominated as election issues, whilst health attracted very few spontaneous 
18responses
Too much weight should not be assigned to these findings, as the 
design of the Gallup Polls did not compare favourably with other research 
attempts (in the U.S., studies conducted by the University of Michigan 
and in the A.N.U.'s Australian Survey Project) to assess the level of 
voters' concern with particular areas of policy dispute. The question of
17. The Federal Secretariat of the Liberal Party conducted pre-electoral 
sample surveys with the assistance of the Morgan-Gal1 up research 
organisation in 1969. Restricted funds and lack of research staff  
prevented the A.L.P. from carrying out anything other than fairly 
rudimentary attempts to survey public opinion.
18. Australian Gallup Poll, No.204, June 1969; No.205, August 1969;
No.206, 4 October 1969.
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identifying the issues as the voters saw them in 1969 is su ff ic ien tly
complex to warrant a chapter of its  own at a la te r stage in the thesis.
However, the Gallup Poll findings are suffic ient at this stage to indicate
that the issues with which the mass media and the candidates were
preoccupied did not necessarily correspond exactly with the views of the
voters. The apparent lack of concern with health matters is particularly
notable in the l igh t of D. A itk in 's  speculation as to whether the mass
public absorbed anything of the debate between the parties over the ir
19riva l health schemes . Although the Vietnam war appeared to have aroused 
the concern of a s ignificant proportion of the electorate, the Gallup 
finding that the opinions of these voters favoured the withdrawal of 
Australian troops may indicate that Gorton was right in his judgement and 
the newspaper proprietors wrong^.
Viewing the issues of the 1969 election from the perspective of the 
contestants, the media and the voters, in turn, has le f t  a wide variety 
of differences in party policy and style of leadership which may each 
have qualified as an election issue according to the defin ition set down 
in Chapter 1. Obviously, no study could hope to encompass a ll the possible 
issues, so that some sort of restriction would need to be imposed by the 
researcher. In this case, the restriction on the nature of the issues 
studied was im p lic it  in the choice of data for analysis, as those designing 
the Australian Survey Project had the ir own c r ite r ia  for the inclusion of
19. A itk in , o p . c i t .  , p.48.
20. Australian Gallup Poll (AGP) No.204, June 1969 - the Vietnam war was 
nominated as the chief election issue by 14.5% of the sample.
AGP Nos. 205, 206:
15 August '69 (205) 4 October '69 (206)
% who chose Vietnam 
from a series of issues 10.6% 12.1%
Continue to f igh t 2.5% 2.9%
Bring forces back 8.1% 9.2%
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some issues and the omission of others. The questionnaire design has 
meant that I have not been able to include examples of each different 
type of issue discussed in the previous chapter, nor has i t  been possible 
to study some of the issues which most clearly suggest themselves as being 
particularly relevant to the 1969 election.
The issue items covered in this analysis have been restricted to 
policy issues on which different stances were adopted by the opposing 
parties. Although the ASP questionnaire did ask its subjects to evaluate 
the parties and their leaders, in terms which encouraged references to 
style as well as policy, each respondent was requested to l i s t  both 
positive and negative aspects in his evaluation. As a result, responses 
could not be easily classified as representing opinions on any "s t y l e  o f  
governm ent" issue. This was particularly unfortunate, in view of suggestions 
in the Press that Gorton's capacities as Prime Minister had constituted 
an election issue for some voters.
The final selection of questionnaire items for inclusion in this 
study was made on the basis that each question should present alternatives 
which could be related to differences in government and opposition policy 
stances even i f  there was not a direct one-to-one correspondence. Eight 
items were chosen in this manner - the Vietnam war; conscription, State 
aid, migration; censorship; Communist China; foreign investment; relations 
with the United States. All were closed questions, some offering four 
alternatives, whilst others gave respondents only a binary choice (see 
Appendix i). The questions differed in the ease with which they could be 
linked with party policy stances, as will become apparent in the next 
chapter when the items, and responses to them, are studied in more detail.
The most frustrating feature of the questionnaire design for attempts 
to test  hypotheses about issue voting in 1969 was the omission of such issues 
as health, education and pensions, which occupied much of the election 
campaign. I t  was possible to identify those issueswhich were of greatest
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concern to the voters from responses to an open-ended question which 
asked subjects to nominate the most important problems requiring Federal 
government attention. However, the inadequacy of the l i s t  of closed- 
format issue items prevented any comparisons being made between the 
contributions to voting behaviour of these issues which were important 
to the voters and the issues (for example, health) which had dominated the 
attention of politicians and the mass media.
Each of the eight issue items selected for analysis received some 
mention in the parties' policy speeches or in the Press publicity for the 
campaign. The merits of party policies towards the Vietnam war, conscription 
and State aid were debated in the media, although the wider issue of 
education received more coverage than was allotted to the specific aspect 
of State aid to non-government schools. Gorton spoke in favour of govern­
ment policies which allocated grants to independent schools on the basis 
of a fixed sum for each pupil, whilst Whitlam stressed the desirability of 
a "needs" formula for assessing Commonwealth financial aid, and independent 
DOGS (Defence of Government Schools) candidates opposed any form of 
government aid. Despite the party leaders' avoidance of the topics of 
Vietnam and conscription in the in it ial  stages of the campaign, media 
commentators contrasted Labor's promises to withdraw Australian troops 
from the war and to abolish conscription, with the Government's continued 
commitment of troops and retention of national service by ballot.
Questions of Australia's future attitudes towards Communist China, 
the U.S. alliance and foreign investors entered the public debate indirectly, 
as components of the type of approach to foreign relations which would be 
likely to be adopted by a Liberal/Country Party government on the one hand, 
or a Labor government on the other. Journalists, joined by Gorton himself 
late in the campaign, accused the A.L.P. of being "so ft"  on Communist 
China, willing to jeopardise future relations with the U.S., and ready to 
stop the inflow of foreign money for development. Although Labor policy,
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in real i ty,  was none of these things - the platform supported the 
continuation of the U.S. alliance, a more real ist ic approach to Communist 
China and greater caution in dealing with foreign investors - the party's 
stance was open to mis interpretation by those who feared that its lef t -  
wing members would support a pro-Communist and anit-American line in 
foreign policy.
Differences in party stances on censorship and immigration, although 
mentioned in Whitlam's and Gorton's policy speeches, respectively, were not 
taken up by the media during the campaign. As there was a clear difference 
in party policies towards censorship, with the Labor party advocating its 
abolition except for the protection of people from exposure to unsolicited 
material, i t  could not be assumed that censorship had ceased to be an 
issue purely because there was no visible public debate. The A.S.P. item 
on censorship was, therefore, included in the analysis with the proviso that 
later evidence might show i t  to have been of no relevance to members of the 
voting public.
Immigration was in a slightly different category. Its failure to 
emerge as a significant item of dispute in the nation-wide media campaign 
did not indicate that i t  was ignored at the local level. Every candidate 
competing for a seat with a significant migrant population could be relied 
upon to contrast his party's immigration policy favourably with that of his 
opposition. The difficulty with this issue was that i t  was hard to pin 
down, in an objective fashion, the difference in party policies. Gorton 
went on record in his election policy speech promising a continued expansion 
of the migrant intake. Although the Labor Party policy platform gave no 
hint of his intentions, Whitlam was known to favour a more selective approach 
to immigration from Southern Europe, together with a relaxation of some 
restrictions on Asian immigration. Conflict within the A.L.P. on this 
la t ter  point made i t  diff icul t  to assess how the public would have perceived 
Labor policy.
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Despite these discrepancies between the A.S.P. items and the 
issues which were the subject o f  publ ic debate at the time of the 1969 
e lec t ion ,  the Austral ian Survey Project has offered a unique opportunity 
to tes t  hypotheses which have been advanced in America and in B r i ta in  
about the nature of linkages between voter 's  opinions on po l icy issues and 
th e i r  vot ing decisions. Past attempts to study these l inks using Austral ian 
Gallup Poll data have been hampered by the res t r ic ted  nature o f  the
21questions asked in pol ls  designed fo r  quick release on the commercial market .
The advantage of the A.S.P. questionnaire l ies  in i t s  detai led study 
of the appl icat ion of a wide range of  variables to each ind iv idual respondent. 
Where Gallup Poll data can be used fo r  corre la t ing  broad movements in 
opinion with voting patterns and socio-demographic characte r is t ics  of the 
sample, the data from th is  project al low closer study of the variables which 
may underl ie voting decisions. In addit ion to socio-demographic variables, 
th is  study w i l l  make use of  information about respondents' in te res t  in 
p o l i t i c s ,  th e i r  knowledge of  party po l ic ie s ,  t h e i r  party id e n t i f i c a t io n  and 
th e i r  vot ing habits. Although the issue items selected fo r  analysis do not 
completely f i t  the conceptual framework of th is  thesis, they represent a 
necessary compromise with the exigencies of finance which plague any attempt 
to quant i fy  public opinion.
The Sample
The data fo r  th is  study comprise the responses of a representat ive 
sample of  1,873 Austral ian electors interviewed in th e i r  homes during 
November 1969. The interviews formed the second wave of  a two-part study 
of  the Austral ian electorate designed by D. A i tk in  and M. Kahan of the 
Austral ian National University  and commenced in 1967. Many of the respond-
21. M. Goot, o p .c i t .  made very e f fec t ive  use of a wide var ie ty  of 
Gallup Poll items to study opinions o f  Austral ian voters over 
a series o f  time in te rva ls .
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ents to the second wave were part of a panel which had already been
interviewed two years previously. A f u l l  analysis o f  the panel data has
been performed by A i tk in  and w i l l  appear in his S ta b i l i t y  and Change in
Austral ian P o l i t i c s , due fo r  publ icat ion shor t ly .
In order to ensure the select ion of a proport ionate number of
respondents from a l l  s ix  States and from both urban and rural areas in
each State, A i tk in  and Kahan used a s t r a t i f i e d  sampling technique which
22re l ied  upon random select ion w i th in  each stratum . Federal electora l
d iv is ions were the basic sampling units and the Commonwealth Electoral
Roll provided the sampling frame. 80 consti tuencies were selected to
provide approximately 2,000 interviews, a sample size considered large
enough to allow the study o f  small sub-groups w i th in  the main sample. The
primary stra ta  were the s ix  States, w i th in  which sub-strata were created
(the most common being a simple urban/rural dichotomy) to al low fo r
d iv e rs i t ie s  in the nature of  the population w i th in each State. Divisions
were chosen w i th in  each State in proportions which matched the actual
dif ferences in State populations. Within each d iv is ion ,  electors to be
interviewed were chosen by random select ion o f  names from the Commonwealth
Electoral Roll f o r  tha t  area. The compulsory nature o f  e lectora l enrolment
in Austra l ia  ensured that the Electoral Roll provided a near-accurate record
of  the ent i re  population o f  Austral ian voters. Adjustments were b u i l t  into
the sample design to take account of population movements which had occurred
since the las t  revision of  the Electoral Roll fo r  each d iv is ion  sampled.
The 1,873 interviews which were ac tua l ly  obtained during f i e l d  work
did consti tu te  a representat ive sample o f  the to ta l  population of Austral ian 
23voters . The demographic makeup of the sample was s u f f i c ie n t l y  close to
22. For a f u l l  descript ion of the sampling procedure, see M. Kahan and D. 
A i t k in ,  Drawing a Sample of the Austra l ian E lectorate , Occasional Paper 
No.3, Department o f  P o l i t i c a l  Science, RSSS, A.N.U., 1968.
23. For an analysis of  the v a l i d i t y  o f  the same, see Methodological Appendix 
in D. A i tk in ,  S ta b i l i t y  and Change in Austral ian P o l i t i c s , forthcoming.
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the Bureau of Census and Statis t ics '  estimates of Australia's adult 
population in 1969 for the survey's designers to have confidence in the 
representativeness of the sample. Whether the sample matched the 
population on a further criterion, that of voting behaviour at the 1969 
Federal election, was a matter of prime concern for this study. The 
distribution of votes amongst those respondents who reported the way they 
had voted in the previous month was, therefore, compared with a percentage 
breakdown of the actual votes recorded at the election:
TABLE 2.3 COMPARATIVE 1969 VOTING ESTIMATES
ASP Sample Total Australian Electorate
% %
Liberal Party 37.1 \ 34.8 \
Country Party
/
9.2 ) 8.6 )
Liberal/Country 46.3 43.4
Labor Party (A.L.P.) 46.1 47.0
D.L.P. 5.2 6.0
Other 2.4 3.7
N 1,873 6,114,118
As can be seen from the table, Liberal Party voters were over­
represented in the sample at the expense of D.L.P. and other party voters. 
The inaccurate representation of those who voted for the smaller parties 
was to be expected in sampling such a large population unless special 
provisions were made to ensure their  inclusion. Country Party voters, 
whose clustering in rural electorates had led Aitkin and Kahan to s trat ify  
the sample along an urban-rural dimension in each State, were, in fact, 
slightly over-represented in the sample.
As the numbers of respondents who voted for the smaller parties were
24. M. Mackerras, Australian General Elections, (Sydney 1972), p.221.
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too low for any reliable examination of their reasons for voting, this study 
will be restricted to those who voted for one or other of the major party 
groupings. Its re l iabil i ty  will therefore not be affected by the failure 
of the sample to include sufficient respondents in the D.L.P. and other 
categories. The major deficiency of the sample, which will need to be 
kept in mind throughout this analysis, is the over-representation of the 
Liberal Party. For this reason, the Labor Party voters will form the main 
focus of attention, where possible.
A further difficulty in analysing the behaviour of those respondents 
who voted for the Liberals, as well as those who supported the Country Party, 
lies in the two parties' coalition status. Although they existed as distinct 
parties in terms of their organisational structures (except in South 
Australia and Tasmania), the coalition between them extended to an agreement 
that, in most electorates, neither party would field candidates against 
s it t ing members of the other party. A result of this electoral co-operation 
was that some of the survey respondents recorded a Liberal vote in the 1969 
election where, in fact, the only non-Labor candidate standing for their 
constituency belong to the Country Party. Other answers, when examined in 
the course of coding the data, indicated that certain respondents regarded 
the Liberal and Country parties as interchangeable entit ies.
For these reasons, Aitkin and Kahan chose to combine the voting 
figures for the two parties into a joint Liberal/Country Party vote for 
the purposes of analysis. The same practice has been followed in this 
study, although some reservations about its  use need to be expressed as 
the characteristics of the two parties' blocs of voting support were by no 
means identical. Different issues were likely to have had different priori ties 
for rural and urban electors who voted for government candidates. Their 
opinions on the issues may also have varied systematically on the basis 
of an urban-rural distinction - a common hypothesis in Australian politics 
is that Country Party supporters are more conservative on foreign policy
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issues than their counterparts in the c it ies . In conceptual terms, the 
amalgamation of the two parties' supporters into a common group must be 
regarded as of dubious va lid ity . However, i t  has provided a way of 
compensating for the responses of an unknown number of voters who did not 
discriminate between the parties, which would otherwise have had to be 
classified as errors in the data.
A feature of the interview design which had implications for the 
accuracy of the data should be noted at this stage. In an e ffo r t  not to 
duplicate information, questions about re lig ion, education level, place of 
b ir th , membership of organisations, perceptions of class behaviour and 
parent's occupation were not asked of the panel respondents in 1969. The 
respondents' 1967 answers were incorporated in the data for the second wave, 
although the situations of some of the respondents might conceivably have 
altered in the intervening period. The practice should not have introduced 
any significant degree of error into the data to be analysed in this study 
except, possibly, with regard to one variable, that of education level.
As a ll respondents were at least 21 years of age, i t  was unlikely that 
there had been any variation in the ir education level between 1967 and 
1969, but the poss ib ili ty  of error should be kept in mind as some respondents 
have been undertaking part-time or fu ll- tim e mature-age studies.
Apart from sampling error, which seems l ike ly  to be minimal in view 
of the closeness with which the sample approximated the Australian electorate, 
other errors in the data may have arisen from inaccuracies in the coding of 
responses. As far as possible, coding errors were tracked down through 
random checking, or editing, at the stage of creating the data f i le  on the 
A.N.U. computer. Attempts were made to reduce the likelihood of interviewer 
bias through careful selection and training of f ie ld  s ta f f ,  but the possib il­
i ty  that some responses were affected by the interviewer's presentation could 
not be completely controlled. A certain level of bias and error within the 
data was to be expected in a sample survey of this size and complexity, and
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S ta t i s t i c a l  procedures have been designed which make allowances fo r  th is  
type of  er ror  in data analysis. Where necessary, results w i l l  be subjected 
to s ta t i s t i c a l  tests of s ign if icance in order to id e n t i f y  the degrees of 
confidence which can be attached to the r e l i a b i l i t y  of  the f ind ings.
Before proceeding to the main subject-matter o f  the thesis , which 
is the analysis o f  opinions on issues relevant to the 1969 Federal e lec t ion,  
i t  w i l l  be necessary to describe the socio-demographic makeup o f  the sample 
and to id e n t i f y  any s ig n i f ic a n t  re lat ionships which ex is t  between the 1969 
voting patterns o f  respondents and th e i r  education, occupation leve l ,  
age and sex.
The educational backgrounds of respondents ( incorporating 1967 data 
fo r  panel members) could be broken down into  three main categories, in 
the fol lowing proport ions:
TABLE 2.4 EDUCATIONAL LEVEL OF A.S.P. RESPONDENTS
%
None/Primary Level Only 527 28.1
Some Secondary/Completed Secondary 1209 64.5
Ter t ia ry /Un ivers i ty  123 6.6
No Answer 14 0.8
1873 100.0%
After  the el imination of  those respondents who fa i led  to answer
e i the r  question and those who supported smaller part ies in 1969, a
s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s ig n i f ic a n t  re la t ionsh ip  was id e n t i f ie d  between education
level and the l ike l ihood of vot ing fo r  Labor or fo r  the Liberal/Country
Party coa l i t ion  at the e lect ion.  As the fo l lowing table i l l u s t r a t e s ,
higher education was associated with an increasing tendency to vote
Liberal/Country Party. The re la t ionship  was s ig n i f ic a n t  at the 1%
25level and the cor re la t ion ,  as measured by Cramer's V, was moderately strong.
25. Cramer's V corre lat ion c o e f f i c ie n t  provides a measure of  the strength o f  
association between variables which are not necessari ly expressed in
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Lib/CP
Labor
TABLE 2.5 1969 VOTE x EDUCATION
None/Primary Secondary T e r t i a ry
39.3 54.3 55.6
60.7 45.7 44.4
100% 100% 100%
(471) (1066) (99)
Chi square with 2 degrees of  freedom = 30.8 p < .01
Cramer's  V = .14
The sample was evenly s p l i t  between those with w h i t e - c o l l a r  and
26those with b l u e - c o l l a r  jobs  - 48.7% could be c l a s s i f i e d  as " w h i te - c o l la r ” 
and 46.9% as " b lu e - c o l la r " . The more d e t a i l e d  occupational c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s  
were as fo llows:
TABLE 2.6 OCCUPATION OF A.S.P. RESPONDENTS
P ro fe s s io n a ls 168
%
9.0
Managers, sem i -p ro fe s s io n a ls 490 26.2
Off ice  and s a le s 253 13.5
S k i l l e d  workers 287 15.3
Sem i-sk i l led  workers 299 16.0
Unski l i e d  workers 292 15.6
No answer 84 4.4
1873 100.0%
25. (cont) continuous form. I t  has been used in t h i s  t h e s i s  as a summary 
s t a t i s t i c  fo r  a l l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  involv ing  1969 vo te ,  except in cases 
where the v a r i a b le  has had to  be assumed to be continuous (and re-coded 
in a 1-0 format) fo r  a n a l y t i c  purposes.  N.H. Nie, e t . a l .  , S t a t i s t i c a l  
Package fo r  the Social  Sciences (N.Y. ,  1970), p .224.
26. In a l l  cases of people not engaged in paid employment, the  respondent 
has been c l a s s i f i e d  according to the  occupat ion o f  Head o f  Household.
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When cross- tabulated with 1969 vote, a very strong re la t io n sh ip  was 
apparent between the two va r iab les ,  with members o f  lower status 
occupations inc reas ing ly  l i k e l y  to vote fo r  the A.L.P.
TABLE 2.7 1969 VOTE x OCCUPATION
Unski l ie d  
workers
Semi -
S k i l le d
workers
S k i l le d
workers
O f f ice  & 
Sal es
Managers^
Semi -
profess ionals
Professionals
L ib /
CP 35.9 34.2 39.8 58.0 64.1 69.0
Labor 64.1 65.8 60.2 42.0 35.9 31.0
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
(259) (275) (255) (219) (426) (142)
Chi square with  5 degrees o f  freedom = 118.6 p < .01
Cramer's V = .27
Men outnumbered women amongst the A.S.P. respondents, but the balance 
was s u f f i c i e n t l y  close to th a t  o f  the to ta l  populat ion fo r  A i t k in  to have 
confidence in the sample's respresenta t iveness. 52.1% (975) o f  the sample
was male and 47.9% (898) was female. The sex o f  respondents was re la ted  
to the d i re c t io n  in which they voted in 1969, w ith  women more l i k e l y  to 
support the L ibera l /Country  Party government:
TABLE 2.8 1969 VOTE x SEX
Lib/CP 
Labor
Corrected Chi square w ith  1 degree o f  freedom = 13.5 p < .01
Male Female
45.7 54.8
54.3 45.2
100% 100%
(852) (797)
Phi = .09
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age d is t r ib u t io n  of  the sample, in keeping with Australian
27f igures, was s l i g h t l y  skewed towards the younger age groups : 
TABLE 2.9 AGE DISTRIBUTION OF A.S.P. SAMPLE
21 - 23 years 175
%
9.3
24 - 35 " 418 22.3
36 - 45 " 404 21.6
46 - 55 " 344 18.4
56 - 75 " 378 20.2
76 - 95 " 63 3.4
No answer 91 4.8
1873 100.0%
There was no consistent re la t ionship  between age and voting behaviour 
in 1969. The Liberal/Country Party coa l i t io n  gained higher proportions of 
the vote than did Labor at the two extremes of  the age spectrum - both 
amongst the 21-23 year old f i r s t  voters, and amongst the 76-95 year olds. 
Apart from these two age groupings, however, there was no s ig n i f ic a n t  
var ia t ion in the voting patterns of respondents of d i f fe re n t  ages.
The re lat ionships observed between voting decisions in 1969 and the 
educational,  occupational and sexual makeup of  the A.S.P. sample were 
those which would be expected on the basis o f  e a r l ie r  studies of  the 
Austral ian electora te . More complex in te r - re la t ionsh ips  amongst these 
variables, and th e i r  associations with a t t i tudes towards publ ic pol icy 
issues w i l l  be traced in the course of  la te r  chapters. I t  has been the
The
population
27. The age groupings as outl ined here are not o f  an equal in terva l  size, 
but have been adapted to s u i t  special purposes o f  analysis. Figures 
in the table cannot, therefore, be used to produce a true frequency 
d is t r ib u t io n  of  the age var iable.  The 21-23 year age group has been 
kept separate in order to id e n t i f y  new voters in 1969. 20 year age
groupings have been used to c lass i fy  a l l  those respondents over 55, 
so that ce l l  sizes in la te r  cross-tabulat ions w i l l  be s u f f i c ie n t l y  large 
fo r  re l iab le  analysis.
47
in te n t io n ,  a t  th is  in t roduc to ry  stage, to provide only a pre l im inary  
descr ip t ion  o f  the sample w i th in  the context o f  the 1969 Federal e lec t ion  
and i t s  associated po l i c y  issues. Despite various p o s s ib i l i t i e s  fo r  e r ro r ,  
we can be conf ident th a t  the Austra l ian  Survey Pro ject data provided a 
r e l i a b le  p ic tu re  o f  the views held by a cross-sect ion o f  the Austra l ian  
e lec to ra te  in 1969.
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CHAPTER 3
ELECTORAL OPINIONS AND PARTY POLICIES
The A.S.P. survey has provided a large body of data which purport 
to measure the opinions of Australian voters on a range of policy issues 
in 1969. Before analysing this data, however, i t  would be as well to 
take heed of earlier researchers' findings which point to the complexities 
in the nature of electoral opinion and the consequent d i f f ic u l t ie s  in 
measurement.
The enormous d i f f ic u l t ie s  confronting the objective study of 
public opinion have for long been recognised both amongst academic 
researchers and the professional pollsters. Studies of the electorate 
in it ia ted  in the 1950's in the United States and taken up more recently 
in Great Britain clearly revealed the tenuous nature of voters' policy 
preferences and the restr ic tion of information about po li t ica l issues 
to a narrow sector of the electorate. In response to suggestions that 
surveys may be measuring a non-existent 'public opinion', the ir designers 
incorporated into the questionnaires various devices to ensure that 
respondents actually possessed some information on which to base their 
attitudes. The professional opinion poll organizations, however, being 
sensitive to the money needed for such refinements, have largely 
contented themselves with the simplest and most blunt instrument of 
opinion measurement, the fixed choice question offering two or three 
alternatives.
Figures currently available on the extent of information on 
po lit ica l issues in Australia and the degree of voter involvement in 
public a ffa irs  suggest that any accurate assessment of opinion levels 
or trends in opinion over time would be as d i f f ic u l t  an undertaking for 
the Australian electorate as i t  has proved to be overseas. Although 
a substantial proportion of voters claim to follow po lit ics  in the 
newspapers or on television (41% of a Brisbane sample read po lit ica l
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news in the press every day and 30% fol lowed p o l i t i c s  in the same way
on radio and television'* ') , the general level of p o l i t i c a l  information has
remained low. Pol icy issues receive th e i r  greatest exposure through the
media at elect ion time, but the contending p o l i t i c ia n s  cannot be sure
whether the voters as a whole have absorbed the information or whether
they have any real concern with the issues being debated. The inadequacy
of media p u b l ic i t y  i t s e l f  as an ind ica tor  of public f a m i l i a r i t y  with an
issue is  underlined by the fac t  that only 27% of the sample c ited above
admitted to paying 'much a t ten t ion '  to campaigns during State or Federal 
2
elect ions , times when i t  might reasonably be expected that levels of  
p o l i t i c a l  information would be at th e i r  highest.
I f  we are to speak of opinion on issues of publ ic po l icy as a 
variable in the voters'  decision-making at the po l ls ,  we must be 
confident that voters can associate p o l i t i c a l  part ies with the issues.
Yet i t  is  by no means certa in that issue stances form a common component 
o f  the e lec tora te 's  image of the part ies in Austra l ia .  An in d i re c t  
measure of th is  was obtained from the Austral ian Survey Project by 
analysing the l ikes and d is l ikes  of respondents in re la t ion  to the two 
main part ies. Approximately a th i rd  of these responses could be said to 
have had some issue content:
TABLE 3.1 IMAGES OF POLITICAL PARTIES
RESPONSES TO 
PARTIES
% WHO MENTIONED % WHO MENTIONED
FOREIGN POLICY DOMESTIC POLICY TOTAL N
ISSUES ISSUES
Pro-Liberal 15.1% 16.1% 31.2% 1,373
Anti -L iberal 11.2 25.9 37.1 1,817
Pro-Labor 7.0 27.8 34.8 1,653
Anti-Labor 19.7 8.8 28.5 1,703
1. J.S. Western and P.R. Wilson, " P o l i t i c s :  Par t ic ipat ion and A t t i tudes" ,
in H. Mayer and H. Nelson (eds), Austra l ian P o l i t i c s :  a Third Reader
(Melbourne, 1973), p. 319.
2. ibid. ,  p .319.
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These figures do provide some support for the contention that the
Liberals in 1969 were unpopular for their domestic policies (or lack of
them) and that Labor was disliked for i ts  foreign policies, but liked
for i ts  domestic policies. They do indicate that some members of the
electorate judged the parties in terms of their policy stances, but we
have no knowledge of the proportion of the electorate to which this
applied as the total number of responses, in each case, included up to
3
five likes and dislikes from each respondent . The remaining replies 
covered a variety of popular and unpopular features of the parties, with 
categories such as " management o f  government" , "people in  the p a rty", 
"philosophy and goals" and group-related or party-related responses 
receiving as much overall coverage as policy issues.
The coding of actual survey responses into broad, summary 
categories for ease of analysis hides the variety in the levels at 
which people perceive policy issues. For the politician intent on 
communicating with as broad a sector of the population as possible, this 
variation in the level of conceptualization must pose immense problems.
It is yet another factor which hinders the study of "public opinion". 
Research carried out under the auspices of the University of Michigan in 
the mid-1950's gave some indication of the different levels at which 
people verbalise their opinions. Campbell and his associates isolated 
at least four levels of conceptualization in voters' assessments of the 
political parties in the United States^:
A. evaluations which contained abstract conceptions associated 
with ideology
B. evaluations in terms of concrete, short-term group interests
C. simplistic associations between 'goodness' and 'badness' of 
the times and the party in power
3. In fact, the total number of responses recorded for each of the four 
questions in no case reached the total sample size of 1873 (see Table 
3.1). Although some respondents may have given multiple replies, 
large numbers did not.
4. Campbell, o p .c i t . ,  pp.222-3.
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D. evaluations "w ithou t recourse to  is su e s  th a t  m ight f a i r l y  
he r e la te d  to  deba tes over dom estic  p u b lic  p o lic y " .
(Campbell's examples - observations on mud-slinging, graft,  
or personal characteristics of candidates).
Campbell and his colleagues noted that differences in the level of
conceptualization occurred with education and with motivation to involve
oneself in political activity. Although they acknowledged the existence
of many environmental barriers to the acquisition of political information,
the researchers concluded that there were certain "c o g n itiv e  l im i ta t io n s "
5which affected the mode of political thought of many voters .
It is not the subject matter of this thesis to investigate the 
differential cognitive capacities of individuals, but we can take up the 
point of the barriers which confront electors in the acquisition of 
knowledge about political issues. This was the approach taken by Converse 
and others in another University of Michigan study conducted in 1968 .^
The authors, understandably, preferred to treat the low levels of 
political information in the electorate as stemming from the high costs 
involved in acquiring this type of knowledge, rather than implying that 
the mass electorate in the United States suffered "inna te  and hence 
in c o r r ig ib le  c o g n itiv e  d e f ic ie n c ie s '^  .
Where a voter rarely sees the stakes involved as very high (he may 
not care about the outcome of an election; see l i t t l e  difference 
between the contending parties or candidates; or expect his single vote 
to have l i t t l e  influence) the costs involved to him in obtaining relevant 
information may be prohibitive. Although the media may be saturated with 
political material which has a high issue content during election time, 
inattention is likely to be less costly to the voter, unless the
5. i b i d . , p.253
6. P.E. Converse, et a l . "Continuity and Change in American Politics: 
Parties and Issues in the 1968 Election", American Political Science 
Review, 63 (1969), p.1099.
7. i b i d . ,  p.1099
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communication also provides him with entertainment, either as a function 
of the communication i t se l f ,  or as a result  of some intrinsic motivation 
to acquire political knowledge. In a discussion of rationality in voting 
behaviour, Downs defended the sometimes totally uninformed status of some 
voters as a rational division of labour stemming from their delegation of
o
part or all of their political decision-making to others . Downs was of 
the opinion that voters would only pay the costs involved in acquiring 
political information if  they expected i t  to change their party loyalty -
the more a voter favoured one party over another the less likely he would
9
be to make the effort  to acquire new political knowledge .
A probable result  of the low levels of information voters are 
motivated to acquire as a basis for formulating opinions, is the tenuous 
nature of the electorate's policy preferences over a period of time.
Butler and Stokes' work in Great Britain has demonstrated the way overall 
measurements of opinion distribution may camouflage considerable fluidity 
in individual's opinions.^ On an issue that had been the centre of 
political controversy over a generation, the nationalization of British 
industry, surveys conducted in 1963, 1964 and 1966 showed apparently 
stable levels of opinion. Yet when individual responses were examined, 
i t  was clear that the overall figures had masked a considerable turnover 
of voters' opinion in the three year period.
More significant evidence on the tenuous nature of public 
attitudes was provided by the same researchers on the issue of Britain's 
nuclear weapons policy, again from interviews conducted in 1963, 1964 
and 1966. By comparing the changing correlations between voters'  opinions 
in the two pairs of closer interviews (1963-4 and 1964-6) with the changing
8. Downs, op .c i t .  , p.221
9. i b id . ,  p.243
10. Butler and Stokes, o p . c i t , p.222
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correlations in the more distant pair of interviews in 1963 and 1966, 
Butler and Stokes showed that the fluidity in opinions could not add up 
to any meaningful pattern of cumulative attitude change. A "s u b s ta n tia l  
sh o rt-ru n  r e s h u f f l in g  o f  view s had fa i l e d  to  y ie ld  the  longer-run  
movement o f  in d iv id u a l p o s i t io n ” which might have been expected from the 
overall f igures^.
The preceding discussion has demonstrated both the ephemeral 
qualities of "pub lic  o p in io n ", and the difficult ies encountered in i ts 
study. No matter how blunt an instrument, however, the sample survey 
remains the only tool for studying the opinions of the electorate on a 
large scale. Despite the dif f icul t ies ,  opinion polls have continued to 
provide broad indications of the state of electoral opinion, with varied 
success in the accuracy of their predictions.
The tools themselves can be refined through various methodological 
devices. Some survey researchers have attempted to avoid measuring a 
nonexistent opinion by f i r s t  asking their respondents whether they have 
"heard or read a b o u t "  the issue concerned; others ask for opinions in an 
open-ended format, so that i t  can readily be seen whether the respondent 
was, in fact,  familiar with the subject. In allowing the greatest 
freedom for the respondent, the lat ter  is the preferable method, but is 
has the disadvantage of producing data which are time-consuming, and thus 
expensive, to process and which are susceptible to variations in 
interpretation.
A measure most recently used to assess opinion is based on the 
presumption that a basic minimum of knowledge of a subject is necessary 
before an opinion can be considered valid - in addition to giving his 
opinion, the respondent is asked to nominate the government's stance on 
the issue. This approach runs the risk of confusing two separate 
concepts, " in fo rm a tio n "  and "op in ion". Although some basic knowledge is
11. i b id . , pp.225-227.
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necessary in order to formulate an opinion, the requisite amount and
12nature of this information is infinitely arguable
A further method for refining the measurement of opinion consists 
of incorporating answers to fixed-alternative opinion items with self- 
assessments of the importance of the issue concerned to the respondent. 
This, too, has i ts problems as the perceived importance (salience) of an 
issue is,  in real i ty,  a separate dimension on which the issue can be 
classified rather than a measure of the validity of the respondent's 
opinion.
Except in one instance, the items on the Vietnam War, the A.S.P. 
survey did not make use of any of these refinements. Its designers, 
however, did attempt to provide a greater range of alternatives on most 
of the issue questions than the Australian Gallup Poll, the only 
professional organization carrying out large-scale opinion surveys at the 
time. The eight issue items chosen for analysis here from the A.S.P. 
questionnaire were all fixed-choice questions, the number of alternatives 
available ranging from five on migration to only two on censorship and 
Communist China. The questions were arranged so as to provide a 
graduated series of alternative opinions from which respondents could 
choose the one closest to their own views. This gradation was not 
validated as an attitude scale for any item, however, and there is no 
guarantee that the alternatives were equidistant from each other in 
relation to any underlying common dimension.
The Vietnam War
Presented with four alternative opinions on the desirable extent 
of Australian troop commitment in the Vietnam War, the survey's 
respondents answered in the following manner:
12. See R.E. Lane and D.O. Sears, Public Opinion (Englewood Cliffs,
New Jersey, 1964), Chapter 6 for survey evidence that opinions can 
exist without supporting information and for a discussion of the 
interactive processes linking opinion-formation and factual knowledge.
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TABLE 3.2 ATTITUDES TOWARDS VIETNAM
%
442 23.6
813 43.4
233 12.4
335 17.9
50 2.7
1,873 100.0%
The actual s i tua t ion  in November 1969 was represented by (A), 
which was Liberal/Country Party pol icy at the time. Labor's o f f i c i a l  
po l icy  cal led fo r  the withdrawal of troops, with the p o s s ib i l i t y  of 
re ta in ing c i v i l i a n  experts in Vietnam to provide " medical, economic and 
technical assistance"^. However, most Labor spokesmen,(part icularly 
those who wished to move th e i r  party 's  pol icy on Vietnam in a more radical 
d i rec t ion )  and media commentators described Labor's stance in terms of 
"staying out of Vietnam altogether" .
FIGURE 3.1 DISTRIBUTION OF OPINIONS ON THE VIETNAM WAR
(A) We should have troops f ig h t in g  in 
Vietnam, including conscripts
(B) We should have troops in Vietnam, 
but only volunteers
(C) We shouldn't  have any troops in Vietnam, 
and only send c i v i l i a n  experts
(D) We should stay out of Vietnam altogether 
Don't know; no answer
13. Austral ian Labor Party, O f f i c ia l  Reports of the 27th and 28th 
Commonwealth Conferences, 1967 and 1969, p.72.
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Although the results showed a substantial body of opinion in 
favour of total disengagement from the Vietnam War, the commitment of some 
Australian troops was clearly the opinion of a majority of the sample 
(67% chose (A) or (B)). The frequency distribution in Figure 3.1 
displays a marked skew towards the involvement of troops in the war.
The large proportion of respondents (43.4%) who chose alternative
(B), the use of volunteer troops only in Vietnam, suggests that the
survey may, in addition, have been tapping opinions on another related
issue, the use of conscripts for overseas service. The results of
earl ier  surveys of the Australian electorate have indicated the existence
of a strand of opinion which objected, not to the general question of
involvement in the Vietnam war or to conscription i t se l f ,  but to the use
of national servicemen in Vietnam. H.S. Albinski reported that the
majority approval for the involvement of combat troops registered in polls
taken before the stationing of conscripts in Vietnam was nearly reversed
when the Gallup Poll asked in 1966 and 1967 whether the public approved of
the decision to involve conscripts in the war^. On the subject of
conscription, J.S. Western and P.R. Wilson found that a favourable
attitude towards national service amongst a small sample of Canberra
voters did not necessarily imply approval of the government's policy of
15sending troops (including conscripts) to Vietnam .
Whatever the reasons for the popularity of alternative (B), we 
are faced with a situation where nearly half of the sample supported an 
option which did not correspond with the policy of any major political 
party in 1969. Whether respondents were aware of this lack of 
correspondence will be dealt with in a later chapter. It suffices to say 
at the moment that the A.S.P. results do not appear to indicate a sharp
14. H.S. Albinski, Politics and Foreign Policy in Australia (Durham,
North Carolina, 1970), p .195.
15. J.S. Western and P.R. Wilson, "Attitudes to Conscription", Pol i t i cs , 
II, 1 (1967) pp. 48-56.
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polarization of views within the electorate on the question of troop 
commitment in Vietnam. Although there were substantial numbers of 
people in favour of the two most extreme alternatives, who may have held 
these views with great intensity (see Chapter 4), the bulk of respondents 
opted for the middle ground. The overall distribution of opinion was 
clearly biased in favour of some degree of troop involvement, but the 
significance of this skew in terms of electoral support for party 
policies cannot be estimated until we know how the respondents perceived 
the parties' stances.
The only other measure of Australian opinion towards Vietnam 
taken at approximately the same time in 1969 which is readily available 
is that of the Gallup Poll. Presented with only two choices, to continue 
fighting in Vietnam or to bring the forces back, the Gallup Poll 
respondents appeared to take a more radical stance than their ASP 
counterparts. According to the Gallup figures of October 1969, 50.9% 
of the electorate opted for bringing the forces home and only 39.4% wanted 
to continue fighting (see Table 3.3). It is notable that a much higher 
proportion confessed to being undecided in this poll, with two 
alternatives available^than had chosen not to give an answer or said they 
didn't know in answer to the ASP survey which had offered four choices.
The discrepancy in the two surveys may be entirely a result of the 
different form of questioning. Previous research by psychologists and 
sociologists has shown that answers to attitude surveys are notoriously 
susceptible to variation according to changes in the level of specificity 
of the question, the number of alternatives offered, etc. For this 
reason, the results of the two surveys are not s t r ic t ly  comparable.
The work of the Gallup Poll organisation is useful, however, as 
i t  can add a time dimension to our knowledge of the electorate's  opinions 
on the Vietnam War. In the twelve month period preceding the October 1969 
Federal election, the Gallup Poll had conducted five surveys offering its
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respondents virtually the same alternatives towards Vietnam on each 
occasion. Although Butler and Stokes' British findings caution us against 
being too confident of the individual movements in opinion behind overall 
measurements of change, the following table shows the f i r s t  signs of a 
collective change in opinion within the Australian electorate:
TABLE 3.3 OPINIONS ON VIETNAM AS MEASURED BY GALLUP POLLS
Oct. 1968 Dec. 1968 April 1969 Aug. 1969 Oct. 1969
N 2706 1580 2092 1964 2580
Continue to 
fight in 
Vietnam
54.4 49.0 48.1 39.7 39.4
Bring forces 
back 37.5 37.2 40.0 54.8 50.9
Undecided 8.1 13.8 12.0 5.5 9.7
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Weighted N 6134 6153 6152 6319 6318
The table shows a decrease in support for the continuation of 
fighting in the period December 1968 to April 1969, with an increase in 
the numbers who were undecided on the question rather than any strong 
movement of opinion towards troop withdrawal. By August 1969, the 
indecision appeared to have crystallized into a majority opinion in favour 
of bringing the troops home, for the f i r s t  time since Menzies' commitment 
of troops in Vietnam in 1965. The figures suggest a slight backtracking 
from this position by the time of the elections in October.
That we should be wary of making a hasty conclusion that half of 
the electorate had come to favour Labor policy by August 1969, however, 
is clear from the results of the ASP survey which showed that divisions 
in opinion were by no means as clear-cut as they may have seemed from the 
Gal 1 up Pol 1.
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Conscription
The four p o s s ib i l i t i e s  on conscript ion offered by the ASP 
questionnaire were answered as fol lows:
TABLE 3.4 OPINIONS ON CONSCRIPTION
(A) We should have conscript ion fo r  m i l i t a r y  
service and i t  should be fo r  a l l  young men,
not ju s t  some 765
(B) The present system of the ba l lo t  fo r
conscript ion should be continued 132
(C) We should have conscript ion, but those 
who are opposed to f igh t ing  should be 
allowed to do th e i r  national service
in other ways 617
(D) We shouldn't  have any form of  conscript ion
at a l 1 316
%
40.8%
7.0%
32.9%
16.9%
Don't know; no answer 43 2.3%
1,873 100.0%
Government and opposit ion po l ic ies  in 1969 were c lea r ly  included
in th is  range of a l te rna t ives .  Liberal/Country Party pol icy was to
continue the exist ing system of a ba l lo t  fo r  national service; wh i ls t
A.L.P. po l icy  was to abol ish conscript ion,  except in the case of "a
16threatened attack on Australia and her overseas territories” .
FIGURE 3.2 DISTRIBUTION OF OPINIONS ON CONSCRIPTION
(O') ( f t ' s  ( c )  C o )
16. A.L.P. op.cit. , p.214.
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As is readily apparent from the frequency distribution in 
Figure 3.2, opinions on this issue were almost equally divided between 
those who favoured conscription for all young men and those who opted for 
the provision of civilian alternatives. There was clearly a great deal 
of disagreement amongst those who were of the opinion that conscription, 
in some form, should be retained. Taken together, these respondents 
comprised a massive 80.7% of the sample.
The lack of agreement registered by the ASP survey as to the most 
desirable form of conscription provides an i l lustrat ion of the pi t fal ls  
which can be encountered in attempting to measure opinion. If respondents 
had been presented with only the two alternatives of retaining or 
abolishing national service, and if  we could assume that they would have 
answered in approximately the same manner as they have done here (which 
is not necessarily valid, as the change in the form of questioning alone 
might lead to a different result ) ,  then we would gain the impression of an 
overwhelming support in the sample for the continuation of conscription.
In a situation where the Liberal/Country Parties and Labor were advancing 
diametrically opposed policies, the former wanting to retain national 
service (with selection by ballot) and the lat ter  seeking i ts  abolition, 
i t  would be but a short step to interpreting such a result as a 
demonstration of strong electoral support for the government on this 
issue. Yet, provided with the option of continuing the present ballot 
system of conscription, only 7.0% of the ASP sample actually proffered an 
opinion which was in line with government policy.
The ASP results appear to indicate scant support in the electorate 
for either the government or the opposition stance on conscription in 
1969. It  is unfortunate that the questionnaire does not provide an 
opportunity for us to see whether the 1,382 (73.7%) respondents who chose 
alternatives (A) or (C) were aware of the discrepancy between their views 
and those of the political parties.
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As was the case with the Vietnam War, Gallup Polls conducted at 
approximately the same time as the ASP survey showed voters as being 
more radical in their approach to conscription:
TABLE 3.5 OPINIONS ON CONSCRIPTION AS SHOWN BY GALLUP POLLS
Aug. 1969 Oct. 1969
N 2106 2527
Continue conscription 63.3 57.6
End conscription 31.9 32.4
Undecided 4.8 10,0
100.0% 100.0%
Weighted N 6319 6318
Although we can make no direct comparisons between these figures 
and the ASP results, the distribution of opinion registered by the 
Gallup Polls was not sufficiently different to be of great concern.
The apparently greater support for ending conscription may well have been 
substantially reduced if respondents had been offered a number of 
alternative forms of national service from which to choose.
A comparison between the August and October Gallup Poll figures 
shows little overall change in the levels of support for and opposition 
to conscription in the months immediately preceding the Federal election. 
This apparent stability may, however, mask considerable fluidity in 
individual opinions, especially as the October poll registered a substantial 
increase in the numbers who were undecided on the issue.
United States - Australian Alliance
The ASP question on the relations between Australia and the U.S. 
was worded as follows:
"Do you think Australia's links with the United States should 
be very close3 fairly close3 or not very close?"
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This item was not very satisfactory as a measure of opinion because i t  
required a subjective estimation of variations in 'closeness' which was 
likely to differ for each respondent. Also, the three alternatives were 
not particularly meaningful in terms of party policies in 1969. Most 
political discussion on the subject had been linked to such concrete 
features of the alliance as joint participation in the Vietnam conflict,  
the ANZUS treaty, U.S. defence bases on Australian soil and the inflow 
of American capital. There had been considerable debate between the 
parties and within the Labor party over the nature of the alliance in 
these terms, and i t  is possible that the electorate had gained an 
impression of one party favouring closer t ies with the U.S. from this 
debate, even though there was very l i t t l e  difference spelt out in the 
official party policies. Making a subjective judgement here (which would 
not necessarily have been shared by the question's respondents), I would 
choose the Liberal/Country Party views as being most nearly represented 
by the 'very close' category, whilst Labor's position varied between 
' fai r ly close' and 'not very close' ,  the lat ter  being favoured by the 
more radical members of the party.
The question was answered in the following manner:
TABLE 3.6 OPINIONS ON CLOSENESS OF LINKS WITH THE U.S.
Very close 1 inks 829 44.3%
Fairly close 1 inks 843 45.0%
Not very close 1 inks 171 9.1%
Don't know; no answer 30 1.6%
1,873 100 . 0%
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FIGURE 3.3 DISTRIBUTION OF OPINIONS ON THE U.S. ALLIANCE
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Although the disadvantages  in the wording of  t h i s  item made i t  a 
very blunt  ins t rument  for  measuring op in ion ,  the r e s u l t s  were such as to 
l eave  l i t t l e  doubt over the popu l a r i t y  of a c lose  a l l i a n c e  with the 
United S t a t e s .  With only 9.1% of  the sample opt ing for  ' no t  very c l o se '  
l i n k s ,  the f requency d i s t r i b u t i o n  in Figure 3.3 i s  c l e a r l y  skewed towards 
the ' c l o s e r '  end of  the spectrum.
Communist China
The survey veered s l i g h t l y  away from cur r en t  i s sues  o f  p o l i t i c a l  
debate  in i t s  i tem on Communist China,  which was prefaced with a r eques t  
t h a t  respondents  should t r y  and envisage a fu tu r e  s i t u a t i o n .  Only two 
a l t e r n a t i v e  opinions  were provided from which to choose:
1. Au s t r a l i a  wi l l  have a l o t  to worry about in regard to 
Communist China
2. China probably won' t  be much of  a problem fo r  us
I t  i s  most l i k e l y  t h a t  the  survey ' s  des igner s  were a t t empt ing to tap 
a t t i t u d e s  towards the 'Red s ca re '  which had occupied such a cen t r a l  place 
in d i s cus s i ons  of  Aus t r a l i an  fore ign  pol i cy  in the  1950' s and 60 ' s  wi thout  
using the emotive words and phrases  which had come to be a s soc i a t ed  with 
the idea of  a Communist t h r e a t  from the  nor th.  As such,  t h i s  item can 
only be taken as an i n d i c a t o r  of  respondents '  general  a t t i t u d i n a l  
o r i e n t a t i o n s  to Communist China,  and not as a measure of opinion on a 
pol i cy  i s sue .  The ques t i on  of  d ip lomat ic  r ecogn i t i on  of  the Peking
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government by Australia, although official  Labor policy in 1969, had not 
received much public airing by the time of the Federal election.
Although not an accurate representation of party policy differences 
towards Communist China, the two alternatives could be said to correspond 
roughly with the parties'  differing assessments of the Republic's future 
position in relation to Australia. It was clear from the government's 
commitment to fight in Vietnam and i ts  fear of a spreading Communist 
influence throughout South East Asia that China loomed as a present and 
future problem in Liberal/Country Party calculations. As a socialist  
party with a trade union base, the A.L.P. was commonly regarded as being 
'softer on Communism' than the government. Labor's spokesmen denied 
the validity of the domino theory in S.E. Asia and did not see Communist 
China as posing a future threat to Australia. The party supported this 
attitude through i ts  policy of extending diplomatic recognition to the 
People's Republic of China.
Answers to the question were distributed as follows:
TABLE 3.7 ATTITUDES TO COMMUNIST CHINA
%
China will give us a lot to worry about 992 53.0
China will not be a problem 642 34.3
Don't know; no answer 239 12.7
1,873 100.00%
A majority of respondents did not appear to share the Labor Party's 
optimism, with 53% of the sample saying they thought Communist China 
would give Australia 'a lot to worry about' in the future.
The high proportion of 'Don't know's recorded in answer to this 
question (12.7% was the highest for all the issue items analysed here), 
together with the restricted number of alternatives available, should 
caution us against placing too much reliance on the rel iabi l i ty  of the
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results as an estimate of electoral opinion. It is highly probable that
a much larger segment of the sample had no firm attitude towards
Communist China, but opted for one of the two alternatives rather than
appear undecided or ignorant. This tendency to over-estimate the
existence of an opinion could also have applied with the issue items
previously analysed, but is more likely in a situation where the
respondents had only to make a single choice between two very general
statements. That opinion on this matter had not crystallised is hardly
surprising when we recall that the questionnaire had asked respondents
to "look into the future". The Gallup Poll conducted in April 1969 also
found a very high proportion of its sample was undecided about Communist
China (20.7%), but this was in answer to a more specific question about
17Australian recognition of Peking.
Foreign Investment
Again, with the item on foreign investment, the ASP questionnaire 
asked respondents to "think about the future" in answering the question. 
Two very general statements on Australian attitudes towards would-be 
foreign investors were offered, together with an "it depends" category 
for those who were uncertain. The alternatives, and the responses they 
evoked, were as follows:
TABLE 3.8 OPINIONS ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT
%
1. Australia needs to be on its guard against
foreign investors 1,130 60.3
We should welcome anyone who wants to 
invest in Australia 460 24.6
It depends 218 11.6
Don't know; no answer 65 3.5
1,873 100.0%
17. Australian Gallup Poll, April 18th 1969.
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In view of  the very broad na ture  of  the two opposing s ta t ements  
o f f e r e d ,  i t  i s  hardly su rp r i s i ng  t h a t  11.6% of  the sample opted fo r  
" i t  depends". I t  i s  impossible  to know in what propor t ions  t h i s  group 
was divided between those for  whom the a v a i l ab l e  a l t e r n a t i v e s  were too 
s i m p l i s t i c  and those who simply could not  make up t h e i r  minds on the 
ques t i on .  I f  the l a t t e r  predominated,  t he re  was l i k e l y  to have been 
cons ide rab l e  over lap  between the " it  depends" category and the  "don't 
know"s.
This i s  again a quest ion where the opt ions  a v a i l a b l e  did not 
correspond c lo se ly  with actual  par ty  p o l i c i e s .  Both the Libera l /Count ry  
Par ty c o a l i t i o n  and the A.L.P.  o f f i c i a l l y  'welcomed'  fo re ign  investment  
to aid in the development of  A u s t r a l i a ' s  r e sources .  The p a r t i e s '  
general  a t t i t u d e s  were by no means i d e n t i c a l ,  however, as Labor spokesmen 
had been prominent  in c a l l i n g  fo r  g r e a t e r  r e s t r i c t i o n s  to be placed on 
the f inanc ing  of p r o j e c t s  using fore ign  c a p i t a l .  The oppos i t ion  had been 
c r i t i c a l  of  ventures  which appeared to be exp l o i t i ng  the c ou n t ry ' s  
na tura l  resources  and s iphon ing-o f f  p r o f i t s  over seas ,  wi thout  ensur ing 
the p a r t i c i p a t i o n  of  Aus t r a l i an  e n t e r p r i s e .  In view of  t h i s ,  Labor may 
have pro j ec t ed  an image of h o s t i l i t y  towards fore ign  investment  to the 
e l e c t o r a t e ,  a l though t h i s  would not be an accura te  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of  
pa r ty  pol i cy .
FIGURE 3.4 DISTRIBUTION OF OPINIONS ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT
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As is i l l u s t ra te d  by the frequency d is t r ib u t io n  in Figure 3.4, a 
large major i ty  of the sample (60.3%) agreed that Austra l ia needed to be 
"on its guard against foreign investors". For many respondents th is  
choice may have been an expression of p a t r io t i c  fee l ing or even 
ethnocentric prejudice, rather than a considered opinion on the merits 
of foreign investment. The nature and phrasing of the question would 
ce r ta in ly  have encouraged an emotional response.
A more spec i f ic ,  po l icy-oriented question asked by the Gallup Poll 
e a r l ie r  in the year produced an even more decisive resu l t .  Asked, "When 
international companies establish big new projects in Australia should
they be allowed to do it on their own3 or only if Australians may 
participate?" , the p o l l ' s  subjects repl ied as fol lows:
TABLE 3.9 OPINIONS ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT ACCORDING TO GALLUP POLL
N
Gallup Poll 
June 1969
2106
Only with Austral ian
par t ic ipa t ion 87.2%
On th e i r  own 9.7%
Undecided 3.1%
Weighted N
100 .ox
6318
The resu l ts  of both surveys suggest that feel ings of  national 
pride formed a component of electoral  opinion on the issue of foreign 
investment in 1969. Both part ies stood to gain from such sentiments as 
Prime Minister Gorton, as well as the Labor opposit ion, had endeavoured 
to establ ish a more independent, n a t io n a l is t i c  approach to Aus tra l ia 's  
defence and foreign re la t ions since taking up o f f ic e  in 1968.
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Migra t ion
Respondents  chose from f i v e  a l t e r n a t i v e s  on m i g r a t i on :
TABLE 3.10 ATTITUDES TOWARDS ASIAN MIGRATION
(A) Asians  should be a l lowed to e n t e r  A u s t r a l i a  
as mi g r an t s  j u s t  l i k e  people  o f  European 
descen t 431
(B) There should be a small  quota  o f  Asian 
mi gran t s 778
(C) Asians  should not  be a l lowed to e n t e r  
A u s t r a l i a  as mi g ran t s 88
(D) We should only  a l l ow people  from B r i t a i n  and 
no r th e r n  Europe to e n t e r  A u s t r a l i a  as  mi gran t s 310
(E) We should not  have any more mi g r an t s  a t  the  
p r e s e n t  t ime 203
Don ' t  know; no answer 63
%
23.0
41.5 
4.7
16.6
10.8
3.4
1,873 1 00 . OX
C l e a r l y ,  t he  q u e s t i o n  was p r i m a r i l y  d i r e c t e d  a t  a s c e r t a i n i n g  
p e o p l e ' s  a t t i t u d e s  towards  a "w hite  A u s t r a l i a Government p o l i c y  in 
1969 al lowed f o r  t h e  i n t a k e  o f  a small  quota  o f  Asian mi gr an t s  under  
more r e s t r i c t i v e  c o n d i t i o n s  o f  e n t r y  than were a p p l i e d  to Europeans.
The A . L . P . ' s  p o s i t i o n  was not  so c l e a r .  O f f i c i a l  p a r t y  p o l i c y  was 
d e l i b e r a t e l y  vague and avoided any ment ion of  r ac e .  I t  suppor t ed  "a 
vigorous and expanding im m igration programme a d m in is te red  w ith  sympathy3 
understand ing  and to le r a n c e "; one o f  t he  bases  of  the  p o l i c y ,  however,  
being " The avoidance o f  the  d i f f i c u l t  s o c ia l  and economic problems which 
may fo llo w  from an in f lu x  o f  peop les having d i f f e r e n t  standards o f  l i v in g , 
tr a d i t io n s  and c u l tu r e s " . ^
At l e a s t  t h r e e  o t h e r  s t r a n d s  o f  op in i on  had found suppo r t  w i t h i n  
t he  p a r t y  from t ime to t ime - t h a t  Asians  should be t r e a t e d  in t he  same 
way as a l l  o t h e r  i n t e n d in g  m i g r a n t s ;  t h a t  no co l oured  people  should be 
al lowed to s e t t l e  in A u s t r a l i a ;  and t h a t  t he  government  should br ing  a
18. A u s t r a l i a n  Labor P a r t y ,  P l a t f o r m,  C o n s t i t u t i o n  and R u l e s , 1969,  p .25 .
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to ta l  h a l t  to migra t ion .  In t h i s  s i tu a t io n  i t  is  d i f f i c u l t  to i d e n t i f y  
any one o f  the above a l t e rn a t i v e s  as Labor p o l i c y ,  although i t  is  
probable tha t  (B) would most c lose ly  approximate the p a r ty 's  o f f i c i a l  
pos i t ion .
FIGURE 3.5 DISTRIBUTION OF OPINIONS ON MIGRATION
The most popular op in ion ,  favoured by 41.5% o f  the survey's 
respondents was tha t  a small quota o f  Asians should be allowed to s e t t l e  
in A u s t ra l ia ;  a po l icy  which was, in f a c t ,  being implemented by the 
L ibera l /Country  Party government a t the time. 23.0% admitted to the more 
l i b e ra l  opinion tha t  Asians should be allowed to migrate in  the same way 
as Europeans. Only a very small proport ion o f  the to ta l  sample (4.7%) 
chose a l t e rn a t i v e  (C), th a t  Asians should not be admitted as migrants. 
This may have been a va l id  measure o f  a lack o f  d isc r im ina to ry  opinion 
against Asians. The much higher response in favour o f  r e s t r i c t i n g  
immigration oppor tun i t ies  to B r i t a in  and northern Europe (16.6%) makes i t  
more l i k e l y ,  however, tha t  (C) was avoided by people who did not want to 
appear o v e r t l y  r a c i s t .  A l te rn a t iv e  (C) should there fo re  be regarded as 
suspect as a va l id  measure o f  a t t i tu d e s  towards coloured migra t ion .
The f i n a l  opt ion (E) appeared to measure a ra ther  d i f f e r e n t  aspect 
o f  a t t i tu d e s  towards migrat ion than the other a l te rn a t i v e s .  Although the
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complete ha l t ing  of immigrat ion may seem the log ica l  f i n a l  step in a 
scale which progress ive ly  r e s t r i c t s  the range o f  migrants,  the motives 
behind such a po l icy  are l i k e l y  to be ra the r  d i f f e r e n t .  Those who 
advocated the cessation o f  immigrat ion in 1969 did so, at least  p u b l i c ly ,  
fo r  reasons re la ted  to the conservation o f  natural  resources in a n t i c ip a t io n  
o f  a fu tu re  s i tu a t io n  o f  sca rc i t y .  This approach may well have contained 
elements o f  ra c ia l  p re jud ice ,  but i t  stemmed p r im a r i l y  from the arguments 
o f  conserva t ion is ts .  I t  was not an opt ion which a t t ra c ted  much support 
from the survey's respondents.
Taken as a whole, despite  the queries raised in r e la t io n  to 
a l te rn a t iv e s  (C) and (E), the re su l t s  demonstrated considerable support 
fo r  the en try  o f  Asian migrants in some form, as the d i s t r i b u t i o n  of 
opinion set out in Figure 3.5 was c le a r l y  weighted towards a l te rn a t ive s  
(A) and (B).
State Aid fo r  Education
The issue o f  government aid to independent and church schools 
was covered in the ASP survey by an item which offered four  a l t e rn a t i v e  
po l i c y  opt ions:
TABLE 3.11 ATTITUDES TOWARDS STATE AID
(A) The government should not give any
%
f in a n c ia l  aid at a l l  to p r iva te  or 
church schools 218 11.6
(B) The government should not give any 
f in a nc ia l  help to these schools u n t i l  
s ta te schools have been brought up to 
date 474 25.3
(C) The government should give help, but 
only to r e a l l y  needy church schools 293 15.6
(D) The government should give as much 
help as possible to both p r iva te  and 
church schools 846 45.2
Don't  know; no answer 42 2.3
1,873 100. 0%
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None of these alternatives was exactly in line with the Liberal/ 
Country Party position on State aid in 1969. The government was giving 
money to private and church schools for particular facilities (e.g. 
libraries, laboratories) as well as allocating funds on the basis of a 
fixed sum per student, regardless of the financial position of the 
schools involved; but itwas not necessarily providing "as much help as 
possible".
The A.L.P. had been rent by conflicts between opponents and
proponents of State aid in the years preceding 1969. Its policy was to
"bring all schools up to acceptable standards", whilst acknowledging its
19"primary ob ligation" to the government school system - this was not 
identical with alternative (B). There was still conflict which surfaced 
within the party from time to time between those who advocated the 
abolition of State aid (A); those in favour of as much government aid 
as possible to private and church schools (D); and those who saw the 
adoption of a "needs principle" (C) as providing the best solution. The 
survey's respondents could hardly be blamed for thinking that each 
alternative had some application to A.L.P. policy.
The sample was clearly in favour of some form of government aid 
to independent and church schools, although one quarter of the respondents
FIGURE 3.6 DISTRIBUTION OF OPINIONS ON STATE AID
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19. ibid., p .12 (my underlining)
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f e l t  that no such aid should be al located u n t i l  state schools had been 
modernized. The frequency d is t r ib u t io n  shown in Figure 3.6 was markedly 
skewed towards giving as much help as possible to non-government schools. 
Only 11.6% of the sample were of  the opinion that State aid should be 
completely abolished.
The resu lts of  Gallup Pol ls conducted in August and October 1969
serve to confirm the pic ture of substantial  electora l support fo r  a high
level of government spending on church schools, although the ASP f ind ings
should caution us not to place too much confidence in the Gallup estimate
of approximately 60% wanting the government to give more in State aid
(see Table 3.12). A larger proport ion o f  the Gallup sample was in
favour of ending State aid , but th is  d i f ference between the surveys
could easi ly  be accounted for  i f  i t  was assumed that the res t r ic ted  choice
offered by the Gallup Poll would have forced respondents who wanted to
postpone State aid into opposing i t  al together or saying they were
undecided, rather than supporting i t s  increase. The only a l te ra t ion  in
the overal l  d is t r ib u t io n  of opinions between August and October appeared
20to be an increase in the number of respondents who were undecided.
TABLE 3.12 OPINIONS ON STATE AID ACCORDING TO GALLUP
August 1969 October 1969
N 2106 2527
Give more State aid 62.4 59.9
End State aid 32.5 29.1
Undecided 5.1 11.0
100.0% 100.0%
Weighted N 6319 6318
20. The high proport ion of  respondents saying they were "Undecided" in
answer to questions on elect ion issues was a feature of the Gallup Poll 
conducted on October 4th, 1969. This may have been a function of the 
pa r t icu la r  sample interviewed by the Gallup organisation on that day; 
but more s ig n i f i c a n t l y ,  i t  may have been a re f lec t ion  of  increasing 
indecision in the electorate as po l l ing  day approached.
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Censorship
The ASP questionnaire provided only two options on the issue of 
censorship. Respondents were asked, "Do you th in k  th a t  th e re  should  be 
some censorsh ip  o f  books and f i lm s 3 or do you th in k  th a t  people  should  be 
a b le  to  read and see what they  l i k e ? ”
TABLE 3.13 ATTITUDES TOWARDS CENSORSHIP
%
1 . Some censorship of books and film 1058 56.5
2. People should be able to read and
see what they 1ike 784 41.9
Don't know; no answer 31 1.6
1,873 100.0%
The two opposing viewpoints corresponded, respect ively,  to Liberal/  
Country Party and Labor policy in 1969. At i t s  Federal Conference in 
July 1969, the A.L.P. had adopted the report  of i t s  Legal and Constitutional 
Committee which recommended tha t  censorship laws should "conform w ith  the
genera l p r in c ip le s  th a t  a d u lts  be e n t i t l e d  to  read3 hear and view what
21they  w ish in  p r iv a te  or p u b lic " .
Opinions were f a i r ly  evenly divided on the censorship issue, with 
a slim majority (56.5%) favouring some form of censorship in preference 
to none at all  (41.9%). Although i t  is possible that  the res t r ic ted  
choice forced respondents who did not hold e i ther  position into expressing 
a false preference, most po l i t ica l  debate on the issue had been conducted 
in the terms in which the question was worded. The fact  that  much larger 
"D on't know" response rates  had been recorded for most other issue items 
in the survey suggested that  subjects were capable of making a valid 
choice here.
In order to observe the overall shape of the opinion d is t r ibu t ion
21. A.L.P., Official Reports of the 27th and 28th Commonwealth Conferences, 
p . 170.
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for each of the preceding items, i t  is necessary to assume that the 
alternative policy positions from which respondents made their choice
??represented interval points along an underlying attitudinal continuum.
The series of graphic i l lustrations which accompany each histogram show 
that the issues of Vietnam, foreign investment, migration and State aid 
were associated with markedly skewed distributions of opinion, whereas 
the sample was almost equally spl i t  on such issues as conscription and 
censorship.
Although the assumption of continuity was questionable in some
cases, particularly that of migration, i t  was advanced for the purpose
of testing a hypothesis which has linked certain shapes in patterns of
electoral opinion to the political party balance. Butler and Stokes, in
their analysis of the determinants of electoral change in Britain,
maintained that the distribution of opinions on an issue needed to be
skewed if  that issue was to have any possibility of affecting the overall
23balance of party strengths at the polls. If opinions were evenly 
balanced, the parties would be unlikely to gain or lose much support by 
favouring one policy alternative over the other. The issues in the ASP 
survey with the greatest p o ten tia l for altering the party balance would 
thus be those which displayed markedly skewed opinion distributions - 
Vietnam, foreign investment, migration, State aid.
Unfortunately, the hypothesis was not readily applicable to all of 
these items as Butler and Stokes pointed out that i ts  most fruitful 
application would be to the case of an issue that posed only two clear 
alternatives,  corresponding with opposing parties'  policy stances. On only
22. This is an assumption I have made in accompanying the distributions 
of opinion displayed in histogram form in the text with continuous 
curves which are intended as i l lustrat ive estimates of electoral 
opinion on each issue. It is an assumption based solely on the 
logical sequence in the alternatives offered to respondents, however, 
and may not have been upheld in testing customary for the validation 
of at t i tude scales.
23. Butler and Stokes, o p .c it . , pp.234-5.
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one time in the questionnaire could i t  be said that Labor and Liberal/
Country Party policies were situated at opposing ends of the spectrum, 
that being the issue of troop commitment to the Vietnam war. Thus, 
although Butler and Stokes' hypothesis suggested that opinions on some 
issues could have been util ised by one or other of the political parties to 
gain electoral advantage, neither side in 1969 had adopted policy positions 
on the issues studies in the ASP project which allowed i t  to exploit the 
electoral situation, except perhaps for the Liberal/Country Party's stance 
on the Vietnam War.
At least two objections can immediately be raised against any
attempt to apply Butler and Stokes' hypothesis to the results of the 1969
Federal election in Australia. Firstly, the hypothesis i t s e l f  is a
cause-effect interpretation of the links between issues and election
outcomes which has been deliberately over-simplified for analytic 
24purposes. Bulter and Stokes have wisely used the skew hypothesis 
as only one of a number of indicators of issues which may have the 
potential to influence voting behaviour. Its relevance to any one issue 
could be completely negated by the simple demonstrction that people did not 
cast their votes on the basis of that issue. The issue-vote linkage forms 
the prime concern of this thesis and will be studied in detail in later chapter 
A second objection to the hypothesis is that i ts  usefulness 
depends on the accuracy with which the shape of opinion distributions 
is described. The ASP survey may be crit icised in this regard. As the 
questionnaire made l i t t l e  use of the methodological refinements which have 
been used in similar research projects, i t  needs to be ascertained whether
24. Butler and Stokes recognised the possibility that the intensity with which 
minority opinions were held could invalidate their hypothesis i f  an in­
tense minority was more likely to vote according to its  issue preference 
than an apathetic majority. Further refinements are, however, necessary 
to their hypothesis. It  is the change in the distribution of opinions 
relative to party strengths over time which is the vital factor in 
determining the likelihood of effect on the overall party balance, rather 
than the degree of skew in the distribution alone.
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the issue items actually performed their function of measuring the 
opinions held by members of the sample.
Comments have already been made on the questionable validity of 
the alternatives available to respondents on some of the issue items - 
the U.S. alliance, Communist China, foreign investment, migration. We 
can have greater confidence in the validity and reliability of results for 
those items which offered respondents four or five specific alternatives 
(the Vietnam War, conscription, State aid) than in those where 
respondents were forced to choose from only two very general statements 
of opinion (Communist China, foreign investment, censorship). Some of 
the former type elicited higher proportions of "Don't know” responses 
than did the latter, but they were likely to be truer estimates of the 
level of uncertainty in the sample as the cost to a respondent with no 
fixed opinion of choosing amongst a large number of fairly specific 
alternatives would, in all probability, have been higher than that 
incurred by admitting ignorance. The validity of the results for items 
which offered only two very broad options but which, nevertheless, 
registered a high level of "Don't know" responses (Communist China, 
foreign investment - both of which asked respondents to speculate about 
the future) must be regarded as particularly suspect.
Where the results of Gallup Polls have been utilised in the 
discussion of individual survey items they have been intended to amplify 
the ASP findings, in some cases through adding a time dimension, rather 
than to serve as a standard for direct comparison. On some of the issues, 
substantial differences in the results obtained by the Gallup organisation 
and by the ASP survey were indicative of the degree to which opinion 
measurement is a function of the nature of the sample and the question 
format. Butler and Stokes' findings on the instability of issue opinions 
(as elicited by opinion survey techniques) over time should also serve 
as a reminder that the attitudes identified in the Australian Survey
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Project are spec i f ic  to both the time and circumstances of the survey.
In addit ion to the i n s t a b i l i t y  of people's a t t i tudes ,  opinion 
research in the ear ly  1960's demonstrated that there was l i t t l e  internal 
consistency in the structure of publ ic opinion. In his seminal work 
on the subject, Converse showed that be l ie f  systems common amongst the 
mass public were not comprised of opinions lo g ic a l l y  interwoven into
O r
coherent ideological outlooks. Only a small proport ion of  the American 
electorate could be c lass i f ied  as having an ideological approach to 
p o l i t i c s ,  even when the widely-known "liberal-conservative” dimension 
was used as a benchmark. There was l i t t l e  evidence of internal  constra int 
in a t t i tu d e  structures and only moderate corre la t ions between party 
po l icy stances and the issue opinions of even those who were highly 
interested in the knowledgeable and p o l i t i c a l  a f fa i r s .
Since Converse's work, the demonstration o f  s t a t i s t i c a l  i n t e r ­
re la t ionships between d i f fe re n t  opinions has become the standard method 
fo r  establ ishing whether a t t i tudes are incorporated into wider ideological 
stances or coherent be l ie f  systems. The appl icat ion of  techniques of 
fac tor  and c lus te r  analysis to series o f  opinion items has surpassed the 
more pr im i t ive  approach adopted in "The American Voter",  whereby the
authors sub ject ive ly  c lass i f ied  evaluations of p o l i t i c a l  objects according
27to whether or not they were expressed in "ideological”  terminology.
Unfortunately, the number of issue items in the ASP questionnaire 
was in s u f f i c ie n t  to perform a factor  analysis which could be expected to 
iso la te  a smaller number of underlying dimensions. I t  was thus not 
possible to investigate whether respondents took th e i r  opinions from (or 
incorporated them in to)  an ideological framework which guided th e i r
25. A. Campbell, et a l . op.cit. , Chapter 10; P.E. Converse, "The Nature of 
Bel ie f  Systems in Mass Publics" in D.E. Apter (Ed), Ideology and 
Piscontent, (New York, 1964); D. Butler and D. Stokes, op.cit. ,
Chapter 9.
26. Converse, "The Nature o f  Bel ie f  Systems in Mass Publics".
27. A. Campbell, et a l . op.cit. ,  pp.222-223.
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responses to poli t ics.  Having a large number of issues with which to 
work, Butler and Stokes were able to study the structure of those 
opinions which were stable over time and to review the applicability of 
" l e f t - r i g h t "  as a framework for issues. They found the " le f t - r ig h t ' ' 'model 
to be of l i t t l e  u t i l i ty  in explaining the responses of most British voters 
to their polit ical paries. Although individual political issues could be 
expected to have an impact on voters, attitudes on issues were
28characteristically n o t  organised into "embracing id e o lo g ic a l s tru c tu r e s " .
Although the question of ideology could not be pursued with
regard to the ASP sample, i t  was possible to obtain a broad picture of
the inter-relationships between opinions through use of inter-item
correlation coefficients (Kendall's Tau, in this case ). Attitudes on
some issues were correlated with those on others, as i l lustrated in
Table 3.14*but the relationships were much weaker than expected. The
30only inter-item correlations of a size worth commenting upon were those 
in the upper left-hand corner of the matrix. Except for conscription, 
these issues could be classified as foreign policy issues and thus i t  
could be expected that attitudes on them would bear some relationship to 
each other. In fact,  the only substantial relationships were those 
between opinions on Vietnam and the three issues of conscription,
Communist China and the U.S. alliance, with correlation coefficients of 
+.23, +.27 and +.27, respectively.
28. D. Butler and D. Stokes, o p . c i t . ,  p.264.
29. Kendall's Tau is a rank-order correlation coefficient which is 
suitable for ordinal data, the only necessary assumption being that 
each of the two variables can be ranked. This assumption has been 
applied to the ASP issue items and would appear to be valid, with the 
possible exception of migration.
30. Kendall's Tau varies between -1.0 and +1.0, but rarely can a value of 
tau be obtained which approaches unity. Its numerical value is usually 
somewhat lower than that obtained by other rank-order methods of 
correlation, such as Spearman's r$. See H.M. Blalock, Social 
S ta t i s t i c s , (New York, 1960), pp.317-324.
* See page 81.
79
Relationships amongst the remaining issues in the matrix were so small
that at least half of them were not s ta t is t ica l ly  signi f icant. These
results may be a reflection of the selection of the ASP items and their
wording, rather than an indication of a low level of constraint amongst
attitudes towards domestic policy within the Australian electorate.
I t  was unfortunate that the narrow range of issue items available
did not allow a comprehensive study of the degree of consistency of
31attitudes within issue ''domains" in Australian public opinion in 1969.
Results of research carried out in the United States in the late 1960's
have indicated an increasing degree of structuring in po l i t ica l  opinions
over the years since Converse's in i t ia l  findings of low levels of
32constraint amongst attitudes. This research culminated in the 
University of Michigan analysis of the 1972 Presidential election, in 
which Democrats and Independents registered markedly high levels of issue 
att i tude constraint, thereby displaying a more ideological approach to 
po l i t ica l  issues than was characteristic of Republicans at the same 
election.
Although disappointing from the point-of-view of understanding the 
structure of po l i t ical  belief  systems in Australia, the finding of very 
low inter-item correlations did at least fac i l i ta te  the interpretation 
of linkages between voting behaviour and opinions on individual issues, 
which wi l l  form the la t te r  part of this thesis. I f  opinions on the 
issues had been closely inter-related, i t  would have been extremely 
d i f f i c u l t  to isolate any one issue as having influenced voting behaviour
31. A term applied to a cluster of inter-related issues identif ied by 
factor analysis as having loadings on a common factor.
32. See N. Nie and K. Andersen, "Mass Belief Systems Revisited: Polit ical 
Change and Attitude Structure", Journal of P o l i t ics , 36, (1974) 
540-591; G. Pomper, Voters' Choice, (New York, 1975), Chap.8.
33. A.H. Mil ler,  et a l ., A Majority Party in Disarray: Policy
Polarization in the 1972 Election (paper prepared by the Center for 
Polit ical Studies, University of Michigan, 1973), p.32.
80
in a pa r t icu la r  d i rec t ion .
An integral part o f  investigating the re la t ionships between voting 
decisions and opinions on the ASP issue items w i l l  be a study o f  the 
degree of  consistency between the at t i tudes of voters and the pol icy 
stances of the p o l i t i c a l  part ies they supported. The work of  Converse, 
who found greater consistency between party stances and the opinions of 
p o l i t i c a l  " e l i t e s "  than of the mass p u b l ic ,34 and of H. McClosky, who 
showed that the pol icy a t t i tudes of party a c t iv is ts  were more part isan
or
than those of rank-and- f i le  supporters, w i l l  be of relevance to 
discussions of partisan cleavage and of party id e n t i f i c a t io n  in the two 
fol lowing chapters.
34. Converse, "The Nature of Bel ie f  Systems in Mass Publics",
35. H. McClosky, "Issue Con f l ic t  and Consensus among Party Leaders and 
Fol lowers", American P o l i t i c a l  Science Review, 54 (1960), pp.406-27.
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T A B L E  3 . 14 I N T E R - I T E M  C O R R E L A T I O N  M A T R I X  FOR ISSUE O P I N I O N S
(Kendal 1 1s T a u )
* = c o r r e l a t i o n  c o e f f i c i e n t  not s i g n i f i c a n t  at 1% level (p > .01)
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CHAPTER 4 
OPINION CLEAVAGES
In studying the distribution of opinions on issues of public
policy within the electorate we are looking at one aspect of the
cleavages which differentiate i ts  members one from another. Cleavages
have been defined as "the c r ite r ia  which divide the members o f  a community
or subcommunity in to  groups".  ^ There are commonly thought to be three
general classes or types of cleavage: (1) ascriptive or " tra it"
cleavages; (2) attitudinal or opinion cleavages and (3) behavioural
2
or "act" cleavages. In setting out this typology, D.W. Rae and M. Taylor 
recognised that the boundaries within i t  were very loose, as one class of 
cleavage would, in real i ty,  differ from another only according to its 
distance away along a common continuum. An ascriptive cleavage along 
lines of social class could readily shade into a corresponding attitudinal 
division, particularly i f  the standard of measurement used was that of 
"subjective c la s s". ^
The three way typology is a useful concept for this study as i t  
can be readily applied to the data from the ASP survey. In the preceding 
chapter the distribution and extent of some attitudinal cleavages within 
the sample were studied. The survey also provides a relevant measure of 
cleavage along behavioural lines, in this case the distinction amongst 
respondents according to the party they voted for at the 1969 Federal 
election. An idea of the pattern of ascriptive cleavages within the 
sample can be gained from' an analysis of respondents' differing educational 
and occupational backgrounds, as well as their age and sex.
1. D.W. Rae and M. Taylor, The Analysis of Political Cleavages (New Haven, 
1970), p.l.
2. ib id . p.l.
3. One measure of "social c lass"  consists of asking a person what class he 
thinks he belongs to. Differences in this subjective assessment are as 
fruitful in indicating attitudinal differences as are the objective 
character!'sties which go to define a person's "social c lass"  (e.g. 
education, occupation, income).
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In a random sample of the size interviewed for the ASP survey, we 
would hope that divisions along socio-demographic cri teria would match 
those found within the electorate as a whole. If the survey was to be of 
value in explaining the results of the 1969 Federal election, respondents' 
votes would need to be divided amongst the parties in the same proportions 
as those recorded at the actual poll. As we saw in an earl ier chapter, 
the sample of 1,873 voters did roughly match up to the overall Australian 
electorate in regard to these cri teria.
Amongst the eight issue items chosen for study, the patterns of 
opinion distribution ranged from those which approached consensus (U.S. 
alliance; foreign investment) to those where the sample was almost 
equally divided (conscription; censorship). It  is the purpose of this 
chapter to examine whether the lines of cleavage in issue opinion were 
underpinned by corresponding divisions in party support and/or socio­
demographic backgrounds. Earlier research work into the conflict patterns 
within democratic societies^ would not lead us to expect such a situation 
of mutually reinforcing cleavages. Instead, we would anticipate that the 
lines of division within the sample would overlap, indicating the existence 
of a multiplicity of cross-cutting cleavages.
This pattern has, in the past, been thought to be both a characteriStic 
of pluralist  democracies and a guarantor of the stabil i ty of their political 
systems. Where the members of a community are bound together by their 
over-lapping group allegiances and their opinions, the system is unlikely 
to face sustained and conflicting demands for change; but where ascriptive, 
attitudinal and behavioural cleavages coincide and act to reinforce one 
another, the society is likely to be spl i t  by intense conflicts and the 
political system placed under strain.
5
The validity of this hypo thesis has not gone unchallenged , but i t
4. See Rae and Taylor, op.ai t .  3 p.87.
5. ibid. 3 p.89.
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is not the purpose of the present study to investigate its application 
to the Australian political system. We are concerned here, to study the 
degree to which cleavages in opinion and party support reinforced each 
other, as an observed correspondence between direction of vote in 1969 
and respondents' attitudes might provide the f i r s t  clues as to the part 
issues played in voting decisions. Such a correspondence could not, 
however, be taken as evidence of any causal links, in either direction, 
between issue opinion and vote.
It would have been surprising if  the ASP survey had uncovered clear 
lines of division in opinion between those who voted for the governing 
parties and those who voted for the opposition in 1969. Students of 
American electoral behaviour have failed to find such polarization, 
although they have observed greater consensus across party lines in some
g
periods than in others. Given the nature of the American political
system, Key maintained in 1961 that overlapping distributions of opinion
were exactly what should be expected:
"(The) op in ion  p a tte r n s  show varying  degrees o f  approach toward 
concurren t consensus between the  p a r t ie s .  On a l l  the  is su e s  a 
shadow o f  c o n f l i c t  rem ains3 and the  shades o f  d i f fe r e n c e  between  
the  p a r t ie s  are sharper on some is su e s  than on o th e rs . In  a 
regime th a t proceeds in  co nsiderab le  degree by the  a ttem p t to  
ach ieve  common co nsen t3 we should  expec t agreement g radua lly  
to  develop  across p a rty  l in e s  on mayor is s u e s .
Australian electoral opinion does not appear to constitute an exception
to Key's findings. In a study of responses to Gallup Polls conducted in
Australia between 1941 and 1968, Murray Goot found bi-partisan agreement
on 80% of all the issues covered, with the extent of agreement differing
o
according to the type of issue.
6. Analysis of the 1972 U.S. Presidential election results suggested 
that policy cleavages within the American electorate were deeper than 
in previous years and did not correspond to traditional partisan 
alignments. A.H. Miller, et a l ., o p . c i t .
7. Key, Public Opinion and American Democracy, p.445.
8. Goot, op. c i t .  3 p.83.
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9 IDSome researchers, like Berelson and Kirkpatrick and Jones in the
11United States, and Blondel in Great Britain have hypothesized that
certain types of issues are consistently more likely to at tract  partisan
dispute than others. In addition, Berelson postulated a " l i f e  h is to r y "
for issues, at a certain stage of which partisan conflict would be 
12greatest. Although not ascribing to Berelson's model, Key believed that
differences between party supporters would be most marked in the
13"developm ental or a g ita t io n a l  s ta g e"  of an issue.
Writers have differed on the extent to which a political system 
needs to display opinion cleavages along party lines for an election to 
have involved a meaningful choice in terms of public policy. Having 
demonstrated the existence of consensus between the Republican and 
Democratic party supporters on the "general r u le s  o f  the  game" and on 
issues involving style of government in 1948, Berelson and his associates 
were adamant that disagreement on some things was necessary to make an 
election important:
" . . .  w ith o u t some c e n tr a l m a tters  o f  cleavage3 p o l i t i c a l  
i n s t i t u t i o n s  would have s t a b i l i t y 3 tru e 3 bu t i t  would be the  
s t a b i l i t y  o f  a m o n o lith ic  s ta te  or the t r i v i a l  su rv iv a l o f  a ^  
p u re ly  'p o l i t i c a l 1 c o n te s t  i r r e le v a n t  to  the  la rg er  s o c ie ty " .
Writing a number of years la ter ,  Key was less inclined to see the
situation in such black-and-white terms. He maintained that parties could
9. Berelson, et a l , op. c i t .  3 claimed that partisan cleavages were more 
common on position issues than on style issues, pp.185-202.
10. S.A. Kirkpatrick and M.E. Jones, "Vote Direction and Issue Cleavage in 
1968", Social Science Quarterly, 51 (1970), pp.689-705, found that 
issue cleavage was lower for foreign affairs than for domestic affairs 
within the American electorate.
11. J. Blondel, Voters, Parties and Leaders (Harmondsworth, UK, 1969) 
concluded that British electors were partisan on social and economic 
matters only.
12. Berelson, o p . c i t . 3 pp.207-12.
13. Key, Public Opinion and American Democracy, p.445.
14. Berelson, pp.c i t . 3 p- 194.
86
s t i l l  appeal in different ways to the voters in situations of near­
consensus, through the question becoming one of which party was better
15equipped to lead the country in agreed policy directions.
Key's approach is similar to that I have already adopted in 
arguing in an earlier chapter that valence issues, as well as position 
issues, can be items which arouse partisan dispute. The pattern of 
opinions on two of the issues covered by the ASP survey approached a 
distribution characteristic of consensus (the U.S. alliance; foreign 
investment). If similar opinions were held by supporters of all parties 
on these issues, then we would be in a position to test Key's hypothesis 
that the electoral choice would be over which party was best suited to 
achieve the consensual goal.
As the ASP questionnaire offered its  respondents a range of
alternatives on most items, the degree of difference between opinions of
government and opposition supporters on each issue was d iff icult  to
quantify. Attitudes towards some issues, such as Vietnam and conscription,
divided clearly along party lines on the alternatives which corresponded
with the parties' policy stances, but not on the remaining alternatives.
In this situation i t  was not possible to construct a simple index which
summarised the extent of cleavage in opinions, as had been done by Goot
16in obtaining a measure of partisanship on Gallup Poll items. On the 
few issues where respondents chose from only two alternatives, such an 
index (obtained by averaging the difference in percentage points between 
the proportion of A.L.P. and Liberal/Country Party voters supporting each 
alternative) could be meaningfully applied. This procedure would have 
masked the existing differences on questions which offered a multiple
15. Key, Public Opinion and American Democracy, p.446.
16. Goot constructed an index of partisanship by averaging the differences 
between the percentages of Labor and non-Labor voters in favour of a 
Gallup Poll opinion item and the percentages of Labor and non-Labor 
voters against the opinion. Goot, op.cit. 3 p.8.
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choice, where a more accurate assessment of cleavages could be gained 
from examining the percentage differences on each alternative.
Partisan Nature of Opinions on the Vietnam War
On the basis of Gallup Poll results, D.W. Rawson drew attention 
to the clear division of opinion on Vietnam along party lines during the 
years 1966-69.17 Goot's conclusions, using the same data, were similar:
"Up u n t i l  19653 the  Vietnam commitment was endorsed by both  
s id e s ;  u n t i l  the  end o f  19663 the  sending  o f  n a tio n a l  
servicem en to  Vietnam was opposed by bo th  s id e s . On most 
o f  the Vietnam q u estio n s  th ere  were3 n e v e r th e le s s 3 m oderate^  
to  s tro n g  d i f fe r e n c e s  between Labor and non-Labor o p in io n . "
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 show the differences in Labor and non-Labor 
attitudes as measured by the Gallup Polls, which persisted throughout 
1969; along with a general movement amongst the supporters of all 
parties in favour of withdrawal which was particularly marked between 
April and August.
A similarly partisan distribution of opinion19 was measured by 
the ASP survey, with the exception of alternative (B) which expressed 
opposition to the inclusion of conscripts amongst the troops:
TABLE 4.1 1969 VOTE x VIETNAM OPINION
Lib/CP Labor
Troops fighting in Vietnam, 
including conscripts
82.5 17.5 100%
(377)
Troops fighting in Vietnam, 
but only volunteers
49.0 51.0 100%
(736)
2 0No combat troops in Vietnam 26.7 73.3 100%
(501)
17. D.W. Rawson, "The Vietnam War and the Australian Party System",
Australian Outlook, 23 (1969), p.60.
18. Goot, o p .c i t .  3 p.153.
19. The measures of partisanship employed in this chapter have been 
calculated on the basis of respondents' actual 1969 vote as reported
to the ASP interviewers. The concept of "party id e n t i f i c a t io n "  and its  
usefulness as a measure of psychological support for the parties will 
be studied in a later chapter.
20. I have combined the two questionnaire alternatives " c iv i l ia n  e xp e r ts  o n ly " 
and "stay  o u t o f  Vietnam a lto g e th e r"  into a single category for the 
purposes of this table. Evidence presented in Chapter 7 suggests some 
confusion amongst respondents over the distinction between these two 
notions, particularly in regard to the A.L.P.'s policy stance.
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Those respondents who favoured the commitment o f  t roo ps ,  i n c lu d in g  
c o n s c r ip t s ,  to the war were h ig h ly  l i k e l y  to vote L ib e ra l /C o u n t ry  Party 
in  1969, whereas the reverse was t rue  f o r  those who wanted the withdrawal 
o f  t roops .  Those in  favour  o f  a vo lun tee r  f i g h t i n g  fo rc e  were equ a l l y  
l i k e l y  to suppor t  the government or o pp os i t io n  p a r t i e s .
The cleavages in  op in ion  found in  response to the ASP ques t ion  between 
suppor ters o f  the contending p a r t ie s  can be i l l u s t r a t e d  in  his togram form 
(see Figure 4 . 3 ) .  The d i f f e re n c e s  in  percentage po in ts  are as fo l l o w s :
FIGURE 4.3 PARTISAN CLEAVAGE ON VIETNAM
— ^ n ---------- l— K /1 _____ ___
(pc> (e>) (c) (e>}
TABLE 4.2 DIFFERENCE IN PERCENTAGE POINTS BETWEEN LABOR AND LIBERAL/ 
COUNTRY PARTY VOTERS ON THE VIETNAM WAR
(A) Troops, in c lu d in g  consc r ip ts 29.7
(B) Only vo lun tee r  t roops 1.9
(C) Only c i v i 1ian experts 7.6
(D) Stay out  o f  Vietnam a l to g e th e r 20.8
The h ighes t  degrees o f  cleavage along pa r ty  l i n e s  were re g is te re d  
on a l t e r n a t i v e s  (A) and (D) which could be said to correspond w i th  the 
opposing p a r t i e s '  p o l i c i e s  on Vietnam. A l t e r n a t i v e  (C) ,  which represented 
the most accurate expression o f  Labor p o l i c y  could not be used to d i s t i n g u i s h
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c lea r ly  between the two groups of voters. I t  can be seen from Figure 4.3 
and from Table 4.3 however, that th is  pa r t icu la r  option was not chosen by
pi
many respondents, regardless of  party al legiance.
TABLE 4.3 1969 VOTE BY VIETNAM OPINION (4 a l te rnat ives)
1969 Vote (A) (B) (C) (D) (E)
Troops + 
Conscripts
Volunteer 
Troops Only
C iv i l ian  
Experts Only
Stay Out 
A1together
Don't know; 
No Answer
Liberal/Country 
Party 37.7 43.7 8.7 7.5 2.4 100% (826)
Labor 8.0 45.6 16.3 28.3 1.8 100% (823)
Although there were clear dif ferences o f  opinion between party 
supporters on the more extreme options, the high level of support for  
a l te rna t ive  (B) observed w i th in the sample as a whole was repl icated 
amongst both Labor and Liberal/Country Party voters. This s i tua t ion  
suggests that there was a 'middle-ground' on Vietnam in 1969 which was not 
taken up by any of  the major part ies ,  and which fa i led  to show up in the 
Gallup Pol ls. The pattern e l i c i te d  by the ASP survey was one of 
po lar isa t ion  on the extremes, moderated by a large area of common 
agreement between the par t ies '  supporters.
Conscription
The resul ts  of Gallup Pol ls conducted in 1969 conveyed a rather
d i f fe re n t  message on the nature of government and opposition supporters'
a t t i tudes towards the re tent ion of national service than did the ASP
survey. The opinions of Liberal/Country Party voters appeared to remain
stable ( in terms of the net d is t r ib u t io n  on ly ) ,  w h i ls t  there was a drop
in the level of support fo r  conscript ion amongst Labor voters between
the months of August and October. Table 4.4 shows near-consensus w i th in
the government camp, but a po lar isat ion of opinion amongst the A.L.P. 's
21. The retent ion of c i v i l i a n  experts only in Vietnam, which was o f f i c i a l  
A.L.P. po l icy ,  received l i t t l e  attent ion in media reports during 1969, 
which stressed the commitment to disengagement in Labor's po l icy .
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supporters:
TABLE 4.4 1969 VOTE BY ATTITUDES TOWARDS CONSCRIPTION
(1969 GALLUP POLLS)
15 August 1969 4 October 1969
Lib/CP Labor Lib/CP Labor
Weighted N 2889 2561 2650 2842
Continue 
conscription 74.0 53.7 72.6 44.3
End conscription 22.2 41.8 20.2 44.9
Undecided 3.8 4.6 7.2 10.8
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
N 963 854 1060 1137
By averaging the percentage differences in party support over the
two a l te rna t ives ,  part isanship indices of 19.9 for August 1969 and 26.5
for October 1969 were obtained. These could be c la s s i f ied ,  respectively,
22as ' s l i g h t '  and 'moderate' partisan differences in Goot's terminology.
They compared with Goot's finding (again based on Gallup Polls) that  items
dealing with "compulsory military training and the possibility of overseas
service" provoked "moderate discord" between Labor and Liberal/Country
23Party voters in the years 1960-68.
As was the case with the Vietnam war, the a v a i la b i l i ty  of four
options on the issue resulted in a more complex pattern of cleavages within 
the ASP sample. Although interviews were undertaken in the same month as 
the second of the two Gallup Polls cited above, the support expressed for 
conscription was of a much more equivocal nature and the d is t r ibu t ion  of
22. Goot, op.cit. , p .68.
23. ibid., p .74.
91
o p i n i ons  was r emarkably  s i m i l a r  amongst  t he  two groups of  p a r t y  s u p p o r t e r s .  
The only  a l t e r n a t i v e  on which p a r t i s a n  d i s p u t e  could be s a i d  to have 
e x i s t e d  was (D),  t h a t  "we shouldn't have any form of conscription at all".
A s u b s t a n t i a l  c l eavage  in op in i on  might  have been expected h e r e ,  as t h i s  
op t i on  cor responded wi th Labor Pa r ty  p o l i c y ,  b u t ,  in r e a l i t y ,  the e x t e n t  
of  d i f f e r e n c e  was smal l .  Con t i nua t i on  of  t h e  b a l l o t  system o f  c o n s c r i p t i o n  
(government  p o l i cy )  was un i fo rmly  unpopula r  amongst  Labor and L i b e r a l /  
Country Pa r t y  v o t e r s :
TABLE 4 . 5  1969 VOTE BY OPINIONS ON CONSCRIPTION (ASP)
1969 Vote (A) (B) (C) (D)
Cons c r i p t i on  
f o r  a l l  
young men
Cont inue
b a l l o t
system
P r ov i de 
c i v i 1ian 
a l t e r n a t i v e s
No form of  
c o n s c r i p t i o n
Don ' t  know; 
no answer
Lib/CP 44.3 9.7 36.0 7 . 9 2.1 100% (826)
Labor 36.9 5.0 29.5 25.9 2.7 100% (823)
The c l eavages  in op i n i on  noted in t h e  t o t a l  sample were reproduced 
wi t h i n  each group of  p a r t y  s u p p o r t e r s ,  a c l e a r  i n d i c a t i o n  t h a t  a t t i t u d e s  
on t h i s  i s s u e  were not  of  a p a r t i s a n  n a t u r e .  The d i f f e r e n c e s  and 
s i m i l a r i t i e s  between t he  p a r t i e s  a r e  p o r t r ay e d  s c h e m a t i c a l l y  in Figure  4.4  
and by pe rce n t age  p o i n t  d i f f e r e n c e s  in Table  4 . 6 .
FIGURE 4 . 4  PARTISAN CLEAVAGE ON CONSCRIPTION
\ o  - •
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TABLE 4.6 DIFFERENCE IN PERCENTAGE POINTS BETWEEN LABOR AND LIBERAL/ 
COUNTRY PARTY VOTERS ON CONSCRIPTION
(A) Conscr ipt ion fo r  a l l  young men 7.4
(B) Continue b a l l o t  system 4.7
(C) Provide c i v i l i a n  a l t e r n a t i v e s 6.5
(D) No form of  c onsc r i p t i on  a t  a l l 18.0
United S t a t e s - A us t r a l i a n  Al l i ance
Although Labor voters  in the ASP sample were more l i k e l y  than 
Libera l /Count ry  Par ty voter s  to opt  fo r  the more d i s t a n t  of r e l a t i o n s h i p s  
with the United S t a t e s ,  p a r t i s a n  d i f f e r en ces  in opinion on t h i s  quest ion 
could not  be regarded as anything more than s l i g h t :
TABLE 4.7 1969 VOTE BY OPINIONS ON RELATIONS WITH THE U.S.
1969 Vote Not Very 
Close
Don' t  know; 
No AnswerVery Close F a i r l y  Close
Lib/CP 52.8 41.4 5.2 0.6 100% (826)
Labor 35.2 49.3 12.9 2.6 100% (823)
I t  has a l r eady  been noted in the previous chapter  t h a t  the 
a l t e r n a t i v e s  provided on t h i s  ques t ion were u n s a t i s f a c t o r y ,  owing to the 
l i ke l i hood  t h a t  respondents  would d i f f e r  in t h e i r  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of  the 
d i s t ances  involved.  On the assumption t h a t  "f a i r l y  c lo s e ” could be 
regarded as the mid-point  of  a s ca l e  ranging from "very c lo s e ” to "not very  
c l o s e ", the response l ev e l s  were rear ranged (by d iv id ing  the percentage 
of  Libera l /Count ry  Par ty  and Labor vo t e r s  who opted for  "f a i r l y  c lo s e ” in 
two and a l l o c a t i n g  ha l f  to each of  the remaining a l t e r n a t i v e s )  to t ransform 
the r e s u l t s  in to  binary form. The r e s u l t a n t  index of  p a r t i s a n s h i p  was 
ca l cu l a t ed  to be 12.7,  i n d i c a t i n g  only a s l i g h t  level  of  disagreement  
between the two s e t s  of vo t e r s .
The overa l l  consensus in a t t i t u d e s  observed in the previous  chapter  
was magnif ied amongst government suppor te rs  and near ly  approached amongst
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those who voted for the opposit ion,  as i l l us t ra ted  in Figure 4.5, 
FIGURE 4.5 PARTISAN CLEAVAGE ON U.S. ALLIANCE
Communist China
Of all  the issue items in the ASP questionnaire,  this  provoked 
the highest "Don't know" response r a t e ,  with only 87.3% of the sample able 
to give an opinion. Amongst those who chose one of the two a l ternat ives  
and who voted for e i ther  of the major party groupings a t  the elect ion,  
there did appear to be a relat ionship between a t t i tudes  towards Communist 
China and voting preference:
TABLE 4.8 1969 VOTE BY OPINIONS ON COMMUNIST CHINA (1)
Lib/CP Labor
100% ( 868) 
100% (570)
China will give us a lot  
to worry about
60.3 39.7
China will not be a problem 36.0 64.0
A substantial  majority of government supporters f e l t  that  Communist 
China would give Austral ia a lo t  to worry about in the future,  whereas 
Labor voters s p l i t  f a i r l y  evenly on the question:
94
TABLE 4.9 1969 VOTE BY OPINIONS ON COMMUNIST CHINA (2)
1969 Vote
Lib/CP
Labor
China w i l l  China won't
give us a l o t  be a
to worry about problem
Don't know; 
no answer
63.3 24.8 11.9
41.9 44.3 13.8
100% (826) 
100% (823)
The above f igu res  in Tables 4.8 and 4.9 ind ica te  a moderate degree 
o f  par t isan d iv i s io n  on th is  issue (index of par t isanship = 20 .5 ) ,  but the 
large number o f  respondents who were undecided should give cause to 
quest ion whether opinion had c r y s ta l l i z e d  s u f f i c i e n t l y  fo r  the issue to 
assume any importance in vot ing decis ions.
Foreign Investment
Opinions on the general approach Aus t ra l ia  should adopt towards 
fo re ign  investors were c le a r l y  b i -p a r t i s a n ,  according to the ASP re su l t s .  
Labor voters were s l i g h t l y  more l i k e l y  to favour a cautious approach than 
were those who supported the government p a r t ies ,  but the d i f fe rence  here 
was v i r t u a l l y  i n s i g n i f i c a n t .  The d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  a t t i tu d e s  w i th in  each 
set o f  voters mirrored the consensus evident fo r  the sample as a whole - 
as shown in numerical form in Table 4.10 and in histogram form in Figure 4.6.
TABLE 4.10 1969 VOTE BY OPINIONS ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT
1969 Vote
Should be on 
guard against 
fo re ign  investors
Should welcome 
fo re ign  investors I t  depends
Don't  know; 
no answer
Lib/CP 57.5 26.9 12.7 2.9
63.9 22.6 9.8 3.7
100% (826)
Labor 100% (823)
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FIGURE 4.6 PARTISAN CLEAVAGE ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT
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Co l laps ing  the th ree  a l t e r n a t i v e s  in to  b ina ry  form, on the 
assumption t h a t  " I t  dep e n d s”  represented the m id -p o in t  o f  a sca le ,  
r e s u l te d  in  a p a r t i s a n s h ip  index o f  on ly  5 .4 .  The s i m i l a r i t y  between the 
two blocks o f  vo te rs  on t h i s  issue received suppor t  from the r e s u l t s  o f  a 
Gal lup  Poll  conducted in  June 1969 which obta ined a b i - p a r t i s a n  response 
to a r e la te d  quest ion on A u s t ra l i a n  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in  development 
p r o je c ts  f inanced by f o re ig n  c a p i t a l .
M ig ra t ion
No c le a r  p a t te rn  o f  d i f f e r e n c e  in  a t t i t u d e s  towards m ig ra t ion  
emerged when comparing L ib e ra l /C o u n t ry  Party  vo ters  in  the ASP sample 
w i th  Labor vo te rs .  Labor vo ters  were s l i g h t l y  more l i k e l y  to favour  
h a l t i n g  the immigrat ion f lo w  a l to g e th e r  and less  l i k e l y  to op t  f o r  a 
c o n t in u a t io n  o f  present p ra c t i c e  which al lowed f o r  a small quota o f  Asians. 
The o v e ra l l  p a t t e rn ,  however, was one o f  a b i - p a r t i s a n  approach to  the 
issue.  This i s  c l e a r l y  shown in the low percentage d i f f e re n c e s  between
24. A u s t r a l i a n  Gal lup P o l l , June 21, 1969.
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vo te rs  f o r  the opposing p a r t ie s  support  o f  each op t ion  in  Tables 4.11 and 
4.12 and in  the c lose approx imat ion o f  each p a r t y  b lo c k 's  a t t i t u d i n a l  
p r o f i l e  in  Figure 4.7.
TABLE 4.11 1969 VOTE BY OPINIONS ON ASIAN MIGRATION
1969 Vote
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E)
Lib/CP
Labor
Asians on 
same basis 
as Europeans
Smal 1 
quota 
o f  Asians
No Asian 
Migrants
Only UK and 
N.European 
migrants
No more 
migrants  
a t  present
Don ' t  know; 
No Answer
100% (826) 
100% (823)
20.2 45.9 4.2 18.6 7.9 3.1
24.2 37.2 4.9 16.3 14.2 3.3
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TABLE 4.12 DIFFERENCE IN PERCENTAGE POINTS BETWEEN LABOR AND LIBERAL/
COUNTRY PARTY VOTERS ON MIGRATION
(A) Asians on same basis as Europeans 4.0
(B) Small quota o f  Asians 8.7
(C) No Asian migrants  0.7
(D) Only U.K. and N. European migrants  2,3
(E) No more migrants  a t  present 6.3
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State Aid fo r  Education
Responses to the A.S.P. item on State aid produced the most c le a r l y  
b i -p a r t i s a n  pattern of a l l  the e igh t  issues in th is  analys is .  Dif ferences 
between Labor and L ibera l /Country  Party voters did not exceed 2.7 percentage 
po ints on any of the four a l te rn a t ive s  ava i lab le  - see Tables 4.13 and 
4.14. The d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  opinions w i th in  each group o f  par ty  supporters 
mirrored tha t  fo r  the main sample and c lose ly  resembled each other (see 
Figure 4 .8 ) .
TABLE 4.13 1969 VOTE BY OPINIONS ON STATE AID
1969 Vote
(A) (B) (C) (D)
No help 
at a l l  from 
government
No help u n t i l  
s tate schools 
improved
Help only to 
needy church 
schools
As much
government
help as possible
Don't  know; 
No Answer
Lib/CP 11.5 26.6
•
17.6 42.5 1.8
Labor 11.7 25.3 15.2
—
45.2 2.7
100% (826 
100% (823
FIGURE 4.8 PARTISAN CLEAVAGE ON STATE AID
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TABLE 4.14  DIFFERENCE IN PERCENTAGE POINTS BETWEEN LABOR AND LIBERAL/ 
COUNTRY PARTY VOTERS ON STATE AID FOR EDUCATION:
(A) No government help a t  a l l  0.2
(B) No help u n t i l  S t a t e  schools  improved 1.3
(C) Help on ly  to needy church schoo ls  2.4
(D) As much government help as p o s s i b l e  2.7
The b i - p a r t i s a n  n a t u r e  o f  the  e l e c t o r a t e ' s  a t t i t u d e s  towards
government a id  f o r  p r i v a t e  schoo ls  in 1969 was conf irmed by the  r e s u l t s  of
two Gal lup P o l l s  c a r r i e d  o u t  very  near  to  the  t ime o f  the ASP survey .  In
August  and in October th e  Gallup r e sponden ts  were asked whether  they
favoured  g iv ing  more in S t a t e  a id  or  c ea s in g  t h i s  form o f  government
s u p p o r t .  In both c a s e s ,  s u b s t a n t i a l  m a j o r i t i e s  o f  v o t e r s  from both
25p a r t i e s  op ted to  i n c r e a s e  the  le ve l  o f  S t a t e  a i d .  The i n d i c e s  o f  
p a r t i s a n s h i p  were t r i v i a l  - 2 .4  f o r  August 1969; 4 .8  f o r  October 1969.
Censorsh ip
Some degree  o f  p a r t i s a n s h i p  was a p p a re n t  in  the  ASP survey  on the  
i s s u e  of  c e n s o r s h ip ,  when the  a l t e r n a t i v e s  posed were "some censorship" 
or  t h a t  people  should  be a b l e  to "read and see what they lik e " . The 
sample o f  Labor v o t e r s  was even ly  s p l i t  on the  q u e s t i o n ,  whereas a 
s u b s t a n t i a l  m a j o r i t y  o f  L ib e ra l /C o u n t ry  P a r ty  v o t e r s  favoured  some 
c e n s o r s h ip :
TABLE 4.15 1969 VOTE BY OPINIONS ON CENSORSHIP
1969 Vote
Some
Censorship
Read and See 
Anything
D on ' t  know; 
No Answer
Lib/CP 63.1 35.2 1.7
Labor 49.3 49.3 1.4
100% (826) 
100% (823)
25. A u s t r a l i a n  Gal lup P o l l s ,  August 15,  1969; October  4,  1969.
99
The partisanship score obtained by averaging the dif ferences in the 
levels of  Liberal/Country Party and Labor support fo r  each a l te rna t ive  
was 14.0 - ind ica t ive of a "slight"  degree of partisan dispute on Goot's 
scale.
In general terms, the ASP resu l ts  were ind ica t ive of very low
levels of part isan discord with in the sample on the eight issues analysed.
No more than "moderate"  partisanship was registered on any item, and the
responses to six items (conscript ion;  the U.S. a l l iance ;  foreign
investment; migrat ion; State aid; censorship) could be c lass i f ied  as 
26b i-par t isan.  Only the Vietnam war and Communist China resulted in 
opinion levels which d i f fe red  by more than 20 percentage points according 
to the voting background of  the respondent. For the most part ,  therefore, 
opinion cleavages with in the ASP sample were not reinforced by cleavages 
in party support.
Although the issues analysed here were few in number, the results
27 28obtained support f ind ings by Goot and by C.A. Hughes and J.S. Western
that the d is t r ib u t io n  of opinions on most issues in Austra l ia assumed a
s im i la r  pattern for  Liberal/Country Party and Labor voters. Unfortunately,
the re s t r i c t io n  in the breadth of th is  analysis means that i t  is  not
possible to draw any general conclusions about the types of issues which
are more l i k e l y  to provoke part isan c o n f l i c t .
On the basis of the ASP survey alone, however, we can refute several
hypotheses which have been advanced in the predict ion of cleavages along
party l ines amongst voters overseas. In re la t ion  to publ ic opinion in
B r i ta in ,  Blondel hypothesized that electors were "partisan on social and
29economic matters only". Although Austral ian voters may have been
26. Goot c lass i f ied  responses as "b i -pa r t isan" ,  i f  there were no more than 
20 percentage points separating Labor from non-Labor voters, op.cit. 3 
p. 83. His pract ice has been fol lowed here.
27. ibid. , p.83.
28. C.A. Hughes and J.S. Western, The Prime M in is te r 's  Pol icy Speech 
(Canberra, 1966), pp82, 171.
29. Blondel, op.cit. p.77.
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partisan on other issues in this category, the items which could be 
classif ied as "social" or "economic” in the ASP survey (conscription; 
foreign investment; migration; State aid; and censorship) recorded 
bi-partisan responses.
Similarly, Kirkpatrick's observation that partisan cleavage on 
issues was lower for foreign affairs than for domestic affairs in the 
United States did not hold in relation to the Australian data. Two of 
the three foreign policy items (the Vietnam war and Conmunist China) were 
the only issues which registered moderate levels of partisan discord; 
whereas opinion patterns were clearly bi-partisan for al l  the domestic 
issues.
Berelson's hypothesis that style issues were associated with
31consensus and position issues with partisan dispute was harder to test 
here as there were no style issues included in the analysis. The 
distr ibution of opinions in a bi-partisan manner for six out of the eight 
position issues, however, suggests that this hypothesis would not be valid 
for Australia, a conclusion also reached by Goot on the basis of Gallup 
Poll data.32 
Inten sity
So far in this analysis, discussion of att i tudinal cleavages has 
been restricted to a single dimension, that of the direction of a voter's 
opinion. Attitudes, however, have affective as well as cognitive 
components. The emotional commitment of a person to his opinion, reflected 
in the intensity with which he prefers his view to other possible 
alternatives, assumes particular importance in the study of public 
opinion as i t  may affect the likelihood of poli t ical action on the part 
of the person concerned, or of governmental action in response to a
30. Kirkpatrick and Jones, op.cit. , p.696.
31. Berelson, op.cit. , pp.185-202.
32. Goot, op.cit. , p.84.
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perception that some members of the electorate attach particularly
33strong feelings to their opinions.
Democratic theorists and students of electoral behaviour have 
considered the possible effects of certain patterns in the distribution 
of opinions and their intensities on the stabil i ty of the political system. 
Key speculated in this vein:
"Offhand o b serva tio n  makes i t  c le a r  th a t a regime th a t  must dea l 
w ith  op in ion  b lo c s  o f  high in te n s i ty  may be b ese t by p e r io d ic  
r e v o lu tio n s 3 d r iven  to  d ic ta to r ia l  methods i f  i t s  d e c is io n s  are 
to  p r e v a i l3 or perhaps p a ra lyzed  by the  i n t r a c ta b i l i t y  o f  
c o n f l ic t in g  view s o f  h igh  i n t e n s i t y . On the  o th e r  hand, a 
government whose people  harbour le s s  in te n se  op in ions co n fro n ts  
d i f f e r e n t  k inds o f  problems in  the  management o f  a f f a i r s . "34
R.A. Dahl considered several possible types of distribution of
35intense opinions in his discussion of democratic theory. Potentially 
the most explosive situations for a political system were those in which 
conflicting opinions were about evenly divided and held with high 
intensity on both sides, and those where an intense minority was opposed 
to an apathetic majority. In both situations, the prospects for stabil i ty 
would presumably be lowered if the divisions in opinion were reinforced 
by other cleavages ( i . e . ,  in a situation where cross-cutting cleavages 
were not in evidence). Dahl's feeling that most political controversies 
in stable democracies would not be of this type was given support by 
Key's examination of opinion intensities in the United States in relation 
to a variety of domestic and foreign policy issues in 1956, in which 
most opinion distributions approached consensus and were characterised by
o r
low intensit ies.  Lane and Sears, in analysing 1952 and 1956 data obtained 
by the University of Michigan, could find only one instance of an intense 
minority and a relatively indifferent majority - that of attitudes towards
33. Key, Public Opinion and American Democracy, p.208.
34. i b i d . ,  p.228.
35. R.A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago, 1956) pp.90-119.
36. Key, Public Opinion and American Democracy, p.228.
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Senator Joseph McCarthy - and even here the dif ferences in opinion and
37in tens i ty  were s t i l l  not very great.
There is a common assumption that voters with opinions of high
in te ns i ty  are more l i k e l y  to act to put th e i r  opinions into e f fec t  than
those who are re la t i v e ly  in d i f fe re n t .  This predisposit ion to p o l i t i c a l
act ion may, however, resu l t  as much from social s i tuations or personal
charac te r is t ics  which themselves encourage a high level of emotional
commitment to opinions as from the commitment i t s e l f .  Key suggested that
in te ns i ty  of  opinion could be derived from the immediacy in impact of a
po l icy  on a class of people; or from group pressures on ind iv iduals ;
38or from the general community s i tua t ion .  The degree of in tens i ty  might
also depend on the information avai lable to the persons concerned, i t s e l f
often a function of  education leve l.  Another hypothesis suggests that
those who have a strong in te res t  in p o l i t i c s  and are accustomed to
pa r t ic ipa te  are also l i k e l y  to feel strongly about th e i r  opinions. Key
found some support fo r  the operation of  each of these factors in re la t ion
to his 1956 data, but warned that his measurements o f  in tens i ty  might not
be construed as having "the same meaning from person to person, situation
39to situation, or issue to issue".
Reservations about the v a l i d i t y  of procedures employed to measure 
in te ns i ty  were expressed by Rae and Taylor, who f e l t  that the concept 
i t s e l f  contained a m b ig u i t ie s .^  To i l luminate these ambiguit ies, three 
questions needed to be asked of the term "intensity" -  "Intensity compared 
to what? Intensity compared to whom? Intensity in what sense?". The 
common method fo r  measuring in tens i ty  in opinion surveys, a simple L iker t  
scale asking respondents to say whether they feel "very strongly, fairly
37. Lane and Sears, op.cit. , pp.111-113.
38. Key, Public Opinion and American Democracy, pp.218-225.
39. ibid., p.227.
40. Rae and Taylor, op.cit. ,pp.45-62.
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s t r o n g ly 3 or no t very s tro n g ly "  about their opinions, does not usually 
specify the particular alternative against which respondents are meant to 
make their comparison (unless the opinion question only presents two 
choices); does not guarantee that the self-ratings are comparable in 
value; and does not specify the exact meaning to be attached to strength 
of feeling. Possible variations along each of these three dimensions 
were thought by Rae and Taylor to provide the source for ambiguities in 
the concept, both as a tool of measurement and of theory.
A number of different meanings can be implied in the statement
that a person holds his views with high intensity. As a self-rating of
intensity of opinion involves an implicit judgement on the part of a person
as to how much he prefers his own view to a possible alternative,ratings
are likely to differ qualitatively unless the researcher has specified
a single standard for comparison. The adjectives employed to describe
strength of feeling may also simply mean different things to different
people. Further, Rae and Taylor pointed out that an expressed strong
preference for a policy might imply a variety of possible reactions if
that policy was not adopted, ranging from mere displeasure, all the way
41to action to overthrow the regime.
The ASP questionnaire can be crit icised for i ts  failure to resolve 
any of these ambiguities in i ts attempt to assess the intensity with 
which respondents held their opinions. Nor did i t  provide a complete 
coverage of the issue items, as questions on intensity were asked in 
reference to only four of the eight issues. On only one item, censorship, 
can we be sure that all respondents were making a comparative judgement 
between the same two alternative opinions. A multiplicity of different 
comparisons could have been involved in a single statement of intensity 
of preference on any of the remaining items, which offered up to five 
possible alternatives. In interpreting the results,  we cannot safely
41 . ib id .
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assume that all respondents assigned the same values to such measures
as "very strong" or "fairly strong"; thus, the interpersonal comparisons
inevitably involved in aggregating responses must be regarded as highly 
42suspect.
Keeping in mind the crude nature of the data, some observations
can be made about the intensity with which different opinions appeared to
be held by members of the ASP sample. By comparing the percentages of
"very strong" responses in each opinion category in Table 4.16, i t  can
be seen that the more extreme opinions did tend to attract more intense
feelings on the issues of the Vietnam war and conscription. This
relationship between extremity of opinion and intensity of feeling has
become such a well-established pattern in public opinion research that i ts
43existence is used to determine the validity of attitude scales. Its 
occurrence here suggests that the survey's designers were successful in 
constructing a series of alternative opinions on Vietnam and conscription 
which approximated a graduated attitude scale for each item.
The results for migration did not f i t  this pattern as a majority 
of the small number who favoured keeping Asians out of Australia altogether 
said they fe l t  "very strongly" about their view. Logically, however, 
this particular attitude could be considered an extreme position; which 
suggests that the question on migration was not measuring respondents' 
comparative positions along a single attitudinal dimension.
42. According to Rae and Taylor, op.cit. , p.54, no operational procedures 
have yet been devised for making reliable interpersonal comparisons 
of intensity. In this respect, the A.S.P. survey is no less 
sophisticated than more recent attempts to measure the intensity
of opinions of voters in the United States.
43. See H. Cantril, "The Intensity of an Attitude", Journal of Abnormal 
and Social Psychology, 41 (1946), pp. 129-135; V.0. Key, Public 
Opinion and American Democracy, p. 209; Lane and Sears, op.cit. , 
p. 105; Rae and Taylor, op.cit., p.61.
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TABLE 4.16 INTENSITY OF OPINIONS ON FOUR ISSUE ITEMS
Number % of th is Total
feeling opinion number
"very feeling with th is
strongly"
Vietnam war
"very 
strongly”
opinion
(A) Troops, including conscripts 224 50.9 442
(B) Only volunteer troops 330 40.7 813
(C) Only c iv i l ian  experts 118 50.9 233
(C) Stay out of Vietnam altogether 218 65.5 335
Conscription
(A) Conscription for all  young men 456 60.0 765
(B) Continue ballo t  system 35 26.9 132
(C) Provide c iv i l ian  a l ternat ives 270 44.3 617
(D) No form of conscription at  all 211 66.8 316
Mi gration
(A) Asians on the same basis as Europeans 157 36.5 431
(B) Small quota of Asians 175 22.6 778
(C) No Asian migrants 56 63.6 88
(D) Only U.K. and N. European migrants 139 45.0 310
(E) No more migrants a t  present 107 52.7 203
Censorship
Some censorship 522 50.2 1058
People should read and see what they like 386 50.6 784
When the d i f fe ren t ia l  in tens i t ie s  with which respondents said they 
held the i r  opinions were compared across the lines of part isan cleavage, 
an association between increased strength of feeling and the direction 
of vote in 1969 became apparent for some opinions, but not for others . 
These e ffects  can best be i l lu s t r a te d  on the opinions where part isan 
confl ic t  was the greates t  - a l te rna t ives  (A) and (D) on Vietnam; and
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a l t e r n a t i v e  (D) on c o n s c r i p t i o n . ^
I n t e n s i t y  of  f ee l i ng  appeared to make l i t t l e  d i f f e r e n c e  to the 
vot ing pa t t e r n  amongst those who were of  the opinion t h a t  t roops ,  
inc luding consc r i p t s  should be in Vietnam, but i t  s l i g h t l y  increased the 
l i ke l i hood  of a Labor vote amongst those who f e l t  Aus t r a l i a  should s tay 
out  of  Vietnam a l t o g e th e r :
(A)
(D)
TABLE 4.17 INTENSITY OF OPINIONS TOWARDS THE VIETNAM WAR
Lib/CP Labor
Very St rongly 81.7 18.3
Troops and
c onsc r i p t s  Not so s t r o n g l y 45 83.2 16.8
in Vietnam
Total 82.5 17.5
Lib/CP Labor
Very St rongly 18.8 81.2
Stay out
of  Vietnam M . c . ,Not so St rongly 25.7 74.3
a l t og e t he r
Total 21.0 79.0
100%
(191)
100%
(184)
100%
(377)
100%
(192)
100%
( 101 )
100%
(295)
The r e l a t i o n s h i p  between s t r eng t h  of  f e e l i ng  and d i r e c t i o n  of  vote was 
s t ronge r  amongst those in favour of  abo l i sh ing  consc r i p t i on :
44. Although the d i f f e r e nc e  of  18 percentage point s  which separa ted the 
propor t ions  of  Labor and Libera l /Count ry  Par ty vo t e r s  who favoured no 
form of  c onsc r i p t i on  a t  a l l  (D) was s t i l l  wi thin Goot ' s  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  
of  ' s l i g h t '  p a r t i s an s h i p  only,  the cleavage here was more than twice 
as l a rge  as t h a t  r e g i s t e r e d  for  any other  a l t e r n a t i v e  opinion on 
con sc r i p t i o n ,  and l a r g e r  than the percentage d i f f e r e n c e s  recorded 
with r e spec t  to any o the r  item except  Vietnam.
45. The two ca t egor i e s  of  i n t e n s i t y ,  ' f a i r l y  s t rong l y '  and ' no t  very 
s t r o n g l y ' ,  have been combined here as i t  was f e l t  t h a t  the d i f f e r e n ­
t i a t i o n  of  ' very s t ro n g l y '  as a d i s t i n c t l y  higher  level  of  i n t e n s i t y  
would have been e a s i e r  fo r  sub j ec t s  than the c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  of t h e i r  
f e e l i n g s  in to  one or  o ther  of  these  two ' lower '  c a t e g o r i e s .
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(D)
TABLE 4.18 INTENSITY OF OPINIONS ON CONSCRIPTION
Lib/CP Labor
Very St rongly 18.1 81.9
No form of
consc r i p t i on  .. .r Not so St rongly 32.7 67.3
a t  al 1
Total 23.4 76.6
100%
(177)
100%
( 101 )
100%
(278)
Despi te the poss ib l e  ambigui t i es  inherent  in the data presented 
here ,  i t  may be f e a s i b l e  to make some t e n t a t i v e  observat ions  on the 
p a t t e rn s  of  i n t e n s i t y  a ssoc i a t ed  with c e r t a i n  opinions  present  wi thin 
the sample,  e s p e c i a l l y  as these  r e l a t e d  to d i v i s i on s  in vot ing support .
On censorsh ip ,  where only two c o n f l i c t i n g  views were po s s i b l e ,  
the sample was f a i r l y  evenly d iv ided ,  with ha l f  of each s ide  saying they 
f e l t  very s t rong ly  about t h e i r  opinion.  The s i t u a t i o n  was un l i k e ly  to 
generate  much c o n f l i c t  for  the p o l i t i c a l  system, however, as only a s l i g h t  
level  of  p a r t i s a n s h i p  was recorded,  i . e .  the d i v i s ion  in opinion was not 
matched by a cleavage along par ty  l i n e s .
The Vietnam war, c onsc r i p t i on  and migrat ion presented i ns t ances  
where m i n o r i t i e s  with in tense  opinions  were opposed by m a j o r i t i e s  with 
l e s s  s t rong l y  f e l t  views. This c o n t r a s t  i s  i l l u s t r a t e d  g ra ph ic a l l y  in 
Figures 4 .9  - 4.11.  As a v a r i e t y  of  opinions  were expressed on each 
i s s u e ,  none of the s i t u a t i o n s  could be said to r ep r e sen t  extreme p o l a r i ­
za t i on .  The c o n f l i c t s  over migrat ion were un l ike ly  to have r epercuss ions  
which would a f f e c t  the par ty  balance in 1969 as d i v i s i on s  were evident  
amongst Libera l /Count ry  Par ty and Labor voters  a l i k e .  There were two 
in s t a nce s ,  however, where mi no r i t i e s  with in t ense  opinions  supported one 
pa r ty  a t  the po l l s  more than the o ther  - a l t e r n a t i v e  (D) on Vietnam 
(65.5% f e l t  "very s t r o n g l y 79.0% voted A.L.P. )  and a l t e r n a t i v e  (D) on 
c onsc r i p t i on  (66.8% f e l t  "very s t r o n g l y 76.6% voted A.L.P.'), In both cases ,  
the tendency to favour the Labor Par ty increased with inc reases  in the level  
of emotional commitment to the opinion.  The r e s u l t s  suggest  t h a t  A u s t r a l i a ' s
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involvement in Vietnam and the debate over conscription were the two
A C
p o te n t ia l ly  most d iv is ive  issues, amongst the eight analysed here, for  
the e lectorate  in 1969. But hasty conclusions would be dangerous at  th is  
stage in the analysis.  The necessity for  caution in regard to the 
measurement of in tens i ty  of feel ing has already been noted: there are
further  dimensions of opinion such as the salience of  issues to the voters,  
which must also be considered.
FIGURE 4.9 DISTRIBUTION OF OPINIONS ON VIETNAM AND COMPARATIVE INTENSITIES
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46. The "division" mentioned here is visualised only in terms of the 
degree of correspondence between opinion cleavages and the pattern  
of party support, as expressed in the d is t r ibu t ion  of votes within  
the sample. No attempt has been made in this chapter to estimate the 
strength of relat ionships between issue opinions and the d irect ion  of  
the ind iv idua l 's  vote at the 1969 elect ion.  Although coe f f ic ien ts  of  
corre lat ion could be obtained which would provide summary measures of  
the degree of association between the issue and voting var iab les ,  they 
would give only a superfic ia l  description of the issue-vote l inkage.  
Such summary s ta t is t i c s  could be misleading at th is  ear ly  stage of 
the analysis as they could mask the contribution of other variables  
to the influence processes which culminate in the voting act .  
Correlation coe f f ic ien ts  have been included in the course of a m u l t i ­
var ia te  analysis of 1969 vote which is reported in Chapter 10.
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FIGURE 4.10 DISTRIBUTION OF OPINIONS ON CONSCRIPTION AND COMPARATIVE
INTENSITIES OF FEELING ASSOCIATED WITH OPINIONS
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FIGURE 4.11 DISTRIBUTION OF OPINIONS ON ASIAN MIGRATION AND COMPARATIVE
INTENSITIES OF FEELING ASSOCIATED WITH OPINIONS
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CHAPTER 5
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES - DEMOGRAPHICS AND ISSUES
Differences in social and demographic attributes, such as 
occupation, education, age and sex, constitute cleavages within society 
which may or may not be related to differences in opinion and/or party 
preference. Any study of the relations between opinions and voting 
behaviour must take into account differences in the makeup of the sample 
of electors chosen for study. Observed variations in the direction of 
vote might well be due to the operation of social factors alone, or 
to their interaction with voters' attitudes.
A person's social characteristics, in addition to his age and sex, 
have generally been considered prior, determining factors in the formation 
of attitudes towards public policy. Variations in level of education and 
occupation are certainly indicative of different experiences in the social­
isation of an individual. Campbell and his associates maintained that 
differences in opinion could arise from voters in different social categories 
being exposed to different types of polit ically relevant experiences, and being 
provided, according to their social roles, with varying prescriptions for 
appropriate behaviour patterns."*- The position of individuals in relation to 
different socio-demographic cri te ria ,  could, on occasions, result in their 
membership of community sub-groups (such as those possessing a private 
school educational background belonging to an "old school t ie "  grouping) 
which would exert pressures on members to conform to certain attitudinal and 
behavioural standards.
Various hypotheses have been advanced in the past to explain apparent 
links between opinions and the possession of certain social or demographic 
characteristics. Perhaps the most persistent assumptions about political 
behaviour in Western liberal democracies have been those which attributed
1. Campbell, op. c i t . } pp.474-5.
I l l
greater "conservatism"  to older people, and to females, in comparison with
males. A more conservative outlook on l i fe ,  reflected in attitudes which
supported the preservation of the status quo and rejected such "socialistic"
innovations as the welfare state was presumed to characterise these types
of people. The overt expression of this conservatism was thought to be
found in a preference for political parties located towards the "right" of
the ideological spectrum. Recent studies have pointed to fallacies in some
2of the empirical and logical bases for these assumptions.
In another theory linking social characteristics to political a t t i t ­
udes, early work on the distribution of authoritarian views in the United 
States was taken as evidence that authoritarianism was related to low socio­
economic status and arose out of sentiments of thwarted aspiration, frust-
3
ration and resentment. These findings, too, have since been called into 
question
In view of the failure of such generalised hypotheses to stand up
to scrutiny, V.O. Key suggested that a more profitable approach to
explaining the differences in opinions on specific issues which undoubtedly
did exist would lie in a pragmatic attempt to analyse the relationships
5
between social characteristics and atti tudes, issue by issue. This chapter
2. M. Goot and E. Reid, Mindless Matrons or Sexist Scientism?, a paper 
presented at the 15th Annual Conference of the Australian Political 
Studies Association in August 1973, pointed out the fallacies and super­
f ic ia l i t ie s  characteristic of the argument that "women are more conserv­
ative than men". In a series of articles in The Australian, October 1969, 
M. Kahan and D. Aitkin argued that, on the basis of the 1967 A.S.P. results 
older Australians were not more conservative in their choice of political 
parties than younger voters, but they were less likely to change their 
party preferences.
3. M. Janowitz and D. Marvick, "Authoritarianism and Political Behaviour", 
Public Opinion Quarterly, 27 (1953), pp.185-201.
4. V.O. Key, Public Opinion and American Democracy, p.137, suggested that 
these findings stemmed from the indisposition of working class respond­
ents to argue with the suggestions of their "lady interviewers".
5. ibid, p.137.
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w i l l  be devoted to an analysis of opinion differences amongst members of 
the A.S.P. sample according to th e i r  re la t ive  educational and occupational 
status,  age and sex and, add i t iona l ly ,  a measure of th e i r  in te res t  in 
p o l i t i c s .  I t  w i l l  also endeavour to discover the extent to which 
differences on these socio-demographic variables can explain var ia t ions, 
or s im l ia r i t i e s  in opinion across party l ines.
Separate measures of respondents' education and occupation have 
been used in preference to a composite index of "social class". Although 
these two variables const i tu te the main socio-economic indicators of a 
person's class, they do not necessarily cover the subject ive elements of 
class membership. The scope of th is  thesis does not allow a f u l l  discuss­
ion of the re la t ions between object ive class d iv is ions,  subject ive 
perceptions of class, community status patterns and opinions on publ ic
g
policy w i th in  the A.S.P. sample. As th is  has been undertaken elsewhere, 
the present study w i l l  confine i t s e l f  to an analysis centred on the two
variables of education and occupation. When respondents' educational
7 8backgrounds were cross-tabulated against the i r  levels of occupation , the
expected strong associat ion between the two variables was observed. The
re la t ionship can most eas i ly  be seen by comparing the cel l  percentages
v e r t i c a l l y  across the three levels of education in Table 5.1.
6. For a f u l l  analysis, see D. A i tk in ,  S ta b i l i t y  and Change in Austral ian 
P o l i t i c s , forthcoming.
7. When panel respondents were re-interviewed in 1969 they were not asked 
whether the level o f  education they had reached in 1967 had altered
in the intervening two years. The l ike l ihood of fu r the r  education in 
adulthood, although small , may have resulted in incorrect estimations 
of  education level fo r  some respondents in 1969.
8. As in most socio logical surveys, occupation is ac tua l ly  that  of the 
Head of the Household, whether or not that person was the interview 
respondent. This means that a l l  married women, unless they were the 
sole income earners, were given the occupational status o f  th e i r  
husbands. See Goot and Reid, op. cit. , pp.31-32 fo r  c r i t i c i s m  of the 
implicat ions of  th is  pract ice.
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TABLE 5.1 ASSOCIATION BETWEEN EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND 
AND OCCUPATIONAL STATUS (ROW PERCENTAGES)
U n sk i l i e d Semi - Ski l i e d
Occupation
ci • n  a  O ff ice  
S k l l l e d  & Sa les
Semi - 
P ro fess  
Managers
P ro fe s s i o n a l NoAnswer
None/
Primary 25.0 25.4 13.9 8 .9 17.8 2.7 6 .3
100%
[527)
Sec­
ondary 12.8 13.3 17.1 15.7 27.4 9 .8 3.9
100%
[1209)
T e r t i a r y 2.4
|
3 .3 4.9 11.4 46.3 29.3 2.4
100%
[123)
(292) (299) (287) (253) (490) (168) (84)
The Vietnam War
Opinions on Vietnam d id  appea r  to d i f f e r  acco rd ing  to  the  v o t e r s '  
e d u c a t io n a l  a t t a i n m e n t s .  The most popu la r  o p t i o n ,  t h a t  v o lu n t e e r  t roops  
only shou ld  be f i g h t i n g  in Vietnam, s u f f e r e d  a c o n s i d e r a b l e  lo s s  in s u p p o r t  
amongst the  t e r t i a r y  educa ted  r e s p o n d e n t s .  The p o p u l a r i t y  o f  a l t e r n a t i v e  
(C),  t h a t  c i v i l i a n  e x p e r t s  only  should remain in Vietnam, i n c re a s e d  wi th 
e d u c a t io n .  The g r e a t e s t  s u p p o r t  f o r  t o t a l  d isengagement from the  war 
was found amongst those  responden ts  who had completed only  the  primary  
l e v e l , o r  lower:
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None/ 
Primary
Sec­
ondary
T e r t i a ry
TABLE 5.2 VIETNAM OPINION x EDUCATION LEVEL
Troops & 
Conscripts  
(A)
Only
Volunteers 
(B)
Only
Ci v i 1i ans 
(C)
Stay Out 
A1together 
(D)
Don't  Know 
No Answer
19.9 41.9 8.3 26.0 3.8 100%(527)
25.2 46.0 11.9 14.6 2.3 100%(1209)
21.1 27.6 35.0 16.3 0.0 100%(123)
I t  was noted in the preceding chap te r  t h a t  d i f f e r en c es  in opinion 
between Labor and L ibera l /Country  Party  vote rs  were most marked on the 
two most extreme o p t io n s ,  the  commitment o f  t ro o p s ,  inc luding c o n s c r ip t s ,  
and t o t a l  disengagement. The i n t e r a c t i o n  of educational in f luences  with 
d i f f e r e n c e s  in opinion according to 1969 vote was apparent he re ,  as 
t e r t i a r y  educated Libera l /Country  Party  vote rs  were more l i k e l y  than t h e i r  
fe llow vote rs  with l e s s  education to favour s tay ing  out of Vietnam a l t o g e t h e r ,  
whereas t h i s  option was l e s s  popular amongst Labor vote rs  with t e r t i a r y  
education than amongst those  with primary education (although the abso lu te  
leve l s  of  support  fo r  t h i s  a l t e r n a t i v e  were, of  course ,  lower fo r  government 
vote rs  than fo r  those whose 1969 vote favoured the o p p o s i t io n ) .  In 
s im p l i f i e d  terms,  support  fo r  t o t a l  withdrawal from Vietnam in crea sed  
s l i g h t l y  with educat ion amongst L ibera l /Country  Party  v o te r s ,  and decreased  
with educat ion amongst Labor vo te r s .  The reverse  p a t t e rn  was ev iden t  fo r  
the  commitment of t ro o p s ,  inc lud ing  c o n sc r ip t s  to the war.
Education appeared to  have two main in f lu en c es ,  independent of  vote.  
Whichever par ty  they supported in 1969, t e r t i a r y  educated respondents  
were le s s  l i k e l y  to favour the  most popular ove ra l l  a l t e r n a t i v e ,  (B), than 
those with le s s  educa t ion .  In c o n t r a s t ,  suppor t  fo r  the  r e t e n t io n  o f  c i v i l i a n
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experts only, (C), increased with education, i rrespective of vote.
Similar patterns in the variation of opinions towards Vietnam 
were noted within the sample when d if feren t  occupations were considered - 
see Table 5.3. The drop in the popularity of r e s t r i c t in g  combat troops 
in Vietnam to volunteers with t e r t i a ry  education, observed above, was 
matched by a corresponding decrease in i t s  popularity amongst those with 
professional occupations. Support for a l te rna t ive  (C) increased with 
occupational level ,  whereas support for a l te rna t ive  (D) decreased with 
occupational level.  Alternative (A), a lso,  showed a s l igh t  increase in 
popularity with higher occupational levels .
TABLE 5.3 VIETNAM OPINION x OCCUPATIONAL STATUS
Unski lied
Semi - 
sk i l led
Ski 1 led
Office & 
Sales Clerks
Semi -
Professional
Owners/
Managers
Professional
Troops & Only Only Stay Out Don't Know
Conscripts Volunteers Civilians Altogether No Answer 
(A) (B) (C) (D)
22.6 40.4
j
9.9 22.9 4.1
20.7 45.2 10.0 22.7 1.3
21.6 43.6 11.8 21.6 1.4
24.9 45.1 11.1 16.2 2.8
25.3 47.1 13.9 11.4 2.2
28.6 36.9
! 1
20.8 11.3 2.4
100%
(292)
100%
(299)
100%
(287)
100%
(253)
100%
(490)
100%
(168)
When direction of 1969 vote was also considered, some of the trends 
in opinion observed with variations in education were repl icated,  whilst 
others were not. Most of the trends were res t r ic ted  to one of the two 
groups of voters, suggesting that  occupation was less effect ive
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than d i re c t io n  o f  1969 vote as a p red ic to r  o f  stance towards Vietnam.
The p o pu la r i t y  o f  re ta in in g  c i v i l i a n  experts only in Vietnam increased 
with  occupational level amongst Labor vote rs , but not amongst L ib e ra l /
Country Party voters . The drop in support fo r  keeping only volunteer 
troops in Vietnam amongst professional people recorded above was rep l ica ted  
f o r  1969 Labor voters, but not f o r  L ibera l /Country  Party voters, where a 
drop in support occurred amongst the unsk i l led  workers at the opposite 
end o f  the occupational scale. The popu la r i ty  o f a l t e rn a t i v e  (D) decreased 
with  occupational level amongst Labor voters; as did the popu la r i ty  o f  
(A) amongst L ibera l /Country  Party voters.
An examination o f  opinions held by respondents o f  d i f f e r e n t  ages 
resu lted  in a rebut ta l  o f  the thesis  th a t  o lder  people, by v i r tu e  o f  t h e i r  
age alone, tend to oppose the notion o f  radical change (see Table 5 .4 ) .  
Support f o r  to ta l  withdrawal from Vietnam, (D), increased, as the age levels  
o f  respondents increased. The other  extreme, commitment o f  troops which 
included conscr ip ts ,  (A) ,  drew i t s  main support from those aged 35 and under, 
and 56 and over. The r e s t r i c t i o n  o f  involvement to volunteer troops, (B), 
was co n s is ten t ly  popular amongst respondents aged 55 and under, and l o s t  
some support in the o lder  age groupings.
A^e
21-23
24-35
36-45
46-55
56-75
TABLE 5.4 VIETNAM OPINION x AGE
Troops & Only Only Stay Out Don't  Know
Conscripts Volunteers C iv i l ia n s  A l together No Answer 
(A) (B) (C) (D)
25.1 46.3 13.1 15.4 0.0
27.8 44.3 12.0 14.8 1.2
19.1 46.5 15.1 16.6 2.7
19.5 48.3 10.2 19.8 2.3
24.9 36.2 11.9 22.0 5.0
i
27.0 ; 31.7
!
6.3 23.8 11.1
100%
(175)
100%
(418)
100%
(404)
100%
(344)
100%
(378)
100%
(63)
76-95
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The general p a t te rn  o f  support  f o r  a l t e r n a t i v e  (B) found w i t h in  the 
whole sample was reproduced amongst both Labor and L ibe ra l /C o un t ry  Party  
vo te rs .  No c le a r  t rend  w i th  age was ev iden t  f o r  a l t e r n a t i v e  (C) amongst 
e i t h e r  group o f  vo te rs .  L ib e ra l /C o u n t ry  Party  vo ters  showed c l e a r l y  the 
drop in suppor t  f o r  commi t t ing c o n s c r ip ts ,  as wel l  as vo lun tee rs ,  to f i g h t  
in  Vietnam amongst those aged 36 to 55 years which was noted w i t h in  the 
main sample. As the graph in  Figure 5.1 i l l u s t r a t e s ,  the younger and 
o ld e r  L ib e ra l /C o u n t ry  Party  vo ters  were more l i k e l y  than those in  the 
middle age groups to have an op in ion  in  l i n e  w i th  pa r ty  p o l i c y  (an 
op in ion  which could be c l a s s i f i e d  as the most "c o n s e rv a tiv e "  o f  the 
a l t e r n a t i v e s  o f fe re d  by the A.S.P. q u e s t io n n a i re ) .
FIGURE 5.1 AGE LEVELS OF RESPONDENTS FAVOURING (A) ON VIETNAM
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Staying out o f  Vietnam a l t o g e th e r  (D) became more popular w i th  Labor 
vo ters  as age increased.  The same t rend was ev id e n t ,  al though to a much 
sm a l le r  e x te n t ,  amongst L ib e ra l /C o u n t ry  Party  vo te rs .  Breaking the 
general t rend w i th  age amongst Labor vo ters  were the 21-23 year  o ld s ,  
who were s l i g h t l y  more l i k e l y  to  favour  (D) than those Labor voters  aged 
from 24 to 45 years - see Figure 5.2.
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FIGURE 5.2 AGE LEVELS OF RESPONDENTS FAVOURING (p) ON VIETNAM
SH-33 3b~A5" 4b ~55 Sb-7S 7b "95
(fcS) (to ) (n t )  O O  (ibfe) (aa)
On the whole,  there was very l i t t l e  d i f f e re n c e  recorded in  the A.S.P. 
survey between male and female op in ions on Vietnam. Female respondents 
were a l i t t l e  less l i k e l y  to favour  the commitment o f  t roo ps ,  in c lud ing  
c o n s c r ip ts  (A) and more l i k e l y  than males to p re fe r  the r e s t r i c t i o n  o f  
t roops to  vo lun teers  (B):
TABLE 5.5 VIETNAM OPINION x SEX
Male
Female
Troops & Only Only Stay Out Don ' t  Know
Conscr ipts Volunteers C i v i l i a n s  A l to ge the r  No Answer 
(A) (B) (C) (D)
100%
(975)
100%
(898)
25.8 41.1 12.2 18.5 2.4
21.2 45.9 12.7 17.3 3.0
The tendency f o r  males, ra th e r  than females,  to  adopt the most 
"conservative” v iewpo in t  on Vietnam was c l e a r l y  observable f o r  both L i b e r a l /  
Country Party  and Labor voters when d i r e c t i o n  o f  1969 vote was taken in to
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account. Liberal/Country Party women were less likely than men to choose 
alternative (A) (42.2% of males; 33.6% of females) and more likely than 
men to favour restricting the Australian commitment to volunteer troops 
(B) or even to civilian advisers (C). Labor women were similarly less 
likely to favour (A) and more likely to choose (B) than men, but they were 
also more likely than men to be of the opinion that Australia should stay 
out of Vietnam altogether (D). Alternative (C) did not appeal to as large 
a proportion of female Labor voters as male.
The finding that women were more in favour of some sort of 
reduction in Australia's commitment to the war than men corresponded with 
the results of earlier research conducted in the United States. A group 
of researchers operating from Stanford University found that, amongst 
members of a national sample surveyed in 1966, females were more likely 
than males to favour policies designed to de-escalate the conflict in
9Vietnam. These results, being obtained three years earlier and in a 
different country, cannot be used as a standard in judging the validity of 
the A.S.P. findings. However, they do provide an interesting comparison; 
and the American researchers' explanation, that women have been shown to be 
"somewhat more opposed to  p o l ic ie s  th a t  could  be considered  'a g r e s s iv e ' 
may be applicable to the A.S.P. sample.* 11
By controlling for the direction of 1969 vote, we have seen that some 
of the relationships between opinion on Vietnam and socio-demographic 
characteristics observed within the main sample were, in fact, confined to 
those respondents who voted for the same party; whilst others persisted 
across party lines. No causal sequence can be assigned to the observed
9. S. Verba, e t  a l , "Public Opinion and the War in Vietnam", American 
Political Science Review, 61 (1967), pp.317-33.
10. i b i d , p.331.
11. But see the points advanced by Goot and Reid, o p .c i t .  , against the 
validity of this type of generalisation.
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re la t ionsh ips,  with the possible exception of  cases where 1969 vote was 
contro l led ,  and where opinion varied with such pre-determined demographic 
charac te r isecs  as age and sex, no matter which party respondents had 
voted fo r  at the elect ion. In no instance can we be sure that the patterns 
of var ia t ion did not resu l t  from the operation o f  some add i t iona l ,  
uncontrol led var iable.  I t  may have been, too, that the pa r t icu la r  socio- 
demorgraphic categories examined had in te rac t ive  effects  - fo r  example, 
that the combination of  a cer tain age grouping and educational standard was 
associated with a pa r t icu la r  viewpoint on Vietnam d i f fe re n t  from that shared 
by others in the same age group with more or less education, and from older 
and younger respondents with the same educational background. One possible 
area fo r  the occurrence of  such in teract ion was examined by a three-way 
analysis which control led fo r  sex, a binary var iable whose use in addition 
to two other variables s t i l l  allowed s u f f i c ie n t  cases in each grouping fo r  
re l ia b le  analysis.
As sex and 1969 vote had been shown to in te rac t  in such a way that
comparisons between the opinions of  male and female respondents on Vietnam
altered s l i g h t l y  according to the p o l i t i c a l  party they supported, so sex
12was found to in te rac t  with educational level and age in varying ways, some 
of which qua l i f ied  any s im p l is t ic  pic ture o f  a more i s o la t io n is t  female 
approach to the Vietnam war. Although the l ike l ihood  of preference for  
re ta in ing c i v i l i a n  advisers in Vietnam (C) was greater fo r  a l l  t e r t i a r y  
educated respondents (regardless of t h e i r  sex) than fo r  those with less 
education, the most consistent supporters of th is  option were females with 
t e r t i a r y  education, of whom 47.6% chose a l te rna t ive  (C) compared with 28,4%
12. Occupation was not included in th is  analysis o f  socio-demographic 
variables which might have an in te rac t ive  e f fec t  with sex in th e i r  
inf luence on opinion, as i t  was f e l t  that the measurement of  females' 
occupation, in terms of Head of Household's occupation, was not a 
va l id  measure and any observed re la t ionsh ip  between sex, occupation 
and opinion would be of questionable v a l i d i t y  and r e l i a b i l i t y  because 
o f  th is .
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o f  t e r t i a r y  educa ted  males .  At t h i s  le ve l  o f  e d u c a t i o n ,  women were 
le s s  l i k e l y  than men to favour  complete d isengagement from Vietnam, 
a l though  s t i l l  being more l i k e l y  to  oppose a con t inued  combat t roop  
p re sence :
TABLE 5.6  ASSOCIATION BETWEEN VIETNAM OPINION AND
T e r t i a r y  
Educated 
Mal es
T e r t i a r y  
Educated 
Females
TERTIARY EDUCATION OF MALES AND FEMALES
Troops & 
C o n s c r ip t s  
(A)
Only
V olun teers  
(B)
Only
C i v i l i a n s  
(C)
Stay  Out 
A 1toge ther  
(D)
D on ' t  Know 
No Answer
25.9 28.4 28.4 17.3 0 .0
11.9 26.2
—
47.6
—
14.3 0 .0
100%
(81)
100%
(42)
When the  e f f e c t s  o f  age and sex on op in ion  were examined,  a l t e r n a t i v e
(B) was found to  be most c o n s i s t e n t l y  favoured  by 21-23 y e a r  o ld  females
(56.9%),  who f i r s t  voted  in 1969. As a r e s u l t ,  21-23 y e a r  o ld  men were much
13more l i k e l y  to  choose the  most "r a d ic a l" a l t e r n a t i v e  (D) than were women
o f  a comparable age ( see  Table 5 . 7 ) .  Although the  younges t  men were more 
r a d i c a l  in t h e i r  views than the  younges t  women they were n o t ,  however, as 
l i k e l y  to  be in favou r  o f  t o t a l  disengagement  as women over  age 55 o r  men 
over  age 45.
13. "R a d ica l" i s  used as an a d j e c t i v e  here to i n d i c a t e  the  l a r g e  degree  o f  
change from 1969 government p o l i c y  which t h i s  a l t e r n a t i v e  would have 
n e c e s s i t a t e d .
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TABLE 5.7 VIETNAM OPINIONS OF 21-23 YEAR OLD MALES AND FEMALES
Troops & Only Only Stay Out Don't  Know
Conscripts Volunteers C iv i l i a n s  A l together  No Answer 
(A) (B) (C) (D)
21-23 year 
old males
21-23 year 
old females
27.2 38.8 14.6 19.4 0.0
22.2 56.9 11.1 9.7 0.0
The broad trend observed by Rawsornin Gal lup Pol l data obtained between 
1965 and 1968 fo r  young people to be more in favour o f Austra l ian  
p a r t i c ip a t i o n  in the war than t h e i r  elders gained some support from the 
A.S.P. re s u l t s .  The complexity o f  the re la t io n sh ip s  between opinion and 
age became evident,  however, when the data were con t ro l led  fo r  sex as 
reported above. As Rawson had seen in e a r l i e r  years, a higher proport ion 
of a l l  those aged under 35 favoured the commitment o f  t roops, inc luding 
consc r ip ts ,  to Vietnam than o f  a l l  those aged 36-75 (and the reverse appl ied 
on the opt ion o f  to ta l  w ithdrawal) ,  but the youngest males (21-23 years) 
were more in favour o f  complete disengagement than t h e i r  immediate elders 
and than the youngest females. These resu l ts  should also serve to i l l u s t r a t e  
the way var iab les which, on t h e i r  own, seemed to bear l i t t l e  r e la t io n  to 
opinion may in fa c t  have been o f  s ign i f icance  when t h e i r  i n te rac t io n  with 
other var iab les was studied. Although there was l i t t l e  overa l l  d i f fe rence 
recorded between male and female a t t i tu d e s  towards Vietnam in the A.S.P. 
survey, a c lea r  d i f fe rence  in opinion emerged when the youngest age groups 
o f  men and women was compared.
Conscr ipt ion
The d i s t r i b u t i o n  of opinions on conscr ip t ion  w i th in  the A.S.P. sample 
was shown in Chapter 2 to favour two opt ions in p a r t i c u la r  - the conscr ip t ion
14. Rawson, op. e i t . 3 p.64
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of all young men; and the provision of civilian alternatives to military 
service. This pattern held for those respondents who had received some 
secondary or tertiary education, but the abolition of conscription 
altogether was more popular amongst those with only primary, or less, 
education than was the option of providing civilian alternatives (see 
Table 5.8). Nearly half of this la t te r  group were in favour of extending 
the call-up to all young men, but the popularity of this option declined 
with increasing education. The abolition of national service was supported 
by approximately one quarter of those with the least education, and one 
quarter of those with the most education, but suffered a loss of support in 
the secondary educated group:
TABLE 5.8 OPINIONS ON CONSCRIPTION BY EDUCATION LEVEL
Conscription Ballot Civilian No Form Of Don't Know
For All System Alternatives Conscription No Answer 
(A) (B) (C) (D)
None/ 
Primary
Secondary
Tertiary
The decreasing popularity of alternative (A) and the increasing 
popularity of (C) with higher education persisted, no matter what party the 
respondents supported in the 1969 election. The large drop in support for 
alternative (D) amongst the secondary educated, however, was almost entirely 
restricted to Labor voters. A small, but noticeabl e decline in support for 
the present ballot system (B) was apparent amongst tert iary educated Liberal/ 
Country Party voters, whereas the level of support for this otherwise 
unpopular option gradually increased amongst Labor voters as their  degree 
of education increased.
46.5 5.9 20.1 24.3 3.2
39.4 7.8 38.0 12.8 3.1
30.9 5.7 38.2 24.4 0.8
-  — ---------—  —■ — — — ■
100%
(527)
100%
(1209
100%
(123)
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Although respondents' occupations were related to their educational 
qualifications, the drop in popularity of the extension of conscription 
to all young men observed above with increasing education was not apparent 
with increases in occupational status, except in the "professional" 
category; the lowest level of support for this alternative came from the 
skilled workers. The ballot system gradually gained support with higher 
levels of occupation, as did the provision of civilian alternatives. The 
popularity of abolishing conscription gradually decreased as the occupational 
status of respondents increased:
TABLE 5.9 OPINION ON CONSCRIPTION BY OCCUPATIONAL STATUS
Conscription Ballot Civilian No Form of Don't Know 
For All System Alternatives Conscription No Answer 
(A) (B) (C) (D)
Unskilled 45.5 4.1 26.0 21.9 2.4 L00%(292)
Semi - 
Skilled 40.1 5.4 31.8 19.7 3.0 100%(299)
Skilled 34.8 8.4 34.8 20.6 1.4 100%(287)
Office &
Sales
Clerks 41.5 7.9 35.6 12.6 2.4
100%
(253)
Semi -
Professional 
Owners, 
Managers
42.2 8.2 35.3 12.4 1.8 100%(490)
Professional 38.7 9.5 36.3 13.7 1.8 100%(168)
None of the trends in the above data were particularly uniform, 
however, and any regularity all but vanished when direction of 1969 vote 
was also taken into account. Even the increase in support for the avail­
abili ty of civilian alternatives with higher occupational status, which 
occurred amongst Labor voters, failed to carry over to government supporters.
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Unski l l ed workers of both p a r t i e s  c o n s t i t u t e d  the  groups most in favour 
of c onsc r i p t i ng  a l l  young men, but the re  was no uniform p a t t e rn  of decl ine  
in suppor t  f o r  t h i s  opt ion amongst voter s  fo r  e i t h e r  s ide .  In sum, the 
occupat ional  ca tegory to which respondents  belonged did not seem to be an 
e f f e c t i v e  d i s c r i mi na to r  between opinions  on c onsc r i p t i on .
Re l a t i ve l y  high l eve l s  of support  fo r  the extens ion of  na t ional  serv ice  
to a l l  young men p e r s i s t e d  across  a l l  the age groups in the sample (see Table 
5 .10) .  In c o n t r a s t ,  the very small percentages  of respondents  in favour of 
the  p resen t  b a l l o t  system of  consc r i p t i on  dec l ined  s l i g h t l y  with increas ing 
age u n t i l ,  in the  76-95 years  age group^not one out  of 63 respondents  
opted fo r  t h i s  a l t e r n a t i v e .  The popu la r i t y  of  providing c i v i l i a n  a l t e r ­
na t ives  (C) decreased with age,  wh i l s t  t he  popu l a r i t y  of  abo l i sh ing  con­
s c r i p t i o n  a l t o g e t h e r  (D) increased with age.  In both these cas es ,  the 
21-23 years  olds  c o ns t i t u t e d  something of  an except ion to the overa l l  
t rend - they were l e ss  l i k e l y  than t h e i r  immediate e lde r s  to favour  (C) 
and more l i k e l y  than those aged up to 45 to choose (D).
TABLE 5.10 OPINION ON CONSCRIPTION BY AGE
Age
21-23
24-35
36-45
46-55
56-75
76-95
Conscr ipt ion Bal lo t  C iv i l i a n  No Form of  Don' t  Know
For All System Al t e rn a t i v e s  Conscr ipt ion No Answer
(A) (B) (C) (D)
42.3 9.1 30.9 16.6 1.1
40.4 7.9 37.1 12.7 1.9
41.3 7.4 34.4 14.6 2.2
43.0 5.5 33.4 16.6 1.5
39.4 6.3 29.6 20.9 3.7
!
; 38.1 0.0 14.3 39.7 7.9
100%
(175)
100%
(418)
100%
(404)
100%
(344)
100%
(378)
100%
(63)
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The data, when control led fo r  1969 vote, provided support for  
the hypothesis that the youngest Liberal/Country Party voters were more 
l i k e l y  to take up posit ions favouring conscript ion than th e i r  immediate 
elders, whereas the new Labor Party voters in 1969 were more opposed to 
conscript ion than those aged up to 45 years. This s i tua t ion  c lear ly  
appl ied with respect to a l te rna t ive  (A), (50% of Lib/CP 21-23 year olds 
chose (A), compared with 40.1% of  24-35 year olds and 42.1% of 36-45 year 
olds; w h i ls t  correspondingly lower proportions of  Labor 21-23 year olds 
made the same choice) and i t  occurred amongst Labor voters choosing a l t e r ­
native (D). However, a surpris ing reversal of th is  pattern occurred with 
a l te rna t ive  (B), which was chosen by fewer Liberal/Country Party 21-23 
year olds than 24-35 year olds voting in the same way, and which att racted 
more support amongst Labor 21-23 year olds than in any other age group 
voting fo r  the same party (although the actual size of the percentages was 
very smal1).
Apart from these rather contradictory resul ts fo r  the new, 21-23 
year old voters, the general pattern observed wi th in the main sample of 
decreasing support fo r  (C) and increasing support fo r  (D) with age was 
reproduced amongst both Liberal/Country Party and Labor voters.
Although the differences involved were not great, female voters, taken 
as a whole, were more l i k e l y  to oppose the continuation of  conscription in 
i t s  present form, or i t s  extension, than were males. Women were less 
l i k e l y  than men to opt fo r  a l te rnat ives (A) or (B) and more l i k e l y  to 
choose (C) or (D):
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TABLE 5.11 OPINIONS ON CONSCRIPTION BY SEX
Male
Female
C o n s c r ip t i o n  B a l l o t  C i v i l i a n  No Form of  Don ' t  Know 
For All System A l t e r n a t i v e s  Consc r i p t i on  No Answer
(A) (B) (C) (D)
44.0 8.1 30.2 15.9 1.8
37.4 5.9 36.0 17.9 2.8
________________1---------------------
100%
(975)
100%
(898)
E a r l i e r  a t t emp t s  to  measure A u s t r a l i a n  a t t i t u d e s  towards c o n s c r i p t i o n
r e s u l t e d  in s i m i l a r  f i n d i n g s .  Alb insk i  c i t e d  two Gal lup Po l l s  t aken in
1966 where women were more opposed to c o n s c r i p t i o n  than men - in the  f i r s t ,
in J u l y  1966, 24.6% of  men and 28.0% of  women opposed c o n s c r i p t i o n ;  and
in November 1966 o p p o s i t i o n  had i n c re a s ed  to 30.8% o f  men and 34.2% of  
15women. On t he  b a s i s  of  a very r e s t r i c t e d  sample o f  Canberra r e s i d e n t s  
Western and Wilson r e p o r t e d  in 1967 a gap between male and female a t t i t u d e s ,  
wi th  37% of  t h e  women in t h e i r  sample opposing c o n s c r i p t i o n ,  compared wi th 
26% o f  t h e  men. ^
The a s s o c i a t i o n  between sex and opin i on  on c o n s c r i p t i o n  p e r s i s t e d  
a c r os s  p a r t y  l i n e s  in t h e  A.S.P.  survey .  S i m i l a r  d i s t r i b u t i o n s  o f  
op i n i on  to  t h a t  r ecorded  above were found f o r  male and female s up p o r t e r s  of  
both major  p a r t y  g r oupings .
A s t udy  o f  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  between age ,  sex and opin i on  on c o n s c r i p ­
t i o n  produced some i n t e r e s t i n g  f i n d i n g s  which may go p a r t  the  way to 
e x p l a i n i n g  the  seemingly  c o n t r a d i c t o r y  r e s u l t s  on the  a t t i t u d e s  o f  21-23 
y e a r  o lds  when the  d i r e c t i o n  o f  1969 vote  was c o n t r o l l e d  f o r .  On the  whole,  
female v o t e r s  o f  a l l  ages were l e s s  in f avour  of  c o n s c r i p t i o n  than men, and
15. A u s t r a l i a n  Gal lup P o l l s , Nos . 184 ( J u l y  16,  1966) and 187 (Nov 18,  1966) ,  
as c i t e d  in A l b i n k s i ,  op. cit. , p .198.
16. Western and Wi lson,  " A t t i t u d e s  to C o n s c r i p t i o n " ,  p.52
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the same general tendencies observed earl ier with increasing age were to 
be found amongst both sexes. However, 21-35 year old women who were less 
likely to be in favour of abolishing conscription than their elders, 
were also less likely to choose this option than were 21-35 year old men 
(although older men were less inclined to take an abolitionist stance 
than older women). Complementing this, 21-35 year old women were more 
likely to want conscription for all young men than men of the same age, 
although all older female age groups were less favourable towards the 
widening of the call-up than were men. In sum, the youngest men were more 
opposed to conscription than their elders, and also than the youngest women. 
United States - Australian Alliance
As this question provided only a very general measure of voters' 
attitudes towards the United States, i t  would be a mistake to emphasize the 
significance of minor variations in response patterns. The major feature 
of the A.S.P. respondents' opinions, which did not change whatever their 
social or demographic background, was a preference for an alliance which was 
at least " f a i r l y  c lo se " .
Possibly as a result of greater caution arising from an increased 
awareness of the complexities of the situation, voters with higher levels 
of education were increasingly likely to opt for a " f a i r l y  c l o s e " , rather 
than a " very c lo s e "  alliance. The highest proportional level of support for 
a "very c lo se "  alliance came from amongst office and sales workers; whilst 
the skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled workers were more likely than the 
higher occupational groups to prefer an alliance which was " not very c lo se " .  
Women were less favourable in their attitudes towards the United States than 
men; and those respondents aged over 56 were more in favour of a "very c lo se "  
relationship than the younger age groups.
Communist China
Due to the high levels of uncertainty registered in response to this 
question, comparisons across different socio-demographic groupings were
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sometimes of dubious va l id i ty .  For example, 16.3% of those who had been 
educated only up to primary level,  or lower, answered "don't know", whereas 
only 6.5% of the t e r t i a ry  educated group were unable to give an opinion 
(see Table 5.12). The a t t i tudes  of those respondents who had reached the 
t e r t i a ry  level ,  however, c learly  differed in direction from the res t  of 
the sample - as a majority of them f e l t  that  Communist China would not 
present a problem to Australia in the future:
TABLE 5.12 ATTITUDES TOWARDS COMMUNIST CHINA BY EDUCATION
China a lo t  China no Don't know
to worry about problem No Answer
None/Primary 
Secondary 
Tertiary
When the direction of 1969 vote was considered, th is  contrast  between the 
t e r t i a ry  educated and the re s t  was found to pers is t .  Greater optimism 
about Communist China was evident amongst both Liberal/Country Party and 
Labor voters with t e r t i a ry  education, although the variation was greates t  
amongst those who voted for Labor.
Attitudes towards Communist China did not appear to vary greatly 
with occupation. The grea tes t  concern about China as a future problem 
was regis tered in the middle ranks of the occupational scale ,  but the 
differences were small and the large numbers of "don't know" responses 
amongst the blue co l lar  workers made comparison d i f f i c u l t .
No consistent pattern of variation in the level of worry expressed 
about China was observed with increasing age. When the direction of 1969 
vote was controlled,  however, the youngest Labor voters were seen to be
48.2 35.5 16.3
56.2 32.0 11.8
40.7 52.8 6.5
100%
(527)
100%
(1209)
100%
(123)
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d i s t in c t ly  atypical in the i r  high degree of optimism about Communist China.
The opinion d is t r ibu t ion  within the whole sample was reversed for this group 
of 69 voters,  55.1% of whom f e l t  that  China would not be a problem for 
Australia in the future.
There was very l i t t l e  difference between the proportions of male and 
female respondents feeling that  Communist China would give cause for 
worry, but there were notably fewer women than men who were willing to say 
tha t  China would not be a problem (see Table 5.13). Women were more than 
twice as l ike ly  to answer "don't know" to this  question. The high level of 
uncertainty, associated with a lack of optimism, was charac te r is t ic  of 
female respondents, whether they voted Liberal/Country Party or Labor in 1969.
TABLE 5.13 ATTITUDES TOWARDS COMMUNIST CHINA BY SEX
China a lo t  China no Don't Know
to worry about problem No Answer
Mai e
Female
Controlling for sex removed some of the problems encountered e a r l i e r  
in comparing a t t i tudes  towards China along d ifferent  socio-demographic 
dimensions, as much of the uncertainty on this  item was res t r ic ted  to 
female respondents. Amongst male respondents i t  was clear  that  those with 
secondary education had the most pessimistic  views on the subject; followed 
by those who had received no education or some a t  primary level ,  who were 
f a i r ly  evenly s p l i t  in th e i r  opinions. Tertiary educated men were, on the 
whole, opt imistic  about China. Although the d is t r ibut ion  of women's views 
with education seemed also to follow th is  pattern,  the resul ts  did not 
j u s t i f y  any defin i te  conclusions as the "don't know" response rate  reached 
as high as 24.5% for the lowest educational grouping.
51.4
54.7
41.2
26.7
7.4
18.6
100%
(975)
100%
(898)
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The variation in opinion with age which was most notable when 
comparisons were made amongst individuals of the same sex was a heightened 
degree of pessimism in males aged between 24 and 35 years, 57.2% of whom 
fe l t  that China would give Australia a lot to worry about. There were 
slight signs amongst both men and women of the greater optimism noted 
earl ier  within the youngest 21-23 years age group, but this was not as 
clearly apparent as i t  had been amongst Labor voters, regardless of sex. 
Foreign Investment
This item provided a clear case where the relationships between 
opinion and a major criterion of social background assumed significance 
only where an additional variable was brought into consideration. When 
attitudes towards foreign investment were analysed by educational level, 
the views of those with none/primary education and those with secondary 
education seemed very similar. Tertiary education appeared to produce 
only a higher level of certainty amongst the respondents - there was no 
alteration in the balance of opposing viewpoints. Underlying this ,  however, 
were two totally different patterns of variation in attitude with educational 
level, depending on the direction of 1969 vote. These patterns are i l l u s t ­
rated in Figures 5.3 and 5.4. The popularity of foreign investors increased. 
with higher education amongst those who voted for the Liberal/Country Party 
coalition, and decreased  as the educational level of 1969 Labor voters 
increased. As the graphs i l lus tra te ,  this trend was most marked on the 
progression from secondary to tertiary education. The proportions of 
Liberal/Country Party and Labor voters supporting the two opposing viewpoints 
were practically identical at the none/primary level and differed very l i t t l e  
at the secondary level. The relatively small number of respondents with at 
least some tertiary education, 123 in a l l ,  accounted for the failure of the 
divergence in opinion at this level to affect the overall tendency, observed 
in the previous chapter, for opinions to be bi-partisan on this issue.
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Although indicating that 1969 vote and opinion on foreign invest­
ment were related specifically to the possession of tertiary education by 
the A.S.P. respondents, the results did not help to resolve the problem 
of cause and effect. At least three solutions to that problem would be 
possible here:
(a) either respondents who had reached the same educational level 
but had voted differently in 1969 had undergone different 
educational experiences in the course of their political 
socialisat ionl ' ,  which led ultimately to the adoption of 
opposing views on foreign investment;
(b) or respondents with higher education were more likely to 
perceive the parties they supported as taking up opposing 
positions on this question, and to adopt views in line with 
their party;
(c) or foreign investment was one issue which determined the 
direction of 1969 vote for those respondents with higher 
education who held different opinions on the issue.
If different attitudes towards foreign investment had been a factor in 
determining the vote of that small proportion of electors with tertiary 
education, the outcome would have had only a marginal effect on the 
overall distribution of votes. However, the interaction between socio­
demographic characteristics and opinions comprises one, perhaps vital ,  
aspect of the search for the links between issue opinion and voting 
behaviour.
Only slight variations in attitudes towards foreign investment could 
be observed with changes in respondents' occupations. Those with professional 
occupations displayed the least hosti l i ty to foreign investment. Controlling 
for 1969 vote provided some evidence of the existence of opposing trends in 
opinion within each group of party supporters, as had been the case with the 
educational criterion. There was a tendency, as one approached the blue-
17. Although respondents can be classified as having reached a uniform 
level of education, there can be no guarantee that the educational 
process was the same for each respondent. Outside the school 
curriculum, education about politics would have differed greatly 
depending on parent's voting habits and those of friends and 
neighbours.
collar end of the occupational scale, for respondents to be increasingly 
wary of foreign investors i f  they were Liberal/Country Party voters in 
1969, and progressively less cautious if  they voted Labor in that election. 
In neither case, however, was the trend as regular as had been observed for 
the different levels of education - variations in the degree of support 
for each viewpoint were particularly uneven amongst the white-collar 
occupations.
No overall relationships between opinion and the age of respondents 
could be observed on this item, nor could any consistent patterns of 
variation be found within the two sets of party supporters. The most 
interesting result was a contrast between opinions of the 21-23 year old 
Labor voters (the most opposed of all age groups in the sample to foreign 
investment), and those of the 21-23 year olds who voted Liberal/Country 
Party (the group which showed the least opposition to foreign investment).
Very l i t t l e  difference was recorded in the responses of men and 
women to this question. Women were more likely to be undecided, and to 
answer " i t  depends", and less likely to welcome foreign investors. The 
last tendency was stronger amongst female Liberal/Country Party voters than 
those who voted for the A.L.P.; and was complemented by a greater tendency 
for women who supported the government parties to be "on guard a g a in s t  
fo r e ig n  in v e s to r s "  than men of the same voting persuasion.
An indication that other socio-demographic factors might have con­
tributed to the variation in attitudes towards foreign investment with 
education observed earl ier amongst Liberal/Country Party and Labor voters 
was provided by substituting sex as the control variable, in place of 
1969 vote. Under these conditions, higher education was associated with 
greater caution towards foreign investors amongst males, and a more 
welcoming attitude amongst females. The magnitude of each trend was 
sufficiently sl ight,  however, that sex differences alone could only have 
accounted for a small fraction of the wide variation in the opinions of
te r t ia ry  educated government and opposition voters described at the 
beginning of this section.
Migration
Whereas the A.S.P. item on the entry of Asian migrants to Australia 
had fa iled to uncover any difference in attitude between Labor and Liberal/ 
Country Party voters, i t  did discriminate amongst people in d ifferent 
social and demographic categories.
As the level of education increased so did the amount of support 
for allowing Asians entry on the same basis as Europeans. Likewise, 
support for the present government policy of admitting a small quota of 
Asians increased with education - reaching a high of 51.2% of those with 
te r t ia ry  education. Restricting migration to those with origins in the 
United Kingdom and Northern Europe lost popularity amongst the more highly 
educated, as did the alternative of halting migration altogether. The 
suggestion that Asians, in particular, should be excluded from migrating 
was supported by only a small percentage of the sample, and this proportion 
did not a lte r with changes in educational background (see Table 5.14).
When respondents who had voted for different parties in 1969 were considered 
separately, these tendencies were repeated in each group.
Variations in opinion with occupation were sim ilar, except that no 
clear pattern was evident on alternatives (A) and (D). Support for 
present government policy (B) increased as occupations changed from blue- 
co lla r to white-collar and professional, whereas the cessation of migration 
(E) lost popularity. On this c r ite r ion , the amount of support for 
excluding Asians, in particular, (C) did vary - from 6.2% of unskilled 
workers i t  gradually fe l l  away to 3.0% of professionals.
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TABLE 5.14 OPINIONS ON ASIAN MIGRATION BY EDUCATION LEVEL
Asians on Small No Migrants Hal t  n , .
Same Basis Quota Asian Only From U.K. Migrat ion ° n „ now 
as Europeans of  Asians Migrants and N.Europe Al toge ther  0 nswer 
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E)
None/ 
Primary
Secondary
T e r t i a r y
22.0 31.5 5.9 19.2 16.1 5 3
22.7 44.7 4.1 16.2 9.6 2.7
31.7 51.2 5.7 9.8 0.8
------------ -----------
0.8
(1209
100%
(123)
Great er  age was c l e a r l y  a ssoc i a t ed  with more r e s t r i c t i v e  a t t i t u d e s  
towards the admission of  Asians as migrants .  The popu l a r i t y  of  a l t e r n a t i v e  
(A) decl ined with age,  w h i l s t  t h a t  o f  (D) increased with age.  The p a t t e rn  
for  a l t e r n a t i v e  (C) was r a t h e r  e r r a t i c ,  but  i t  did appear  to gain support  
as age i ncreased .  Levels of  support  fo r  the two remaining opt ions  did not  
vary to any g rea t  e x t en t  with age. The same p a t t e rn  o f  v a r i a t i o n  appeared 
amongst both Libera l /Count ry  Par ty and Labor vo t e r s .
Men and women responded d i f f e r e n t l y  to the a l t e r n a t i v e s  of f e red  on 
the migrat ion of  Asians (see Table 5 .15) .  Female respondents  were more 
l i k e l y  to favour the l e a s t  r e s t r i c t i v e  opt ion of  al lowing ent ry  to Asians 
on the same bas i s  as Europeans (A), but  s l i g h t l y  l e s s  l i k e l y  to support  
a small quota (B). A g r e a t e r  propor t ion of  men favoured r e s t r i c t i n g  
immigrat ion to people from the United Kingdom and Northern Europe (D),  but  
fewer men than women wanted to h a l t  migrat ion for  the presen t  (E).
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TABLE 5.15 OPINIONS ON ASIAN MIGRATION BY SEX
Asians on Small No Migrants Halt n „
Same Basis Quota Asian Only from U.K. Migration g°'
as Europeans of Asians Migrants and N.Europe Altogether w r
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E)
Male
Female
19.7 43.3 5.3 19.6 8.6 3.5
26.6 39.6 4.0 13.3
■ - — ... -------  .. — — ----------
13.3
—
3.2
100%
(975)
100%
(898)
These variations held for both Liberal/Country Party and Labor voters, 
except for alternative (B) which was supported equally by men and women 
who voted for the government parties, but drew more support from male 
Labor voters than female.
When the results for opinion on Asian migration by education and 
by age were controlled for sex, the relationships observed earlier pre­
dominated over any variation in opinion which might have been due to 
sex differences. Amongst both men and women, increased education was 
associated with less restr ic tive attitudes towards the entry of Asians 
and increased age with more restrictive views.
State Aid for Education
The distribution of opinion on State aid within the whole A.S.P. 
sample was markedly in favour of the government providing as much help 
as possible to church and independent schools. Variations in opinion with 
education were only of a minor nature and did not disturb this basic 
pattern (see Table 5.16). Support for providing as much government aid as 
possible fell from a high of 49.9% of those with primary education or less, 
to 40.7% of the group with tertiary education. The more highly educated 
respondents were increasingly likely to favour the restriction of aid 
to the needy church schools. Of the three educational levels, those with 
secondary education were the least likely to opt for the halting of
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government assistance entirely and the most likely to favour postponing 
i t  until the State schools were brought up to standard.
TABLE 5.16 OPINION ON STATE AID BY EDUCATIONAL LEVEL
No State 
Aid at All
(A)
No Aid 
until State
Aid Only 
to Needy
As Much 
State Aid
Schools Better Church Schools as Possible 
(B) (C) (D)
Don't Know 
No Answer
None/ 1
Primary 12.3 20.9 12.7 49.9 4.2 £
Secondary 10.8 27.5 16.4 43.6 1.7 |k
Tertiary 16.3 23.6
i-----------------------------------------------------------------
19.5 40.7 0.0 [
When the direction of 1969 vote was controlled, the drop in support 
for (D) and increase in support for (C) with higher education were seen to 
be restricted to Labor voters. Amongst Liberal/Country Party voters the 
secondary educated respondents were marked by a greater tendency to opt 
for the less extreme alternatives (B) and (C), although they s t i l l  pre­
dominantly favoured the provision of as much government aid as possible (D).
Very l i t t l e  difference was recorded in opinions according to the 
respondents' occupations. Skilled workers comprised the group which showed 
the greatest opposition to State aid - 15.3% wanted to halt government 
assistance altogether, but s t i l l  38.3% were in favour of as much help as 
possible.
The situation changed, however, when the sample was divided into two 
groups according to direction of 1969 vote. Amongst government supporters 
skilled workers were s t i l l  the least favourable towards State aid. The 
opinions of Labor voters did vary quite markedly with occupation, the 
most hostile group being those employed in a professional capacity, of 
whom 25.0% wanted to cease State aid entirely. Office and sales workers,
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s e m i - s k i l l e d  and u n sk i l l e d  labourers  were the Labor supporte rs  most 
favourably  in c l in e d  towards the a l l o c a t i o n  of government funds to church 
and independent schools .
The level  of  approval fo r  S ta t e  a id  decreased with inc reas ing  age 
of  respondents  (see Table 5 .17) .  This trend  was c l e a r l y  in evidence on 
the  two extreme p o s i t i o n s ,  the complete h a l t in g  of a id  (A) and the provis ion  
of  as much a s s i s t a n c e  as p o s s ib le  (D). I t  p e r s i s t e d  amongst those who 
voted L ibera l /Country  Party  in 1969, but was not c l e a r  amongst Labor vo te r s .
Age
TABLE 5.17 OPINIONS ON STATE AID BY AGE
No S ta te  
Aid a t  All
(A)
No Aid Aid Only As Much
Until  S ta te  to Needy S ta te  Aid 
Schools B e t t e r  Church Schools as Poss ib le  
(B) (C) (D)
Don' t  Know 
No Answer
21-23 9.7 28.6 12.6 48.0 1.1 100*(175)
24-35 7.9 28.2 15.6 46.4 1.9 100%(418)
36-45 11.9 26.7 14.6 46.0 0.7 100%(404)
46-55 12.8 20.3 20.1 44.8 2.0 100%(344)
56-75 13.8 24.1 17.2 40.5 4.5 100%(378)
76-95 20.6 20.6 11.1 39.7 7.9 100%(63)
When the  sex of  respondents was taken in to  cons ide ra t ion  (see Table 
5 .1 8 ) ,  a l a r g e r  p ropor t ion  of women than men was seen to favour p lac ing  some 
r e s t r i c t i o n  on the t iming (B) or a l lo c a t io n (C )  of government funds wi th in  the 
p r i v a t e  system of educa t ion .  This s i t u a t i o n  p e r s i s t e d  amongst those 
respondents  who voted Libera l /Country  Party  in 1969, whereas,  amongst Labor 
v o t e r s ,  females were s l i g h t l y  more l i k e l y  than males to favour S ta te  a id ,
with or  wi thout  r e s t r i c t i o n s .
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TABLE 5.18 OPINIONS ON STATE AID BY SEX
No State 
Aid at A l l
(A)
No Aid Aid Only As Much
U nt i l  State to Needy State Aid
Schools Bet ter  Church Schools as Possible 
(B) (C) (D)
Don't Know 
No Answer
Mai e 13.3 23.0 13.4 47.4 2.9
Female 9.8 27.8 18.0 42.8 1.6
100%
(975)
100%
(898)
Censorship
The d e s i r a b i l i t y  o f  censorship was an issue on which the A.S.P. 
respondents' opinions were f a i r l y  evenly d iv ided, with a m a jo r i ty  favour­
ing some censorship. The size o f  th i s  m a jo r i ty  increased as the level 
o f  educat ion increased:
TABLE 5.19 ATTITUDES TOWARDS CENSORSHIP BY EDUCATION
Some
Censorship
Read and 
See Anything
Don't Know 
No Answer
None/
Primary 49.7 47.1 3.2 100%(527)
Secondary 58.6 40.3 1.1 100%(1209)
T e r t ia ry 61.0 38.2 0.8 100%(123)
t
As some degree o f  par t isanship was reg is tered on th is  i tem (P=14), 
i t  could be expected th a t  opinions would be re la ted to educat ional background 
in d i f f e r e n t  ways, depending on the d i re c t io n  o f  vote in 1969. This was, 
in f a c t ,  the case. The trend observed above was re s t r i c te d  to those who 
supported the L ibera l /Country  Party c o a l i t i o n :  the views o f  Labor voters
a l te red  l i t t l e  with educat ion ( in  f a c t ,  secondary educated Labor voters 
took the hardest l i n e  on the need fo r  censorship).
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Support  fo r  some censorsh ip  c l e a r l y  inc reased  as occupational 
level progressed from the u n s k i l l e d ,  b l u e - c o l l a r  workers to the 
p r o f e s s i o n a l s :
TABLE 5.20 ATTITUDES TOWARDS CENSORSHIP BY OCCUPATION LEVEL
Unski 11ed Semi - Ski l i e d S k i l l e d
Off ice  & 
Sales
Managers
Owners Profess iona l
Some
Censorship 44.5 53.2 55.1 62.5 61.8 62.5
Read & See 
Anything 53.8 45.2 43.6 36.0 37.1 35.1
Don't  Know 
No Answer 1.7 1.7 1.3 1.6 1.0 2.4
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
(292) (299) (287) (253) (490) (168)
The r e g u l a r i t y  of t h i s  t rend  was d i s r u p te d ,  however, when the two groups 
of  vo te rs  were considered s e p a r a t e ly .  Although th e re  was an ove ra l l  
in c rease  in the  p ropor t ion  o f  L ibera l /Country  Party  vote rs  favouring 
censorsh ip  as one progressed away from the b l u e - c o l l a r  end of the 
occupational s c a l e ,  the  group with the most r e s t r i c t i v e  views were the 
o f f i c e  and s a le s  workers in the  middle of  the  s c a l e .  The most l i b e r a l  
approach o f  any occupationa l group in the whole sample was adopted by the 
166 u n s k i l l e d  workers who voted Labor, 62.7% of  whom thought people should 
be able  to read and see what they l ik e d .  From th e r e ,  the degree o f  support  
fo r  censorsh ip  amongst Labor vo te rs  g radua l ly  inc reased  un t i l  i t  reached a 
high po in t  with the  owner/manager grade.  Labor vo te rs  in p ro fess iona l  
occupations  c o n s t i t u t e d  an exception to t h i s  t r en d  as they were a l i t t l e  
l e s s  l i k e l y  to favour censorsh ip  than s k i l l e d  workers.
A t t i tu d e s  towards censorsh ip  became more r e s t r i c t i v e  with age:
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TABLE 5.21 ATTITUDES TOWARDS CENSORSHIP BY AGE
21-23 24-35 36-45 46-55 56-75 76-95
Some
Censorship 46.3 53.8 59.4 58.1 61.4 68.3
Read & See 
Anything 52.0 45.5 39.1 39.8 36.2 30.2
Don't  Know 
No Answer 1.7 0.7 1.5 2.1 2.4 1.6
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
(175) (418) (404) (344) (378) (63)
This t rend  was ev iden t  i r r e s p e c t i v e  of the  way respondents  voted in 1969.
In f a c t ,  the  views o f  21-23 year  old L ibera l /Country  Party  and Labor vote rs  
were very s i m i l a r ,  with m a jo r i t i e s  favouring no censorsh ip  in each case .
The permissive s tance of  t h i s  youngest  group of  government supporte rs  
c o n t r a s t e d  s t r i k i n g l y  with the  pro-censorsh ip  views o f  the o th e r  age groups 
which voted in a s im i l a r  manner. The Labor vote rs  in the sample 
p resen ted  a p ic tu r e  o f  a more gradual trend  towards a r e s t r i c t i v e  view­
po in t  with inc reas ing  age.
Opinions on censorsh ip  could not be d i f f e r e n t i a t e d  on the bas is  of  
sex d i f f e r e n c e s  a lone .  The only v a r i a t i o n  was amongst female Labor 
v o t e r s ,  who were s l i g h t l y  more permissive in t h e i r  a t t i t u d e s  than males 
(46.7% of these  women opting fo r  some censorsh ip ,  in comparison with 51.4% 
of  Labor men). T e r t i a r y  educated men were more in favour of censorsh ip  than 
o th e r  men and a l l  women. Although female opinions became in c re a s in g ly  
r e s t r i c t i v e  as education increased  from none/primary to secondary,  the 
opinions  of  the  t e r t i a r y  educated women could not be d i s t in g u i sh ed  from 
those  with secondary education only.
I t  was ev iden t  t h a t  the permissive a t t i t u d e s  o f  the 21-23 year  old age
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group owed more to the contribution of men than women, as controlling for 
sex showed the youngest women to be more conservative in their approach to 
censorship than men of the same age. 36-45 year old women;too, were more 
l ikely to favour censorship than men belonging to the corresponding age 
group. They were more restrictive in their views than women aged from 46 
to 75, who were themselves more permissive towards censorship than their 
male counterparts.
The preceding analysis has uncovered some of the patterns of inter­
action between opinion, socio-demographic background and direction of vote 
amongst A.S.P. respondents on a range of position issues. The inter­
relationships between the different variables studied appeared to be more 
complex on some issues than on others. The combination of two (or, perhaps 
more, unaccounted for) socio-demographic characteristics (for example, 
tertiary education and being female) was seen, on occasion, to result in 
different opinion patterns from those observed when each characteriStic 
was analysed separately. Cleavages in opinion with different socio-demographic 
criteria persisted across party lines on some issues, but not on others.
And on any single issue item, some socio-demographic variables produced a 
different relationship with opinion depending on the direction of 1969 vote, 
whereas others were related to opinion in the same manner regardless of the 
voting preference of the respondents.
Although we have not been able to allocate cause and effect  in the 
observed relationships, the analysis has shown the extent to which some 
cleavages in the social and demographic makeup of the sample corresponded, 
or failed to correspond with differences in opinion. Using 1969 vote as a 
control variable, i t  has been possible to observe the interaction between 
party preference and respondents' socio-demographic background.
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Interest in Politics
A further dimension along which voters can be compared is that of
their involvement in political activity. Key advanced the concept of
"p o l i t i c a l  s t r a t i f i c a t i o n " , whereby strata of people within the electorate
could be differentiated by their polit ical,  rather than social, economic
18or demographic, characteristics. The sorts of cri teria  used could be
measures of participation in electoral campaigns or other political acts,
estimates of psychological involvement in polit ics,  or measures of political 
19efficacy. Each of these cri teria  is applicable to the study of electoral
reactions to policy issues, the hypothesis being that those people with high
levels of involvement in political activity are more likely to have opinions
and to know the parties' relative stances on issues.
Various estimates exist of the extent to which Australian voters
20participate in their political system. The compulsory nature of voting
in Australia ensures that the vast majority of people make at least this
minimal, overt commitment to political activity and turn-out levels are
consequently higher than in other countries, such as the United States and
Great Britain, where no compulsion is exercised. Apart from this important
difference, which does have implications for the type  of work undertaken by
volunteer party activists ,  the extent and range of participation in politics
in Australia does not appear to differ greatly from other liberal democracies.
On the basis of A.S.P. data obtained in 1967, Aitkin arrived at the following
22breakdown of the Australian electorate:
18. Key, Public Opinion and American Democracy, chap.8.
19. i b i d . ,  pp.184-95.
20. See D. Aitkin, "Electoral Behaviour" and J.S. Western and P.R. Wilson, 
"Politics: Participation and Attitudes" in Mayer and Nelson (eds), op. 
c i t .  , pp.301-335.
21. Aitkin, "Electoral Behaviour" in Mayer and Nelson (eds) o p . c i t .  , p.302.
22. i b i d . ,  p.303.
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TABLE 5.22 DEGREE OF INTEREST IN POLITICS IN 1967 A.S.P. SAMPLE
The p o l i t i c a l l y  act ive and aware 30%
A passive audience 37%
The quite in d i f fe re n t  and uninterested 33%
100%
This type of  s t r a t i f i c a t i o n  is l i k e l y  to have implicat ions fo r  the degree
of  f a m i l i a r i t y  electors have at any time with the issues of  publ ic pol icy
being debated by p o l i t i c ia n s  and publ icised through the mass media.
The extent of  an ind iv id ua l 's  involvement in p o l i t i c s  can be
assessed in various ways. Par t ic ipat ion i t s e l f  has both act ive and passive
components: a person can par t ic ipa te  by act ive ly  taking part in the
p o l i t i c a l  process, or he can be interested in and knowledgeable about
23p o l i t i c a l  a f fa i r s  without himself i n i t i a t i n g  any act ion. Key made a
d is t in c t io n  here between psychological involvement, or in te res t  in p o l i t i c s ,
24and i t s  behavioural manifestations. Although subject ive involvement in 
p o l i t i c s  was correlated with active pa r t ic ipa t ion ,  there were some whose 
a c t i v i t y  in the p o l i t i c a l  arena did not stem from in te res t  in p o l i t i c s ,  
per se3 and others whose in te res t  did not extend to an act ive commitment.
The A.S.P. questionnaire included a number o f  measures o f  overt 
p o l i t i c a l  pa r t ic ip a t io n ,  such as party membership, attendance at p o l i t i c a l  
meetings, and pa r t ic ipa t ion  in voluntary work fo r  e lect ion candidates.
I t  also asked respondents the extent to which they followed elect ion 
campaigns in the mass media, whether they knew candidates' names and how 
much in te res t  they general ly had in p o l i t i c s  - a l l  indices of psychological 
involvement in p o l i t i c a l  a c t i v i t y .  A f u l l  analysis o f  the re lat ionships
23. Western and Wilson, " P o l i t i c s :  Part ic ipa t ion  and Att i tudes" in Mayer 
and Nelson (eds), o p .c i t .  , p.319.
24. Key, Publ ic Opinion and American Democracy, pp.184-192.
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between these different levels of participation and issue opinion (in terms 
of both the direct of opinion and the familiarity of respondents with the 
issue) would entail a research project of its  own. A single measure, 
self-assessment of interest in polit ics, was therefore chosen for study 
here.
The categories upon which respondents were asked to base their 
assessment were very broad (a good deal of interest;  some interest;  not 
much interest; none) and were not necessarily equivalent in meaning for 
all respondents. I t  was fe l t ,  however, that the question would cover a 
wide variety of different types of participation and would thus provide 
the broadest possible estimate of psychological involvement. There was also 
a sense in which the hypothesis that high participators would be more likely 
to have opinions on issues of government policy was logically more closely 
related to the broad dimension of psychological involvement (or passive 
participation) than to actual behavioural participation.
The question resulted in the following distribution of self-assessed 
interest in politics:
TABLE 5.23 DEGREE OF INTEREST IN POLITICS IN 1969 A.S.P. SAMPLE
A good deal of interest 407
%
21.7
Some interest 869 46.4
Not much interest 491 26.2
No interest 103 5.5
Don't know, no answer 3 0.2
1873 100.0%
The very low refusal rate - only 3 respondents failed to give an answer - 
can be taken as an indication that respondents did not find the comparison 
asked for an unusual one. Although the breakdown provides no indication of 
the proportions actually taking part in political activity,  i t  does suggest 
that Aitkin's calculation of 30% of the electorate being " p o l i t i c a l  a c t iv e  
and aware" and 33% "q u ite  in d i f f e r e n t  and u n in te r e s te d "  was not applicable
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to the 1969 A.S.P. sample.
The strat if icat ion observed within the A.S.P. sample on the basis of 
this variable was related to, but not identical with the pattern of 
cleavage along socio-economic lines. The degree of interest in politics 
admitted to by the respondents clearly increased both with education and 
with occupational level. The results for education were as follows:
TABLE 5.24 INTEREST IN POLITICS BY EDUCATION LEVEL
None/
Primary Secondary Tertiary
Good deal of interest 17.8 20.5 48.8
Some interest 39.8 49.8 41.5
Not much interest 32.6 25.1 9.8
None 9.1 4.5 0.0
Don't Know 
No Answer 0.6 0.0 0.0
100% 100% 100%
(527) (1209) (123)
The persistence of varying degrees of interest at each educational level 
(except for the disappearance of "no in t e r e s t "  amongst the tertiary educated) 
provides support for Key's argument that i t  is misleading to res tr ic t  analyses 
of political behaviour to socio-economic differences, where the cross­
cutting cleavage based on differences in levels of political involvement
25may hold additional explanatory power.
The level of interest in politics displayed by the A.S.P. respondents 
gradually increased with age, reached a peak in the 46-55 year old age group 
and then declined. Men were more likely to have "a good dea l o f  in te r e s t"
25. i b i d . 3 pp.197-198.
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in politics or "some i n t e r e s t ” than were women, but the proportion 
disclaiming any interest in politics at all was approximately the same 
for both sexes (see Table 5.25).
TABLE 5.25 INTEREST IN POLITICS BY SEX
Male Female
Good deal of interest 27.3 15.7
Some interest 48.0 44.7
Not much interest 19.5 33.5
None 5.0 6.0
Don't Know 
No Answer 0.2 0.1
100% 100%
(975) (898)
The general pattern of differences in sex, age and educational 
level amongst the A.S.P. sample was similar to that observed by Western 
and Wilson in their survey of 456 Brisbane residents, although these
26researchers were using composite indices of active and passive participation.
The overall variation in levels of political interest was similar for 
those who voted either for the A.L.P. or for the government parties in 1969.
The Labor voters, however, were more likely to be at the extremes of having 
a "good dea l o f  i n t e r e s t ” in politics or no interest at all than were those 
who voted Liberal/Country Party. The persistence of this tendency in voting 
habits over more than one election could have implications for the nature 
of the different parties' bases of support within the electorate, which 
might, in turn, affect each organisation's ability to familiarise i ts  supporters
26. Western and Wilson, "Politics: Participation and Attitudes" in Mayer 
and Nelson (eds), o p . c i t p.322.
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with party policy.
A detailed examination of the hypothesis that voters' familiarity with 
issues increases with their involvement in politics was not possible with 
the A.S.P. data as the questionnaire did not follow up the opinion items 
with any test of the extent of respondent's knowledge. The only indication 
of the degree to which respondents were familiar with an issue was the 
proportion who failed to give an opinion. In each case, the number who 
admitted that they "didn't know" probably represented an underestimation 
of the actual extent of ignorance on that issue. As those who said they 
had no interest in politics were more likely to willingly admit to 
ignorance on political issues than those who claimed to be very interested, 
the proportion of "don't know"s as an index of familiarity is likely to 
have been biased in favour of the la t te r  respondents.
The increase in the proportion of "don't know"s recorded as self- 
assessed interest in politics declined was sufficiently large for most 
issues, however, that i t  could be taken as confirmation of the general 
hypothesis. The exception to this was the censorship issue, where the 
level of interest in politics did not appear to be related to the ability 
to formulate an opinion. This result was not surprising, as the abolition 
of censorship was an issue with moral overtones, on which all people might 
be expected to have an opinion, regardless of their knowledge of censorship 
as a political issue.
The largest increases in uncertainty levels with disinterest in 
politics were to be found on foreign policy issues - the Vietnam war; 
Communist China; the U.S. alliance - and on foreign investment. The 
"don't know” response rate did not increase so drastically on those issues 
which might be expected to have more of an immediate impact on electors - 
conscription; State aid; migration.
On most issues, differences in the degree of interest in politics 
appeared to be linked to the direction of opinion as well as to the ability
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to express a view. Communist China, with large increases in the level of 
uncertainty as interest fell away, constituted an exception to this. In 
some cases, increased support for an option did appear to be derived more 
from a deeper knowledge of the situation than from conflicting views. For 
example, those who expressed no interest in politics were more likely to
pick either of the extreme options on State aid ( i ts  cessation; or i ts
increase), whereas the more complex alternatives of postponing such aid 
until State schools had been improved, or of discriminating amongst non­
government schools on the basis of need appealed more to those respondents 
for whom politics was an interesting activity.
No similar explanation could account for the preferences of those 
more interested in politics on other items. Respondents with a higher 
psychological involvement were more likely to favour a close alliance with 
the United States, restrictions on the immigration of Asians, some censorship 
and a welcoming stance towards foreign investors. These were all attitudes 
which were more in keeping with government than with A.L.P. policy in 1969.
The results on the Vietnam war and conscription were more equivocal, with
those moderately interested taking a conservative stance, in comparison both 
with highly interested respondents and those who were indifferent towards 
polit ics.
The extent of cleavage in opinions between those with "a good deal o f  
in te r e s t" in politics and those with none at all was not very great on any of 
the issues surveyed - the results justified speaking only in terms of 
tendencies to favour one view in preference to another. I t  cannot therefore 
be expected that the variations in direction of opinion with involvement in 
politics which were observed at this particular time in 1969 would hold over 
a longer time span.
In the case of changes in the level of familiarity with policy issues 
however, we can be more confident that the results reported here are indicative
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of a general long-term trend. The increased abili ty of respondents with 
high degrees of interest in polit ics to formulate opinions, which was so 
clearly apparent on each of the policy issues examined in the A.S.P. 
survey, was in keeping with the findings of earl ier research on participation 
levels conducted both in Australia and overseas. The related question, as 
to whether high participators have greater knowledge of party policy stances, 
will be studied in subsequent chapters.
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CHAPTER 6
THE IMPACT OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION
To this point, the analysis of the Australian survey data has taken 
as i ts  dependent variable the direction in which each respondent cast his 
vote in the 1969 Federal election. An attempt to explain the forces under­
lying this behavioural criterion, however, necessitates a change in focus - 
a move away from the voting act to an examination of the psychological forces 
underpinning i t .
The concept of party identification has been employed successfully
in the United States to provide some explanation of the psychology of the
mass electorate. This measure of a voter's feelings of psychological
attachment to a political party was f i r s t  operationalized by Angus and
Campbell and his associates in the Michigan studies to help explain the
stabil i ty  of voting patterns in American presidential elections.1 23 In an
earl ier  study, Key had written of American voters making a "s ta n d in g
2
d e c is io n "  to support one party or another. Asked directly whether they 
thought of themselves as Republicans or Democrats, Campbell's respondents 
were able to classify themselves by their party loyalties, irrespective of 
whether they had any formal membership ties with the party involved. More­
over, further questioning elicited from the voters the strength or weakness 
of their  feelings, an indication for Campbell that he and his colleagues 
were measuring a psychological commitment which was experienced in a range
3
of intensities common to both sides of the political spectrum.
Party identification was visualised by the Michigan researchers as 
an explanatory link between the individual and political reference groups. 
Partisan loyalty provided the voter with an explanation of the environment
1. Campbell, e t  a l3 o p . c i t pp.120-145.
2. V.0. Key, as cited in Campbell, i b i d . ,  p.120.
3. The difficult ies inherent in measuring intensity of opinions have been 
outlined in the previous chapter. Campbell's work gave l i t t l e  recognition 
of their existence.
10 J
by means of "an a f f e c t i v e  o r ie n ta t io n  to  an im portan t g ro u p -o b je c t" .
The voter's actions would be guided by this loyalty, which performed the 
functions of a perceptual screen in reducing the bewildering variety of 
stimuli from the political environment into an order which he could 
comprehend.
The value of party identification as an analytic concept lay in
its  explanation of a psychological state, as distinct from the behavioural
measure of voting. Campbell insisted that the two were distinct measures
which should not be confused:
"When an independent measure o f  p a r ty  id e n t i f i c a t io n  i s
used i t  i s  c le a r  th a t even s tro n g  p a r ty  adheren ts a t  tim es  ^
may th in k  and a c t  in  c o n tra d ic tio n  to  th e ir  p a r ty  a lle g ia n c e ."
Although voters saw the political world from the reference point of their
own standing party loyalty, i t  did not wholly dictate their actions. They
could consciously or unconsciously decide to vote in a different manner if
they were sufficiently motivated to do so by information coming from other
sources. Campbell cited the case of a 41 year old Texas resident in the 1956
Presidential election who classed herself as a Democrat:
"I'm  v o tin g  Republican now only because o f  the cand ida te .
I ' d  g iv e  any th ing  in  the world i f  Eisenhower were on the  
Democratic t i c k e t .
In a later ar t ic le ,  Donald Stokes summed up the evaluative function 
performed by party identification for voters who, on the whole, did not 
have any deep interest in politics but were asked to make a political 
judgement at regular elections:
"To the average person the a f f a i r s  o f  government are remote 
and complex3 and y e t  the average c i t i z e n  i s  asked p e r io d ic a lly  
to  fo rm u la te  o p in ions about those  a f fa i r s .  A t the very l e a s t3 
he has to  decide how he w i l l  v o te 3 what cho ice he w i l l  make 
between cand ida tes o f fe r in g  d i f f e r e n t  programmes and very
4. Campbell, o p . c i t . 3 p.121.
5. i b i d , p .122.
6. ibid, p. 149
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d i f f e r e n t  v e rs io n s  o f  contemporary p o l i t i c a l  e v e n ts . In  
th i s  dilemma, having the p a r ty  symbol stamped on c e r ta in  
ca n d id a te s , c e r ta in  is su e  p o s i t io n s , c e r ta in  in te r p r e ta t io n s  
o f  p o l i t i c a l  r e a l i t y  i s  o f  g rea t p sych o lo g ica l conven ience .
The contribution of party identification to the individual voter's
perceptual outlook has been considered to have a significant effect on
the nature of electoral swings across a whole nation. If party identification
g
can be conceived as an inertia component in any individual voting decision , 
then on a national level i ts  effect would be to dampen the wild swings in 
electoral support which might be expected if  voters were reacting to new 
parties, new candidates, new policies without any firmly established 
preconceived loyalties. In the United States at least,  party identification 
has been considered to contribute to the stabili ty of voting support for the 
two major parties.
As "the b e s t  measure"  of the long-term, enduring influences on 
9
political behaviour, party identification has been a core concept in the 
development of analytic techniques for studying the behaviour of the 
American electorate. Philip Converse, for example, devised the "normal 
v o te "  model,^ which relied upon calculating the distribution of partisan 
loyalties in the electorate over a sequence of elections in order to 
establish a hypothetical baseline indicative of the amount of voting 
support each party could expect to receive, if  the rates of defection amongst 
party supporters were equal for each side.'*''*' Any deviation in the actual
7. D. Stokes, "Party Loyalty and the Likelihood of Deviating Elections" 
in A.Campbell, e t  a l , Elections and the Political Order (N.Y., 1966)
p .126.
8. P.E. Converse, "Information Flow and the Stability of Partisan Attitudes", 
in Campbell, i b i d . ,  p.140.
9. Miller, e t  a l ,  o p . c i t . ,  p.20.
10. P.E. Converse, "The Concept of a Normal Vote" in Campbell, Elections 
and the Political Order, pp.9-39.
11. The "normal v o te "  model devised by Converse in only applicable to a s t r ic t  
two=party situation and thus is not suitable for analysing Australian 
Federal elections.
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distribution of votes recorded in an election from this theoretically
"normal" expectation could be attributed to short-term forces which may,
12or may not have been specific to that election. Converse clearly 
demonstrated his conception of party identification as a stabilising 
factor in his own explanation of the model:
"The e le c t io n  outcome in  the p o p u la tio n  . . .  may be construed  
as the r e s u l t  o f  sh o r t- te rm  fo rc e s  a c tin g  upon a c e r ta in  d i s ­
tr ib u t io n  o f  p a r ty  lo y a l t ie s  which have c h a ra c te r ize d  the 
p o p u la tio n  . . .  The hallm ark o f  the  sh o r t- te rm  p a r tisa n  fo rce  
i s , o f  course, th a t  i t  induces d e fe c tio n s  across p a r ty  l in e s ,  
y e t  d e fe c tio n s  which are unaccompanied by any underly ing  
r e v is io n  o f  p a r ty  lo y a lty .  The model does n o t preclude the  
p o s s i b i l i t y  th a t  the d i s t r ib u t io n  o f  u n d erly in g  lo y a l t ie s  i t s e l f  
may change over tim e fo r  a p o p u la tio n , and the  i n i t i a l  phases 
o f  such a change m ight w e ll be marked by d e fe c tio n s  no t y e t  
accompanied by p a r tisa n  co n versio n . However, i t  i s  e m p ir ic a lly  
c le a r  th a t in  the  leng then ing  p e r io d  o f  our o b serva tio n , vo te  
s h i f t s  have no t been accompanied by conversion  bu t ra th e r  have 
been fo llo w ed  r o u tin e ly  by a c tu a l r e tu rn  to the  p a r ty  o f  o r ig in a l  
c h o ic e . "13
Butler and Stokes, in a joint panel study of three successive
British elections, were not so confident that the party loyalties of
British electors could survive voting defections without change.^
Although approximately 90% of their sample could nominate a general party
loyalty and "w ell over f o u r - f i f t h s "  of the respondents said they had always
15supported the same party, the proportion of British voters who altered
their electoral choice whilst retaining the same party identification was
considerably lower than that recorded in a similar panel study conducted
in the United States. The authors' explanation of this difference suggested
that the American voter might have a greater need to develop "a general
16concep tion  o f  h is  t i e s  to  a p a r ty "  as a perceptual guide, owing to the
12. For the application of the "normal v o te ” model to an analysis of the 
outcome of the 1968 and 1972 U.S. Presidential elections see R.W. Boyd, 
"Popular Control of Public Policy: A Normal Vote Analysis of the 1968 
Election", American Political Science Review, 66 (1972) pp.429-49 and 
Miller e t  a l ,  o p .c i t .
13. Converse, "The Concept of a Normal Vote", p.15.
14. Butler and Stokes, o p . c i t . ,  pp.56-64.
15. ib id .  3 p.57.
16* i b id  p.63.
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multiplicity of electoral choices forced upon him by the federal structure 
of the country's political system. If this was the case, i t  might be 
expected that the relationships between party identification and voting in 
Australian elections would follow the American, rather than the British 
pattern.
However, the closeness of party identification, as a psychological
attribute,  to the voting act i t s e l f  gave rise to two reservations about the
u t i l i ty  of the concept which were expressed by K. Prewitt and N. Nie.^
They queried both the validity of party identification as a measure
distinct from a voter's extrapolation of his remembered voting record, and
its  theoretical f e r t i l i ty ,  being a construct "uncom fortably"  close in nature
18to the actual voting decision. Ironically, the u t i l i ty  of party identi­
fication in explaining the motives behind voting behaviour is closely linked 
to the degree to which voters diverge from i t  in their electoral choices.
The ease with which respondents can relate to the party identification item 
in an attitude questionnaire can also be indicative of its  validity as an 
independent construct.
The A.S.fc survey results certainly gave reason to expect that party 
identification was a familiar form of psychological attachment for Aust­
ralian voters. In response to the question, "G enerally speaking3 do you 
u su a lly  th in k  o f  y o u r s e l f  as L ib e r a lL a b o r 3 Country Party or D.L.P. ? " ,  
89.0% (1667) of the sample classified themselves in one of these or another 
category. This proportion of party identifiers is consistent with the 
British and American findings, and is supported by Aitkin's figure of
17. K. Prewitt and N. Nie, "Review Article: Election Studies of the Survey 
Research Centre", British Journal of Political Science, I, 1, (1971), 
pp.479-502.
18. i b i d . , pp.486-7. On the second of these queries, Prewitt and Nie 
acknowledged the contribution of P. Rossi, "Four hand marks in Voting 
Research" in E. Burdick and A. Brodbeck (eds), American Voting Behaviour, 
(Glencoe, 111., 1959).
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87% of a similar sized sample interviewed in the same survey project in 
191967 . Party loyalties were distributed amongst the 1969 respondents
as outlined in Table 6.1.
TABLE 6.1 PARTY IDENTIFICATION WITHIN THE 1969 SAMPLE
Liberal/Country Party 868
%
46.3
Labor 740 39.5
D.L.P./Other 59 3.2
Didn't identify with a party 186 9.9
Didn't know/no answer 20 1.1
1873 100.0%
As Campbell found in the United States, the Australian voters 
interviewed were able to classify the strength of the ir feelings in a way 
which suggested that party loyalties ranged in intensity along a continuum 
progressing from weak feelings of linkage with a particular party through 
to a strong psychological commitment. The proportions of the A.S.P. 
sample admitting to d iffe r ing  strengths of party commitment are set out 
in Table 6.2
19. D. A itk in , "Electoral Behaviour", o p .o i t . ,  p.302.
20. The Liberal and Country parties, although in coalition in 1969, existed 
as two separate organisations at the Federal level and in a ll States 
except South Australia. I t  is not s t r ic t ly  correct, therefore, to 
assume that a voter's loyalty to one party would be automatically 
transferred to the other. However, i t  has been considered preferable 
to regard them as a single entity here, by combining the figures for 
party identification. Respondents' expressed attitudes towards the 
parties were responsible for this decision. During coding of the survey 
data i t  was observed that a number of people had given their party 
identification as "L ib e ra l " when, in fact, they lived in a Country Party 
electorate which had never been contested by the Liberal Party.
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TABLE 6 .2  STRENGTH AND DIRECTION OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION
Very s t r o n g  L i b e r a l / C o u n t r y  P a r ty 234 12.5
F a i r l y  s t r o n g  L i b e r a l / C o u n t r y  P a r ty 458 24.5
Not very  s t r o n g  L i b e r a l / C o u n t r y  P a r ty 172 9 .2
Very s t r o n g  Labor 303 16.2
F a i r l y  s t r o n g  Labor 318 17.0
Not very s t r o n g  Labor 112 6.0
Did not  i d e n t i f y  wi th a p a r ty 186 9.9
FIGURE 6.1 STRENGTH AND DIRECTION OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION
WITHIN THE 1969 SAMPLE
As F igure  6.1 i n d i c a t e s ,  the  major  p a r ty  groupings  in A u s t r a l i a  did  
no t  appea r  to  be on an equal f o o t i n g  in t h e i r  a b i l i t y  to  a t t r a c t  s t r o n g  
f e e l i n g s  o f  l o y a l t y  from t h e i r  s u p p o r t e r s .  The Labor P a r ty  had a l a r g e r  
p r o p o r t i o n  o f  i t s  f o l l o w e r s  amongst the  responden ts  who f e l t  very s t r o n g l y  
committed than  did  th e  government p a r t i e s  - 40.9% o f  Labor i d e n t i f i e r s  
s a i d  they  f e l t  "very s t ro n g ly "  about t h e i r  p a r ty  l o y a l t y ,  compared with  
on ly  27.0% o f  L i b e ra l / C o u n t ry  P a r ty  i d e n t i f i e r s .  This c o n t r a s t  between 
the  two b locs  o f  p a r ty  s u p p o r t e r s  in A u s t r a l i a  was not  e v i d e n t  in Campbel l 's
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analysis of the distribution of party identification in America, where
the Republican and Democratic parties did not differ markedly in their
21ratio of strong to weak support. The vast difference in historical and
ideological backgrounds of the Labor and non-Labor parties in Australia
22immediately suggests i t se l f  as an explanatory factor here.
The establishment of party identification at an early stage in the
political l i fe of a voter and i ts subsequent resistance to change have
been widely considered as integral parts of the concept, responsible for
23its stabilizing effect on voting patterns. The process of political
socialization, whereby a child is gradually introduced to the political
norms and values of a society through the influence of family, school,
peer groups, and, later,  work experiences, has been used to explain the
formation of partisan loyalties. There has been some debate, however,
over the actual nature of the influence processes at work here, and the
age at which party identification can f i r s t  be recognised in the form
in which i t  is common amongst adults. Figures derived from studies of
school children in the United States and in Australia differ in the la t ter
respect. Early American findings that 9 year olds had firm party loyalties
which were distributed in roughly similar proportions to those found in a
24comparable adult population, can be contrasted with R.W. Connell's
Australian study, where children of a similar age displayed only tentative
party preferences and one third of the children were completely undecided
25between the parties.
21. Campbell, The American Voter, p.124.
22. Similarities in the background of Labor parties in Australia and in 
Great Britain would suggest that the British Labor Party may enjoy a 
similar advantage over i ts rival the Conservative Party. Unfortunately, 
no British figures were available to test  this hypothesis.
23. Campbell, The American Voter, Chapter 7.
24. F.I. Greenstein, Children and Pol i t ics , (New Haven, Conn., 1969) reports
a 1958 study of New Haven children. See also H. Hyman, Political Social­
isation (Glencoe, 111., 1959).
25. R.W. Connell, The Child's Construction of Polit ics,  (Melbourne, 1971).
The tenuous nature of the preferences expressed by his 9 and 10
year old respondents led Connell to reject American notions that childhood
partisan loyalties were developed through a Freudian psychological
2 6process of identification with a parent-figure. This interpretation had 
stressed the emotional and irrational basis of party identification,
where " p o l i t i c a l  f e e l in g s 3 e v a lu a tio n s  and a ttachm ents formed w e ll be fo re
27the  c h i ld  learned  the r e le v a n t  su p p o rtin g  in fo rm a tio n " . Instead, Connell
suggested that allowance should be made for the conscious activity of the 
children in undertaking "reasonable a c ts  o f  p o l i t i c a l  ch o ice3 g iven  the  
grounds a v a ila b le  to  them". ^
In an earlier study of American high school and university students,
L.A. Froman and J.K. Skipper attempted to show that party identification
was based "to  a s ig n i f i c a n t  e x te n t3 on c e r ta in  b e l i e f s  about various is su e s
and problems th a t  are a s so c ia te d  w ith  one p o l i t i c a l  p a r ty  or the o th e r"  by
setting up candidate choice situations where a respondent's party identi-
29fication would be in conflict with his issue opinions. Froman and Skipper 
admitted that the older ages of their  subjects prevented their contradicting 
Greenstein's conclusions that party identification was learned amongst 9 
year olds independently of issues. Nevertheless, they contended that younger
26. i b i d , , pp.77-81.
27. Greenstein, o p . c i t . 3 p.72.
28. Connell, o p . c i t . 3 p.81.
29. L.A. Froman and J.K. Skipper, "An Approach to the Learning of Party 
Identification", Public Opinion Quarterly, 27, 3 (1963), pp.473-480. 
Froman and Skipper admitted that their  choice situations were not 
necessarily " r e a l i s t i c "  ones for voters, p.478. Their questionnaire's 
clear juxtaposition of party candidate and issue position in a "d is ­
sonance" situation would not normally be replicated in voters' minds 
owing to the multiplicity of messages received from the political 
environment and the operation of perceptual devices which aid the voter 
in avoiding just this type of conflict situation (see Chapter 7 of 
this thesis).
161
less educated people learned to discriminate between the parties on the 
basis of moralistic or "s t y l e "  issues - in contrast with the older, more 
educated students, for whom "p o s i t i o n " issues about policy were like ly  
to be important.
In re-introducing rational choice as an element in the learning of
party identifica tion, Froman and Skipper, and Connell with Australian
children, were adopting an approach similar to that of Arthur Goldberg in
his analysis of empirical evidence from the Michigan studies of adult 
30voting behaviour. Goldberg used his findings as a basis for arguing 
that party loyalties were rooted in socially-oriented group norms which 
constituted rational guides to action (in terms of the reduction of 
information costs involved in a voter's attempt to cope with the po li t ica l 
environment).
The results of the studies such as those cited above have aided in 
removing the deterministic overtones of some earlie r analyses of the role 
played by party identification in voting decisions. In adopting a more 
sophisticated approach to the interplay between individual choice, the 
po li t ica l environment and learned responses, such studies have helped to 
answer earlie r critiques of survey research which accused po lit ica l 
sociologists of relying upon an overly mechanistic interpretation of 
po li t ica l behaviour.
The persistence of a party loyalty as a stable guide to a voter's 
perception of his environment forms an integral part of the explanatory 
value of the concept of party identification. The in a b il i ty  of a voter's 
psychological attachment to a party to survive any voting change would s tr ip
30. A. Goldberg, "Social Determinism and Rationality as Bases of Party
Identif ica tion", American Polit ica l Science Review, 63 (1969), pp.5-25. 
Connell pointed out that Goldberg's thesis could not explain the f i r s t  
formation of party preferences, as children could not make the necessary 
means-end calculations about their own po lit ica l actions at this early 
stage, Connell, o p . o i t . 3 p.66.
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the concept of its relevance in explaining the dynamics behind a voting 
decision. Yet the above discussion should caution against any conception 
of party identification as a static force, dictating to the individual 
a consistent form of political behaviour. Campbell himself saw party 
identification as characterised "no t by r ig id im m u ta b le  f i x a t io n  on one
p a r ty  ra th e r  than the o th e r3 b u t by a p e r s is ta n t  adherence and a r e s is ta n c e
31to  con trary  in f lu e n c e ."
The relative susceptibility of party loyalties to change is one of 
the most difficult  aspects of party identification to assess. In the absence 
of longitudinal studies, data on the stabili ty of party identification over 
time depends on the ability of survey respondents to recall past events.
The recall data accumulated by Campbell and his associates was considered 
by them to provide "im pressive  evidence o f  the constancy o f  p a r ty  a lle g ia n c e " .
The information which could be gleaned from the A.S.P. survey data 
was sketchy and of dubious accuracy in the case of older respondents.
However, the overall percentage breakdown did support the notion of party 
identification as a stable commitment ,for the majority of voters. 76.0%
(1267) of those who had volunteered a party identification (or 67.6% of 
the whole sample) said they had never changed that loyalty in the past; 
whereas 22.6% (377) of identifiers (or 20.1% of the whole sample) remembered 
having altered their loyalty at some stage. Of this la t te r  group, approxi­
mately one third (114) said they had made the change in the last couple of 
years or during the last  election. Unfortunately, i t  was not possible 
to compare movements in party identification with respondents' past voting 
patterns, or even to ascertain the ages at which respondents had switched 
their loyalties.
The relationships between party identification and vote at the 1969
31. Campbell, The American Voter, p.146.
32. i b i d . 3 p.127.
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Federal elect ion were in terest ing in themselves, however. Although the 
d i rec t ion  in which respondents voted bore a strong and highly s ig n i f ic a n t  
re la t ionship to th e i r  party id e n t i f i c a t io n  (Cramer's V = +.64, p > .001), 
small numbers of respondents did choose to vote against th e i r  part isan 
loya l t ie s :
TABLE 6.3 ASSOCIATION BETWEEN PARTY IDENTIFICATION
AND 1969 VOTE 
1969 Vote
Lib/CP Labor DLP/Other Did not Vote An answer
Lib/CP
Labor
DLP/
Other
No Party 
Ide n t i f i ca t ion
No Answer
83.2 6.9 5.6 1.6 2.6
4.9 88.8 3.6 0.4 2.3
16.9 15.3 66.1 0.0 1.7
29.6 48.9 10.8 3.8 7.0
15.0 30.0 5.0 5.0 45.0
868)
(186)
The resul ts show a defection rate amongst Liberal/Country Party i d e n t i f i e r s
of  6.9% to Labor, in contrast with only 4.9% of Labor id e n t i f i e r s  who
defected in the reverse d i rec t ion .  The Labor Party gained fa r  more votes
than did any of i t s  opponents from those who professed to have no party
id e n t i f i c a t io n .  Those who id e n t i f ie d  with the D.L.P. or other smaller
part ies defected at an approximately equal rate to the Liberal and Country
33parties and to the A.L.P.
Labor's a b i l i t y  to re ta in  the votes of a higher proport ion of i t s  
id e n t i f ie r s  and to a t t ra c t  more support from the "independent” voters in 
the sample should not be any surprise in a survey conducted at the time
33. The f igures on the 1969 f i r s t  preference vote to DLP and smaller
party id e n t i f ie r s  may not give a true picture of decisions to defect 
from party id e n t i f i c a t io n  as, in th is  case, the absence of  candidates 
of  the preferred party standing in the voters'  electorates may have 
forced a vote for  another party.
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of an election which saw a 7% national swing to the Ä.L.P. I t  is of
interest, however, that the total Labor vote recorded for the A.S.P. sample
drew more heavily from amongst those respondents without any party
identification ("independents” contributed 11.1% of the Labor vote) than
from amongst those whose loyalty lay with any of the other parties (Liberal/
Country Party, D.L.P. and Other Party identifiers contributed 8.4% of the
Labor vote) - and this occurred with a survey sample which was biased in
favour of the government parties. Unfortunately, i t  is not possible
within the bounds of the present study to investigate the questions which
34suggest themselves here.
As no follow-up data are available on these respondents, i t  is 
impossible to tell  whether the voting defections traced here were, in 
fact, temporary in nature or whether they signalled an approaching change 
in party identification. On the basis of these figures, however, i t  can 
be concluded that vote and party identification were demonstrably 
different concepts for a proportion of the Australian electorate in 1969.
The nature of the concept of party identification as established by 
Campbell and his colleagues gained further support from the A.S.P. data 
when the relationships between strength of party identification and like­
lihood of a contrary vote were examined. For both party groupings, the 
frequency of respondents voting against their party identification 
decreased as the intensity of feeling they associated with their loyalty 
increased. This relationship is illustrated graphically in Figure 6.2.
34. The questions which do suggest themselves are whether the "independents” 
from whom Labor draw 11.1% of its  1969 vote were mainly young voters 
who had no firmly established party loyalty, or whether they were 
mainly habitual swinging voters.
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FIGURE 6.2 STRENGTH AND DIRECTION OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION 
IN RELATION TO 1969 VOTE
(33i\)  0 ^  (mi W  l**}
A f u r t h e r  hypo t he s i s  was t h a t  t hose  r e spondent s  who had changed
t h e i r  p a r t y  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  in t he  pa s t  would be more prone to d e f e c t  from 
t h e i r  c u r r e n t  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  in c a s t i n g  t h e i r  1969 vote  than would those  
who had a s t a b l e  h i s t o r y  o f  p a r t i s a n  l o y a l t y .  The da t a  gave some s uppor t  
to t h i s  hypo t he s i s  f o r  Labor i d e n t i f i e r s ,  but  not  f o r  those  who i d e n t i f i e d  
wi th t he  government  p a r t i e s .
In c o n t r a s t  to  t he  no t i on  of  t he  i ndependent  c i t i z e n ,  f r e e  o f  pa r t y  
t i e s ,  who was concerned wi th p o l i t i c a l  a f f a i r s  and weighed t h e  r i v a l  c l a ims  
of  compet ing p a r t i e s  in making h i s / h e r  c ons i de r e d  e l e c t o r a l  judgement ,  
Campbell p o s i t e d  an a s s o c i a t i o n  between p a r t i s a n s h i p  and psycho l og i ca l  
involvement  in p o l i t i c s .  The s t r o n g e r  an i n d i v i d u a l ' s  sense  o f  a t t a chmen t
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to a political party, the more likely he or she was to be interested in 
35political affairs. The Australian data upheld this hypothesis, as the 
following table demonstrates:
TABLE 6.4 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTENSITY OF PARTY 
IDENTIFICATION AND INTEREST IN POLITICS
Very
Strong
Lib/CP
Fairly 
Strong 
Lib/CP
Not Very
Strong
Lib/CP
Didn't
Identify
Not Very
Strong
Labor
Fairly 
Strong 
Labor
Very
Strong
Labor
Good
Deal 30.8 16.8 14.0 26.3 8.9 16.7 34.0
Some 48.7 59.2 41.9 43.0 29.5 49.4 36.3
Not
Much 18.4 22.5 37.2 21.5 49.1 27.7 23.8
None 2.1 1.5 7.0 8.6 12.5 6.3 5.9
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
(234) (458) (172) (186) (112) (318) (303)
As the strength of identification with one or other of the parties decreased, 
so the percentage of respondents with a good deal of interest in politics 
decreased, and the percentage with no interest in politics at all or not 
much interest showed a corresponding increase. " Some i n t e r e s t "  in politics 
was most common amongst those respondents with a " f a i r l y  s trong"  party 
loyalty. The failure of those with no party identification to conform to 
the general pattern was an interesting indication that a total lack of
35. Campbell, The American Voter, pp.142-5. This hypothesis is directly 
contradicted by Downs' economic rationality model of voting behaviour 
which predicts that the more a voter favours one party over another, 
the less likely he is to obtain political information, Downs, o p .c i t .
A series of studies, including the A.S.P. survey, have produced 
empirical evidence which runs counter to this portion of Downs' theory.
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partisanship could not be equated with a generally low level of interest 
in political affairs - the "independents"  were more likely to express a 
good deal of interest in politics than were the " fa ir ly  s tro n g "  party 
identifiers. Overall, Labor identifiers were distributed more towards 
the two extremes of political involvement than were those identifying with 
the government parties.
Having established that party identification is a concept which can 
be applied to the Australian survey respondents, we can now move on to the 
main task of this chapter which is to examine the relationships between 
voters' attitudes on political issues and their standing party loyalties.
As a f i r s t  step, each of the issue items in the A.S.P. questionnaire 
was cross-tabulated against the party identification variable and a 
s ta t is t ica l  measure of the strength of association within each set of two 
variables was obtained. The information gained from this simplified 
approach was limited in its  usefulness, as no allowance was made, in i t ia l ly ,  
for varying intensities of party loyalty or for the degree of correspondence 
between questionnaire alternatives ancT party stances on the policy issues. 
However, testing the significance of the simple bivariate relationships was 
a necessary precaution to ensure that variations did not occur merely by 
chance. The relative sizes of the correlation coefficients quickly 
identified those issues where attitudes were most closely related to the 
direction of party loyalties.
Using Chi square, responses to all the issue items were found to be
significantly related to direction of party identification at the most
rigorous .1% level of significance. When the s tre n g th  of association was
measured, however, only a few issues emerged as bearing noteworthy
relationships to the independent variable. The size of the Cramer's V
36correlation coefficient varied from a miniscule +.07 on State aid for
36. Cramer's V is a correlation coefficient which can be used to measure 
the strength of association between variables which are not expressed 
in continuous form. The d ir e c t io n  of party identification (and, like-
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education to + .22 on Vietnam - as expected, a perfect co rre la t ion  was
not approached on any one issue. C learly, respondents' a tt itudes on
issues of public po licy were not so le ly determined by th e ir  party
id e n t i f ic a t io n ;  and, conversely, ne ither were th e ir  party lo ya lt ie s
37dictated completely by th e ir  issue opinions.
The four issues which recorded the highest corre la t ions with party 
id e n t i f ic a t io n  were:
TABLE 6.5 CORRELATION BETWEEN ISSUE OPINION 
AND PARTY IDENTIFICATION 
Cramer's V
Vietnam war .22
Communist China .21
Conscription .16
Censorship .15
The top two items, the Vietnam war and Communist China were the 
only issues on which opinions had displayed even a moderate degree of 
partisan cleavage (using 1969 vote as the independent variable) in 
Chapter 4. This correspondence was not unexpected. Although party 
id e n t i f ic a t io n  did d i f f e r  from 1969 vote in some cases, the overall 
d is t r ib u t io n  o f opinions in the sample could not be expected to d i f fe r  
s ig n i f ic a n t ly ,  whichever o f the two measures was taken as the independent 
variable.
On the basis of th is  study o f the 1952 and 1956 U.S. Presidential 
e lec tions , Campbell reached several conclusions on the nature o f the 
re la tionsh ips between voters ' a tt itudes  on p o l i t ic a l  issues and th e ir  
party id e n t i f ic a t io n  which can be used to shed l ig h t  on the motivations
36. cont. wise, the d ire c t ion  o f 1969 vote) is such a variab le , where 
id e n t i f ic a t io n  with one p o l i t ic a l  party does not possess any obvious 
rank order in re la t io n  to id e n t i f ic a t io n  with another party.
37. I t  is important to specify both of these conditions, as no assumptions 
can be made at th is  stage as to the d irec t ion  o f cause and e f fe c t .
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underlying voting decisions made by the Australian electorate in 1969.
The significance of the suggestion that a voter's partisan loyalty acted
as a guide to perception of the political environment was that information
about issues (as well as about parties and candidates) would be selectively
perceived to f i t  in with an existing preference for a particular political
party. Campbell and his colleagues were convinced that the main direction
of influence was from party identification to attitude formation, rather
than the reverse; although they did admit that some information from the
political environment, i f  sufficiently inconsistent with a voter's party
38allegiance, could work to change the la t ter .
Campbell found that the s tro n g er  a voter's feeling of identification
with a party, the more likely he was to hold views which were consistent
with those adopted by that party. Party identification could explain a
large part of the variance in individual's attitudes towards political
objects. It could account, too, for the internal consistency of attitude
sets - stronger partisans were more likely to have views which were both
39internally consistent and corresponded with their party s stance.
The difficulty in testing Campbell's findings in relation to the 
A.S.P. data on policy issues stems from the problems already encountered 
in locating party policy stances in terms of the alternatives posed in the 
questionnaire items. This task could only be accomplished with any degree 
of certainty on the questions relating to the Vietnam war, conscription, 
censorship, Communist China and foreign investment (see Chapter 3). Even 
in these cases there could be no guarantee that the respondents' perception 
of equivalence between the questionnaire alternatives and party policies 
corresponded with my own.^° In contrast with the small number of usable
38. Campbell, o p . a i t ., p.135.
39. i b i d . ,  pp.128-36.
40. This information is available on one issue item, the Vietnam war, 
and will be analysed in the next chapter.
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items lacking any standard format in the A.S.P. survey, Campbell's data 
enabled him to construct two sets of scaled items on domestic and foreign 
policy, the alternatives on each issue ranging from a pro-Democratic 
stance at one end of the scale to a pro-Republican stance at the other.
Despite the fact that reliable scale construction was not feasible 
with the A.S.P. data, i t  was possible to examine the distribution of attitudes 
amongst respondents with variations in strength of party identification and 
to compare these attitudes with party policy stances on the items listed 
above. The two issues - the Vietnam war and Communist China - which bore 
the strongest relationships with the party identification variable were also 
the only ones where cleavages in opinion between those who identified with the 
opposing parties corresponded with actual differences in Liberal/Country 
Party and Labor policies. Campbell's hypothesis that a greater sense of 
identity with a party was associated with a higher likelihood of consistency 
between the attitudes of a respondent and his party's policy was upheld in 
both these cases. The results are graphically illustrated in Figures 6.3 
and 6.4.
As had been the case when 1969 vote was used as the independent 
variable (see Chapter 4), there was evidence of a partial cleavage in 
attitudes towards the two issues of conscription and censorship with party 
identification. In each instance, one of the alternatives presented to 
respondents discriminated between Liberal/Country Party and Labor 
identif iers,  but the remaining alternatives did not. The policy positions 
which were clearly related to direction of party loyalty were the ending of 
conscription and the abolition of censorship - differences between opposing 
party identifiers in their  level of support for these particular options were 
primarily responsible for the overall correlation coefficients of .16 and 
.15, respectively, which were noted earlier.  Support for halting conscription 
and for abolishing censorship was mainly restricted to those who identified 
"very s tr o n g ly "  with the Labor Party. In accordance with Campbell's findings
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FIGURE 6.3 ATTITUDE TOWARDS VIETNAM BY STRENGTH AND 
DIRECTION OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION41
41. The graph does not  show the  degree of  support  fo r  the four th  a l t e r n a t i v e  
(B - t h a t  vo lun tee r  t roops  only should be r e t a i ned  in Vietnam),  which 
was d i s t r i b u t e d  f a i r l y  evenly amongst Lib/Cp and Labor i d e n t i f i e r s ,  
because t h i s  view did not  correspond with the pol icy of  any of  the major 
p a r t i e s  in 1969. The f igu r es  for  a l t e r n a t i v e s  C ( t h a t  c i v i l i a n  exper t s  
only should be r e t a i ne d  in Vietnam) and D ( t h a t  Aus t r a l i a  should s t ay  
out of  Vietnam a l t o g e t h e r )  have been combined by averaging the 
percentage  suppor t  from each i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  ca tegory,  as both a l t e r ­
na t ives  could c o r r e c t l y  be c l a s s i f i e d  as r epresen t ing  Labor pol i cy .
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FIGURE 6.4 ATTITUDE TOWARDS COMMUNIST CHINA BY
STRENGTH AND DIRECTION OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION
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on the importance o f  the i n t e n s i t y  o f  pa r ty  l o y a l t y ,  s t rong i d e n t i f i e r s
were the ones who tended to adopt stances in  l i n e  w i th  t h e i r  p a r t i e s '
p o l i c i e s  on the issues o f  c o n s c r ip t i o n  and censorsh ip.
The d iscovery  o f  a d i f f e r e n c e  in  op in ions between those who f e l t
s t ro n g ly  and those who f e l t  on ly  weakly committed to  the same pa r ty  has
c e r ta in  s i m i l a r i t i e s  w i th  research conducted by McClosky in  the Uni ted 
42States .  Working w i th  known pa r ty  a c t i v i s t s  and r a n k - a n d - f i l e  pa r ty  
suppor te rs ,  McClosky found t h a t  op in ion  cleavages between the two sets o f
42. H. McClosky, e t  a l . 3 o p . c i t .
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leaders were not necessarily replicated amongst their followers; indeed, 
often the rank-and-file supporters of a party were closer in their attitudes 
to their counterparts in the opposing party than to their own party leaders.
The A.S.P. data, consisting of rough self-assessments of intensities of feeling 
associated with party loyalty, were not comparable with McClosky's findings, 
which relied upon behavioural measures of party activism. However, his 
line of enquiry was adapted to the A.S.P. data in order to investigate a 
further dimension of the differences in opinion associated with different 
strengths of party identification.
On two issues, foreign investment and censorship, there was more
similarity between the views of those whose loyalty lay with opposing
parties but who did not feel very strongly about i t ,  than there was between
these respondents and their fellow identifiers in the same party, who d id
43feel very strongly. Foreign investment was not an issue which had 
registered any cleavage between the views of opposing party identifiers,  
when these had been considered in the aggregate without any breakdown for 
various strengths of party identification. Opinions on the abolition of 
censorship had shown some partisan cleavage, but this was clearly restricted 
to a division between very strong identifiers which was not matched at the 
weaker levels of party identification. The gap between the attitudes of 
weak and strong followers of the same party was, in both these cases, larger 
than that between voters who identified, though " no t very s t r o n g ly " , with 
parties which were advancing opposing viewpoints.
As the data suggested that there were differences in opinion associated 
with the strength of feeling, as well as the direction of party identification
43. This assessment of similarity is based on comparing the difference 
between the percentage of strong and weak identifiers from the same 
party holding a particular viewpoint, and the difference between the 
percentage of weak identifiers from each of the two opposing parties 
with the same attitude. On the issues of foreign investment and 
censorship the former difference was larger than the la t te r  for both 
parties.
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in the 1969 Australian electorate, i t  might be asked whether strong 
identifiers held their views with greater intensity than those with weaker 
party loyalties. The results produced equivocal answers to this question 
on the three issues (Vietnam, conscription, censorship) where intensity of 
feeling was examined and where i t  was also possible to match party policy 
stances to the questionnaire alternatives. Some, but not all attitudes 
were held with greater intensity by those who fe l t  "very strongly"  committed 
to a particular party.
On Vietnam and conscription the association between strength of 
feeling for a party and strength of commitment to a policy position was 
particularly in evidence at the extremities of opinion. " Very strong"
Liberal/Country Party identifiers could be differentiated from their 
fellows with weaker loyalties by the greater intensity of their support for 
the retention of troops, including conscripts in Vietnam, and for the 
extension of conscription to cover all young men (incidentally, not a 
government policy). The obverse applied to "very strong"  Labor identifiers,  
who fe l t  intensely that Australia should stay out of Vietnam and that 
conscription should be abolished, in comparison with less committed Labor 
identifiers who held the same views with less intensity.
It has already been noted, in Chapter 4, that the more extreme policy 
options on the issues of Vietnam and conscription attracted stronger 
feelings than did the more moderate alternatives. The present findings 
indicate that "very strong" party identifiers were responsible for a 
large share of this heightened intensity of feeling. The observed relation­
ship between intense party loyalty and strongly fe l t  attitudes may well 
have been restricted, however, to the few issues (such as Vietnam and 
conscription) where supporters of different parties took up clearly opposing 
stances, regardless of whether these corresponded with their respective 
party's policies.
The investigation to this stage has revealed a more complex pattern
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of relationships between party identification and voters' attitudes on 
political issues than Campbell and his colleagues found as a result of 
their research. To a certain extent, this may be due to the narrow focus 
of the present study, necessitated by certain technical limitations in 
the survey i tse lf .  Campbell was able to base his analysis on a large number 
of items of domestic and foreign policy, and to incorporate these in 
independently validated opinion scales. The variations between different 
issues which have become apparent here may well have been submerged in 
more general trends of the sort observed by Campbell, i f  the number of issue 
items available for analysis had been larger, and had been asked in a 
standardised form.
The failure to find evidence of a cleavage in attitudes along 
party lines on several of the issue questions was not necessarily indicative 
of the absence of any links between party identification and attitude 
formation on these issues amongst the Australian respondents. Party loyalty 
may s t i l l  have functioned as a perceptual screen, but respondents simply 
may have been unable to correctly identify the parties' policy stances.
An awareness at least of where one's own party stands on an issue is necessay 
if  party identification is to be used as a guide to attitude formation. So 
far, no evidence of the capacity of respondents to make this linkage 
correctly has been obtained for the A.S.P. survey. I t  will be covered in 
the next chapter, so far as the boundaries of the survey allow. Suffice 
i t  to say here that, in view of the difficulty experienced in matching 
questionnaire alternatives to party policies, we might hardly expect the 
respondents to be aware of any correspondence. Without such awareness, 
i t  cannot be said that the absence of cleavages in opinion along the 
lines of party identification was indicative of anything more than a lack 
of knowledge of party policies on the part of the voters.
As a corollary to this point, i t  could be suggested that those strong 
party identifiers whose views corresponded with party policy on Vietnam and
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Communist China were merely taking advantage of a greater degree of 
knowledge about the parties and were not using their party identification 
in any sense as a guide to their  perception of the environment. It  has 
already been established that respondents' interest in political affairs 
increased with the strength of party attachment, regardless of the 
direction of that attachment. Was party identification related to 
educational background in the same way? The data suggest that i t  was not. 
Although a clear overall difference was evident in the education levels of 
Labor and Liberal/Country Party identifiers,  the la t te r  having a higher 
proportion of secondary and tertiary educated followers, there was no 
consistent pattern of alteration in degree of education with the intensity 
of party loyalty. The outstanding exception to this, and one which went 
against the above hypothesis, was found amongst very strong Labor identifiers,  
44.9% of whom had none/primary education - a substantially higher figure 
than for any other category of party support.
Despite the lack of relevance of educational level, strong partisans 
may have benefited from an abili ty  to distinguish clearly between party 
stances which was not shared by those whose party commitments were weak.
This possibility will be investigated in the following chapter. Together 
with an estimation of respondents' perceptions of party policies on the 
central issue of the Vietnam war, i t  may help to shed further light on 
the relationships between party identification, attitudes and, ultimately, 
voting behaviour.
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CHAPTER 7
PERCEPTION OF PARTY DIFFERENCE
Each individual voting decision is heavily dependent upon the voter's 
perception of the competing parties and candidates and his/her judgement of 
the differences between them. This statement would be of l i t t l e  s ignifi­
cance if  voters merely reacted to objective reality, without interposing 
their own subjective interpretations of the political world. In fact , a 
single political event is open to a wide variety of interpretations and 
people's perceptions of i t  are likely to be coloured by their personal 
experiences and attitudes. And, in turn, subsequent events are affected 
by these perceptions - "Today's subjective unreality in the voters’ minds 
affects tomorrow’s objective reality in the political arena".^
In the task of differentiating between the parties, voters are 
dependent on broad subjective images which serve as simplified guides to
reality. We have already seen that perceptions of the parties' stances
2on issues of public policy can constitute components of these images.
The images may, on the other hand, be based on more generalized judgements
relating to subjective values about politics and parties - possibly
group-oriented, or rooted in a particular ideology. The establishment of
an association in the public's mind between particular parties and the
interests of social classes - one party for "the workers" and one for
"big business" has proved a consistently effective means for asserting
3
party difference in the British and Australian political systems.
Different ideological stances also provide useful party labels which serve
1. Berelson et a l , op.cit. , p. 216
2. See also Butler and Stokes, op.cit, pp. 433-6.
3. Group-related assessments of the parties were fair ly frequent amongst 
responses to the ASP items which asked what voters liked and disliked 
about the major parties. 20.9% of all the reasons respondents gave for 
liking the Labor Party were group-related - the bulk of these (255;
25.4% of total responses) referred in some way to the association 
between "workers" and the A.L.P.
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to distinguish parties from their competitors.
The competition between parties for the allegiance of the same body 
of voters in two-party systems has increased the need to rely on such 
opposing images if the parties are to be perceived as distinctly different. 
Political scientists, in the United States particularly, have spoken of a 
tendency towards convergence in the policies of broad, mass-based parties. 
This hypothesis has been applied to Australia, although the divergent 
historical and ideological origins of the Liberal and Labor parties, 
together with the existence of such an avowedly sectional party as the 
Country Party, should lead us to question the extent of its relevance.
The ASP survey has provided some data on the degree of difference 
between the parties perceived by Australian voters, as distinct from 
measures of the objective differences or similarities in party policies. 
This data can be obtained from three main sources in the questionnaire:
1. an item requiring respondents to make a general assessment of party 
difference;
2. a comparison between the frequencies with which the two main parties 
were chosen to solve problems nominated by the respondents as 
important;
3. an examination of the extent of respondent's knowledge of party 
policies on the Australian commitment to the Vietnam war.
These items, each possessing some measurement deficiencies, together
constituted only a tentative assessment of the ways Australian voters
distinguish between the parties from which they must choose at election
time. A more fruitful approach would require some measurement of trends
across time intervals in the public's assessment of party difference.
Data derived from the question, "In general3 would you say there
is a good deal of difference between the parties3 some difference or
not much difference?" , was the most suspect, in terms both of its
reliability and its validity. As Converse observed of American studies,
attempts to measure party difference lacked reference points as to
179
"how big is big", and hence would remain subjective. There could be no 
guarantee that respondents would share the same conception of "distance" - 
in each case, the judgement would have been a personal one. In addition, 
the wording of the question may have forced respondents to make an 
estimation of party difference which was not meaningful to them. The 
results could only be of use, therefore, to provide a rough indication of 
the degree of difference common in voters' perceptions of the political 
p a r ties.
The distribution of answers to this item was indicative of a 
greater emphasis on distance between the parties than might be expected 
from the American hypothesis that party policies have tended to converge.
In all, 37.5% (703) of the ASP sample perceived a "good deal of difference" 
between the parties. A large proportion of the sample saw at least
"some difference" between the parties - 26.9% "some difference" + 37.5%
"a good deal of difference"\ whilst only 6.1% was unable to answer the 
question (see Figure 7.1).
4
Pfocf
FIGURE 7.1 PERCEPTION OF DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE PARTIES
4. P. Converse, et a l ., "Continuity and Change in American Politics, 
Parties and Issues in the 1968 Election", American Political Science 
R e v i e w , 63 (1969), p. 1100.
5. The question on party difference presumably referred to all the
political parties contesting the 1969 election. The positive r e l a t i o n - _ 
ship between perception of party difference and strength of identification 
with either the A.L.P. or the Liberal/Country Party coalition suggests, 
however, that the item did provide a valid measure of the degree of 
distance perceived between the government and opposition parties.
Some confirmation of the validity of the results was provided by
the observation of a link between the perceived distance between the 
parties and the strength of partisanship. As the strength of respondents' 
loyalties to either the government or the opposition parties increased, 
so did the likelihood that they would perceive a greater overall 
difference between the parties (see Figure 7.2). Educational level and 
interest in politics, too, were positively linked with perception of 
party difference - suggesting that the apparent relationship with strength 
of partisanship could have been largely spurious. The latter's persistence 
even when education level was controlled, however, confirmed that it was 
genuine in nature.
FIGURE 7.2 STRENGTH OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION AS A FUNCTION OF
tOr DISTANCE PERCEIVED BETWEEN THE PARTIES Ub\cf> ; w f e
oercewicva <x ciccd
\0 -
0
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On the whole, Liberal/Country Party identifiers were more likely 
to perceive greater distances separating the parties than were those whose 
loyalties lay with the Labor Party. This result could be partially, but 
not completely, attributed to higher levels of education amongst Liberal/ 
Country Party supporters. The differences between Liberal/Country Party 
and Labor identifiers of the same educational background may have arisen 
from the contrast in perspective stemming from the parties' respective 
statuses in government and in opposition. As supporters of a government 
long in power, Liberal/Country Party identifiers might be inclined to 
exaggerate the difference between the government parties and the untested 
opposition, whilst Labor supporters would not see the transition to a 
Labor government as altering the fundamentals of Australian l i fe .
An additional assessment of the way Australian electors perceived 
the political parties could be made by comparing the extent to which Labor 
or the Liberal/Country Party coalition was seen as likely to solve 
particular problems nominated by the ASP respondents. The questionnaire 
asked, "In your opinion3 what are the most important problems the 
federal government should do something about?", and followed-up with a 
request to identify the party which would be most likely to do what the
c
respondent wanted on the f i r s t  two problems mentioned.
An analysis of the follow-up responses showed clear differences
in the voters' perceptions of the parties' capacities to handle some of
the most commonly mentioned problems. Only 9.3% (175) of the sample could
see "no d ifference"  between the parties on the f i r s t  problem they had
specified as needing federal government attention. 26.8% (502) saw one
or other of the government parties as most likely to solve their problem
in a satisfactory way; whilst 43.2% (809) favoured the Labor Party. The
large proportion of respondents who nominated the Labor Party in this
fashion (compared with a total 39.5% of the sample who identified with
6. Results for this item will be analysed more exhaustively in the following 
chapter.
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the Labor Party) provided an immediate indication that assessments of 
the parties' problem-solving abi l i t ies  were not entirely derivative of 
party a l1egiance.
The Labor Party was not favoured by most respondents on all the 
problems specified, however. As illustrated in histogram form in 
Figure 7.3? three problems were predominantly seen as areas where the 
government parties would be successful - defence, primary industry and 
national development (although national development registered the highest 
”no d i f fe rence" response rate - 18.3% of 104 respondents specifying that 
problem). Defence, particularly, was a problem area where perceptions 
of the parties were polarized, with only 1.9% (n = 157) seeing "no 
d i f ference” between the parties' abi l i t ies  to do what the respondents 
wanted. It was also the only issue which attracted a significant number 
of mentions for the D.L.P. (12.7% of 157).
7. The codes used for this item did not discriminate amongst those 
respondents who took opposing views on the particular issue they 
nominated as an important problem. Both pro and con respondents have 
therefore been included under the same category and i t  should not come 
as any surprise that both parties have been mentioned by respondents as 
best able to handle each of the problems listed. Even if  the compara­
tive frequencies shown in the histogram are seen as mere reflections 
of the divisions of opinion within the sample, the comparison is 
s t i l l  valid as a measure of the degree to which differences were 
perceived between the parties' policies on the problems nominated.
See Repass, op .c i t .
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The A.L.P. was favoured to tack le  social  serv ices, heal th , 
pensions, the Vietnam war, housing, education and the economy. This 
f in d in g  corresponded with e a r l i e r  research by Don A i t k in  and Michael
g
Kahan, as wel l as data from elsewhere in the 1969 ASP quest ionnaire 
(see Chapter 3),  both sources suggesting tha t  the Labor Party was more 
favourably  regarded fo r  i t s  domestic p o l i c ie s  than was the L ib e ra l /
Country Party c o a l i t i o n .
Although not completely accounted fo r  by par ty  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n ,  the 
d i f fe rences  in the p a r t ie s '  images as problem-solvers were rooted in the 
l o y a l t i e s  f e l t  by the respondents to the opposing pa r t ies .  Where one 
party  was favoured over another to handle a p a r t i c u la r  problem, the 
problem i t s e l f  was usual ly  mentioned most f requen t ly  by supporters of tha t  
party  - e .g . ,  primary indus try  was predominantly an area of concern to 
L ibera l /Country  Party i d e n t i f i e r s ;  pensions were mentioned most o ften by 
Labor i d e n t i f i e r s .  Overa l l ,  the l i ke l ih o o d  o f  a respondent nominating a 
p a r t i c u la r  par ty  to solve h is /he r  problem depended on the d i re c t io n  and 
strength o f  par t isan l o y a l t y  (see Table 7 .1 ) .
TABLE 7.1 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PARTY IDENTIFICATION AND PARTY NOMINATED
AS "PROBLEM-SOLVER"
Lib/CP
Very
Strong
Lib/CP
F a i r l y
Strong
Lib/CP 
Not Very 
Strong
No Party 
Id e n t i - 
f  i ca t ion
Labor 
Not Very 
Strong
Labor
F a i r ly
Strong
Labor
Very
Strong
Lib/CP 60.7 48.5 29.1 18.3 17.0 5.7 2.0
Labor 12.8 19.4 32.0 37.1 44.6 73.3 86.8
No d i f fe rence  
between par t ies 8.5
13.3 12.8 12.4 9.8 6.3 2.3
Other Party;  
No answer; 
Don't know
18.0 18.8 26.1 32.2 28.6 14.7 8.9
100*
(234)
100*
(458)
100*
(172)
100*
(186)
100*
(112)
100%
(318)
100*
(303)
8. D. A i t k in  and M. Kahan, " P o l i t i c s  and the Elect ion Campaign", a ser ies 
o f  f i v e  a r t i c l e s  in The Aus t ra l ian ,  October 10, 15, 20, 22, 23, 1969.
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The responses of Labor identifiers were more closely tied to their
party loyalties than were those of Liberal/Country Party identifiers. In
the absence of any party allegiance, Labor was more likely to be favoured
for i ts  abili ty to solve salient problems - 37.1% of those who did not
identify with a party nominated Labor, whilst only 18.3% suggested the
Liberal/Country Party coalition. This preference for Labor extended into
the ranks of weak Liberal/Country Party identifiers, more of whom chose
Labor than the government parties to tackle problems concerning the
g
Vietnam war, education, the economy, pensions, housing and health. There 
was no corresponding leakage of weak Labor identifiers to support the 
Liberal/Country Party government as a likely problem-solver, even though 
the question related to possible Federal government action.
Quite large proportions of respondents failed to answer the question 
or said they did not know which party would be best able to handle the 
problem they had nominated. Only small numbers admitted to seeing no 
difference between the parties in this regard. A total 72.9% of the 
sample was able to discriminate amongst the parties concerning their 
abil i t ies  in problem areas which the respondents themselves thought to be 
important. However, i t  was impossible to tell from these results whether 
an actual knowledge of party stances underlay the perception of party 
difference expressed in this choice of parties. The relationship between 
many respondents' choices and their partisan loyalties suggested that 
party identification was probably used as a guide to perception.
A voter's knowledge of party policies aids in establishing the
link between personal opinion and perception of party stance which is a
necessary pre-condition if  an issue is to have any influence on his
voting decision. ^  An abili ty to discriminate between the competing
9. Too much reliance cannot be placed on this comparison as the number of 
respondents in each cell of the table was small.
10. Campbell et a l ., The American Voter, p.170. This is listed as one of 
the three pre-conditions for issue voting.
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part ies is im p l i c i t  in the rea l isa t ion  that one party represents a voter 's
own posi t ion on an issue better than the other part ies. Evidence from
numerous voting studies in the United States and B r i t a i n , ^  however,
suggests that the electorate often does not possess the information necessary
to cor rec t ly  id e n t i fy  and d i f fe re n t ia te  between party stances. I t  is clear
that the capacity of voters in th is  regard d i f fe rs  according to th e i r
educational background and extent of  involvement in p o l i t i c a l  a c t i v i t y ,
but i t  has also been argued that the type of issue i t s e l f  is responsible
for  some var ia t ion in the extent of knowledge about party po l ic ies  w i th in
the electorate. Berelson suggested the degree of con t rove rs ia l i ty  of an
issue in the community as an explanation fo r  dif ferences he observed in
the capacity of his respondents to id e n t i fy  candidate stances - the more
con t rove rs ia l , or d iv is ive  the issue, the more l i k e l y  voters were to know
12the correct party stance. Campbell observed a var ia t ion  in the capacity 
to perceive party dif ferences from 2 out of 3 respondents who held 
opinions on the "long-standing issues of the hew and Fair Deal period" 
to fewer than 1 out of  every 2 people with opinions on foreign pol icy 
i s s u e s .^
In these s i tua t ions i t  appears that dif ferences in the degree of 
ambiguity with in the p o l i t i c a l  environment are responsible fo r  var ia t ions 
in the level of voters'  knowledge. Very of ten, the stance of  a party on 
a pa r t icu la r  po l icy issue is  obscure and d is t inguish ing i t s  pol icy from 
that of another party is  a highly ambiguous task. Key argued that the two
11. See studies by Berelson et a l . ,  o p . o i t . i  Campbell et a l . ,  The American 
Voter; Key, Public Opinion and American Democracy; Butler and Stokes, 
o p . c i t . i  Coverse, "Continuity and Change in American P o l i t i c s " ;  B. Page 
and R. Brody, "Pol icy Voting and the Electoral Process", American 
P o l i t i ca l  Science Review, 66 (1972), pp. 979-95; L. Froman and 
J. Skipper, "Factors Related to Misperceiving Party Stands on Issues", 
Public Opinion Quarte r ly , 26 (1962), pp. 265-72.
12. Berelson et a l . ,  op.eit. , pp.218-20.
13. Campbell et a l . ,  The American Voter, p.180.
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major parties in the American system were forced by the competition for 
votes to advance fair ly similar policies which were characterised by
"equ ivoca tion  and a m b ig u ity". ^
To Downs, deliberate attempts to obscure and confuse were part of
15a rational strategy for those competing for power in a two-party system.
The effort to maximise votes resulted in an overlapping of the parties 
on moderate policies, accompanied by a division on a few extreme stands 
designed to retain the loyalty of those voters on the fringes of the 
parties' ideological positions. Both parties could then expect to gain 
votes from being as ambiguous as possible about their net policy positions, 
and about their stances on controversial issues of public debate.
This outcome has been observed in the past by theorists of
17
democracy and by authors of election case studies. B.I. Page and
R.A. Brody attributed the failure of Vietnam, as an issue, to influence
the outcome of the 1968 U.S. Presidential election to the practical
impossibility of differentiating between the stances adopted by Nixon
18and Humphrey towards the continuation of the war. In a review of 
election studies carried out by the University of Michigan Survey Research 
Centre, Prewitt and Nie discussed the implications of such uncertainty for 
the debate over voter rationality. "How"s they asked, "should the
'r a t io n a l ' person respond to  an e le c to r a l  s i tu a t io n  c h a ra c te r ise d  by
19vagueness3 overlapp ing  is su e  p o s i t io n s  and so fo r th ? "  In response,
14. V.0. Key, Politics,  Parties and Pressure Groups (N.Y., 1958), pp.231-2.
15. Downs, o p .c i t .  , pp.135-6.
16. For a refinement of Downs' argument on the rationality for political 
parties to pursue a strategy of ambiguity, see K. Shepsle, "The Strategy 
of Ambiguity: Uncertainty and Electoral Competition", American Political 
Science Review, 66, (1972), pp.555-68. Shepsle used mathematical models to 
demonstrate that the strategy would not maximise votes in all circumstances
17. G. Sartori, Democratic Theory, (Detroit,1972), p.207.
18. Page and Brody, o p .c i t .  ,
19. Prewitt and Nie, o p . c i t . , p.492.
188
voters might well find their only guides to choice in the parties
favoured by their parents and/or by the social groups to which they 
20belonged. Deductive ra t iona lity , in the sense of an individual 
calculus about the costs and benefits in alternative electoral choices, 
would thus be severely circumscribed by the ambiguity of the electoral 
situation. Paradoxically, a strategy which was rational for the competing 
parties to pursue could obscure the grounds for rational choice available 
to the voters as individuals.
Whether ambiguity is , or is not a rational strategy for a party to
pursue in a coalition situation (such as that applying to the Liberal and
Country parties in Australia), uncertainty is also a common characteristic
of Australian party competition. The internal party differences and
confusion over actual policy stances noted in Chapter 3 in relation to the
positions adopted by the Australian parties on the issues examined in the
ASP survey suggest that d iffe rentia tion between the parties would have
been a d i f f ic u l t  task for the electorate in 1969.
There were two controversial issues, however, on which the parties
had been pursuing clearly opposed policy lines for a long period preceding
the 1969 election: Australia's involvement in the Vietnam war, and the
abolition or retention of conscription. On these issues, opinions of the
ASP respondents were divided more clearly along partisan lines than on any
other items (see Chapter 4). In such circumstances, with ambiguity in the
21po lit ica l environment at a minimum, a re la tive ly  high degree of knowledge 
of party policies would be expected.
Unfortunately, the ASP survey permitted the examination of
20. Partisanship was conceived as a rational guide to voting choice in 
much the same fashion by Goldberg, "Social Determinism and Rationality 
as Bases of Party Identif ica tion", op .c i t .  See discussion of this in 
Chapter 1.
21. Even in these circumstances, some confusion about party policies was 
to be expected. Labor Party spokesmen, as reported in the media, were 
not clear as to whether a Labor government would withdraw to ta l ly  from 
Vietnam or leave behind some Australian c iv ilians as advisers.
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perceptions of party policy on only one of these items, the Vietnam war.
In this case, the cri teria used for determining the "correct"  policy 
positions of the parties were the official party policy (A.L.P. only), the 
party leaders' 1969 opening campaign speeches, and Press reports of party 
stances in the twelve month period preceding the election. On this basis, 
the "correct" assessment of Liberal/Country Party policy was best 
represented by alternative (A), the retention of troops, including 
conscripts, in Vietnam. Both alternatives (C) (maintaining only civilian 
advisers in Vietnam) and (D) (total withdrawal from Vietnam) could be 
classified as " correct"  descriptions of the A.L.P.'s stance towards 
Australian participation in the Vietnam war.
An overwhelming proportion of the sample, 84.8% (1589), correctly 
identified the government parties'  policy on Vietnam as alternative (A)
(see Table 7.2). As was expected, knowledge of Labor's policy was not so 
widespread (see Table 7.3), with 60.0% (1123) of the sample choosing 
alternative (D) and only 16.0% (300) choosing (C) which, in fact,  
corresponded most closely to the off icial ,  written policy of the party.
A combined total of 76.0% could be said to have a "correct" perception 
of the A.L.P.'s stance on Vietnam, a higher degree of knowledge than an 
opposition party might expect to register on all i ts  policies. Very 
few respondents admitted their ignorance of either party's position, but 
these admissions would be underestimations of the extent of uncertainty 
within the electorate as some respondents would almost certainly have risked 
making a guess from the available alternatives.
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FIGURE 7 .4  PERCEIVED PARTY POLICY STANCES ON THE VIETNAM WAR
TABLE 7.2  PERCEPTIONS OF LIBERAL/COUNTRY PARTY POLICY ON VIETNAM
(A) Troops ,  i n c l u d i n g  c o n s c r i p t s ,  i n  Vietnam
(B) Only v o lu n t e e r  t ro o p s  i n  Vietnam
(C) Only c i v i l i a n  e x p e r ts  i n  Vietnam
(D) Stay o u t  o f  Vietnam a l t o g e t h e r  
D o n ' t  know; no answer
1589
64
17
12
191
1,873
%
84.8
3.4
0.9
0.6
10.3
100. 0%
TABLE 7 .3  PERCEPTIONS OF LABOR POLICY ON VIETNAM
(A) Troops ,  i n c l u d i n g  c o n s c r i p t s ,  i n  Vietnam 44
(B) Only v o lu n t e e r  t roops  in  Vietnam 177
(C) Only c i v i l i a n  e xpe r ts  i n  Vietnam 300
(D) Stay o u t  o f  Vietnam a l t o g e t h e r  1123
D o n ' t  know; no answer 229
%
2.3
9.5
16.0
60.0
12.2
1,873 100. 0%
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The r e g u l a r  p r og r es s i o n  in t he  f r equency  o f  responses  upwards from 
(A) to (D) f o r  the  Labor Par ty  and downwards from (A) to (D) f o r  the  
government  p a r t i e s  (as s e t  out  in Tables  7 .2  and 7 . 3  and i l l u s t r a t e d  in 
Figure  7 . 4 )  sugges t s  t h a t  r e sponden t s  were a b l e  to  see t he  f o u r  a l t e r n a ­
t i v e s  as a s c a l e ,  wi th L i b e r a l / Co u n t r y  P a r t y  p o l i c y  towards one end and 
Labor p o l i cy  towards t he  o t h e r .
Respondent s '  knowledge o f  both government  and o p p o s i t i o n  p o l i c i e s  
on Vietnam i nc re a s e d  wi th t he  i n t e n s i t y  of  p a r t y  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n ,  i r r e s p e c ­
t i v e  o f  the d i r e c t i o n  o f  l o y a l t y .  A d e c l i n e  in  the  "d o n 't  know" r esponse  
r a t e  and an i n c r e a s e  in t he  f r equency  o f  c o r r e c t  r esponses  were appa r e n t  
as the  s t r e n g t h  of  p a r t i s a n  l o y a l t y  i n c r e a s e d .  The l a t t e r  t r en d  i s  
i l l u s t r a t e d  g r a p h i c a l l y  i n  Figure  7 . 5 .
FIGURE 7.5 ACCURACY OF PERCEPTIONS OF PARTY POLICIES ON VIETNAM IN
RELATION TO STRENGTH OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION
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In regard to both government and opposition policy positions,
Liberal/Country Party identifiers had a higher overall level of knowledge 
than Labor identifiers.  Those with no party identification were more 
likely to perceive party policies accurately than were all but the 
strongest Labor identifiers.
In addition to the combined figures for "correct'' perceptions of 
Labor policy, the graph shows separately the response patterns for 
alternatives (C) and (D). The necessity for this stems from the diver­
gence in response rates amongst Liberal/Country Party identifiers 
depending upon whether they nominated alternative (C) or alternative (D) 
as corresponding to Labor's policy stance. The pattern of increased 
accuracy of perception with intensity of party loyalty apparent amongst 
all Labor partisans was not shared by those who identified with the 
government parties and nominated (C) as being equivalent to A.L.P. policy, 
although i t  was strongly in evidence for those Liberal/Country Party 
identifiers choosing alternative (D). This finding suggests that 
increased intensit ies of party loyalty, rather than being indicative 
purely of higher levels of knowledge about all parties'  policies, may 
have been responsible for a tendency to perceive the opposing party as 
adopting a stance as far removed as possible from the policy of one's own 
party.
Combining answers to the two questionnaire items on government and 
opposition policy stances gave an indication of the degree to which the 
sample perceived the parties as adopting different positions on the Vietnam 
war, irrespective of the objective accuracy of their perception. In al l ,  
83.3% of the sample allotted different alternatives on Vietnam to the 
competing parties - an indication of a widespread awareness within the 
electorate in 1969 that the parties presented some choice on the question 
of Australian involvement in the war.
56.0% of the sample chose a combination of "troops, including
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c o n sc r ip ts  in  Vietnam" (A) as Liberal/Country Party policy and " s ta y  ou t 
o f  Vietnam a l to g e th e r " (D) as Labor policy; a further 15.1% chose the 
same for the Liberal/Country Party coalition, but f el t  Labor policy was 
nearest to " c iv i l ia n  e xp e r ts  on ly  in  Vietnam" (C). Following the earl ier 
rule of regarding both (C) and (D) as correct interpretations of Labor 
policy, a total 71.1% of respondents could be classified as having 
correctly discriminated between government and opposition stances towards 
Vietnam.
Although these findings were indicative of an extraordinarily high
level of accuracy in the perception of party policies on this particular
issue, they did not, in themselves, demonstrate conclusively that the
respondents' perceptions were derived from knowledge of their political
environment. In the absence of such information, i t  can be hypothesized
that voters would use their loyalty to a political party as a cue and simply
al lot  the party of their choice the policy which corresponded with their
own opinion. Such an action would correspond with Downs' model of rational
decision-making which saw the acquisition of political information as a
costly activity which would be avoided unless the voter expected a high
yield, in the form of an altered estimation of the parties which would
22ultimately lead to a change in vote. Without information about the 
polit ical parties, the accuracy of a voter's assessment of party policy 
would depend on the degree of correspondence between his own opinion and 
actual party policy. If assessments of the policies of two competing 
parties were called for, their accuracy would also depend on the extent 
to which party policies were actually polarised, assuming that a voter 
in this situation would al lot  the opposite policy stance to the party which 
did not at t ract  his loyalty.
It has been suggested that this type of psychological process may 
be indicative, not of a lack of information about the parties, but of
22. Downs, o p .c i t .
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unconscious a t tempts  on the pa r t  of  voters  to reduce c o n f l i c t  between
t h e i r  own views and t h e i r  image of the pa r ty  to which they gave a l l e g i an c e .
In one of  the e a r l i e s t  comprehensive vot ing s t u d i e s ,  Berelson demonstrated
the ex i s t ence  of  a tendency fo r  p a r t i s an s  to misperceive candida te  and
23par ty  s tances  in the  d i r e c t i o n  of  cons i s t ency  with t h e i r  own views.
As the s t r eng t h  of  par ty  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  i nc reased ,  so did the tendency 
towards cons i s t ency ,  so t h a t  the process  of  percept ion operated "to make
the opponent in to  more o f  an 1 enemy 1 and thus to magnify the p o ten tia l
24fo r  p o l i t ic a l  cleavage".
The ASP survey data enabled an examinat ion of  the  degree of 
cons i s t ency  between respondents '  own views on Vietnam and t h e i r  percept ion 
of  pa r ty  pol i cy  p o s i t i o n s .  When the pa r ty  a respondent  nominated as 
holding the same viewpoint  as himsel f  ( i r r e s p e c t i v e  of  the actual  na ture  
of  t h i s  opinion)  was compared with the r e spondent ' s  own par ty  
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  in Table 7 .4 ,  i t  became c l e a r  t h a t  the hypotheses di scussed 
above did not  apply to the ma j o r i t y  of  vo t e r s  sampled on t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  
i s sue .
TABLE 7.4 CONSISTENCY OF PARTY POLICY PERCEPTIONS ON THE VIETNAM WAR AND
PARTY IDENTIFICATION
Party to which respondent  a l l o c a t e d  same pol i cy  on 
Vietnam as his  own opinion
Par ty
I d e n t i f i c a t i o n Lib/CP Labor
Lib/CP 
and DLP
No
Party Other^^
No answer;  
Don' t  know
Lib/CP 27.4 6.6 11.5 42.4 5.8 6.3
Labor 5.3 34.9 2.7 44.7 2.8 9.6
100%
( 868 )
100%
(740)
23. Berelson e t  a l . ,  o p .c it .  , p p . 220-2.
24. ib id . ,  p.225.
25. The category "Other" in t h i s  t a b l e  inc ludes  var ious  combinat ions of  
p a r t i e s ,  inc luding the DLP, whose pol i cy  on Vietnam was a l so  examined 
in the  ASP q u es t i o n n a i r e .  The propor t ions  of  respondents  nominating 
o t he r  combinations o f  p a r t i e s ,  a p a r t  from the  Lib/CP and DLP 
combination (a l ready included in the t a b l e ) ,  were so small as to be 
v i r t u a l l y  n e g l i g ib l e  when considered s ep a ra t e ly .
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Table 7.4 shows the proportions of those identifying with the major 
parties whose opinions on Vietnam were consistent with their perceptions 
of the party they supported - 38.9% of Liberal/Country Party identifiers 
(338 respondents) and 34.9% of Labor identifiers (258 respondents). The 
largest categories amongst both groups of supporters consisted of those 
respondents who failed to nominate either the government parties, the 
opposition or the D.L.P. as advancing a policy on Vietnam which corresponded 
with their own view. The bulk of the remaining respondents, not included 
in the table, were those who did not admit to any feelings of party 
loyalty and, therefore, could not be using party identification as their 
cue for perception of party policies. Some respondents, who identified 
with the D.L.P. or other minor parties, could have been acting in accor­
dance with the consistency hypothesis, but their numbers were small. In 
the absence of a full breakdown of the 1DLP and Other Party1 identification 
category, the figures here can be taken as providing a rough indication 
of the extent of consistency between opinions on the Vietnam war, party 
loyalties and perceptions of party policies within the ASP sample.
According to this, a maximum  of 596 respondents (or 31.8% of the sample) 
could have been using party identification as a cue in the absence of 
information about party policies, or could have been perceiving party 
stances in such a way as to maintain consistency between their own opinions 
and feelings of party loyalty.
This finding also has implications for a further hypothesis which 
has been advanced concerning the relevance of opinions on Vietnam to 
voting decisions in Australian elections. In 1969, Rawson pointed out the 
fallacy in assuming that Vietnam, as an issue, influenced voting behaviour 
simply because the opinions of those who voted for different sides were 
divided.26 He suggested that, in fact, the opposite effect might be 
occurring and that the opinions on the Vietnam war measured by public
26. Rawson, o p . c i t .  , p.60.
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opinion polls may have been derived from the respondents' party 
loyalties. The ASP survey has demonstrated that this was clearly not the 
case for the bulk of i ts  respondents in 1969, who held opinions on the 
war which were independent of the ir partisan leanings. Of th is category, 
829 respondents (or 44.3% of the total sample) gave answers which 
indicated that none of the major parties offered a policy on Vietnam 
which was in line with the ir own opinion. Most of this group (569 
respondents) held the view that only volunteer troops should be fighting 
in Vietnam (B), a stance which was not, in fact, catered for by any of 
the parties in 1969. I f  these results can be extrapolated to the 
electorate at large, they indicate a substantial gap between the images 
of the parties in the 1969 election and the voters' own opinions on the 
Vietnam war.
Although the majority of the ASP respondents held opinions on 
Vietnam which were not congruent with the ir party identification and 
perceptions of party policy, an examination of the minority whose 
attitudes were consistent showed support for Berel son's hypothesis that 
the pull towards consistency varied with the strength of party loyalty.
As Table 7.5 il lus tra tes , the likelihood of correspondence between a 
respondent's own position on Vietnam and his perception of a party's 
policy stance increased as the strength of identification with that party 
increased. Conversely, the proportion whose views and/or perception of 
party policy were inconsistent with party identification increased as 
the intensity of party loyalty decreased. As this analysis was confined 
to whether or not a respondent identified a party's policy position as 
coinciding with his own opinion, i t  has not been possible to test 
Berel son's hypothesis that strong identifie rs  also tend to cast the 
opposing party in the role of the "enemy”  by a llo ting i t  a stance contrary 
to the ir own.
The results to th is  point have demonstrated that the voters'
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percept ions  of  pa r ty  p o l i c i e s  on Vietnam in 1969 were l a rg e ly  a t t r i b u t a b l e  
to actual  knowledge of pa r ty  s tances ,  r a t h e r  than to the opera t ion of  
psychological  forces  i nc l i n i ng  voter s  to shape par ty  images in accordance 
with t h e i r  own views. That Vietnam was an unusual i s sue  in the degree of  
knowledge di splayed by voters  i s  suggested by e a r l i e r  f ind i ngs  of  a 
g ene r a l l y  low level  of  informat ion about p o l i t i c s  wi thin the Aus t ra l i an  
e l e c t o r a t e .  I t  a l so s tands  in s t a r k  c o n t r a s t  to A i t k i n ' s  f ind ing  t h a t
TABLE 7.5 CONSISTENCY OF PARTY POLICY PERCEPTIONS ON THE VIETNAM WAR AND
PARTY IDENTIFICATION (DIRECTION AND STRENGTH)
Par ty to which respondent  a l l o c a t ed  same pol i cy  
on Vietnam as h i s / h e r  own opinion
Lib/CP Labor Lib/CP and DLP No par ty Other
No answer;  
Don' t  know
Very Strong 
Lib/CP 29.9 4.3 16.7 40.2 4.7 4.2
F a i r l y  Strong 
Lib/CP 28.8 6.8 11.6 41.7 6.1 5.0
Not Very Strong 
Lib/CP 20.3 9.3 4.7 ’ 47.7 7.0 11.0
Not Very Strong 
Labor 12.5 21.4 4.5 43.8 3.5 14.3
Fa i r l y  Strong 
Labor 6.0 30.8 1.9 49.1 3.7 8.5
Very Strong 
Labor 2.0 44.6 3.0 40.6 1.6 8.2
100%
(234)
100%
(458)
100%
(172)
100%
( 112 )
100%
(318)
100%
(303)
a g r ea t  ma jor i t y  of  the ASP survey ' s  1967 respondents  could not  i d e n t i f y  
the major p a r t i e s '  po l i cy  s tances  on S t a t e  aid fo r  educa t ion ,  an i s sue  
which had a l so  received a g rea t  deal of  a t t e n t i o n  from the media a t  the 
t i m e . ^
Par ty i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  has been shown to be r e l a t e d  to respondents '
27. D. Ai tk in ,  S t a b i l i t y  and Change in Aus t r a l i an  P o l i t i c s , for thcoming.  
S t a t e  aid fo r  educat ion i s  perhaps not a comparable i s sue  as the 
e l e c t o r a t e ' s  knowledge of  A.L.P.  po l i cy  could j u s t i f i a b l y  be confused 
as a r e s u l t  of the b i t t e r  d i s sens ion  wi thin the pa r ty  on t h i s  i s sue  
in the  year s  preceding 1967.
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perception of party policies in two ways:
1. overall, respondents who identified very strongly with either of the 
party blocs were more likely to perceive both government and opposition 
stances accurately than were those who fel t  their loyalty less strongly;
2. the likelihood of consistency between Liberal/Country Party identifiers'  
own opinions and their perception of government policy increased with 
the strength of their identification and, similarly, the likelihood of 
correspondence between Labor identifiers'  own views and their perception 
of Labor party policy increased with the strength of their party 
identification.
These two trends are i l lustrat ive of the difficulty in untangling different 
aspects of party identification - are strong party identifiers more 
knowledgeable about polit ics (see previous chapter) and, therefore, more 
likely to perceive party policies correctly? or are they more susceptible 
to psychological pressures towards consistency? or both?
The hypothesis that the increased accuracy of perception of party
policies with heightened intensity of party identification was at least
partially attributable to greater knowledge of the political environment
received support from the finding that accuracy of perception was also
related to interest in polit ics and to education. The proportion of
respondents who correctly identified both Liberal/Country Party and Labor
policy positions on Vietnam increased as their degree of interest in
28politics and level of education increased. These two variables have 
already been shown to be positively related to strength of partisan 
loyalty (for either party). The higher overall level of knowledge of 
party policies amongst Liberal/Country Party identifiers,  in comparison 
with their Labor counterparts, also suggested that differential educational 
levels contributed to increased accuracy of perception amongst strong 
identifiers - government party identifiers having, on the whole, higher
28. See Appendix III for tables detailing these relationships.
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educational backgrounds than opposition supporters.
Overseas findings, although not s t r ic t ly comparable, provide 
support for the hypothesis that accuracy of perception is related to 
greater knowledge of polit ics amongst strong partisans, but indicate that 
this is not a simple relationship. Berelson's early U.S. studies 
established that accuracy of perception was positively related to the
29amount of mass media exposure, interest in politics and educational level.
Froman and Skipper investigated these findings in relation both to strength
30of party identification and to the type of issue involved. Using an 
"average m ispercep tion  sco re" , rather than a direct measure of the accuracy 
of perception of party policies, Froman and Skipper observed less 
misperception amongst stronger party identifiers on position issues, but 
more misperception amongst the same voters on style issues. Accuracy of 
perception increased with educational level on both types of issues. The 
author's explanation for their findings lay with the nature of style
issues - "since  s t y l e  is su e s  are ambiguous and em o tio n a lly  charged they
31tend  to  be su b je c t to  more m isp ercep tio n  than p o s i t io n  is s u e s " .  Apart 
from the suggestion that aroused emotions are not conducive to accurate 
perception, this argument is based on an observation (discussed earl ier 
in this chapter) that knowledge of party policies within the electorate 
is dependent on the degree of actual ambiguity in the political situation. 
Unfortunately, Froman and Skipper's results with regard to style issues 
could not be tested here, as Australia's involvement in the Vietnam war 
was clearly a position issue, of a highly controversial nature, where 
ambiguity in party positions had been reduced to a minimum.
It was possible, however, to examine the effects of intensity of 
partisanship on perception of party policies, independent from the influence
29. Berelson, o p .c i t .  , Chapter 10.
30. Froman and Skipper, o p .c i t .
31. ib id .  , p.271.
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of educational background. When the education variable was controlled, 
strength of party identification was s t i l l  seen to be associated with 
increased accuracy of perception amongst respondents with none/primary 
education and secondary education. Numbers in the te rt ia ry  education 
category were too small for reliable analysis, but i t  appeared that 
strength of party identification was not related to accurate knowledge of 
party policies at this level of education. The exception to the general 
increase in accuracy with intensity of party loyalty amongst Liberal/ 
Country Party identif ie rs  nominating alternative (C) as Labor policy 
(see Figure 7.5) persisted at both none/primary and secondary education 
levels. Although the increased knowledge of party policies with strength 
of party identification may have been attributable to the sole influence 
of education at the te r t ia ry  level, intensity of party identification 
clearly had some independent effect on accuracy of perception amongst those 
with less education.
Whether, in the absence of educational influences, the continuing 
increases in awareness of party policy stances on Vietnam resulted from 
greater psychological pressures towards consistency of attitudes amongst 
those intensely loyal to one or other of the po lit ica l parties could not 
be f in a l ly  established without the aid of more sophisticated techniques 
of multi-variate analysis. An examination of the party images of those 
very strong identifie rs  whose own opinions on Vietnam were consistent with 
actual party policies (45.3% (106) of Very Strong Lib/CP iden tif ie rs ;
54.8% (166) of Very Strong Labor iden tif ie rs) could also te l l  l i t t l e  about 
the nature of the influence of partisanship on accuracy of perception.
In each of these cases, the great majority of respondents perceived both 
parties' policy stances correctly (87.7% of the Very Strong Lib/CP 
identifie rs  who favoured alternative (A) - n=106; 80.1% of the Very
Strong Labor identifie rs  who favoured alternatives (C) or (D) - n=166), 
and were more l ike ly  to do so than respondents holding similar views but
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with weaker feelings of party identification - an outcome which could 
result e ith e r  from increased knowledge of politics or from greater 
pressure towards consistency of attitudes. Accuracy of perception and 
consistency were compatible in this situation.
The high popularity of alternative (B) (the retention of volunteer 
troops only in Vietnam) amongst supporters of both parties, provided an 
opportunity to examine the impact of pressures towards consistency on the 
perception of party policies for different levels of party identification 
where accuracy of perception was not compatible with consistency. I f  very 
strong party identifiers amongst those holding opinion (B) s t i l l  perceived 
party policies accurately (no party, in rea l i ty ,  having supported this 
alternative),  then their perception must have been influenced by some other 
variables apart from a psychological drive for consistency.
Due to the popularity of alternative (B), a relat ively large 
number of cases was available on which to test this hypothesis. 40.2% (94) 
of Very Strong Liberal/Country Party identif iers held this opinion, as did 
37.6% (114) of Very Strong Labor identif iers. Their perceptions of party 
policy stances were as follows:
Very Strong Lib/CP identifiers with opinion (B) (n=94)
83.0% (78) correctly assessed both parties' policy positions (AC;AD)
7.5% (7) chose (B) as Lib/CP policy - the perceptions of these
respondents could have been subject to pressures towards 
consistency.
Very Strong Labor identifiers with opinion (B) (n=114)
58.8% (67) correctly assessed both parties' policy positions (AC;AD)
22.0% (25) chose (B) as Labor policy - the perceptions of these
respondents could have been subject to pressures towards 
consistency.
Amongst Liberal/Country Party identif iers, weaker levels of identification 
were associated with less accuracy of perception; whereas the proportions
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cor rec t ly  iden t i fy ing  party pol icy posit ions did not d i f f e r  s ig n i f ic a n t ly  
according to strength of party id e n t i f i c a t io n  amongst Labor supporters who 
shared opinion (B). The increased accuracy of  perception, in defiance of 
any pressures towards consistency of outlook, as strength of id e n t i f i c a t io n  
with the government part ies increased, was probably the re su l t  of higher 
education amongst these respondents. More education would have been 
accompanied by more in te res t  in ,  and knowledge about the p o l i t i c a l  sphere, 
which would, in turn, have ensured that voters holding opinion (B) knew 
i t  did not correspond with the po l ic ies of any o f  the major part ies 
towards Vietnam in 1969.
The foregoing analysis has attempted to untangle the inf luence on 
perception of two aspects o f  in tens i ty  of party id e n t i f i c a t io n  - higher 
educational level (and consequent knowledge o f  p o l i t i c a l  a f f a i r s ) ;  and a 
hypothesized dr ive towards consistency of  a t t i tudes .  I t  has only p a r t i a l l y  
succeeded in th is ,  but has demonstrated conclusively that a substantial  
number of ASP respondents did n o t misperceive party po l ic ies  in the 
d i rec t ion  of reducing inconsistencies between the i r  a t t i tudes towards the 
Vietnam war and the i r  party loya l t ie s .  Most respondents had, in fac t ,  
assimilated information about party stances on the Vietnam issue in a 
manner which met the c r i t e r i a  fo r  inductive r a t i o n a l i t y  (see Chapter 1), 
although some, c le a r ly ,  had not taken any subsequent steps to adapt the i r  
own b e l ie f  systems to accommodate th is  c o n f l i c t in g  information. Whether 
they preferred to ignore i t s  implicat ions or tolerated inconsistencies on 
the Vietnam war issue because other issues, or th e i r  partisan lo y a l t ie s ,  
were more important to them must remain matters fo r  conjecture.
Although the ASP resul ts  did cast some doubt on the extent to which 
psychological theories of  cognit ive dissonance can be appl ied to voting 
behaviour, they did support the arguments of Berel son, and of  Froman and 
Skipper tha t ,  u l t im a te ly ,  the accuracy o f  perception of  party po l ic ies
32. L. Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance, (Stanford, Cal, 1966).
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rests on the controversiality of an issue within the community and the 
amount of actual ambiguity in the parties' stances.
According to the ASP survey, Australian voters in 1969 were able 
to discriminate between the parties on the basis of their Vietnam policies, 
demonstrating a very high level of knowledge of the respective party 
stances. To a certain extent, voters' own attitudes on the Vietnam war 
were divided along party lines, but a sizeable proportion of the sample 
was of the opinion that the conscripts serving in Vietnam should be 
brought home, leaving the volunteer troops to continue fighting. 70.0% of 
these respondents (n=813) recognised that none of the parties had adopted 
this option as party policy. Small proportions mistakenly allocated 
the ir own opinion to one or more of the major parties.
For those voters able to link  their own opinion with the policy 
advanced by either the government or the opposition, the Vietnam war may 
have been an in fluentia l factor in determining which party they would 
support at the 1969 Federal election. . A breakdown of respondent's 
opinions and perception of party policy according to their 1969 vote, 
however, demonstrated that a large number failed to make this linkage in 
a way consistent with their voting decision. From Table 7.6 i t  can be 
calculated that a proportion amounting to 66.3% of the total sample held 
a view on Vietnam which did not correspond with the ir perception of the 
policy of the party for whom they voted. The further elimination of 2.7% 
of the sample who did not volunteer an opinion on the issue leaves a 
remainder of 31%, being the maximum proportion whose voting decision could 
have been influenced by the Vietnam war.
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TABLE 7.6 OPINION ON VIETNAM BY PERCEPTION OF PARTY STANCE ON THAT
OPINION AND DIRECTION OF 1969 VOTE
1969 vote
Respondents' Party to which R 
Opinion attached th is  opn. Lib/CP Labor Other Total
58.6% x co r rec t  
30.7% x co r rec t  
0.5%
3.4%
6.9%
100%
4.3%
10.9%
5.4%
70.0% x co r rec t  
9.4%
100%
0.9%
30.8% x co r rec t  
62.7%
5.6%
100%
1.2%
55.9% x co r rec t  
29.6%
13.3%
100%
(A) Troops, 
inc lud ing 
conscr ip ts  
f i g h t i n g  in 
Vietnam
Lib/CP po l icy 44.8 7.0 6.8
Lib/CP & DLP po l icy 20.1 4.5 6.1
Labor po l icy 0.2 0.2 0.1
No p a r ty 's  po l icy 2.0 0.9 0.5
Other 3.2 2.3 1.4
Total 70.3% 14.9% 14.9%
(B) Only 
vo lunteer 
troops 
f i g h t i n g  in 
Vietnam
Lib/CP po l icy 3.4 0.5 0.4
Labor po l icy 1.7 8.1 1.1
DLP po l icy 3.2 1.2 1.0
No p a r ty 's  po l icy 32.2 32.1 5.7
Other 3.8 4.2 1.4
Total 44.3% 46.1% 9.6%
(C) Only 
c i v i l i a n  
experts in 
Vietnam
Lib/CP po l icy 0.9 0.0 0.0
Labor po l icy 4.7 22.7 3.4
No p a r ty 's  po l icy 21.9 33.1 7.7
Other 3.4 ’ 1.7 0.5
Total 30.9% 57.5% 11.6%
(D) Stay 
out o f  
Vietnam 
a l together
Lib/CP po l icy 0.3 0.3 0.6
Labor po l icy 9.0 43.0 3.9
No p a r ty 's  po l icy 5.4 19.1 5.1
Other 3.6 7.2 2.5
Total 18.3% 69.6% 12.1%
(N=442 )
( =23.6%)
(N=813 )
( =43.4%)
(N=233 )
( =12.4%)
(N=335 )
( =17.9%)
The row to ta ls  in Table 7.6 i l l u s t r a t e  the low degree o f  
misperception o f  party  p o l icy  amongst those respondents choosing a l t e rn a ­
t ives  (A) or (B) on Vietnam. Although co r rec t  perceptions were less 
apparent in the case o f  opinions (C) and (D), there was no evidence that 
respondents were misperceiving par ty po l icy  in  a d i re c t io n  which was 
cons is ten t  with t h e i r  1969 vote. 62.7% o f  those in favour o f  (C) in  fac t  
thought th a t  none o f  the par t ies  supported i t ;  a t i n y  0.9% voted fo r  the 
government and in c o r re c t l y  perceived i t s  p o l i c y  to be (C); 4.7% voted
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Liberal/Country Party, although they correctly identified Labor policy 
as corresponding with their own opinion (C).
Similar trends could be observed amongst those respondents holding 
different views about the war - except for opinion (B) which provided the 
only case of a significant number of voters misperceiving party policy in 
a way consistent with their voting decision. 11.5% of those supporting (B) 
incorrectly identified i t  as representing the stance of the party for 
which they voted (3.4% Lib/CP; 8.1% Labor).^ Converting these percentages 
to proportions of the total sample, however, resulted in precious l i t t l e  
support for the hypothesis that misperception of party policy stances occurs 
in the direction of reducing conflict and strain within a voter's attitude 
structure. On the whole, the ASP respondents were able to tolerate a 
conflict between their vote, their opinion and their perception of the 
policy of the party they supported.
These findings would not be expected in relation to the other issues 
covered in the ASP questionnaire (except, perhaps, that of conscription) 
owing to lower levels of exposure in the media and less controversiality 
within the community. It  is unfortunate that the survey design did not 
allow an examination of respondents' perceptions of party policies on issues 
where information transmitted to the electorate about the parties would 
have been of an ambiguous nature. This chapter has shown that respondents 
generally perceived some difference between the parties and shared certain 
images of the government and opposition which differentiated between the 
parties' capacities for tackling particular domestic and foreign policy 
problems. It has only been in regard to the Vietnam war, however, that the 
data have been suited to an examination of Campbell's pre-condition for 
issue voting that ".. (an Issue) must be accompanied by some perception
33. People listed in the table under "Other" (both for perception of 
party policy and for 1969 vote) may have misperceived party policy 
in a direction consistent with their vote, but the numbers are likely 
to be very small as a proportion of the total.
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tha t one party represents the person's own position  b e tter  than do the
34other parties". The vast majority of respondents were suf f ic ient ly  
knowledgeable to make this  link on the question of Australian involvement 
in the Vietnam war, but a large proportion did not, in f ac t ,  vote in a 
manner consistent  with the i r  perceptions of the par t i es .
34. Campbell et  a l . ,  The American Voter, p.170.
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CHAPTER 8 
SALIENT ISSUES
A further dimension on which issues can be assessed is their degree
of salience to the voters. An issue must have achieved some prominence
in a voter's mind if  i t  is to affect his voting decision. Various
operational definitions of "s a l ie n c e "  can be used to estimate this degree
of prominence, thus providing further information on the bonds between
voter and issue which are a necessary complement to the perception of
links between issue and party studied in the previous chapter.^
The concept of salience is an extension of attempts to measure
the affect associated with an attitude by assessing the intensity of
2feelings with which an opinion is held. The advantage of salience as a 
concept lies in the use of open-ended survey questions which measure 
both cognition and affect through ensuring that the respondent has some 
awareness of the issue, can formulate an opinion on i t  and is concerned 
about i t .  In using these questions, D.E. RePass asserted that, " . . .  the  
resea rch er  comes much c lo se r  to  measuring an a t t i tu d e  which i s  on the  
respondent 's  mind ( s a l ie n t)  a t  th e  tim e o f  the in te rv ie w  - an a t t i tu d e  
which presumably was s a l ie n t  b e fo re  th e  in te rv ie w  and w i l l  remain so
3
a fterw ards ".
The type of questions usually employed to measure salience, in fact, 
plumb a further dimension of the links between issue and voter - they 
establish the relevance of a particular issue to a voting decision at a 
particular election. It could be said that they investigate the bond 
between issue and election in the voter's mind. Other preconditions for
1. See Butler and Stokes, o p . c i t . , pp.230-234 for the importance of 
establishing these bonds as pre-conditions to issue voting.
2. Early studies, such as Campbell et a l , The American Voter, restricted 
their consideration of the links between issue and voter to the high 
affect, or intensity of feeling, associated with an attitude.
3. RePass, o p .c i t .  , p.391.
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issue voting - awareness of an issue, intense feelings about i t ,  linkage 
of the issue to party policy - will not provide sufficient motivation for 
action if  the voter does not see that issue as relevant to the vote he is 
called upon to cast at a particular election.
The ASP questionnaire asked, " In your opinion3 what core the most 
important problems the Federal government should do something about?"
In doing so, i t  was inviting respondents to specify the issues important 
to them which could be tackled by Federal government action and thus were 
presumably of relevance to a voting decision at a Federal election.^ This 
indirect approach has been preferred by survey researchers in recent years 
to the use of direct requests for the reasons behind a voting decision. 
Results gained from the la t ter  approach are thought to have been highly 
dubious, owing to the complexity of the task of sorting out the influences 
on voting behaviour (likely to be almost as d if f icu lt  for the voter 
himself as for researchers) and the tendency for respondents to give the 
replies they feel are expected by their interviewers.
Respondents to the ASP survey could nominate as many problems as
they liked, but only the f i r s t  five were coded in the results,  on the
assumption that additional problems could not really be said to have been
uppermost in the voter's mind. Unlike work carried out in the United
5
States by the University of Michigan Survey Research Center, the ASP 
questionnaire did not provide follow-up questions intended to refine the 
estimation of salience. U.S. respondents were asked how worried they were 
about each problem they had nominated (extremely worried, fair ly  worried, 
or just quite interested) and whether the problem was "on th e ir  mind a l o t ", 
so that problems could be classified as "highly sa lien t"  only if they met 
these additional cr i teria .  Unfortunately, the only refinement possible in
4. Behind this survey question lies the assumption that electors were 
casting their votes for a government, rather than for the election of 
an individual candidate to Federal Parliament.
5. See RePass, o p .a it.
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the analysis of ASP results was the separation of first-mentioned problems 
from the rest,  assuming that the f i r s t  problem was of greatest importance
r
to the voter.
Most of the ASP respondents did have a l i s t  of "important problems". 
Only 166 (8.9%) subjects failed to nominate a problem; 310 (16.5%) gave 
only one answer; and the remaining 1,397 (74.6%) were able to suggest two 
or more problems of importance to them:
TABLE 8.1 NUMBER OF IMPORTANT PROBLEMS MENTIONED
%
None, no answer 166 8.9
1 problem 310 16.5
2 problems 584 31.2
3 problems 494 26.4
4 problems 214 11.4
5 or more problems 105 5.6
1,873 100.0%
As was to be expected, a wide variety of problems was included 
amongst the 4,341 problems mentioned, ranging from international issues, 
such as the Vietnam war and relations with Great Britain, through major 
national issues, such as the economy and social services, to State and 
local issues, such as sewerage and council fac i l i t ies  for teenagers. The 
inclusion of the la t ter  type of problem provided a clear indication that 
the Australian electorate did not discriminate amongst issues on the basis 
of the formal division of powers between different levels of government, 
at least in the 1969 Federal election. The Federal government was seen 
as potentially capable of doing something about an enormous range of 
problems. The great variety of problems also nominated for Federal
6. There was a possible fallacy in this procedure as the respondent may 
have not immediately confided to the interviewer his prime concern 
about a highly controversial issue.
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government a tten tion  in the United States was remarked upon by D.E. RePass 
in  his analysis of the Univers ity  o f Michigan survey data fo r  1960 and 
1964.^ In response to the same type o f questions asked o f B r i t is h  
e lectors operating w ith in  a un ita ry  system o f government, Butler and
o
Stokes found a s im ila r  range o f important problems.
Some ind ica tion  of the va r ie ty  of problems nominated is  given by 
Table 8.2 which shows the twelve most frequently mentioned problems in 
re la t io n  to the to ta l number of problems and in re la t io n  to the size of 
the sample. The most common problems were education and pensions - no 
other issues accounted fo r  more than ten percent o f the to ta l number of 
mentions. The level of concern about these issues w ith in  the sample is 
demonstrated most c le a r ly  by the fa c t  tha t 36.7% of respondents included 
education somewhere in th e ir  l i s t  of problems and 30.3% mentioned the 
problem of pensions. Some of the categories used by the coders overlapped - 
social welfare issues taken together (including pensions and health, as 
well as the general social services category) comprised 27.5% of a l l  
problems mentioned, and were o f some concern to 63.9% of the sample.
7. RePass, op .a i t .  , p.391.
8. Butler and Stokes, op .a i t .  , Chapter 15.
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TABLE 8 .2  MOST COMMON IMPORTANT PROBLEMS
% of  t o t a l  no 
o f  problems
(n = 4 3 4 1 7
% o f  sample 
"Tn = 18731
Defence ( i n c l u d in g  n a t io n a l  
s e r v i c e )
361 8 .3 19.3
Vietnam 261 6 .0 13.9
Education 687 15.8 36.7
Socia l  S e rv ice s 243 5.6 13.0
Pensions 567 13.0 30.3
Health 385 8 .9 20.6
Housing 204 4.7 10.9
Roads and T ran s p o r t 145 3.3 7.7
Nat iona l  Development 260 6 .0 13.9
Economy 302 7 .0 16.1
A s s i s t a n c e  to pr imary  i n d u s t r y 111 2.6 5.9
Commonwealth-State r e l a t i o n s 106 2.4 5.7
Other i s s u e s 709 16.3 37.9
4341 100.0%
R e s t r i c t i n g  the  a n a l y s i s  to  t h o s e  i s s u e s  o f  h i g h e s t  s a l i e n c e  to  the  
v o t e r s ,  by c o n s id e r i n g  on ly  th e  f i r s t - m e n t i o n e d  problem in each r e s p o n d e n t ' s  
l i s t ,  r e s u l t e d  in very l i t t l e  d i f f e r e n c e  in the  r e l a t i v e  f requency  and 
range o f  i s s u e s  mentioned (see  Table 8 . 3 ) .  Education (nominated by 17.4% 
o f  the  sample)  and pens ions  (13.3% o f  th e  sample)  remained f a r  and away 
th e  i s s u e s  o f  g r e a t e s t  concern  to the  ASP r e s p o n d e n t s .  Defence came n ex t ,  
be ing nominated f i r s t  by 8.4% o f  th e  sample.  The Vietnam war (6 .9%),  the  
economy (6.3%) and h e a l t h  (6.2%) a t t r a c t e d  app rox im ate ly  the  same degree  
o f  conce rn .  The broad c a t e g o ry  o f  "social services" was l i s t e d  f i r s t  by 
on ly  3.8% o f  r e s p o n d e n t s .  However, when co n s id e re d  as a composite  
c a t e g o r y  t o g e t h e r  with  pens ions  and h e a l t h ,  i t  became e v id e n t  t h a t  n e a r l y  
a q u a r t e r  o f  th e  sample (23.3%) was p r i m a r i l y  concerned with  s o c i a l
212
w e l f a r e  i ssues .
TABLE 8 .3  MOST COMMON FIRST-MENTIONED IMPORTANT PROBLEMS 
(Arranged in  o rd e r  o f  f requency)
%
Educat ion 325 17.4
Pensions 250 13.3
Defence ( i n c l u d i n g  n a t i o n a l  s e r v i c e ) 157 8 .4
Vietnam 130 6.9
Economy 118 6 .3
Hea l th 116 6.2
N a t iona l  development 104 5.6
Housing 80 4 .3
Soc ia l  s e rv ic e s 71 3.8
Commonweal th-State r e l a t i o n s 56 3.0
A ss is tan ce  to  p r im a ry  i n d u s t r y 53 2.8
Other issues 247 13.2
No problem, no answer 166 8 .9
1373 100.0%
This  h igh l e v e l  o f  concern w i t h  s o c ia l w e l f a r e  was s i m i l a r  to  t h a t
found by B u t l e r  and Stokes in  an e a r l i e r ,  1963 s tudy  o f  the  B r i t i s h
g
e l e c t o r a t e .  The 1969 A u s t r a l i a n  responden ts  were marked ly  more concerned 
w i t h  educa t ion  and le s s  concerned w i t h  housing issues  than t h e i r  B r i t i s h  
c o u n t e r p a r t s  o f  s i x  years  e a r l i e r .  Amongst American v o te rs  ques t ioned  in  
1968, the  Vietnam war was o f  h ig h e s t  s a l i e n c e ,  f o l l o w e d  by r a c i a l  and 
p u b l i c  o rd e r  i s s u e s ,  and then  s o c ia l  w e l fa re . ' * '0
9. i b i d . ,  p .414.
10. K i r k p a t r i c k  and Jones,  o p . c i t . ,  p.699.  I t  was no t  s u r p r i s i n g  t h a t  
e duca t ion  was not  seen as an im p o r ta n t  problem the  Federal government 
should do something a b o u t ,  as i t s  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  and f i n a n c i n g  i s  
p r i m a r i l y  a l o c a l  m a t te r  i n  the  Un i ted  S ta te s .
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Using panel data from the two waves of the ASP survey, Aitkin
showed that the problems important to Australian voters in 1969 had changed
very l i t t l e  from those of 1967.^ Education and health appeared to have
become issues of greater concern by 1969, but overall the impression was
one of s tabili ty.  Gallup polls conducted during the 1960's had also
consistently pointed to education, health and pensions as the most
12important issues for the electorate.
The Gallup polls relating specifically to the 1969 election, however,
produced a rather different result . In June 1969, the Gallup organisation
asked its  respondents to nominate the chief issue which would be of concern
to them at the end-of-year Federal election. Education and the Vietnam
war, each being mentioned by 14.5% of the sample, emerged as the chief
13issues, followed by pensions, with 11.4% of the sample. Later polls in 
August and October showed the Vietnam war as the chief election issue 
(although i t  was chosen by only 10.6% and 12.1% of respondents in each 
case) when respondents were forced to choose from a restricted l i s t  of 
issues which included State aid and the means tes t ,  but not the more 
general issues of education and pensions.^ In both these polls, 
approximately 60% of the sample did not consider any of the issues listed 
to be of sufficient importance to determine their vote at the approaching 
Federal election. The lack of spontaneity and the restricted choice of 
issues in the later polls meant that they did not, in fact, provide a 
valid test  of salience.
The open-ended question posed by Gallup in June differed from the 
ASP questionnaire's approach in that i t  specifically linked the respondent's 
most important issue to his voting decision at the coming election. The
11. D. Aitkin, Stability and Change in Australian Poli t ics , forthcoming.
12. ib id .
13. Australian Gallup Poll, Mo. 204, 21st June 1969.
14. Australian Gallup Polls, No. 205, 15th August 1969; No. 206,
4th October 1969.
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wider expression of concern with the Vietnam war registered amongst 
members of the Gallup sample may have been a result of this difference 
in wording. Although some logical contradiction is involved, i t  is quite 
possible that voters may have intended to cast the ir vote on the basis 
of party policies towards Vietnam, whilst not rea lly  feeling that the war 
was a problem which any Federal government could do something constructive 
about (a position implied by the ASP wording). I f  this was so, the Gallup 
poll results would prove a more accurate indicator of the significance of 
the Vietnam war for voting behaviour in the 1969 election that results 
obtained by the ASP survey. At th is point, i t  can be concluded that 
education and pensions were issues of re la tive ly  high salience within the 
Australian electorate at the time, but final conclusions on the salience 
of Vietnam w ill have to be le f t  to a la ter stage in the analysis.
The types of problems which were of high salience (by the f i r s t -  
lis ted criterion) did vary to some extent according to the partisan 
loyalties of the respondents. Some issues - the economy, education, 
social services (general category) - were mentioned with almost equal 
frequency by Liberal/Country Party and Labor iden tif ie rs . Others, 
however, were more l ike ly  to be of concern to the supporters of a pa rt i­
cular party; the most strik ing example of this being the nomination of 
pensions as an important problem requiring Federal government attention by 
more than twice as many Labor identif ie rs  as government supporters.
As the analysis was restricted to the eleven most often f i r s t - l is te d  
problems (the crite rion for inclusion being at least 50 mentions), i t  was 
not possible to make any firm conclusions as to the sort of problems which 
enjoyed a higher level of salience amongst those identifying with a 
particular party. But i t  did appear that party supporters were more 
l ike ly  to nominate areas with which their party had shown concern in the 
past. Labor identifie rs  were more concerned with pensions, the Vietnam 
war, housing and health; whereas Liberal/Country Party identif ie rs
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nominated defence, nat ional development, Commonwealth-State re la t io n s
and assistance to primary indus try  with greater frequency (see Table 8 .4 ) .
D.E. RePass, who observed the same tendency amongst American vo ters ,
suggested th a t  i t  could be due e i th e r  to se lec t ive  a t te n t io n  to p o l i t i c a l
communications amongst party  supporters, or to the d i f f e r e n t  l i f e  s i tua t ions
15c h a ra c te r i s t i c  o f  those i d e n t i f y in g  with  opposing pa r t ies .  The greater 
preoccupation o f  Labor i d e n t i f i e r s  w ith  the problem o f  pensions was 
understandable in e i th e r  o f  these terms.
Sal ient problems fo r  those respondents who claimed to be free  o f  
par ty  t ie s  included educat ion and pensions, in keeping with  f ind ings  fo r  
TABLE 8.4 SALIENCE OF ISSUES ACCORDING TO PARTY IDENTIFICATION
Party I d e n t i f i c a t i o n
Lib/CP Labor No party  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n
Total 
Sample
Education 18.1 16.8 16.7 17.4
Pensions 9.0 18.8 10.8 13.3
Defence 10.5 5.5 6.5 8.4
Vietnam War 4.8 8.5 11.3 6.9
Economy 6.2 6.5 6.5 6.3
Health 5.5 7.6 3.8 6.2
National development 7.3 3.9 4.8 5.6
Housing 3.6 5.8 1.1 4.3
Social services 3.3 4.3 3.2 3.8
Commonwealth-State 
Relations 4.0 1.8 3.8 3.0
Assistance to primary 
industry
5.1 0.5 1.1 2.8
Other 13.2 12.0 20.4 13.2
No problem, no answer 9.4 8.0 10.0 8.9
1002 1002 100% 100%
(868) (740) (186) (1873)
15. RePass, o p . c i t . , p.395.
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the general sample. The exception, however, was provided by the Vietnam 
war which was nominated as the most important problem by 11.3% of 
non-identifiers, in comparison with only 6.9% of the total sample. The 
higher salience of the Vietnam war amongst these respondents suggested that 
the overall frequency of i t s  mention as an important problem may have 
underestimated the significance of Vietnam as an issue affecting voting 
behaviour at the 1969 Federal election,  particularly i f  i t  could be 
established that non-identifiers were more l ikely to switch their vote 
than others (see Chapter 9).
In addition to the presence and direction of party identification,  
certain social and demographic characteristics were associated with the 
types of issues nominated as most important problems. The likelihood of 
respondents specifying a problem at all was also dependent on differences 
in these variables. People with very l i t t l e  interest in po l i t ic s ,  unskilled 
workers, people with low educational leve ls ,  older respondents and females 
were more likely than others either not to answer the question, or to be 
unable to suggest an important problem.
Some interesting differences in the types of problems mentioned 
according to interest in po l i t ics ,  education, occupation, age and sex 
emerged when the four issues of highest salience (education, pensions, 
defence, the Vietnam war) were compared.
Education, the most common problem, was most l ikely to be of 
concern to those with a high degree of interest in po l i t ic s ,  those in 
professional and semi-professional occupations, and those respondents who 
themselves had been educated at the tertiary level.  It drew most attention 
from respondents in the 24-45 year age groupings, and was mentioned more
16. This finding was not unexpected, but disturbing. It would appear
highly unlikely that these people had no problems; but, rather, that 
they could not verbalise them in response to a survey question. The use of 
an open-ended question here may have avoided the ar t i f ic ia l  imposition 
of opinions on respondents who had no views on a particular issue, but 
i t  has s t i l l  neglected those voters who could not readily articulate  
their views.
frequently by women than by men.^
Pensions were more likely to seem a problem to a very different 
set of people - manual workers, and those with the lowest levels of 
interest in politics and with the least amount of education. Not surpris­
ingly, the older respondents were, the more likely they were to nominate 
pensions as their f i r s t  answer (except for the 76-95 year old group, whose 
numbers were small and many of whom did not specify a problem at a l l ) .  As 
with education, though, females were more often concerned with pensions 
than males.
Defence (including conscription) particularly, and Vietnam, to a
lesser extent, were more likely to be mentioned by those with "a good
dea l" or "some" interest in polit ics, and with higher levels of education.
The two issues appealed to quite different occupational groupings,
however - defence was of most concern to those in professional occupations,
whilst the Vietnam war was of most importance for office and sales
18workers. Of all the age groups, 21-23 year olds were most likely to be 
concerned with both Vietnam and with defence (the la t te r  probably due to 
the inclusion of conscription within this category by those coding the 
data). Respondents older than 23 years were decreasingly likely to see 
the Vietnam war as their most important problem, whereas the likelihood of 
defence being mentioned gradually increased again after age 45. Male 
respondents were slightly more likely to nominate either defence or 
Vietnam than were females.
Quite clearly, there were some interrelationships amongst the 
different socio-demographic variables in their association with the types 
of problems which were highly salient. Also, i t  was apparent that some of 
the differences observed previously in response patterns of Liberal/ 
Country Party and Labor identifiers could be explained by the variation
17. See Appendix IV for tables setting out these and following results.
18. Except the small number of 76-95 year olds.
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in social composition of the two blocs of party supporters. Sorting out
the relative contributions of partisan loyalty, on the one hand, and
socio-demographic variables, on the other, to the types of problems
perceived as important did not appear to be a worthwhile exercise, in view
of the way the problems themselves had been classified by those coding the
ASP data. The inclusion within the same category of respondents whose
19views on the correct approach to a problem were diametrically opposed 
meant that this particular question, whilst giving an indication of the 
general problem areas which were salient to Australian voters in 1969, was 
not very meaningful to the analysis of voting behaviour unless accompanied 
by information on the party each respondent saw as most f i t te d  to handle 
his problem.
The questionnaire did, in fact, provide this information in the 
form of two follow-up items asking respondents to specify the party which 
they fe l t  would be most l ike ly  to do what they wanted on the f i r s t  two 
problems mentioned. The extent to which the parties were perceived 
d iffe ren tly  in this regard has already been analysed in the previous 
chapter. Only a small proportion of the sample admitted to seeing no 
difference between the parties' capacities as problem-solvers - the 
remainder appeared to be influenced in their answers by partisan loyalties. 
Regardless of the type of problem specified as important, the party 
perceived as best able to handle i t  was l ike ly  to coincide with the 
respondent's party identification (see Table 8.5).
19. For example, respondents who were pro- and anti- Australia's troop 
commitment to Vietnam were a ll included within the same category, i f  
they nominated the Vietnam war as an important problem. No 
d iffe rentia tion could be made between pro- and anti- respondents 
without going back to an inspection of the individual questionnaires.
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TABLE 8.5 PARTIES AS "PROBLEM-SOLVERS" BY PARTY IDENTIFICATION
Party nominated to handle f i r s t - men t ioned  problem 
Par ty I d e n t i f i c a t i o n
Lib/CP
Labor
No Party 
I d e n t i f i c a t i o n
I i h / r p  I . No d i f f e r e n c e  ? r ^a r ^ ’Ub/CP Labor No Answer,
Don t  Know
47.8 20.0 12.0 20.2
74.1 5.9 5.3 14.7
18.3 37.1 12.4 32.2
100%
( 868 )
100%
(740)
100%
(186)
This t rend was much l e s s  apparent  amongst government suppor te r s  than
amongst those who supported the oppos i t i on .  Libera l /Count ry  Par ty
i d e n t i f i e r s  were a l so  f a r  more l i k e l y  to see "no d i f ference"  between the
p a r t i e s .  A f u r t h e r  a na l ys i s  by s t r eng t h  as well as d i r e c t i o n  of  par ty
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  showed c l e a r l y ,  however, t h a t  the l i k e l i hood  of  perce iving
a par ty  as a problem-solver  increased with the s t r e ng t h  of  f e e l i n g s  of
l o y a l t y  towards t h a t  p a r t i c u l a r  pa r ty  (whether Libera l /Count ry  Par ty  or
Labor) and di splayed a cor responding decrease  as the  i n t e n s i t y  of  l o y a l t y
20towards the opposing par ty  i ncreased .  In s t a t i s t i c a l  t e r m s }the  two 
va r i a b l e s  d i splayed a moderately s t rong degree of  c o r r e l a t i o n  (Cramer ' s  
V=+.42) which was s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  the .1% l e v e l .
In the absence of  any par ty  a l l e g i a n c e ,  Labor was more l i k e l y  to 
be favoured for  i t s  a b i l i t y  to solve s a l i e n t  problems - 37.1% of  those who 
did not i d e n t i f y  with a par ty  nominated Labor,  w hi l s t  only 18.3% suggested 
the Libera l /Count ry  Par ty  c o a l i t i o n .  Despi te the a s s o c i a t i o n  of  responses  
with par ty  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n ,  t h i s  preference  for  Labor extended in to  the 
ranks of  weak Libera l /Count ry  Par ty i d e n t i f i e r s ,  with the r e s u l t  t h a t  
43.2% of  a l l  respondents  nominated the  Labor Par ty to handle t h e i r  most 
important  problem (47.4% of  the 1,707 respondents  who nominated a problem),  
in comparison with a t o t a l  39.5% of  the  sample which i d e n t i f i e d  with the
20. See Table 7.1 (Chapter  7) .
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Labor Party.
Particu la r types o f problems, too, were seen as the province of 
21p a rt ic u la r  part ies . The explanation fo r  th is ,  however, appeared to l ie  
in the observed var ia t ion  amongst the sorts of issues that were sa l ien t 
to Liberal/Country Party, as compared with Labor supporters. The 
differences i l lu s t ra te d  in the previous chapter were thus not so much 
an ind ica tion  that parties were perceived to have d i f fe re n t  capacities 
in d i f fe re n t  areas, as an outcome of the in te r-re la t io n sh ip s  amongst 
partisanship, sa lien t problems and perceptions of the parties.
Contro ll ing fo r  the influence of partisanship did produce some 
in te res ting  comparisons between the types of problems which were seen as 
best handled by one or other of the major parties . Amongst Liberal/Country 
Party id e n t i f ie r s ,  problems o f defence and assistance to primary industry 
were overwhelmingly seen as areas which the Liberal/Country Party co a lit io n  
could best handle, whereas the government was only marginally favoured 
over Labor to tackle pensions and health, and nearly one quarter o f those 
fo r  whom the economy was h igh ly sa l ien t saw no d ifference between the 
parties . None of the s a l ie n t  problem areas was seen by more than 30% 
of Labor id e n t i f ie rs  to be capable of so lu tion by the Liberal and Country 
Parties. The la t te r  parties were nominated to handle the problem of 
defence by 29.3% of Labor supporters, compared with 61.0% who suggested 
the Labor Party. At the other extreme, health, social services, pensions, 
education and the Vietnam war were overwhelmingly regarded by Labor 
supporters to be areas which the Labor Party i t s e l f  could best tackle (see 
Tables 8.6 and 8 .7).
A comparison of the resu lts  fo r  Liberal/Country Party and Labor 
id e n t i f ie rs  suggested that the la t t e r  were more strongly influenced by 
party lo ya lt ie s  than the former in th e i r  nomination of the party best 
suited to handle the problem most sa l ien t to them. Three problems in
21. See Figure 7.3 (Chapter 7).
TABLE 3 . 6  PARTIES NOMINATED TO SOLVE DIFFERENT PROBLEMS
BY LIBERAL/COUNTRY PARTY IDENTIFIERS
P a r t y  nom in a ted  to  h a n d l e  problem
Lib/CP Labor
No
D i f f e r e n c e O the r
E d u c a t io n 45 .2 23 .6 17.2 14 .0
P e n s io n s 4 1 .0 37 .2 11 .5 10.3
Defence 78 .0 11 .0 0 . 0 11.0
Vie tnam War 50 .0 33 .3 7 .1 9 .6
Economy 4 2 .6 18 .5 24 .1 14 .8
H e a l th 4 5 .8 35 .4 10.4 8 .4
N a t io n a l
Development 58.7 20 .6 15.9 4 . 8
Housing 4 8 .4 22 .6  * 16 .1 12.9
S o c i a l
S e r v i c e s 51 .7 34 .5 10 .3 3 .5
Commonwealth- 
S t a t e  R e l a t i o n s 4 2 .9
22 .9 11.4 22 .8
A s s i s t a n c e  to
P r im ary
I n d u s t r y
70 .5 6 .8
T~
13.6 9 .1
O th e r  I s s u e s 53 .9 13 .9 16 .5 15.7
100%
(157)
100%
(78)
100%
(91)
100%
(42)
100%
(54)
100%
(48)
100%
(63)
100%
(31)
100%
(29)
100%
(35)
100%
(44)
100%
(115)
TABLE 8 . 7  PARTIES NOMINATED TO SOLVE DIFFERENT PROBLEMS
BY LABOR IDENTIFIERS
P a r t y  nom ina ted  to  h a n d le  problem 
No
Lib/CP Labor  D i f f e r e n c e  O the r
E du c a t io n
P e n s io n s
Defence
Vietnam War
Economy
H e a l th
N a t io n a l
Development
Housing
S o c ia l  
S e r v i c e s
Commonwealth-
S t a t e
R e l a t i o n s
A s s i s t a n c e
to  P r im ary
I n d u s t r y
O the r  I s s u e s
2 .4 8 3 .9 6 .5 7 .2
5 .8 8 7 .1 4 . 3 2 .8
2 9 .3
1
61 .0 2 .4 7 .3
12 .7  1 8 1 .0
j
0 . 0 6 .3
0 .0 77 .1 6 . 3 16 .6
1 .8 9 2 .9 1.8 3 .5
6 .9 58 .6 24 .1 10.4
0 . 0 79 .1 7 .0 13.9
3 .1 9 0 .6 6 . 3 0 .0
7 .7 69 .2 7 .7 15.4
0 .0 100.0 0 .0 0 . 0
5 .9 74 .1 5 .3
J----------------------
14.7
——- . ■-   .. ■ ■
100%
(124)
KM
(139)
100%
(41)
100%
(63)
100%
(48)
100%
(56)
100%
(29)
100%
(43)
100%
(32)
100%
(13)
100%
(4)
100%
(89)
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particular, however, stood out as being more closely associated, across 
the sample, with one party grouping, in preference to the other. The 
establishment of some association in the respondents' minds, independent 
of the influence of partisanship, between the Liberal/Country Party 
coalition and the area of defence was suggested by the high frequency 
with which government supporters nominated the coalition to handle the 
problem in combination with the relatively high frequency of the same 
response amongst Labor supporters (29.3% of Labor supporters for whom 
defence was highly salient). This type of relationship was reversed 
amongst government and opposition identifiers who were concerned with 
pensions and health in a way which indicated that these two problem 
areas were more likely to be associated with the Labor Party, regardless 
of the influence of party identification.
In the case of these three salient issues, the hypothesis that the
type of problem, as well as the respondents' party loyalties, influenced
their perceptions of the parties' capacities received confirmation from
an analysis which differentiated amongst various strengths of party
identification. The earlier finding that stronger identifiers were
increasingly likely to nominate their party as a problem-solver was
clearly in evidence for a range of different problems at the two strongest
levels of party identification. But it did not always hold for the weakest
levels of partisanship, especially in relation to the particular problems
22of defence, pensions and health.
These results give some indication of the patterns of interaction 
between party loyalties and knowledge of party stances in the formation 
of perceptual links between the parties and the problems of high salience
22. Unfortunately, this analysis could not be pursued very far as the 
number of respondents nominating some problems became very small 
when each party's support was divided into three different degrees 
of strength of party identification.
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to voters. In relation to the issues important to ASP respondents,
partisanship appeared the overriding factor of those whose psychological
commitment to one or other of the major party groupings was fairly
intense. When party identification was not so strongly established,
however, the type of problem specified was likely to be just as important
in determining the party specified as best able to handle i t  (in a manner
consistent with the respondent's opinion on the problem). The significant
proportion of "not very  s tro n g "  Liberal/Country Party identifiers nominating
the Labor Party to solve their most important problem could be explained
23by the "so c ia l w elfa re  or in te r v e n t io n is t "  nature of many of the issues
specified, where Labor's ideological stance would have been well known
throughout the electorate. In such cases, where parties had taken opposing
stands over a long period of time, RePass hypothesised that a " s tr a in
toward p o l i t i c a l  r e a l i t y "  would operate, in conflict with the pull exerted
24by partisan loyalties. The knowledge that one party was more suited 
than the other to solve a particular problem clearly overrode the 
influence of partisanship amongst weak Labor identifiers for whom defence 
was highly salient, and weak Liberal/Country Party identifiers who were 
concerned with pensions or health (n=10).
Overall, the Labor Party benefited from the nature of the problems 
which were salient within the electorate in 1969 and from the large prop­
ortion of partisan answers amongst i ts  own identifiers. Also, i t  drew 
support as a problem-solver from those respondents who lacked any feelings 
of party identification. A substantial proportion of these respondents 
" d id n 't  know" which party would best handle the problem they had nominated, 
but, of the remainder, more preferred the Labor Party to the Liberal/Country 
Party coalition. This preference extended over a number of different
23. Aitkin, Stability and Change in Australian Politics (forthcoming).
24. RePass, o p . c i t p.395.
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problems, even including defence and the economy, which were not regarded
25by the general sample as areas in which Labor would be successful.
TABLE 9.8 PARTIES NOMINATED TO SOLVE DIFFERENT PROBLEMS 
BY THOSE WITH NO PARTY IDENTIFICATION
No
Lib/CP Labor Difference Other
Education 
Pensions 
Vietnam 
Defence 
Economy
The most in te res ting  re su lt  in Table 8.8 (despite the very small 
numbers on which to base percentages) was the substantial proportion of 
no n - id en t if ie rs  fo r  whom Vietnam was sa lie n t who nominated the Labor 
Party to tackle the problem, and the very small f ra c t io n  who fa i le d  to 
perceive any difference between the parties on the Vietnam war. When i t  
is kept in mind tha t Vietnam was the most important problem fo r  a 
s ig n i f ic a n t ly  larger proportion of non - id en t if ie rs  (11.3%) than o f the 
to ta l sample (6.9%), i t  appears tha t the Vietnam war may have been in a 
position to influence some of those respondents not susceptible to 
partisan pressures to vote fo r  Labor on th is  issue in 1969.
Despite the sample's overall preference fo r  the Labor Party to 
handle the sa l ien t issues of the day, the party 's  advantage was not
12.9 48.4 19.4 19.3
20.0 35.0 20.0 25.0
19.0 66.7 4.8 9.5
8.3 41.7 8.3 41.7
8.3 41.7 16.7 33.3
100%
(n=31)
100%
(n=20)
100%
(n=21)
100%
(n=12)
100%
(n=12)
25. Only the f ive  most frequently mentioned problems have been included 
in th is  analysis as the numbers involved were very small. The 
frequencies w ith in  each ce ll in the table were s t i l l  so small tha t 
the percentages could not be regarded as necessarily accurate.
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reflected in an electoral majority in 1969. Aitkin suggested, as a 
reason for this, the absence of links between responses to the ASP item 
testing salience and voters' own political behaviour - " I t  may very well 
be the case than many respondents c ited  problems which they knew from 
reading and discussion to be important ones3 but not important in  the sense 
tha t they impinged d ire c tly  on one's own l i f e . I f  this was so,
questions which attempted, indirectly, to e l ic i t  the issues important to 
voters at the time of an election may have been better phrased in a manner 
which put the respondent closer to the situation of casting a vote. For 
example, the June 1969 Gallup item which asked voters what would be the 
most important issue for them at the end-of-year elections may have provided
9 '
a more valid indication of the issues which were relevant to voting decisions. "
One does not have to question the validity of the survey item i t s e l f ,  
however, to explain the failure of the 1969 election results to reflect 
the overall preference for Labor as a problem-solver. The general image 
of a party, and its  leader, and its emotive appeal to the voter via the 
links of partisan loyalty could be expected to override the perception 
that an opposing party was most competent to handle one problem which the 
voter felt  to be particularly important. This explanation was supported by 
the ASP data. An analysis of respondents' actual votes in 1969 by
(a) their party loyalties, and
(b) their choice of parties to solve salient problems, 
showed clearly that partisanship was the
predominant influence when (a) and (b) were in conflict.
26. Aitkin, Stability and Change in Australian Politics (forthcoming).
27. The accuracy of the "most important problem "  question in isolating 
those issues salient to voting behaviour depends on the proximity 
of the survey to an actual election. A question asked six months 
before an election (as was the case for the Gallup Poll item) would
be of dubious relevance to electoral behaviour unless respondents were 
specifically directed to bear the election in mind.
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Table 8.9 compares the percentages  voting Labor in 1969 of 
respondents with d i f f e r i n g  par ty  l o y a l t i e s  and varying percep t ions  of 
the  p a r t i e s  as problem-solvers .  From a h igh-po in t  o f  91.6% of those 
i d e n t i f y in g  with the A.L.P. and nominating i t  to solve t h e i r  most import­
an t  problem, the  actual  Labor vote dropped to a low of  2.9% amongst those 
c o n s i s t e n t l y  loyal to the  Liberal  and Country p a r t i e s .  In each column, 
the decrease  in percentages  from top to bottom can be a t t r i b u t e d  to the 
in f luence  o f  changing percep t ions  of the  p a r t i e s '  competence to solve 
s a l i e n t  problems, w h i l s t  the  drop in percentages  from l e f t  to r i g h t  in 
each row of  the  t a b le  r e f l e c t s  the move from Labor p a r t i s a n s h i p ,  to 
independence,  to lo y a l ty  towards the opposing p a r t i e s .  In each case ,  
the f a l l  in the Labor vote was g r e a t e r  with changes in pa r ty  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n
than with a l t e r a t i o n s  in pe rcep t ions  of  the  p a r t i e s  as problem-solvers .
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TABLE 8.9 PERCENTAGE VOTING LABOR IN 1969 BY PARTISANSHIP
AND CHOICE OF PARTY AS PROBLEM-SOLVER 
Party  I d e n t i f i c a t i o n
Party  nominated 
to solve problem Labor
No par ty  
I d e n t i f i c a t i o n Lib/CP
Labor 91.6 68.1 18.4
(548) (69) (174)
No d i f f e r en c e 84.6 52.2 4.8
(39) (23) (104)
Lib/CP 63.6 20.6 2.9
(44) (34) (415)
Although the re  were few respondents who i d e n t i f i e d  with the Labor 
Par ty  but nominated the Libera l /Country  Party c o a l i t i o n  to handle t h e i r
28. The percentage in each ce l l  i s  t h a t  voting fo r  the Labor Party  in
the 1969 Federal e l e c t i o n .  The numbers in parentheses  are  the  t o t a l s  
on which percentages  were based, n o t  the raw scores  fo r  each c e l l .
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salient problem (n=44), a clear majority of these people (63.6%) voted 
Labor. Conversely, very few (18.4%) of those loyal to the governing 
parties, but seeing Labor as the most competent problem solver, in fact 
voted for the A.L.P. in 1969. Partisanship (or some other related factor) 
clearly determined the votes of those respondents who saw no difference 
between the parties in relation to their abili ty to solve important 
problems (84.6% of Labor partisans and only 4.8% of Liberal/CP supporters 
voted for the Labor Party). The choice of a party to handle a respondent's 
problem was not entirely without influence on his vote, however, as was 
demonstrated in the voting percentages for those who lacked any party 
loyalties. Also, those respondents identifying with the Labor Party but 
choosing the government as a problem-solver were less likely to vote for 
the A.L.P. at the Federal election than their  fellow partisans who had 
nominated Labor - and the same trend was in evidence amongst Liberal/Country 
Party identifiers.
The predominant influence of partisanship amongst the Australian 
respondents was not in keeping with 1968 U.S. findings which demonstrated 
that salient issues and the related estimates of party competence, often
29overcame long-term party loyalties in the determination of voting behaviour.
If the ASP survey had enabled the construction of a scale of issue partisan-
30ship over a series of salient problems, as did the Michigan research, i t  
may have emerged that the likelihood of voting contrary to partisan 
loyalties increased with the strength of feeling towards particular 
important problems and towards the parties as problem-solvers. In the 
absence of this refinement, however, i t  can only be concluded that the 
issues salient to Australian voters were not as important to their electoral 
decisions in 1969 as were the forces of party identification.
29. RePass, o p . a i t pp.399-400.
30. ib id . ,  p.399.
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This general conclusion does not jeopardise the poss ib ility  that 
salient issues may have had a strong influence on the voting behaviour 
of those people who possessed no party ties . Nor is i t  su ffic ie n t to 
make fina l judgements on the basis of electoral decisions made on only 
one occasion. Despite the influence of partisanship, perceptions of the 
parties related to the ir performance in issue areas of high salience may 
have figured more s ign ifican tly  in decisions to switch voting direction 
between 1966 and 1969, than in the behaviour of those whose voting 
patterns remained the same. This po ss ib ility  w ill be investigated in 
the following chapter on those who switched the ir votes in 1969.
The analysis so far has not made any comparison between the re la tive
influence on voting decisions of issues which were of high salience to
electors and those which were regarded as less important, when party
iden tifica tion  was held constant. Common sense would suggest that the
influence of the former would be greater and, indeed, th is hypothesis
provided the basis for RePass' contention that open-ended survey questions
examining the relevance of issues to the voters should be used in
preference to fixed-choice items which merely tested opinions on issues
31possible of no concern at a l l.  In previous chapters the issues studied 
have been restricted to the la tte r  type. The inclusion in the ASP survey 
of a question probing the salience of various policy areas should, 
therefore have provided the opportunity to compare, on each issue, those 
respondents who displayed concern with those who did not. This proved, 
unfortunately, to be impossible in relation to a ll but two policy issues, 
owing to the small numbers of respondents who classied as "im p o r ta n t  
p ro b le m s"  the issues included as fixed-choice items elsewhere in the 
questionnaire.
The Vietnam war, conscription, State aid, migration and relations with
31. i b id .
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the United States were a l l  mentioned by some respondents as important 
problems the Federal government should do something about. Only the 
Vietnam war, however, a ttrac ted  a large number of f i r s t  mentions (130).
31 respondents mentioned conscription in th is  way; 16 mentioned State 
a id ; 10 mentioned immigration; and only 6 saw A u s tra l ia 's  re la tions  with 
the U.S.A. to be th e ir  f i r s t  important problem. As a re s u lt ,  re l ia b le  
comparisons with the rest o f the sample could only be made on the Vietnam 
issue; with conscription being included in the analysis on grounds of 
in t r in s ic  in te re s t,  although any observations could only be ten ta t ive .
Several comparative questions about the data seemed to be relevant 
to the voting behaviour of the two groups of respondents (those fo r  
whom an issue was sa l ie n t ;  and those fo r  whom i t  was not) and w i l l  be 
examined in the fo llowing pages:
. Did the views of those fo r whom an issue represented an 
important problem d i f f e r  in d irec t ion  from those o f the 
remaining respondents?
. Were there s ig n if ic a n t  social and demographic differences 
between the two groups?
. Did those fo r  whom an issue was sa lien t say they f e l t  more 
strongly about th e ir  views than those who merely expressed 
an opinion on i t?
. Were the former more l ik e ly  to perceive the opposing party 
stances on the issue with greater accuracy than the rest?
An analysis of the answers given by those respondents who had 
specified e ither the Vietnam war or conscription as th e i r  most important 
problem to the separate a t t i tu d e  questions on the two issues did show 
some difference in the opinions of these respondents in comparison with 
the remainder of the sample. In the case of conscrip tion, i t  also demon­
strated the existence o f opposing viewpoints w ith in  the group fo r  whom 
the issue was most sa l ie n t .
The d is t r ib u t io n  of opinion amongst those respondents fo r  whom 
Vietnam was most important was skewed towards the reduction of Austra lian
231
t roop  commitment to the  war ( see  Table 8 . 1 0 ) .  50.8% of  them (n=130) wanted
e i t h e r  t o t a l  d isengagement  o r  the  r e t e n t i o n  only  of  c i v i l i a n  a d v i s e r s .
Only 10.8% of  t h e se  v o t e r s  were in agreement  with government p o l i c y ;  88.5% 
f e l t  t h e r e  shou ld  be some s o r t  o f  r e d u c t io n  in A u s t r a l i a n  t ro o p  l e v e l s .
The most moderate approach ,  t h a t  o f  b r in g in g  home only  th e  n a t io n a l  s e r v i c e  
men, remained the  most p opu la r  s i n g l e  o p t i o n ,  however,  as i t  had been when 
the  views of  th e  whole sample were c o n s id e re d .
TABLE 8 .10  COMPARATIVE VIEWS ON VIETNAM OF THOSE FOR WHOM IT WAS
A SALIENT ISSUE AND THOSE FOR WHOM IT WAS NOT
(A) (B)
Troops & Only 
C o n s c r ip t s  Vo lun teers
(C) (D)
Only
C i v i l i a n  Stay Out D on ' t  Know 
Exper ts  o f  Vietnam No Answer
Those who saw 
Vietnam war as 
t h e i r  "most 
im portant problem"
10.8 37.7 24.6 26.2 0 .7
Remainder o f  
the  Sample 24.6 43.8 11.5 17.3 2 .8
Total  Sample 23.6 43.4 12.4 17.9 2.7
100%
(130)
100%
(1743
100%
(1873
Those f o r  whom c o n s c r i p t i o n  was the  most s a l i e n t  i s s u e  were more
even ly  d iv id ed  in t h e i r  op in io n s  ( see  Table 8 . 1 1 ) .  The i r  a t t i t u d e s  towards
n a t io n a l  s e r v i c e ,  as measured by th e  ASP q u e s t i o n n a i r e ' s  f o r c e d - c h o i c e  op in ion
item were more l i k l y  to  l i e  a t  the two ext remes o f  "c o n sc r ip tio n  fo r  a l l "  or
32",a b o lish  c o n s c r ip tio n ” than were th o se  o f  the  t o t a l  sample.
32. I t  was no t  p o s s i b l e  to  compare the views o f  th o se  r e sponden ts  f o r  whom 
c o n s c r i p t i o n  was o f  most importance with the  views o f  the  remainder  o f  
the  sample.  In o rd e r  to  i s o l a t e  the  former r e sponden ts  from th o s e  who 
f e l t  o t h e r  a s p e c t s  o f  defence  to  be im por tan t  ( c o n s c r i p t i o n  having been 
inc luded  in th e  genera l  c a t e g o ry  o f  " d e fen c e ”  by the  c o d e r s ) ,  i t  was 
n e c e ss a ry  to  go back to  the  in d iv id u a l  q u e s t i o n n a i r e s  the m se lves .  A 
new d a ta  f i l e  was c o n s t r u c t e d  f o r  the  31 r e sponden ts  concerned with 
c o n s c r i p t i o n ,  b u t ,  in th e  absence  o f  a complete new da ta  f i l e  f o r  the  
remaining r e sponden ts  in th e  sample,  comparisons could  on ly  be made 
with th e  t o t a l  sample.
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TABLE 8.11 COMPARATIVE VIEWS ON CONSCRIPTION OF THOSE FOR WHOM IT
WAS A SALIENT ISSUE AND THE TOTAL SAMPLE
(A) (B) (C) (D)
Con- C i v i l i an
s c r i p t i o n  Bal lo t  A l t e r -  Abolish Don' t  Know 
fo r  a l l  System na t ives  Conscr ipt ion No Answer
Those who saw 
consc r ip t i on  as 
t h e i r  "most important 
prob lern"
Total Sample
* includes  above 31
48.4 0.0 22.6 29.0 0.0
40.9 7.0 32.9 16.9 2.3
n=31)
The impl i ca t i ons  of  t h i s  high p o l a r i s a t i o n  of  views were i n t e r e s t i n g ,  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  in the absence of  any respondents  f o r  whom c onsc r i p t i on  was 
s a l i e n t  suppor t ing the government ' s  b a l l o t  system of  s e l e c t i o n .  Presuming 
a l ink  between concern with consc r i p t i on  and vot ing behaviour ,  the quest ion 
of  i n t e r e s t  to the outcome of  the 1969 Federal  e l e c t i o n  would be whether 
those voters  wanting c onsc r i p t i on  f o r  a l l ,  in p re ference  to the  b a l l o t  system, 
would s t i l l  support  the government p a r t i e s .  I f  so,  t h e i r  votes  might be 
expected to cancel out  the pa r ty  choice of  those who favoured some r e l a x ­
a t i on  in the nat ional  s e r v i ce  requi rements ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  as only a r e l a t i v e l y  
minute f r a c t i o n  of  the e l e c t o r a t e  could be expected to see consc r i p t i on  as 
an "important problem" (only 0.6% of  the t o t a l  ASP sample did so) .
In add i t i on  to v a r i a t i o n s  in opin ion ,  t he re  were some s i g n i f i c a n t
socia l  and demographic d i f f e r e nc e s  in the backgroundof those who regarded
e i t h e r  Vietnam or  c onsc r i p t i on  as an impor tant  problem, in comparison with 
33the t o t a l  sample.  Both groups included a h igher  propor t ion of  male 
respondents  than would be expected from the d i s t r i b u t i o n  of  sexes in the 
t o t a l  sample ( t h i s  was noted e a r l i e r  in t h i s  chapte r  in r e l a t i o n  to Vietnam 
and the more general  problem area of  " defence") . There were some d i f f e r e nc e s ,
33. See Appendix IV for  t a b l e s .
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however, between the two groups with respect to education level - those 
concerned with Vietnam were more l ik e ly  to have te r t ia r y  education, and 
those fo r whom conscription was important were more l ik e ly  to have no 
education, or only primary or secondary schooling (there were no te r t ia r y  
educated respondents in th is  group). As noted e a r l ie r ,  21-35 year olds were 
overrepresented in the group who nominated the Vietnam war as important, 
and older age groups tended to be under-represented. The re la tionsh ips 
between age and concern with conscription were more complex, however, 
(possibly re f le c t in g  the s p l i t  in opinion between those who were pro- and 
a n t i - )  with 21.23 year olds more l ik e ly  to be in th is  group and, a lso,
46-75 year olds. Unlike Vietnam, 24-35 year olds were markedly under­
represented.
I f  there was some connection between the in te n s ity  o f fee ling  with
which an opinion was held (a f fe c t)  and the importance attached to tha t
34subject by the voter (sa lience), then i t  would be expected that those 
fo r whom Vietnam or conscription was a matter o f concern would say they 
f e l t  strongly about th e ir  opinion on tha t issue. In fa c t ,  th is  expectation 
was only p a r t ia l ly  f u l f i l l e d  by the data, with an in te res ting  exception in 
the case of conscription.
For Vietnam, those who were o f the opinion tha t only volunteer 
troops should remain (37.7% of the group) were s l ig h t ly  more l i k e ly  to 
feel " v e ry  s t r o n g l y ”  about th is  and less l i k e ly  to feel "n o t  v e ry  s t r o n g l y ”  
than the same opinion-holders in the to ta l  sample. Over the three remaining 
a lte rn a t ive s , those fo r  whom Vietnam was sa l ie n t were less l i k e ly  to feel 
” n o t  v e ry  s t r o n g l y ”  about th e ir  opinion than the to ta l  sample, but th is  
was not matched by any corresponding increase in the very strong opinion
34. The existence o f a connection between these two measures cannot be 
taken fo r  granted. See D.W. Rae and M. Taylor, The Analysis o f 
P o l i t ic a l  Cleavages, Chapter 3, on the d i f f i c u l t i e s  o f measuring 
in te n s i ty .
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category. Although fewer voters in the high salience group showed 
minimal affect in their opinions on the war, the group overall did not hold 
its  opinions with markedly greater intensity than the ordinary respondents.
There was an interesting reflection of the polarisation of opinion 
on conscription in the intensity of feelings of those who saw i t  as an 
important problem. Those in the group who wanted "co n scr ip tio n  fo r  a l l "  
were much more likely to feel very strongly about their view than were the 
same opinion-holders in the total sample (which included themselves). Those 
who were in favour of either "a b o litio n "  or " c iv i l ia n  a l t e r n a t i v e s " , however, 
held their views with lower intensity than did their counterparts (including 
themselves) in the general sample. The tentative nature of these findings, 
due to the small number of respondents concerned with conscription (n=31), 
was disappointing as the data could otherwise have been taken as evidence for 
the existence of a potentially volatile situation where opinions were highly 
polarised between one group of respondents who fe l t  very strongly about 
their opinions and an opposing group, .for whom the problem was s t i l l  import­
ant, but who felt  less intensely committed to their  views.
The degree of accuracy in the respondents' perceptions of party 
positions could only be ascertained for the Vietnam war. A comparison 
between the perceptions of those respondents for whom Vietnam was an import­
ant problem and the general sample showed l i t t l e  difference in the abili ty 
of the two groups to discriminate government and opposition policy stances. 
Where Vietnam was salient,  respondents were only slightly more likely to 
give an accurate assessment. This lack of contrast in knowledge of party 
policies may not have been the rule, however, for other issues where voters 
on the whole were not as clearly aware of the parties' positions as they 
were on the Vietnam war.
At this stage of the analysis, the contention that salient problems 
were more likely to influence voting behaviour than issues of less concern
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to the voters must remain at the status of an as yet unconfirmed hypothesis. 
The argument that issues must be seen to be relevant to electoral 
decisions in order to have an effect on voters is a persuasive one.
Even if  true, however, i t  would not necessarily follow that a l l  issues of 
high salience within the electorate could be expected to have some impact 
on the election results. The discovery that respondents who said they were 
primarily concerned about the Vietnam war s t i l l  did not feel very much more 
strongly about their opinions on the subject than other respondents should 
at least lead one to question the assumption that the salience of this issue 
provided sufficient motivation for voting action.
Of those 130 respondents who nominated the Vietnam war as their most 
important problem 54.6% voted for the A.L.P. in 1969 and 35.4% voted 
Liberal/Country Party. I t  would be tempting, but possibly completely 
mistaken, to conclude that this distribution of votes reflected the bias 
in the opinions of these respondents towards some degree of withdrawal from 
Vietnam. There also happened to be more Labor identifiers than government 
supporters amongst voters who displayed concern with Vietnam, and i t  may have 
been this factor alone which was responsible for Labor's advantage in actual 
votes. Allowing the importance of party identification, however, Labor's 
vote amongst these respondents may have been swollen by the addition of non- 
party identifiers concerned with Vietnam (16.2% of the total 130) who were 
swayed by Labor's stance on this issue.
Conclusions about the likely impact of an issue such as Vietnam on 
electoral behaviour are also complicated by the conflicting nature of the 
evidence as to the degree of i ts  importance within the electorate. I t  has 
already been mentioned that a Gallup Poll conducted four months prior to the 
ASP survey found a proportion of the electorate regarding Vietnam as their 
chief election issue (14.5%) which was twice as large as the proportion 
identified by the ASP survey. I t  could be argued that the ASP questionnaire
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provided a better test of salience in connection with the 1969 Federal
election, as i t  was administered very close to polling day; but i t  could
also be argued that the wording of the Gallup Poll item tied respondents
more closely to a consideration of the issues important to their forthcoming
35electoral decision.
To add to the confusion, Albinski's analysis of earlier Gallup
findings suggested that Vietnam was the most important problem for up to one
36quarter of Australian electors in the years 1966 and 1967. On the basis
of this data, he concluded that Labor's electoral support was weakest
37amongst those who assigned the greatest salience to Vietnam. These results 
are not necessarily incompatible with those reported in this chapter as 
they apply to a different time period - but they do i l lustra te  the necessity 
of taking similar measures over a number of time intervals i f  conclusions 
are to be reached with any great degree of certainty.
A statement which can be made with confidence is that the Vietnam 
war was by no means as salient an issue amongst Australian voters as i t  
was amongst Americans. Using the same question format as that employed 
in the ASP survey, B.I. Page and R.A. Brody found in 1968 that nearly half 
their respondents spontaneously mentioned Vietnam as the most important 
problem the government in Washington should try to take care of, far
38greater numbers than those who specified any other issues as important.
I t  did not follow, however, that the issue exercised greater influence 
over voting behaviour in the United States than in Australia, as its  
importance to the American voters was not matched by an abili ty to discrim­
inate between the stances of the competing candidates, Nixon and Humphrey,
35. Australian Gallup Poll, No.204, 21st June 1969.
36. Albinski, o p .e i t . 3 pp.192-3.
37. ib id . 3 p. 199.
38. Page & Brody, o p .c i t . 3 p.982. See also, Kirkpatrick and Jones, o p .c it .
237
at the 1968 Presidential election.
Apart from the Vietnam war, the only other issue item amongst the
eight specifically included in the ASP questionnaire which attracted a
sufficient number of mentions to be studied as a salient problem in
i t se l f  was that of conscription. Here the 1969 voting distribution was
48.4% Liberal/Country Party and 45.0% Labor (n=31). These figures were
perhaps linked to the polarization of views on the subject of conscription
already observed amongst the group, but they were more likely to have
resulted from party ties (the distribution of which favoured the government 
40coalition ), except for a small proportion of Liberal/CP identifiers who 
voted Labor. Numbers in this category were unfortunately too small to pursue 
the implications of the interesting variation in the intensity with which 
opinions were held, in the light of the actual voting figures.
It was also unfortunate that the distribution of opinions amongst 
respondents who were concerned about the other more salient issues of 
education and pensions could not be ascertained from the coded data. The 
1969 voting pattern of those who nominated pensions (34.0% Lib/CP; 56.0% 
Labor) could largely be explained by the respondents' party loyalties.
This was not the case with education, however, where those who fe l t  i t  to 
be the most important problem voted for the Labor Party in 1969 in greater 
numbers (44.0% Labor) than would be expected from an analysis of their 
party ties (38.2% identified with the Labor Party). Clearly, some factor 
other than partisanship affected voting behaviour here and, given the great
39
39. Page and Brody, o p .c i t . 3 p.994.
40. As none of the 31 respondents for whom conscription was most important 
agreed with the government's ballot system of selecting national 
servicemen, the views of the Liberal/Country Party identifiers within 
the group were most likely to have favoured the option of "conscription  
fo r  a l l  young men".
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importance attached to education as a problem area, i t  is possible that some 
Liberal/Country Party id e n t i f ie rs  were influenced to change th e i r  vote by 
th e ir  views on the issue.
The data analysis undertaken in th is  chapter has suggested a number 
o f issue areas (education, pensions, defence, Vietnam) l ik e ly  to have been 
of relevance to the voting decisions o f s ig n if ic a n t  proportions o f the 
Austra lian electorate in 1969. The design of the ASP questionnaire was 
such that i t  has been possible to study only one o f these issues, the 
Vietnam war, a t any great depth. On a general le ve l,  however, attempts 
have been made to assess the re la t ive  contributions o f party id e n t i f ic a t io n  
and issue concern to the voting decisions o f those respondents who nominated 
p a r t icu la r  problems as important. The implications o f th is  fo r  the actual 
e lectora l outcome in 1969 can only be f u l l y  realised i f  the focus of study 
is fu r the r narrowed to those respondents who decided to switch th e i r  voting 
support to another party at the Federal e lec tion .
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CHAPTER 9
SWITCHES IN THE VOTE
Information on voting patterns recorded at a single election can 
only be of limited value in explaining the determinants of voting behaviour.
As researchers and practical politic ians are primarily interested in the 
occurrence of change in voting habits (or, conversely, the maintenance 
of stable patterns of behaviour), an analysis which is to have some 
predictive value requires data accumulated over a period of time.
A characteristic of recent voting studies in the United States and 
Great Britain has been the ir longitudinal nature, using the responses of a 
panel of voters over a series of time intervals. The use of this technique 
reflects a realisation that knowledge of changes over time in the attitudes 
of voters and in the ir perceptions of po lit ica l rea lity  is essential to an 
understanding of what motivates a person to switch his vote from one party 
to another. In his analysis of American electoral behaviour between 1968 
and 1972, Gerald Pomper described the problems inherent in reliance on 
"synchronic" data, derived from a single election study - that attempts to 
generalise from time-bound results gave the il lus ion of a s ta tic  system as 
they were insensitive to long-term movements in opinion and were restricted 
to a particular historical period which may have been a typ ica l.1 23
The Australian Survey Project was designed to overcome such
2lim itations in earlie r studies of Australian voters by analysing the opinions 
of a single electorate sample in two interview waves, one conducted in 1967 
and the other in 1969. I t  represented the f i r s t  comprehensive attempt to 
map the forces for s ta b i l i ty  and for change operating on the Australian
3
electorate over a period of time. Aitkin was able to observe movements in
1. Pomper, op.cit., p.187.
2. Gallup Polls of Australian po li t ica l attitudes are repeated over regular 
time intervals, particu larly near an election, but the problem in using 
this data is that the wording of questions is changed from time to time.
3. A itk in, S tab il i ty  and Change in Australian Politics (forthcoming).
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opinion on issues such as Vietnam which corresponded with changes in voting 
behaviour from one Federal election to the next.
Although the present study makes no assumptions about the permanence 
of attitudes recorded in 1969, i t  can be criticised for neglecting the 
dynamics of opinion formation as i ts  coverage has been restricted to the 
second wave of the A.S.P. survey. Because of this restriction, i t  has not 
been possible to undertake any assessment of the links between changes in 
electoral opinion on issues of public policy and changes in the levels of 
voting support for the opposing parties.
One vital aspect of the time dimension has, however, been included 
in the analysis. The 1969 questionnaire asked respondents to recall their 
vote at the previous Federal election, held three years earlier. Data from 
this item provided a base for comparing the attitudes held in 1969 by people 
who had decided to switch their votes with those of voters who had remained 
faithful to the same party over the two elections. Although this 
procedure would not allow any inferences of causality, the finding of 
substantial differences between the opinions of "s w i t c h e r s" and party 
"f a i t h f u l s " on any of the relevant issues would constitute persuasive 
evidence that these issues were in some way associated with the voting 
changes, provided that the effects of other variables (such as party ident­
ification; socio-demographic characteristics) had been simultaneously 
controlled. The ability of alterations in party identification or differences 
in the intensity of party loyalties to explain movements in the vote could 
provide important indications, even i f  mainly negative ones, of the extent 
to which issue opinions played an identifiable role in prompting voting 
change.
A word of caution must be expressed as to the accuracy of the data 
recording changes in voting behaviour between the two elections. The 
1966 voting figures relied on the respondents' accurate recall of a 
voting act they had performed three years earlier.  15% of the sample either
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refused to answer this question or admitted that they did not know how 
they had voted on the previous occasion. An 85% response rate was not 
particularly encouraging, especially as some respondents undoubtedly 
gave incorrect answers, perhaps confusing their former Federal vote with 
a vote they had cast at State government elections in the intervening 
period.
Some confidence in the recall data could, however, be gained from the 
similarity between movements registered in the sample's voting patterns 
and the size of the actual net swing recorded for the total Australian 
electorate between the elections of 1966 and 1969. The swing figure for 
the 1969 Federal election calculated on the basis of the "two party
4
preferred vote" was 7.1% towards the Labor Party. As data on the A.S.P. 
respondents coveredonly their f i r s t  preference votes, the most valid 
comparison was not with this figure, however, but with the changes in the 
parties' share of f i r s t  preferences throughout Australia. The Labor Party's 
total f i r s t  preference votes at the 1969 Federal election increased by 7.0% 
from the 1966 figure. Ibis accompanied a drop of 7.9% in the Liberal/ 
Country Party coalition's share of f i r s t  preferences, the difference of 
0.9% benefiting the smaller parties in 1969. In comparison with these 
figures, Labor's share of the votes case by the 1,517 A.S.P. respondents 
who recalled how they had voted on both occasions increased by a net 7.7%, 
from 38.2% in 1966 to 45.9% in 1969. Although this was very close to the 
actual increase recorded in Labor's voting support across Australia at the 
1969 election, there was a much larger discrepancy between the survey's 
results for the drop in Liberal/Country Party support (down 11.7% from 58.0% 
of f i r s t  preference votes recalled for 1966 to 46.3% of votes in 1969) 
and the actual drop of 7.9% registered in the electoral returns for 1969.
As will be seen when the complex movements in voting support amongst A.S.P. 
respondents are analysed, rather than merely the net percentage swings,
4. Mackerras, o p . o i t p.211.
the survey recorded a greater  movement from the Labor Party in 1966 to 
the smaller part ies in 1969 than, in fac t ,  occurred within the wider 
e lec tora te .
242
Most of the a t tent ion in th is  chapter will be given to the swing 
towards Labor, where the magnitude of new swings recorded in the general 
e lec tora te  and within the Ä.S.P. sample were su f f ic ien t ly  similar  to give 
confidence in the va l id i ty  of the survey figures.  The number of survey 
respondents swinging towards the government coalit ion in 1969 was too 
small for re l iab le  analysis (N=36) and, i t  would seem from the above 
comparison, may have represented an underestimation of the actual trend 
within the Australian e lec tora te .
The full  c irculat ion of votes within the A.S.P. sample (excluding
those respondents who refused to answer e i the r  question or who did not know
how they had voted) between 1966 and 1969 is set  out in Table 9.1.
TABLE 9.1 PATTERN OF VOTING CHANGES 1966-1969 
AMONGST A.S.P. RESPONDENTS
Lib/CP
1969 Vote
Labor DLP Other
Didn' t  
Vote
1966
Lib/CP 42.5 9.9 2.2 1.5 0.9
Labor 1.9 33.7 1.0 0.4 0.2
DLP 0.3 0.6 2.1 0.1 0.0
Other 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.3 0.0
Didn't
Vote 0.5 0.8 0.1 ! 0.2 0.5
45.3 45.2 5.4 2.5 1.6
57.0
37.2
3.1 
0.6
2.1
 100.0% (n=1568)
5. This figure excludes 305 respondents who refused to answer e i ther  
question or who did not know how they had voted on one or both 
occasions. The figures in each cell represent percentages of the 
tota l  (N=1568). Row and column to ta ls  add to 100.0% - they do not 
correspond to the percentage swings of f i r s t  preference votes cited 
in the t ex t ,  as this  pa r t icu la r  table includes non-voters.
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Considering the compulsory nature of voting in Australian Federal 
and State elections, i t  was not surprising that only very small proportions 
of the sample said they had failed to vote at either of the elections. A 
large number of those respondents who said they had not voted in 1966 were, 
in fact, too young to have registered at the time. Only 7 respondents said 
they had omitted to vote at both elections - the sample included 34 non­
voters in 1966 and 24 non-voters in 1969.
The cells outlined heavily in the middle of the table indicate the
g
overall stabil i ty  of voting patterns across the two elections. In a l l ,
78.3% of those respondents who answered both questions voted consistently 
for the government parties, the Labor Party or the D.L.P. Most of the 
changes amongst the remaining voters were confined to straight conversion^ 
between the two major party groupings. 72.8% (N=213) of those who defected 
from the Liberal/Country Party coalition in 1969 switched their vote to 
Labor, whilst 58.0% (N=52) of those switching away from the Labor Party 
voted for the government coalition in 1969. The D.L.P. gained the votes 
of 16.4% (N=213) of Liberal/Country Party defectors and 28.8% (N=52) of Labor 
defectors. The greater attraction of the D.L.P. for those switching away
g
from Labor fit ted the hypothesis that the D.L.P. has performed the function 
of a stepping-stone for upwardly mobile Catholics, moving away from trad­
itional working class loyalties to the Labor Party, ultimately towards 
identification with the Liberal Party. The proportions, however, were not
6. Respondents in the "Other - Other" cell may not, in fact, have voted 
for the same minor party at both elections, but as there were only 4 
respondents in the cell ,  this would not affect the level of s tabil i ty  
within the sample.
7. For the explanation of "conversion" as a concept in describing voting 
change see Butler and Stokes, o p . c i t Chapter 12.
8. D. Kemp, "Swingers and Stayers: The Australian Swinging Voter, 1961-72", 
in H. Mayer (ed.) Labor to Power (Sydney, 1973), p.284.
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in keeping with the net swing figures towards the minor parties actually 
recorded in the 1969 election, and the numberswere too small to warrant 
further investigation.
The degree of conversion within the sample favoured the Labor Party 
in 1969, with five times as many respondents switching the ir support from 
the government parties to the opposition (155) as switched in the opposite 
direction (30). 92.3% (N=168) of the votes gained by Labor in 1969
from those who had previously supported other parties, in fact, came from 
1966 Liberal/Country Party voters. Thus, most of the circulation of votes 
which did occur between 1966 and 1969 could be accounted for by stra ight 
conversion between the major parties which benefittedLabor overall.
Despite the s ta b ility  of most respondents' voting behaviour, the 
percentage who did a lte r the ir voting pattern between the two elections 
(18.2% of 1568 respondents who answered both questions) was rather higher 
than might have been expected as a result of the forces against change 
exerted by feelings of party iden tifica tion  common amongst most members 
of the sample. In fact, the proportion was not very d iffe ren t from an 
estimated percentage of 14.0% who were "swinging voters” at the 1969 election,
9
calculated by David Kemp on the basis of Gallup Poll data.
We have already observed variations in the strengths of respondents' 
feelings of party loya lty , and i t  would be expected that the "inertia 
c o m p o n e n t of party iden tifica tion  would have much less effect on those 
who fe lt  only weakly committed to one or other party. Not surprisingly, 
the likelihood of changes in voting behaviour on the part of the A.S.P. 
respondents did increase as the in tensity of party loyalties decreased.
This relationship held both for respondents defecting away from the party 
with which they iden tified  in the ir 1969 vote and for those who, in addition,
9. ibid., p.282.
10. Campbell, et al. 3 Elections and the P o litica l Order, p.140.
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a c t u a l l y  switched t h e i r  vote to the opposing pa r ty  a t  the 1969 e le c t i o n  
(see Tables 9.2 and 9 .3 ) .
TABLE 9.2-% OF LIB/CP IDENTIFIERS RECALLING 1966 LIB/CP VOTE 
WHO DEFECTED AWAY FROM LIB/CP AND SWITCHED TO LABOR IN 1969
Lib/CP Lib/CP Lib/CP
Very Strong F a i r l y  Strong Not Very Strong
Defect ion away from 
Lib/CP in  1969
Switched to 
Labor in 1969
( *  Nos. in parentheses represent  t o t a l s  o f  Lib/CP i d e n t i f i e r s  
who re c a l l e d  vo t ing  f o r  t h a t  p a r ty  in  1966)
7.1
(196)
9.9
(362)
25.7
(136)
3.1
(196)
5.0
(362) 16-9(136)
TABLE 9.3-% OF LABOR IDENTIFIERS RECALLING 1966 LABOR VOTE
WHO DEFECTED AWAY FROM LABOR PARTY AND SWITCHED TO LIB/CP IN 1969
Labor Labor Labor
Very Strong F a i r l y  Strong Not Very Strong
Defect ion away from 
Labor in  1969
Switched to  
Lib/CP in  1969
(*  Nos„ in parentheses represent  t o t a l s  o f  Labor i d e n t i f i e r s  
who re c a l l e d  v o t ing  Labor in  1966)
Respondents who d id  not i d e n t i f y  w i th  any o f  the p a r t ie s  were the 
most s uscep t ib le  o f  a l l  to  v o t in g  change in  1969. Of those n o n - i d e n t i f i e r s  
who re c a l l e d  both t h e i r  1966 and 1969 votes (N=125), 50% a l te r e d  t h e i r  vo tes,  
w h i l s t  the remaining 50% stayed f a i t h f u l  to  the pa r ty  f o r  which they had 
voted in  1966. This compared w i th  on ly  13.3% o f  L ibe ra l /C o u n t ry  Party  
i d e n t i f i e r s  ( N=716 - on ly  respondents who re c a l l e d  both t h e i r  1966 and 1969
3.9
(259)
7.1
(197)
12.8
(78)
1.5
(259)
2.5
(197)
12.8
(78)
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votes) whose voting patterns underwent change between the 1966 and 1969 
elections, and 16.6% of Labor identifiers (N=(&b) who changed their votes.
In addition to the presence and strength of feelings of party 
loyalty, the persistence of such feelings over time was related to the 
likelihood of voting change in 1969. The majority of respondents who voted 
for the same party at each election comprised those party loyalists who 
had never identified with any other party. 70.9% of the Liberal/Country 
Party faithfuls (N=667) both identified with the coalition in 1969 and had 
never preferred a different party. Permanent loyalty was even more a 
feature of the Labor faithfuls, 84.8% of whom (N=528) preferred the Labor 
Party in 1969 and had never changed their allegiance.
The pattern of party identification amongst the two groups who switched 
from the Liberal/Country Party coalition in 1966 to Labor in 1969, and the 
reverse, was very different. Each group of switchers was divided in its 
loyalties, unlike the bulk of party faithfuls,  whose loyalties lay with the 
parties they supported in the ballot box (see Table 9.4). The group of 155 
Liberal/Country Party -* Labor switchers was spli t  three ways, with roughly 
equal proportions identifying with each of the two opposing sides and a further 
third lacking any party identification. The small number of respondents 
(30) who switched their votes in the opposite direction included a much 
higher proportion of Labor identifiers.
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TABLE 9.4 ASSOCIATION BETWEEN 1966-1969 VOTING CHANGES AND
PARTY IDENTIFICATION
1966/1969
Votes Lib/CP Labor
DLP/
Other
No Pa r t y  
I d e n t i f i c a t i o n
No
Answer
Lib/CP 
F a i t h f u l s 91.3 2.1 0 . 3 6.3 0 . 0
Lib/CP + 
Labor 31.0 38.7 1.3 27.7 1.3
Labor
F a i t h f u l s 1.3 95.3 0 . 2 3 . 0 0.2
Labor -* 
Lib/CP 20.0 63.3 3.3 10.0 3.4
100% 
(n=667)
100%
( n=155)
100%
(n=528)
100%
(n=30)
The presence  of  d i f f e r i n g  pa r t y  l o y a l t i e s  amongst  those  who swi tched 
t h e i r  vo t e s  in 1969 r a i s e d  q u es t i on s  conce rn ing  the  n a t u r e  of  t h e i r  d e c i s i o n s  
to  change.  Was the  swi tch  a r e s u l t  o f  t emporary d i s i l l u s i o n m e n t  wi th a 
f a v o u r i t e  p a r ty ?  Did t he  1969 vote  r e p r e s e n t  a r e t u r n  to the  p a r t y  wi th 
which t he  v o t e r  u s u a l l y  a s s o c i a t e d  h i m s e l f / h e r s e l f ?  Was the  change only one 
in a s e r i e s  of  swings? Was the  swing accompanied by a change in p a r ty  
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n ,  marking a permanent  t r a n s i t i o n  to  a new p a t t e r n  o f  vo t ing  
behaviour?  These q u es t i on s  a r e  of  impor tance in a s s e s s i n g  the  r e l e v a n c e  of  
i s s ue  op i n i ons  to  vo t i ng  changes in 1969, as t h e  r o l e s  played by i s s u e s  
may have d i f f e r e d  c o n s i d e r a b l y  in each case .
An a n a l y s i s  of  t h e  changes over  t ime in t he  p a r t y  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of  
Libera l  Country P a r t y  -* Labor s wi t c h e r s  ( u n f o r t u n a t e l y ,  t he  s i z e  o f  the 
o t h e r  group was too small  f o r  any d e t a i l e d  breakdown to  be meaningful )  
provided some c l ue s  as to the  compos i t i on  o f  t he  group.  27.7% (43) of  
t h e se  s wi t c h e r s  admi t t ed  to no f e e l i n g s  of  p a r t y  l o y a l t y .  20.0% (31) 
i d e n t i f i e d  wi th t he  L i b e r a l / Co un t r y  P a r t y  c o a l i t i o n  in 1969 and had never  
changed ( t e m p o r a r i l y  d i s i l l u s i o n e d ? ) ;  6.5% (10) i d e n t i f i e d  wi th the  Labor
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Party and had never changed (temporarily disillusioned in 1966 and now 
returning to the fold?); 31.6% (49) identified with Labor in 1969 but had 
preferred the Liberal/Country Party coalition in the past (in transition 
to becoming stable Labor supporters?); and an inexplicable 7.1% (11) 
identified with the government parties in 1969 and had preferred Labor at 
some time in the past. Of the 49 whose change in party identification 
corresponded with the change in voting direction, 71.4% said they had 
actually switched their loyalty since the 1966 election. The influence 
of party identification alone could perhaps account for the voting changes 
within this sub-group. Any speculation as to the precise role of issues in 
these, or other voting changes would prove fruit less unless i t  could be 
established that respondents who altered their votes in 1969 differed in 
their opinion from those who continued to support the party they had voted 
for in 1966.
At this stage, the possibility that switchers could be differentiated 
from party faithfuls on the basis of socio-demographic characteristics alone 
could not be discounted. Significant differences in the social and 
cultural backgrounds of respondents, as well as their age and sex, might 
have been sufficient in themselves to explain voting change, without any 
need for further explanatory variables.
Analysis of the A.S.P. data showed, however, that there was no simple 
way in which socio-demographic variables alone could account for decisions 
to switch votes in 1969. Differences in the educational level, occupation 
and interest in politics of those who did defect from their 1966 votes 
compared with the party faithfuls could not explain the d irection  in which 
the former voters swung.
Reports of previous research on "flo a tin g  vo te rs" and results 
recorded earl ier in this study suggested, as a plausible hypothesis, that 
those who switched their votes (in whatever direction) in 1969 would be less
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well educated, possess less in te rest  in p o l i t i c s  and be located at lower 
points in the occupational scale than would those respondents who remained 
fa i t h fu l  to one or other of the part ies. As e a r l ie r  analysis of the A.S.P. 
data showed that in te res t  in p o l i t i c s  (which was i t s e l f  associated with higher 
education and higher level occupations) was greater amongst strong party 
id e n t i f i e r s ,  i t  could be expected that  the social character is t ics  of the 
swinging voters in the sample, who were more l i k e l y  to id e n t i fy  only 
weakly with a p o l i t i c a l  party, would f i t  th is  hypothesis. Although 
admitting that be l ie f  in the hypothesis advanced here had been stronger 
amongst American survey researchers (as expressed, fo r  example in Campbell's 
American Voter) than the actual evidence might warrant, Converse did 
establ ish in 1962 a cor re la t ion  between i n s t a b i l i t y  of voting patterns 
in U.S. Presidential and Congressional elect ions and low levels of invo lve­
ment in p o l i t i c s . ^  More recent Austral ian research into the l inks between
vote switching and in te res t  in p o l i t i c s  at the time of the 1972 and 1974
12Federal elect ions produced equivocal resul ts  which were of l i t t l e  help as 
a guide to predict ing the behaviour of the A.S.P. respondents some years 
e a r l ie r .
In fac t ,  the hypothesis was not confirmed on any of the three 
variables of self-expressed in te res t  in p o l i t i c s ,  education or occupation. 
Instead, those respondents who changed th e i r  vote between 1966 and 1969 
were more l i k e l y  to be interested in p o l i t i c s  and showed s l i g h t l y  higher
11. ibid.
12. Whilst R. Cameron found that voters switching from the Liberal/Country 
Party coa l i t io n  to Labor at the 1972 elect ion were less interested than 
Liberal/Country Party f a i t h fu l s ,  D. Kemp could f ind no l inks between 
in te rest  in p o l i t i c s  and tendency to swing at the 1972 elect ion. See 
a r t ic le s  by Cameron and Kemp in H. Mayer (ed.) ,  Labor to Power. Two 
years la te r ,  a 1974 ANOP pol l  found greater awareness and in te res t  in 
p o l i t i c s  amongst swinging voters than amongst average voters, see
L. Oakes and D. Solomon, Grab fo r  Power (Melbourne, 1974).
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levels of education and occupation than their fellows whose votes remained 
stable. Table 9.5 shows the different degrees of interest in political 
affairs common to switchers and to party faithfuls.
TABLE 9.5 PROPENSITY TO CHANGE VOTE BY INTEREST IN POLITICS
Good Deal Some Not much No
of Interest Interest Interest Interest
1966-1969
Switchers
1966-1969 
Faithful s
Total who 
Recalled 1966 
& 1967 votes
25.7 52.8 18.3 3.2
21.7 45.6 28.3 4.4
22.5 46.9 26.4 4.2
100%
(284)
100%
(1233)
100%
(1517)
In addition to possessing higher levels of interest in polit ics,
the switchers within the A.S.P. sample were slightly more likely to have
experienced secondary or tertiary level education than the stable voters,
and were more likely to be found in professional or semi-professional 
13occupations. No consistent differences were found between the two groups 
of voters on the variables of age or sex.
The failure of these results to meet the expectations engendered by 
earl ier analysis of the characteristics of weak party identifiers can be 
explained by the tendency for a large number of non-identifiers to switch 
their  vote between elections. Although interest in politics was positively 
related to strength of party loyalty amongst identifiers,  the relationship 
did not hold for those who lacked any party identification. This group did 
include some respondents who expressed no interest in politics at al l ,  but 
a quarter of i ts  members were voters with " a good deal o f  in t e r e s t "  (a 
proportion only exceeded by the "very s tro n g "  Liberal/Country Party and 
Labor identifiers) . If the la t te r  were disproportionately represented in
13. See Appendix V for tables giving details of these relationships.
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the 50% o f no n - iden tif ie rs  who swung between 1966 and 1969, th e ir  high 
in te re s t  in p o l i t ic s  may have accounted fo r  the generally greater in te re s t 
amongst switchers, as a whole, than amongst fa i th fu ls .
As the social cha rac te r is t ics  o f switchers in the A.S.P. sample 
d if fe red  from those expected on the basis o f overseas research, the data 
need to be placed in perspective. The re la t ionsh ip  between voting change 
and in te res t in p o l i t ic a l  a f fa i r s  was by no means a strong one and i t  may 
have been spec if ic  to the circumstances of the 1969 e lec tion .
David Kemp emphasised the importance o f s itua tiona l factors in 
suggesting that the absence o f any l in k  between in te re s t  in p o l i t ic s  and 
propensity to swing at the subsequent Federal e lection held in 1972 was due 
to the campaign having stimulated a higher than usual degree o f  in te re s t  
in p o l i t ic s  throughout the e le c to ra te .^  His argument was un like ly  to 
account completely fo r  the A.S.P. re su lts ,  however, as the in te re s t  levels 
fo r  the to ta l sample, although higher than those recorded in the 1967 
f i r s t  wave of the survey p ro jec t, were lower than those suggested by the 
ASRB poll f igures fo r  the 1972 e lec tion . Table 9.6 sets out the 
comparative spreads of in te re s t  in p o l i t ic s  recorded throughout the 
e lectorate at the three separate time in te rva ls .
TABLE 9.6 ELECTORAL INTEREST IN POLITICS OVER 3 
FEDERAL ELECTION PERIODS
In te res t in P o l i t ic s 1967 1969 19721D
% % %
Good deal of in te re s t 18 22 37
Some in te res t 37 46 37
Not much in te res t 34 26 20
No in te res t 12 6 6
100% 100% 100%
(2044) (1873) (2497)
14. Kemp, o p .c i t . ,  p.287.
♦
15. i b i d . ,  p.287, footnote 40.
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As Kemp a t t r ibu ted  the absence of any in te rest  - swing re la t ionship to 
temporary and inord inate ly  high levels of p o l i t i c a l  involvement in 1972 
( in  explaining why low levels of  in te res t  were not associated with voting 
change), i t  would be highly un l ike ly  fo r  the presence o f  a re la t ionship in 
the reverse direc t ion  from that expected (however small i t s  size) to be 
expl icable in terms of in te res t  levels which were lower, overa l l ,  than 
those observed by Kemp.
Although Kemp's explanation could not account fo r  the 1969 A.S.P.
data, i t  must be recognised tha t  the survey's measure of voters'  psychological
involvement in p o l i t i c s  was time-bound and could not be used to overturn any
long-standing hypothesis about p o l i t i c a l  behaviour. I t  was also a blunt
instrument, by no means approaching the refinement o f  measures of  p o l i t i c a l
awareness which have been associated with research into the nature of the
"floating voter" in the United States. Converse showed in 1962 that the
v i ta l  variable in the re la t ionship  between voting change and p o l i t i c a l
involvement was the mass of  information about p o l i t i c s  possessed by
each voter, i t s e l f  dependent on both the degree of voter in te rest  in p o l i t i c s
16and the p o l i t i c a l  circumstances of the time. In an elect ion involving a 
high output o f  p o l i t i c a l  information, even those voters normally un in te r­
ested in p o l i t i c s  could be expected to acquire a large mass of new 
information.
Convincing evidence to supplant the present view of the "swinging 
voter" as uninformed and uninterested would necessitate the measurement of 
varying levels of p o l i t i c a l  information and awareness amongst switchers and 
fa i t h fu l s  over a number of time in te rva ls ,  including non-campaign periods.
The resul ts  reported here, however, should have provided s u f f i c ie n t  reason 
to, at least ,  query the appl icat ion of the t ra d i t ion a l  picture of the 
"floating voter" to the Austral ian electorate.
16. P. Converse in Campbell, et al. 3 Elections and the P o l i t i ca l  Order.
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Knowledge of the direction of voting change between 1966 and 1969 
did not help substantially in explaining the differences in interest, 
education and occupation observed between those A.S.P. respondents who 
switched their votes and the party faithfuls. Although the circulation 
of votes was comprised largely of those switching from the Liberal and 
Country parties in 1966 to the Labor Party in 1969, the social characteristics 
of these respondents failed to account fully for the observed differences.
The higher levels of interest in politics noticed amongst those who 
switched their votes were attributable to the fact that one quarter of the 
Liberal/Country Party Labor switchers (N=155) expressed "a good deal of 
interest" in political activity. But the educational and occupational 
differences between switchers and faithfuls could not be explained in this 
fashion.
The occupational backgrounds of Liberal/Country Party -* Labor 
switchers were of slightly lower status than those of switchers generally, 
and substantially lower than those of Liberal/Country Party faithfuls.
This contrasted with the earlier finding that those who altered their votes 
between 1966 and 1969 were characterised by higher level occupations than 
were those whose voting patterns remained stable. Unfortunately, any 
study of the contribution made to this discrepancy by the occupational 
characteristics of those who switched their support in the reverse direction, 
from Labor to the Liberal/Country Party coalition, was precluded by the 
small size of the group (N=30).
The higher educational levels common to switchers as a whole were 
not attributable to unusually high concentrations of educated voters amongst 
any one group of respondents.^ Instead, the educational backgrounds of
17. This can be compared with Kemp's 1972 finding that the positive relation­
ship between tendency to swing and education level could be attributed 
to the defection of better-educated voters away from the Liberal/
Country Party coalition, Kemp, o p . c i t p.286.
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those switching th e ir  votes in e ith e r d irec tion  in 1969 were remarkably 
s im ila r  to those of the voters from amongst whom they had defected: 
TABLE 9.7 PROPENSITY TO CHANGE VOTE BY EDUCATIONAL LEVEL
Lib/CP 
Fa ith fu ls
Lib/CP -* 
Labor
Labor 
Fai th fu ls
Labor -* 
Lib/CP
None/
Primary Secondary Tertia ry
24.4 68.7 6.9
25.8 67.7 6.5
42.7 54.6 2.7
43.3 53.3 3.4
100%
(661)
100%
(155)
100%
(524)
100%
(30)
The numerical sizes o f the various groups in th is  table (where there were 
5 times as many Liberal/Country Party -*■ Labor switchers as the reverse) 
can be taken to account fo r  the overall d ifference observed in the 
educational levels of switchers as compared with party fa i th fu ls .
The underlying reason fo r  these resu lts , where educational level 
appears to have been more c lose ly  re lated to 1966 vote than to behaviour 
in 1969, may have been the re tention o f a stable party id e n t i f ic a t io n ,  
despite voting changes, amongst those with s im ila r  educational backgrounds. 
Contro ll ing fo r  party id e n t i f ic a t io n  demonstrated that th is  was, indeed, 
the case amongst those who had voted fo r  the c o a l i t io n  parties in 1966.
The d is t r ib u t io n  o f educational q u a l i f ica t io n s  remained s im ila r  fo r  
Liberal/Country Party fa i th fu ls  and Liberal/Country Party Labor switchers 
who had retained a psychological id e n t i f ic a t io n  with the Liberal/Country 
Party c o a l i t io n  in 1969. The educational patterns o f these same groups o f 
switchers and fa i th fu ls  diverged, however, where party id e n t i f ic a t io n  was 
anything other than pro-Liberal/Country Party in 1969.
Examination o f such additional variables as d irec t ion  o f voting 
change and party id e n t i f ic a t io n  has demonstrated the tenuous nature of
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any generalizations which can be made about the charac te r is t ics  o f 
"swinging voters"  from th is  type of data. The socio-demographic makeup 
of tha t 10% of the A.S.P. sample who switched th e ir  voters from one major 
party to the other between 1966 and 1969 did raise queries about the 
accuracy o f previous portrayals of the "swinging voter". However, on 
fu r th e r examination, the data did not provide the basis fo r  any new 
picture of those voters who have a propensity to swing at an e lec tion .
The A.S.P. respondents who swung towards the Labor Party in 1969 
were c le a r ly  more in terested in p o l i t ic s  and be tter educated than the sample 
as a whole. As they outnumbered switchers in the reverse d irec tion  by 5 to 
1, i t  was not surpris ing  tha t th e ir  charac te r is t ics  dominated the comparison 
between switchers and party fa i th fu ls .  The differences between pro-Labor 
and pro-L ibera l/Country Party switchers on the variables o f in te res t in 
p o l i t ic s  and education were s u f f ic ie n t ly  great, however, that in an e lection  
where the predominant swing had benefited the government pa rt ies , instead 
o f Labor, the social cha rac te r is t ics  o f "swinging voters" would have appeared 
to be quite d i f fe re n t .  The find ings suggest a need to study voting changes, 
and accompanying a lte ra t io ns  in party id e n t i f ic a t io n ,  over a series o f 
e lections in order to produce a p ro f i le  o f the "swinging voter" which is 
not spe c if ic  to the circumstances of any one e lec tion .
Although some estimation o f a vo te r 's  propensity to switch parties 
between the 1966 and 1969 elections was possible on the basis o f information 
about his in te re s t  in p o l i t ic s ,  and knowledge o f his educational and 
occupational s ta tus, i t  was c lear that these variables alone could not 
explain the size or d irec t ion  o f the swing. In order to study the forces 
prompting voters to defect from the party o f th e ir  1966 vote, the size o f 
the swing in both d irec tions was computed fo r  the range o f opinions expressed 
in answer to the e igh t issue items included in the A.S.P. questionnaire. 
Keeping in mind tha t d i f fe re n t  party lo y a lt ie s  and socio-demographic back­
grounds would u lt im a te ly  need to be con tro lled , the f ind ing of an unusually
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strong swing towards one of the parties amongst the holders of a 
particular opinion would suggest that the issue concerned had some 
bearing on the outcome of the election.
The general pattern of voting changes amongst members of the
A.S.P. sample has already been described. The Labor Party gains in 1969
could be attributed mostly to straight conversion, with five times as
many respondents switching their  support from the government parties to the
opposition as the reverse. When the changes were expressed as percentages
of the totals of 1966 votes for both party groupings, however, the degree
of movement did not appear to be quite so one-sided. 17.0% of all those
who recalled voting for the Liberal/Country Party coalition in 1966 (N=911)
switched their  vote to Labor three years later,  whilst 5.1% of previous
Labor voters (N=587) changed their vote in the opposite direction. As
might have been expected, these overall levels of defection from 1966
voting patterns did not always persist when the sample was divided into
sub-groups on the basis of attitudes expressed on the eight issue questions.
The percentages changing their votes in one or the other direction were
higher than the overall figures for some attitudes, and lower for others.
When the percentage swing amongst respondents sharing a common attitude was
18much larger than for the whole sample (indicating a higher defection rate 
amongst these respondents), i t  would appear that the possession of this 
opinion was in some way related to the respondents' decisions to switch 
their votes in 1969. The likelihood that this relationship had significantly 
affected the size of the swing actually recorded across the whole sample 
would depend on the numbers involved in the attitude group.
Two of the four possible alternative viewpoints on Vietnam proved to
18. The term "d e fe c t io n  r a te "  applied to the percentage of one party's 
1966 supporters holding a particular opinion, who defected to the 
other party in 1969.
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be associated with p a r t ic u la r ly  high defection rates which benefited the 
Labor Party in 1969. 30.5% of 1966 Liberal/Country Party voters who
believed that a l l  troops should be withdrawn from the Vietnam war but 
some c iv i l ia n  experts retained (N=95) switched th e i r  votes to Labor in 
1969. The more radical view, that Austra lia  should stay out o f Vietnam 
altogether had a defection rate o f 26.8% of former supporters o f the 
government parties (N=82). As Table 9.8 ind icates, a number o f other 
a tt itudes  were also associated with movements towards the Labor Party 
considerably in excess of the 17.0% defection rate o f 1966 Liberal/Country 
Party voters fo r  the sample as a whole:
TABLE 9.8 DEFECTION RATES TO LABOR IN 1969 RECORDED ON 
6 DIFFERENT ISSUE OPINIONS
% of 1966 Lib/CP
voters holding 
th is  view who
swung to Labor
in 1969 N
Vietnam War - only c iv i l ia n  experts 
to be retained (C) 30.5 95
Vietnam War - stay out altogether 
(D) 26.8 82
Communist China - no problem fo r  
Austra lia 24.6 260
Conscription - a b o l i t io n  (D) 24.4 86
Censorship - freedom to read, see 
what one l ikes 23.1 334
Relations with U.S.A. - f a i r l y  close 21.7 396
The small size of the swing in the reverse d ire c t io n ,  from Labor to 
the Liberal and Country Parties, made any estimation of the a tt itudes 
associated with tha t swing p a r t ic u la r ly  d i f f i c u l t .  One a t t i tu d e ,  however, 
when held by respondents who had voted fo r  the ALP in 1966, was associated 
with a markedly high swing to the government parties . In comparison with 
an overall level o f 5.1% of 1966 Labor supporters switching in th is  manner,
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19.6% of the sub-group fee ling  tha t a l l  troops, including conscripts, 
should be retained in Vietnam (N=46) changed th e ir  vote to support the 
Liberal/Country Party co a l i t io n  in 1969. Although the size o f the sub­
group was too small to draw re l ia b le  conclusions, the fac t tha t the swing 
registered amongst i t s  members was four times greater than normal did 
suggest tha t the possession o f a hardline a t t itude  towards Vietnam by 
1966 Labor supporters was linked with voting change in some cases. The 
only other opinions associated with notably high defection rates amongst 
those who had formerly voted fo r  the Labor Party were tha t c iv i l ia n  a l t e r ­
natives should be provided fo r  national service, and that Communist China 
would give Austra lia  a lo t  to worry about in the fu ture :
TABLE 9.9 DEFECTION RATES TO LIBERAL/COUNTRY PARTY COALITION IN 
1969 RECORDED ON 3 DIFFERENT ISSUE OPINIONS
% of 1966 Labor 
voters holding 
th is  view who 
swung to Lib/CP
in 1969 N
Vietnam War - a l l  troops, including 
conscripts, to remain 
(A) 19.6 46
Conscription - provision o f c iv i l ia n  
a lte rna tives (C) 7.8 153
Communist China - a lo t  fo r  Austra lia
to worry about 7.5 239
The uneven d is t r ib u t io n  o f the swing in both d irections across the 
range o f a lte rna t ive  views on Vietnam indicated that th is  issue may have 
had considerable s ign if icance in determining voting change amongst a 
proportion o f the A.S.P. switchers (see Table 9.10). The only option on 
the Vietnam war which registered swings close to the size o f those fo r  the 
general sample was (B) - tha t only volunteer troops should continue 
f ig h t in g .
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TABLE 9.10  DEFECTION RATES AMONGST THOSE HOLDING DIFFERENT
OPINIONS ON VIETNAM
(A) (B) (C) (D)
1966/1969
Votes
Troops & 
C o n s c r ip t s  to  
remain
V olun tee r  
Troops only  
to remain
Civ i 1ian 
Exper ts  only 
to  remain
Stay Out 
o f  Vietnam 
A 1toge ther
Lib/CP -*■ Labor 6.4 19.9 30.5 26.8
N (295) (413) (95) (82)
Labor +  Lib/CP 19.6 5.6 1.2 3.1
N' (46) (251) (85) (191)
N = no. o f  1966 Lib/CP v o te r s  o f  t h i s  op in io n .
N'= no. o f  1966 Labor v o t e r s  o f  t h i s  op in io n .
A l t e r n a t i v e s  (C) and (D) were a s s o c i a t e d  wi th ex t rem ely  high d e f e c t i o n  
r a t e s  amongst th o se  who had voted f o r  the  government p a r t i e s  in 1966 and 
a l t e r n a t i v e  (A) with  a s i m i l a r l y  high d e f e c t i o n  r a t e  f o r  1966 Labor 
s u p p o r t e r s .  In each o f  t h e s e  t h r e e  c a s e s ,  the  r a t e  o f  vote  sw i tc h in g  in 
the  o p p o s i t e  d i r e c t i o n  was much lower than  normal f o r  th e  sample.
As a l t e r n a t i v e  (B) was th e  most f r e q u e n t l y  exp res sed  op in ion  on 
the  Vietnam, however, w h i l s t  o p t io n s  (C) and (D) were not  p a r t i c u l a r l y  
po p u la r  amongst 1966 L i b e ra l / C o u n t ry  P a r ty  v o te r s  and o p t io n  (A) was very 
r a t e  amongst 1966 Labor v o t e r s ,  the  number of  responden ts  who were in a 
p o s i t i o n  where they  were l i k e l y  to  be i n f l u e n c e d  to  change t h e i r  vo te s  by 
t h e i r  op in io n s  on Vietnam was r e l a t i v e l y  sm a l l .  The f i n d i n g  t h a t  Vietnam 
was l i k e l y  to  have prompted v o t ing  change amongst only  a r e s t r i c t e d  p o r t i o n  
o f  th e  A.S.P .  sample,  conf irmed s u g g e s t io n s  a r i s i n g  from o t h e r  s o u r c e s .  In 
a more r e f i n e d  measure o f  the  l i n k s  between changes in a t t i t u d e s  towards 
the  war and v o t ing  swings between 1966 and 1969, A i tk in  e s t i m a t e d  t h a t  only  
4% o f  th e  A.S.P .  p a n e l ,  whom he l a b e l l e d  th e  "Vietnam sw itchers" , could  be 
s a id  to  have a l t e r e d  t h e i r  vo te s  in e i t h e r  d i r e c t i o n  in response  to  changed
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opinions on the issue. A itk in  commented that the fra c t ion  o f th is  
percentage swinging towards Labor comprised less than h a lf  o f the net gain 
by Labor from conversion in 1969. E a r l ie r  findings of th is  study on the 
re la t iv e  salience o f the Vietnam war issue to the A.S.P. respondents also 
suggested tha t the proportion of the sample s u f f ic ie n t ly  concerned about 
the war to change th e ir  vote on the basis o f th e ir  opinion towards i t  
would have been very small. Nevertheless, the defection rates reported 
here suggest tha t Vietnam was the most powerful o f the e ight issues 
surveyed in prompting voting change amongst respondents holding certa in 
a tt itudes  towards the war which were in c o n f l ic t  with the po lic ies  o f the 
parties fo r  whom they had voted in 1966.
Communist China as a future problem fo r  Austra lia  was a fu r th e r 
issue on which voting changes were unevenly d is tr ib u te d  according to the 
opinions held by respondents. Although the swings were not so greatly  
exaggerated as with the Vietnam war issue, the percentages o f voters 
defecting from the party of th e i r  1966 choice were s u f f ic ie n t ly  d i f fe re n t  
from thosefor the general sample to suggest tha t Communist China be included 
as an issue which may have influenced the voting decisions o f some A.S.P. 
respondents in 1969 (see Table 9.11). In the case of each a tt itu d e  towards 
Communist China, a higher than expected swing towards one party was accomp­
anied by a low rate o f change in the opposite d ire c t ion .
19
19. A i tk in ,  S ta b i l i t y  and Change in Austra lian P o l i t ic s  (forthcoming). 
A i tk in 's  measure has been described here as being more "re fin e d " 
because i t  was derived from panel data which included respondents'
1966 votes as recorded in the f i r s t  wave of the survey conducted in
1967 (ra ther than re ly ing  on respondents' reca ll 3 years la te r )  and 
i t  therefore allowed the study of opinion changes between 1967 and 
1969 in re la t io n  to voting changes over the same period.
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TABLE 9.11  DEFECTION RATES AMONGST THOSE HOLDING DIFFERENT
OPINIONS ON COMMUNIST CHINA
1966/1969 Votes Communist China 
a l o t  to worry about
Communist China 
No Problem
Lib/CP -* Labor 
N
13.4
(546)
24.6
(260)
Labor -► Lib/CP 7.5 3.1
N (239) (257)
N = no. o f  1966 Lib/CP v o te r s  o f  t h i s  op in ion
N'= no. o f  1966 Labor v o te r s  o f  t h i s  op in ion
On th e  c o n s c r i p t i o n  i s s u e ,  one a l t e r n a t i v e  - t h a t  o f  a b o l i s h i n g  
n a t io n a l  s e r v i c e  a l t o g e t h e r  - was a s s o c i a t e d  with  a very high d e f e c t io n  
r a t e  o f  24.4% amongst 1966 L i b e ra l / C o u n t ry  P a r ty  s u p p o r t e r s  advoca t ing  
t h i s  a c t i o n  (N=86) and a markedly low swing o f  1.2% o f  1966 Labor v o t e r s  
(N=171) in th e  r e v e r s e  d i r e c t i o n .  Although the  p e rce n tag e  o f  1966 Labor 
v o t e r s  in f av o u r  o f  c i v i l i a n  a l t e r n a t i v e s  to  n a t io n a l  s e r v i c e  who conver ted  
t h e i r  votes  to  the  government p a r t i e s  in  1969 (7.8% o f  153 re sp o n d en ts )  
was l i s t e d  e a r l i e r  (see  Table 9 .9 )  as having exceeded th e  5.1% d e f e c t i o n  
r a t e  reco rded  f o r  t h e  genera l  sample,  th e  p ro p o r t i o n  o f  l ike -m inded  
r e sponden ts  who swung in th e  o p p o s i t e  d i r e c t i o n  (19.6% of  341 1966 Lib/CP 
s u p p o r t e r s )  was a l s o  h ig h e r  than the  o v e r a l l  p e rce n tag e  swing in t h i s  
d i r e c t i o n  o f  17.0%. This occur rence  cou ld  have r e s u l t e d  from the  u n c e r t a i n t y  
o f  some responden ts  as to  which p a r ty  was most l i k e l y  to  i n t ro d u c e  c i v i l i a n  
forms o f  s e r v i c e ,  and need no t  n e c e s s a r i l y  have i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  the  a t t i t u d e  
i t s e l f  was i r r e l e v a n t  to v o t in g  change.  I t  would be s a f e r ,  however,  to 
r e s t r i c t  any i n f e r e n c e s  on th e  l i n k s  between the  c o n s c r i p t i o n  i s s u e  and 
v o t in g  behav iour  to  th e  su g g e s t io n  t h a t  a number o f  1966 L ib e ra l /C o u n t ry  
P a r ty  s u p p o r t e r s  who s u b s e q u e n t ly  swi tched  to Labor may have been in f l u e n c e d  
to  do so by t h e i r  b e l i e f  t h a t  c o n s c r i p t i o n  should be a b o l i s h e d .
A h ig h e r  p e rce n tag e  o f  th o se  who he ld  the  view t h a t  people should
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be able to read and see whatever they liked with no censorship swung to 
Labor in 1969 than was recorded throughout the general sample. The 
defection rate amongst previous government supporters of this opinion 
was 23.1% (N=334), whereas only 4.2% of 1966 Labor voters who were of the 
same opinion (N=284) swung in the opposite direction. The desire to abolish 
censorship, therefore, may have been responsible for some voting changes 
in 1969.
Respondents who chose " f a i r l y  c lo se "  as a description of the 
desirable state of relations between Australia and the United States were 
also more likely to defect from the Liberal and Country Parties (21.7% 
of 396 1966 Lib/CP voters) and less likely to defect from Labor (4.3% 
of 277 1966 Labor voters) than was the sample taken as a whole. However, 
the relatively small size of the deviation from the normal defection rates, 
and the lack of clarity in the options provided to respondents on the issue 
(a choice of "very c lo s e ",  " f a i r l y  c l o s e "  and "not very c l o s e ”) should lead 
to caution in the interpretation of these results.
This examination of relative defection rates has indicated that the 
possession of certain attitudes on the four issues of the Vietnam war, 
Communist China, conscription and censorship may have prompted voting 
change amongst respondents who had previously supported parties whose 
stances were opposed to these attitudes. The Vietnam war appeared to be 
the most potent of the eight issues in this regard. Opinions on the three 
issues of migration, State aid for non-government schools, and foreign 
investment had defection rates which did not deviate markedly from those 
recorded for the sample as a whole. This did not constitute proof that 
the attitudes concerned were irrelevant to voting behaviour in 1969, but 
they were unlikely to have had much influence under such circumstances.
Although this analysis has enabled certain issues to be isolated as 
p o s s ib le  contributors to voting change amongst segments of the A.S.P. sample, 
no conclusions could be reached as to the causal processes involved.
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Additional, uncontrolled variables may have been partially responsible for 
the relationships observed here. Also, some allowance should be made for 
the presence of purely accidental relationships between voting changes and 
the possession of particular views, as was indicated by the persistence of 
small percentage swings in directions not logically related to the 
respondents' attitudes (e.g., 3.1% of 1966 Labor voters who wanted total 
disengagement from Vietnam (N=191) but switched to the Liberal and Country 
Parties in 1969).
A fuller picture of the attitudes most likely to be associated with
voting change, particularly in Labor's favour, in 1969 emerged from a
comparison of the distribution of opinions amongst switchers with those
of the respondents who remained faithful to one or other of the major
parties at both elections. I t  proved impossible to differentiate between
the opinions of switchers and the party faithfuls on the two issues of
foreign investment and State aid, thus confirming the suggestion made above
on the basis of defection rates that these issues did not play a
significant part in prompting respondents' decisions to change their votes.
Four items - the Vietnam war, Communist China, conscription, relations
with the USA - did prove to be effective discriminators between both sets
of switchers and their respective groups of faithfuls, with the attitudes
of those who changed their votes lying, for the most part, somewhere in the
middle ground between the opinion distribution characteristic of the two
opposing groups of party faithfuls. The position of the two remaining
issues, censorship and migration, was somewhat unclear, with some differences
between the opinionsof Liberal/Country -* Labor switchers and the Liberal/
Country Party faithfuls, but l i t t l e  distinction between those who switched
20in the reverse direction and the Labor Party faithfuls.
20. In the following analysis, the alternatives available on each issue 
have been collapsed into binary form, as any more detailed breakdown 
of the views of the small number of Labor -> Liberal/Country Party 
switchers (30) would not be reliable.
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As stated above, the opinion which was associated with the greatest  
movement of votes towards the Labor Party in 1969 was the view that 
Australian troops should be withdrawn from the Vietnam war, but that  some 
c iv i l ian  experts should remain. Further analysis showed tha t  the l ik e ­
lihood of voting change in e i the r  direction was related to the degree to 
which respondents favoured the withdrawal of troops. Collapsing the four 
a l ternat ives  into binary form resulted in the following dis t r ibut ion  of 
opinion:
TABLE 9.12 1966/1969 VOTING CHANGE BY OPINION ON COMMITMENT 
OF TROOPS TO VIETNAM WAR
Labor fa i th fu ls
O)
4 ->
o>
CT)
UD
cn
CO
co
cn
Lib/CP -* Labor 
Switchers
Labor -> Lib/CP 
Switchers
Lib/CP fa i th fu ls
Some degree of No troop
troop commitment commitment
1
50.7 49.3
66.4 33.6
76.7 23.3
83.5 16.5
- - - - -  - - -  - ,
100%
(517)
100%
(152)
100%
(30)
100%
(648)
The opinions of both groups of switchers c learly  occupied the middle 
ground between the Liberal/Country Party fa i th fu ls ,  who predominantly 
favoured intervention in the war, and the Labor Party fa i th fu ls  who were 
evenly divided. This type of d is t r ibu t ion  was noti surprising,  as those who 
changed th e i r  votes between elect ions could be expected to be less 
polarised in th e i r  opinions on relevant issues than the consistent 
supporters of e i ther  side. If  Vietnam had been the decisive issue for all 
switchers, we would hypothesize that  none of those respondents who altered 
th e i r  votes would have continued to hold an opinion supported by the party 
from which they were defecting. This case would be unlikely to a r i s e ,  however, 
for a t  leas t  three reasons:
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(a) a ll those who switched would not have made their 
decision on the basis of the same issue;
(b) some of the party fa ith fu ls , even, had opinions 
which diverged from the ir parties' stances (e.g.,
50.7% of Labor Party fa ith fu ls  s t i l l  fe l t  that 
there should be some degree of Australian troop 
commitment in Vietnam);
(c) these figures did not take into account whether 
switchers correctly perceived the parties' policies 
on the issue.
The distribution of opinion outlined above did show that attitudes 
on the Vietnam war issue were associated with voting changes for at least 
some of the A.S.P. respondents, as those who swung to Labor in 1969 were 
clearly less interventionist overall than consistent Liberal/Country Party 
voters, and vice-versa. The causal factors underlying this association, 
however, remained unclear. The demographic variables of age and sex could 
be discounted on the basis of their fa ilu re , earlier in the chapter, to 
show any relationship to the likelihood of voting change. The education 
level of respondents, however, was positively related to the ir propensity 
to swing and also bore some relationship to opinions on Vietnam. As the 
association between educational background and Vietnam opinion was of a 
complex nature (see Chapter 5) which differed in direction for 1969 Liberal/ 
Country Party and Labor voters, higher levels of education amongst switchers 
could not in themselves be responsible for the total set of relationships 
observed here. Educational differences could have contributed to the 
particularly large swing to Labor recorded amongst those in favour of 
alternative C(the retention of c iv i l ia n  experts only in Vietnam), as 
this opinion increased in popularity with higher education.
The exact contribution of possible in fluentia l variables, such as 
education, could not be established with the small number of switchers 
present within the sample - and even with larger numbers, more sophisticated 
s ta t is t ica l techniques of causal path analysis would be required. At this 
stage i t  was only possible to d ifferentia te between those extraneous 
variables which may have affected the relationship between issue opinion and
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voting change and those variables, such as age and sex, whose contribution 
could be discounted. Party identification was also eliminated from 
consideration as an in fluentia l variable in this case, as controlling 
for party loyalties did not a lte r the less interventionist pattern of 
opinion amongst both sets of switchers despite the fact that some had 
retained loyalties which were inconsistent with the ir 1969 votes. Despite 
the possible contribution of other variables, the evidence of this 
chapter suggests that the issue of Australian intervention in Vietnam was 
a l ike ly  in fluentia l factor in the voting decisions of those who swung to 
Labor, in particular, at the 1969 elections. How this accorded with the 
re la tive ly  low salience of Vietnam amongst the general sample w il l  be 
investigated at a la te r stage.
Conscription was another issue on which the distribution of opinions
amongst both groups of switchers could be clearly distinguished from
those who continued to vote for the same party in 1969. The distinction
was most clearly observable when the question was collapsed into the two
alternative approaches of retaining conscription in some form or abolishing
i t  altogether. The most meaningful comparisons in Table 9.13, as with the
Vietnam war issue, were between the Liberal/Country Party Labor switchers
and the Liberal/Country Party fa ith fu ls , the former being rather less l ike ly
to favour any form of conscription than the la tte r ;  and between the Labor -*
Liberal/Country Party switchers and the ir counterparts who remained fa ith fu l
to Labor, the former being more favourably disposed towards conscription 
21than the la tte r .  The views of the small number of respondents who defected 
from the Labor Party in 1969 were, in fact, v ir tua lly  identical with the 
views of the consistent Liberal/Country Party supporters.
21. As the number of Labor -> Liberal/Country Party switchers with opinions 
on conscription was only 27, the percentages in this row of the table 
are l ike ly  to be unreliable.
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TABLE 9.13 1966/1969 VOTING CHANGE BY OPINION ON 
ABOLITION OF CONSCRIPTION
CD
+->
O
>
CTi
CO
CTi
co
co
CT>
Labor f a i t h f u l s
Lib/CP Labor 
Switchers
Labor -> Lib/CP 
Switchers
Lib/CP f a i t h f u l s
Some form Abolish
of  Conscr ipt ion Conscr ipt ion
68.4 31.6
86.1 13.9
92.6 7.4
91.3 8.7
100%
(513)
100%
(150)
100%
(27)
100%
(652)
Educat ional  d i f f e r ences  between swi tchers  and f a i t h f u l s  alone could 
not  account  fo r  the decreased popu l a r i t y  of  consc r ip t i on  amongst those 
who defected from the Libera l /Count ry  Par ty in 1969 as secondary 
educat ion was genera l l y  a ssoc i a t ed  with a drop in support  f o r  the a b o l i t i o n  
of  c onsc r i p t i on  amongst 1969 Labor voters  (see Chapter 5) .  Cont ro l l ing  
f o r  par ty  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n ,  too,  f a i l e d  to explain the d i f f e r ences  in the 
d i s t r i b u t i o n  of  opinions  in terms of  t h i s  va r i ab l e  alone.
S l i g h t  d i f f e r ences  of  opinion on the i ssue of  A u s t r a l i a ' s  r e l a t i o n s  
with the United S t a t e s  were recorded between those who swi tched t h e i r  votes 
and those who cont inued to suppor t  the same par ty  in 1969 (see Table 9 .14) .  
Although the percentage d i f f e r en c es  did appear to c o n s t i t u t e  a meaningful 
t r e n d ,  two q u a l i f i c a t i o n s  were necessary - f i r s t l y ,  the response ca t egor i e s  
of  "very c l o s e " > " f a i r l y  c lo se "  and "not very c lo se "  were not  p a r t i c u l a r l y  
meaningful in comparat ive terms;  and, secondly,  the three-way d i v i s i on  of  
responses produced a r e s u l t  which was l i k e l y  to have been highly un r e l i a b l e  
fo r  the  small number of  Labor -*■ Libera l /Count ry Par ty swi tchers  (30) .  With 
these  q u a l i f i c a t i o n s  in mind, the data showed t h a t  those respondents  who 
switched to Labor in 1969 were l e ss  l i k e l y  to favour a "very c lo se "  a l l i a n c e  
with the USA than the Libera l /Count ry  Par ty f a i t h f u l s ,  but  gene r a l l y  favoured
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a closer a l l iance than did the Labor stalwarts.  The small group of  Labor -* 
Liberal/Country switchers could be dist inguished, in turn, from these Labor 
fa i th fu ls  by th e i r  greater support fo r  a "v e ry  c lo s e "  al l iance.
TABLE 9.14 1966/1969 VOTING CHANGE BY OPINION 
ON THE U.S. ALLIANCE
Relations with USA
Not
Very Close Fa i r ly  Close Very Close
Labor fa i t h fu l s
Lib/CP -* Labor
Switchers
Labor -* Lib/CP
Switchers
Lib/CP fa i t h fu ls
As the e f fec t  o f  higher educational levels on a t t i tudes towards the 
United States was to increase the proportion of  respondents opting fo r  a 
" f a i r l y  c lo s e "  a l l iance ,  i t  was possible that the education variable 
accounted fo r  the greater populari ty  of  th is  a l te rna t ive  amongst those 
who switched to Labor in 1969. Those respondents who retained an 
id e n t i f i c a t io n  with the Liberal and Country part ies despite voting 
changes shared s im i la r  opinions to the Liberal/Country Party fa i t h fu ls  
on the US a l l iance,  but th is  was not the case amongst respondents who 
id e n t i f ie d  with Labor.
The opinions o f  those who switched th e i r  votes on the issue of 
Communist China d i f fe red quite markedly from those of respondents who 
continued to support the party of  th e i r  1966 choice (see Table 9.15). 
Greater optimism about Aus t ra l ia 's  re la t ions with Communist China was to 
be found amongst voters who swung away from the Liberal/Country Party 
coa l i t ion  in 1969; conversely, Labor-* Liberal/Country Party switchers 
were almost as pessimist ic as those fa i th fu l  to the government parties 
across the two elect ions.
36.6 48.6 14.8
38.2 56.5 5.3
46.7 40.0 13.3
54.9 40.6 4.5
100%
(513)
100%
(152)
100%
(30)
100%
(663)
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TABLE 9.15 1966/1969 VOTING CHANGE BY OPINION 
ON COMMUNIST CHINA
Labor f a i t h f u l s
Lib/CP -* Labor 
Switchers
Labor -+ Lib/CP 
Switchers
Lib/CP f a i t h f u l s
Communist China as a Problem fo r  A u s t ra l i a
100%
(445)
100%
(137)
100%
(26)
100%
(588)
Lot to
Worry About No Problem
46.7 53.3
53.3 46.7
69.2 30.8
71.3 28.7
The presence of a g r e a t e r  p ropor t ion  of  t e r t i a r y  educated respondents 
amongst the  swi tchers  may have been re sp o n s ib le  fo r  the  g r e a t e r  optimism 
of  those  who swung to Labor; but pa r ty  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  did not appear to 
have any e f f e c t  on the  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of opin ions .
The L ibera l /Country  Party  -> Labor swi tchers  were evenly divided 
in t h e i r  a t t i t u d e s  towards censorsh ip .  With 50% opposing any form of 
censorsh ip  a t  a l l ,  t h i s  group was more permissive in i t s  opinions than 
e i t h e r  group of par ty  f a i t h f u l s  (see Table 9 .16) .  Those who switched 
t h e i r  votes in the  oppos i te  d i r e c t io n  could not be d i f f e r e n t i a t e d  from 
the Labor f a i t h f u l s  on the  bas is  of t h e i r  opinions on t h i s  i s sue .
TABLE 9.16 1966/1969 VOTING CHANGE BY OPINION ON CENSORSHIP
Labor f a i t h f u l s
Lib/CP + Labor 
Switchers
Censorship
People to Read 
Some Censorship What they Like
51.1 48.9
50.0 50.0
66.4 33.6
100%
(519)
100%
(154)
100%
(657)Lib/CP f a i t h f u l s
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Education level clearly was not a contributing factor in this 
relationship between voting change and increased opposition to censorship. 
Earlier in the analysis i t  was demonstrated that the more highly educated 
respondents, who were present in greater numbers amongst the switchers 
than amongst the party faithfuls,  were increasingly in favour of some form 
of censorship - the reverse relationship to that outlined here. Shared 
feelings of party identification also failed to explain the differences 
in opinion distribution between those who swung to Labor and the remaining 
party faithfuls.
A comparison of attitudes towards Asian migration did not e l ic i t  
any meaningful differences between the four groups of voters when responses 
were divided amongst the five options offered in the questionnaire. However, 
when the response categories were reclassified into "some level o f  Asian 
migration" as opposed to "no Asian migration", clear differences of opinion 
became apparent (see Table 9.17). Labor party faithfuls emerged as the 
hard-liners, with their Liberal/Country Party counterparts being more 
favourably inclined towards the entry of Asians. A very large majority of 
those who swung towards Labor in 1969 was in favour of some Asian migration. 
This result renedered voting change in this direction virtually inexplicable 
in terms of the issue of Asian migration, as i t  was the only case where 
the views of switchers were more pronounced in a direction which was favoured 
by consistent supporters of the party from which they defected and was less 
popular amongst the faithfuls of the party to which they swung. The 
attitudes of the Labor -> Liberal/Country Party switchers were 
characterised by slightly greater liberality than was displayed by those 
who remained faithful to the Labor Party.
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TABLE 9.17 1966/1969 VOTING CHANGE BY OPINION ON
Labor f a i t h f u l s
Lib/CP -> Labor 
Switchers
Labor -> Lib/CP 
Switchers
Lib/CP f a i t h f u l s
On th i s  issue, i t  was possible th a t  the higher educat ional leve ls  
o f  respondents who switched t h e i r  votes to Labor were responsible f o r  
the d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  opinions amongst t h i s  group, ra ther  than tha t  the 
issue i t s e l f  inf luenced t h e i r  vot ing decis ions. Higher education was 
associated with more favourable a t t i tu d e s  towards Asian migrat ion and, 
as the views o f  these p a r t i c u la r  switchers did not re la te  l o g i c a l l y  to 
a move away from the government par t ies  and towards Labor, the evidence 
suggested th a t  some fa c to r  (or  fac to rs )  apart  from migrat ion caused the 
swing to Labor. As the observed d i f fe rences o f  opinion pers is ted when 
party  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  was co n t ro l le d ,  they could not be explained by the 
in te rven t io n  o f  th is  va r iab le .
To sum up, those who switched t h e i r  vot ing support from the govern­
ment pa r t ies  to Labor in 1969 were more l i k e l y  to favour a reduct ion in 
troop commitment to Vietnam and the l i b e r a l i s i n g  o f  conscr ip t ion ,  less 
l i k e l y  to want very close re la t io n s  with the US or to regard Communist 
China as a problem, more l i k e l y  to favour the a b o l i t i o n  of censorship, 
and more l i k e l y  to favour some Asian migrat ion than those who continued 
to vote L ibera l /Country  Party in 1969. On each o f  these issues except 
Asian m ig ra t ion ,  the sw itchers '  a t t i tu d e s  lay somewhere between those o f
ASIAN MIGRATION
ig ra t io n  o f  Asians to Aus t ra l ia
Some Asian 
Migrat ion
No Asians 
in A us t ra l ia
56.9 43.1
74.2 25.8
60.0 40.0
67.8 32.2
100%
(508)
100%
(151)
100%
(30)
100%
(643)
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the Labor and Liberal/Country Party fa i th fu ls .  The few who changed th e ir  
votes from Labor to Liberal/Country Party, on the other hand, were more l ik e ly  
to favour the commitment of troops in Vietnam and the continuation of 
conscrip tion, and more l i k e ly  to favour very close re la tions  with the US 
and to regard Communist China as a problem than consistent Labor supporters.
Concern over foreign investment in Austra lia  and the question o f State 
aid fo r non-government schools were the only issues which could be e l im in ­
ated, a t th is  stage, as possible determinants o f voting change in 1969.
Although Asian migration could not be completely discounted, i t  was un like ly  
to have had any independent influence on the swing and the opinion differences 
on the issue o f the US a ll iance  were too small to be meaningful. The censor­
ship issue could only have been in f lu e n t ia l  in the voting decision o f those 
who swung to Labor. The remaining issues - the Vietnam war, conscription and 
Communist China - seemed l i k e ly  to have had some bearing on decisions to 
switch votes in both d irec tions  between 1966 and 1969. Whether they influenced 
some or a l l  o f the switchers, in conjunction with other variables or 
independently, or whether the associations between opinion and voting change 
were e n t i re ly  spurious could not be proven at th is  stage of the analysis.
The in a b i l i t y  o f such variables as age, sex and education to explain the 
opinions o f those who switched th e ir  votes showed tha t socio-demographic 
variables alone were not responsible fo r  voting change. A lte ra tions in 
party id e n t i f ic a t io n  or inconsistencies between partisanship and 1969 vote 
also could not account fo r  the differences in opinion observed here. However, 
i t  would be wrong to discount the p o s s ib i l i ty  tha t some other fa c to r ,  perhaps 
an issue not id e n t i f ie d  in the A.S.P. questionnaire but re lated to the 
remaining issues, could have been of primary importance in the movement of 
votes between 1966 and 1969.
I t  would seem reasonable to concentrate the search fo r fu r the r 
explanatory factors amongst those issues which the voters themselves nominated 
as important problems. An analysis of the association between sa lien t
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problems and the l ike lihood  of voting change between 1966 and 1969 
revealed a number of issues which registered comparatively high percentage 
swings amongst those voters l i s t in g  the issues as important problems 
requ ir ing  Federal government action. Only one of these self-nominated 
issues, the Vietnam war, also appeared amongst the questionnaire items 
iso la ted so fa r  as possible contributors to voting change.
TABLE 9.18 ASSOCIATION BETWEEN 1969 SWING TO LABOR
AND SALIENT ISSUES
% o f 1966 Lib/CP 
voters who l is te d  
issue as "most 
im portant proFlem" 
and swung to Labor
in 1969 N
Housing 29.0 31
Health 25.0 48
Vietnam War 22.9 48
National Development 19.7 66
Pensions 19.2 104
Education 17.3 168
Defence 14.3 84
Table 9.18 l i s t s  the seven "most im portant problems" which were 
associated with the greatest gains fo r  Labor in 1969 amongst former L ibe ra l/  
Country Party voters. The issues which were most frequently nominated 
as important problems by the A.S.P. respondents as a whole, pensions and 
education, were not the most e f fe c t ive  predictors o f defections. Higher 
proportions o f the re la t iv e ly  few 1966 Liberal/Country Party voters fo r 
whom housing, health or the Vietnam war were sa lie n t ac tua lly  switched 
th e i r  support to Labor in 1969. I t  was unfortunate fo r  the r e l i a b i l i t y  
o f the swing estimates tha t the numbers nominating each o f these three 
issues as "most im portant" were so small.
The same problem was evident when the l inks  between sa lie n t  issues 
and the size o f the swing in the reverse d irec t ion  were examined:
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TABLE 9.19 ASSOCIATION BETWEEN 1969 SWING TO LIB/CP 
AND SALIENT ISSUES
7o of  1966 Labor 
voters  who l i s t e d  
i s sue  as "most 
important problem" 
and swung to Lib/
CP in 1969 N
Defence 9.4 32
Health 6.7 45
Housing 6.1 33
Pensions 5.3 114
Education 5.3 95
The combination of  low numbers nominating defence,  hea l t h  and housing as 
s a l i e n t  problems with the small s i ze  of  the swing to the Libera l /Count ry 
Par ty  c o a l i t i o n  meant t h a t  i t  was not  f e a s i b l e  to a l l o c a t e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  
for  the  movement of  votes  in t h i s  d i r e c t i o n  to any of  these  i s sues  in 
p a r t i c u l a r  - the vot ing changes recorded here could have been purely 
a c c i d e n t a l .  I t  was i n t e r e s t i n g ,  however, to compare the r e l a t i v e  c o n t r i b ­
ut ions  of  the i ssues  which appeared to be a s soc i a t ed  with t h i s  swing a ga i ns t  
those o f  the i s sues  which,  when s a l i e n t ,  e l i c i t e d  markedly high swings 
in the  oppos i t e  d i r e c t i o n .
The Vietnam war f i gur ed  s t rong ly  as a s a l i e n t  i s sue  in the swing 
towards Labor in 1969, but  did not  con t r i bu t e  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  to the small 
swing recorded in favour of  the  government p a r t i e s .  Conversely,  defence 
appeared to play a major ro l e  in the  l a t t e r  swing, but  ranked only seventh 
amongst the i s sues  l inked with the h ighes t  percentage swings to Labor.
These were qu i t e  p r ed i c t ab l e  r e l a t i o n s h i p s ,  given the r e spec t i ve  p a r t i e s '  
p o l i c i e s  and campaign b i a se s .
Less easy to expla in  was the s t rong a s s oc ia t i on  between giving 
p r i o r i t y  to hea l t h  or  housing and swi tching towards the Labor Par ty in 
1969, in view of  the appearance of  these  same two i s sues  in the l i s t  of  
s a l i e n t  problems l inked with vot ing change in the oppos i te  d i r e c t i o n .  The
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failure of the questionnaire to discriminate amongst respondents who held 
differing opinions on the problem they had nominated as important could 
help to account for this anomaly. Respondents giving priority to the 
problem of health, for example, could have been divided between a group 
wanting the introduction of a compulsory scheme of health insurance and 
tending to swing to Labor, and a group favouring the retention of private 
health insurance, some of whom switched to the government parties. Such 
an explanation assumes, however, a meaningful relationship between issue 
salience and voting change which may not have been warranted in the case of 
the very few respondents whose nomination of health or housing as important 
problems coincided with a switch from Labor to the Liberal/Country Party 
coalition in 1969.
The comparatively low ranking of pensions and education in the analysis 
of the swing to Labor demonstrated that issues which aroused widespread 
concern throughout the electorate were not necessarily those most closely 
linked with voting change. Concern with housing, health or even the 
Vietnam war was a more potent indication that a respondent would transfer 
his voting support from the government parties to the opposition in 1969 than 
was a concern with either education or pensions. This point would not be 
reflected in the raw data, as pro-Labor switchers for whom education or 
pensions were salient would have outnumbered others in the swing to Labor.
For those interested in an electoral outcome, the spread of concern with 
an issue, or issues, amongst the voting population would continue to be of 
prime importance. The emphasis in this study on causal relationships, 
however, necessitated that a distinction be made between an issue's contri­
bution to a voting swing as a result of variation in,
(i) the numbers of voters for whom the issues was 
important - salience;
(ii) the percentage of (i) who switched their votes - 
potency of an issue for voting change.
On the basis of this distinction, education and pensions were highly salient
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issues amongst the members of the A.S.P. sample. The respondents concerned 
with these issues, however, did not switch their votes in either direction 
at the 1969 election with any markedly greater frequency than did the 
sample as a whole. The most potent issues for voting change were housing, 
health and the Vietnam war in relation to the pro-Labor swing, and defence 
in relation to the swing towards the government parties.
The finding that those issues which aroused the most widespread 
concern within the A.S.P. sample were not necessarily the best predictors 
of voting change confirmed the reservations expressed in Chapter 8 concerning 
any assumption that a salient issue would necessarily influence voting 
behaviour by virtue of its  importance to the electors alone. On an 
individual level, the commonsense proposition that an issue must bear some 
importance to a voter i f  i t  is to influence his voting decision was valid.
I t  could not be assumed, however, that issues nominated as important by 
equal segments of the sample bore an equal potential to influence votes. 
Although some level of salience was a pre-condition for issue voting, i t  
did not follow that the most salient issues had the strongest connection 
with voting swings. The intervention of some other factors besides the 
perceived importance of the issues themselves must have accounted for the 
difference in the percentage swings recorded. Although the perception of 
an issue as important might have provided the motivation  for voting change, 
other conditions would need to have been fulfi l led in order for a swing 
to occur.
Three additional conditions were necessary for voting change to 
have been prompted by concern for an issue:
(a) the presence of an opinion (preferably held with 
some intensity) on the issue concerned;
(b) the perception that a different party from the one 
previously voted for would be most likely to init iate 
action in accordance with the voter's opinion on the 
issue;
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(c) the possession of a party loyalty which was not so 
strongly felt  as to outweigh (a) and (b).
Unfortunately, the only information obtainable from the questionnaire on 
the application of these three conditions to the issues commonly nominated 
as important problems was in relation to the Vietnam war (see previous chap­
ter) .  As a result , i t  was impossible to say why the two most salient issues 
within the sample, education and pensions, were not good predictors of 
voting change, whilst health and housing, which ranked respectively sixth 
and eighth in the l i s t  of "most important problems", were each associated 
with large percentage swings towards the Labor Party.
The available evidence on the Vietnam war issue did indicate that 
the above conditions were likely to have been fulfi l led for a proportion 
of those respondents who regarded the war as the most important problem 
necessitating Federal government action. Analysis undertaken in the 
previous chapter showed that the views of those for whom Vietnam was 
salient were skewed towards the reduction of Australia's troop commitment, 
although their opinions were not necessarily held with any greater 
intensity than those of the rest of the sample. Most of the respondents 
concerned identified the Labor Party as the party most likely to take 
appropriate action on the problem. The widespread knowledge recorded 
within the sample about the major parties' stances towards Vietnam made 
i t  highly likely that most of the 22.9% of 1966 Liberal/Country Party voters 
concerned about the war who switched their votes to Labor in 1969 had 
perceived that the la t te r  party would do what they wanted on the issue.
The ties exerted by party loyalty, also, were likely to have been at a 
minimum within this group owing to the relatively high representation of 
non-identifiers amongst those for whom Vietnam was salient. As non­
identifiers were found to be the most susceptible of all respondents to 
voting change between 1966 and 1969, this constituted further evidence that 
concern with the Vietnam war had prompted a number of the changes in party
278
support recorded at the 1969 election.
Unfortunately, the status of this evidence linking Vietnam, as a 
salient issue, to voting change had to remain at the level of inference, 
based on the analysis of the data carried out up to this point. When an 
attempt was made to test  the validity of the points made here by isolating 
from the sample those respondents who had expressed concern about the war 
and had switched their votes, the size of the group turned out to be far 
too small for reliable analysis.
The small size of any group of voters within the total electorate
who could be expected to have changed their vote on the basis of a single
policy issue has constituted a severe handicap to any researcher attempting
to assess the role of issues in voting behaviour. In comparison with party
identification, which has proved the best predictor of voting so far, the
amount of change in voting behaviour between elections attributable to the
influence of a single issue has rarely proved large enough to register in
s ta tis t ica l  analyses of variance. As a result , some researchers have
experimented with using scales of issue partisanship which score respondents'
22opinions on a multiplicity of issues, on the assumption that some voters 
are oriented more towards policy issues p er se  than other voters.
From the outset, the emphasis of the present study has been on the 
contribution of in d iv id u a l  issues to the 1969 election campaign and to 
voting decisions made at, or before, the Federal election. Using simple 
bivariate tables, i t  has not been possible to draw any finite conclusions as 
to the degree of influence exerted by any one issue. From the analysis so 
far, i t  can be inferred with reasonable confidence that the Vietnam war 
was the issue which would have exerted the most powerful pressures towards 
voting change, bu t only over a very sm all p ro p o rtio n  o f  the to ta l  A .S .P . 
sample. Three other issues - Communist China, conscription and censorship -
22. "Issue p a r tisa n sh ip "  scales were used by RePass, o p .a i t .
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were associated with voting changes in ways which could not be accounted
for by the influence of party identification or other variables such as
age, sex, education and interest in politics. As these issues did not
23rate independent mention as salient problems, i t  was possible that 
they did not init iate voting swings but were merely associated with 
movements in the vote through their linkage with some other influential 
issue, such as Vietnam. There were other issues - health, housing and 
defence - which recorded higher than usual percentage swings amongst 
those respondents who perceived them to be important problems, but these 
had to be excluded from further analysis as there was no provision for them 
in the questionnaire design. Keeping in mind that some issues of signi­
ficance for voting change may have been ommitted in this fashion, the 
next step in analysing the data was to carry out a more complex multi­
variate procedure of statis t ical  analysis which was capable of arranging a 
number of variables in sequence, according to their relative contributions 
to the vote.
23. This was not completely true, as conscription was listed as the 
"most im portan t problem" by 31 respondents. The number of these 
respondents who also switched their vote in 1969 was likely to be 
so small, however, that the association could not be attributed to 
anything more than accident.
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CHAPTER 10
A MULTI-VARIATE ANALYSIS
To this point, the linkages between issue opinions and voting behaviour 
in 1969 have been studied through an exhaustive process of crosstabulating 
two single variables (usually an issue with 1969 vote) in order to observe 
the associations within each set of variables. Composite variables, such 
as 1966-1969 vote, have been constructed where necessary and controls have 
been applied to counteract the influence of such additional variables as 
party idenfitication and socio-demographic factors. However, with simple 
cross-tabulation i t  has only been possible to control for the influence 
of one or two additional variables at a time and the intercorrelation 
existing between the d ifferent issues have largely had to be ignored.
Despite these lim itations, a large body of information has been compiled 
about Australian voters' attitudes towards policy issues, their 
perceptions of party differences and the ir own issue p r io r it ie s ,  in relation 
to their party loyalties and to their actual voting behaviour. The analysis 
led, in the preceding chapter, to the formulation of a hypothesis that 
four of the ASP issue items, in particular, were associated with the swing 
to Labor recorded at the 1969 election.
To be of more than passing value, however, the findings so far need 
to be incorporated within a theory of the dynamics of voting behaviour in 
a 1iberal-democratic po lity . Construction of such a theory for Australia 
would require a comparison of the relative influence of d ifferent variables 
on voters which is beyond the scope of simple bivariate analysis. We need 
to be able to compare the re lative contributions of the different issues 
and of such additional factors as party identification to voting decisions 
in 1969.
S tatis tica l techniques have been developed which allow the simultan­
eous analysis of relationships between a series of variables and a single 
dependent variable. The complexity of the s ta t is t ica l operations involved
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ensures that th is  type of analysis is almost always performed with the aid
of a computer. One such program which is p a r t i c u la r ly  suited to the ASP
data is the University of Michigan's Automatic In teract ion Detector (AID).1 2
This program analyses the re la t ive  effect iveness of a m u l t ip l i c i t y  of
variables in predict ing the value of  a dependent variable with allowances
fo r  in teract ion effects and fo r  in te rco r re la t ions  amongst the explanatory
variables. I t  can be used with nominal data, where variables are expressed
in the form of c la ss i f ica t io ns ,  rather than being continuous.
Because the nominal nature of the ASP data was known, the presence of
in te rcor re la t ions  amongst the issues had been establ ished and in te ract ion
2
effects  were also suspected, AID was chosen as a sui table program fo r  
mu l t i -va r ia te  analysis of  the ASP respondents' opinions on the issue items 
in re la t ion  to th e i r  1969 vote. Although th is  technique could not be used 
to predic t the l ike l ihood of changes in voting behaviour between 1966 and 
1969, i t  could be used to test the hypothesis that opinions on the 
Vietnam war, conscr ipt ion,  Communist China and censorship were more e f fec t ive  
as predictors of 1969 vote than a t t i tudes towards any of  the other issues 
in the ASP survey. More prec isely,  i t  could be expected to discriminate 
amongst these four issues, arranging them in order of th e i r  effect iveness 
in explaining the respondents' 1969 votes.
As described by i t s  designers, the program "employs a non-symmetrical 
branching process3 based on variance analysis techniquess to sub-divide 
the sample into a series of sub-groups which maximize one 's ability to
1. See J.A. Sonquist and J.N. Morgan, The Detection of In teract ion Effects 
(Ann Arbor, Mich., 1964) fo r  a descript ion of  the AID program and the 
reasons fo r  i t s  development.
2. A possible example of an in teract ion e f fe c t  operating amongst the 
d i f fe re n t  variables in the ASP data would be that opposition to conscripts 
f ig h t in g  in Vietnam might prompt a Labor vote amongst respondents with
no feel ings of party i d e n t i f i c a t io n ,  but would s t i l l  be associated with 
a Lib/CP vote amongst those who id e n t i f ie d  strongly with the government. 
See Appendix J in Sonquist and Morgan, op.cit., fo r  a discussion of 
in teract ion ef fec ts .
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3p r e d ic t  va lu es  o f  th e  dependent v a r ia b le " . Instead of asking the question, 
"What i s  the  e f f e c t  o f  x  on y when e ve ry th in g  e ls e  i s  h e ld  c o n s ta n t? " , which 
has been implicit in the type of analysis performed so far in this study, 
Sonquist and Morgan have based their approach on a different question -
"What do I  need to  know most in  order to  reduce p r e d ic t iv e  e rro r  a maximum
4
amount?" . Using analysis of variance techniques, the program sequentially 
spli ts  the sample in a binary fashion, so that at each step in the procedure 
the means of the two sub-groups chosen in the spli t  account for more of 
the total sum of squares than the means of any other combination of sub-
5
groups. The computer output takes the form of an asymmetrical tree, with 
each branch accounting for more of the variance in the dependent variable 
than the following branch.
It could not be expected that a l l ,  or even most of the ASP issue items 
would appear in the AID output as effective predictors of respondents'
1969 vote. Restraints have been written into the program to ensure that 
the sample will not sp l i t  on variables which do not describe a minimum 
proportion of the variance, nor will i t  spli t  into groups where the numbers 
of observations are so small that the sp l i t  may have been influenced by 
sampling error.
The spli tting process employed in the program was suitable for 
predictor variables which were of a nominal or ordinal nature. However, 
the dependent variable needed to be in the form of an interval scale, 
if  the program was to produce sub-groups whose means could easily be 
identified as representing high or low values of the dependent variable.
For this reason, the data on 1969 vote was converted into binary form with 
a Labor vote being recorded as 1 and a vote for any other party as 0. The 
resultant AID analysis, using 1969 Labor vote as the dependent variable and 
the eight issue items, unchanged, as predictors, sp l i t  the sample into a
3. Sonquist and Morgan, o p . c i t .,  p.l.
4. i b i d . ,  p.iv.
5. i b id . ,  p.4.
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series of sub-groups whose means represented percentages of the 1969 Labor 
vote. The decision to employ the Labor versus non-Labor form was made as 
a result of preliminary AID analyses which demonstrated that Liberal and 
Country Party votes could not be combined into a composite dependent variable 
as each was explained by a different set of predictors. Although the 
combined form had been used earl ier  in the study, for the reasons outlined 
in Chapter 2, the emphasis where possible had been on explaining votes 
cast for the Labor Party, rather than for the government parties. I t  was 
decided, therefore, to conduct the multivariate analysis of 1969 voting 
behaviour on the basis of isolating those issues which best explained a 
decision to vote for the Labor Party.
Figure 10.1 shows the results of the f i r s t  AID analysis. The 
Vietnam war was clearly the issue which most effectively discriminated 
between those respondents who supported Labor and those who voted for 
other parties. Conscription and Communist China also explained some of 
the Labor vote, but no other issues were sufficiently significant as 
predictors to appear in the analysis.
The tree was of a pronounced asymmetrical shape, with respondents 
who felt  that troops, including conscripts, should continue to fight in 
Vietnam (A) recording such a low percentage Labor vote (Y = 16.3%) that 
the group could not be sp l i t  on any other predictor variables. The sample 
spli t  twice on Vietnam, with opinions on the two issues of conscription and 
Communist China explaining a significant amount of the variance in the Labor 
vote amongst those who thought, respectively, that volunteer troops should 
be retained in Vietnam (B), and that all troops should be withdrawn (C,D).
The Labor vote for the entire sample was 43.9% (N=1873). Amongst 
those holding opinion (A) on Vietnam (and, incidentally, the few respondents 
who answered "don't know") i t  was 16.3% (N=491), whereas those holding all 
other views on the same issue recorded a Labor vote of 53.8% (N=1382). This 
particular sp l i t  amongst the options provided on the Vietnam issue was the
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most effective predictor of whether a respondent would support the Labor 
Party at the 1969 election. Subsequently, the program s p lit  those holding 
opinions (B,C,D) into two groups - the most lik e ly  to vote Labor being 
respondents who favoured the complete withdrawal of troops (C,D) (Y = 64.7% 
Labor; N=569); and the least lik e ly  to vote Labor being those who supported 
the retention of volunteer troops in the war (B) (Y = 46.1% Labor; N=813).
The most effective predictor of a Labor vote in 1969 amongst the la tte r  
group of respondents was the view that Communist China did not constitute 
a future problem for Australia. Those wanting the retention of volunteer 
troops in Vietnam were s p lit  on the issue of Communist China into a group 
feeling that China would not be a problem (Y = 54.0% Labor; N=348) and a 
group believing that China would give Australia a lo t to worry about in the 
future (Y = 40.2%; N=465).
Amongst respondents who wanted a complete withdrawal from Vietnam, 
the AID program s p lit  on opinions towards conscription. The view that 
conscription should be abolished explained a greater proportion of the 
Labor vote (Y = 77.2%; N=184) than a ll other attitudes which supported some 
form of national service (Y = 58.7%; N=385).
As a general statement, i t  could be said that respondents who wanted 
the withdrawal of troops from Vietnam, in addition to the abolition of 
conscription were the most lik e ly  of a ll to vote for the Labor party in 
1969 - 77.2% of them, in fact, voted Labor. The general hypothesis that 
opinions on the Vietnam war, conscription, Communist China and censorship 
would be the most effective items for predicting voting behaviour in 1969 
was confirmed for the f i r s t  three issues, but not with regard to censorship.
To put the results of th is AID analysis into perspective, i t  needs 
to be noted that many other variables could have been included as possible 
predictors of voting behaviour at the 1969 election. Those which immediately 
spring to mind are the socio-demographic variables of education, occupation, 
age and sex, which have been u tilise d  at ea rlie r points in this study, and
the measure of voters' attitudes towards the political parties which is 
commonly represented by party identification.
Although education, occupation, age and sex displayed some relation­
ships with 1969 vote in the simple cross-tabulations performed earlier in 
the study, I would suggest that the relationships were not sufficiently 
strong for any of these variables to register in an AID analysis of the 
Labor vote. Once the focus of research has moved from investigating one- 
to-one relationships to that of multi-variate analysis, socio-demographic 
variables as separate measures are likely to be of l i t t l e  u t i l i ty  in 
explaining voting behaviour. The dynamics of a voting decision would be 
almost impossible to conceptualise in terms of individual variables such 
as age, sex, etc . '6 7 For this reason, measureswhich attempt to summarise 
the influence on voters' attitudes of a wide range of variables are more 
commonly used in analysing the influence paths leading up to a voting decision.
Although not i t s e l f  a composite variable, party identification is a 
construct which purports to measure voters' attitudes towards the political 
parties which have themselves been shaped by a whole host of variables.
Numerous researchers in Australia and overseas have hypothesised that i t  
plays the role of an intervening variable, f i l tering the voters' perceptions
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6. Educational level may well be a variable which constitutes an exception 
to this hypothesis. In their analysis of the 1972 U.S. Presidential 
election, A.H.Miller and his colleagues at the University of Michigan 
Survey Research Centre found that education played a role in deter­
mining whether issue attitudes or candidate preferences were used as 
bases for voting choices. They observed, " I t  i s  apparen tly  fa r  
e a s ie r  fo r  c o lle g e  educated  in d iv id u a ls  to  d i r e c t ly  tr a n s la te  is su e  
a t t i tu d e s  in to  a vo te  d e c is io n  than fo r  th e  r e la t i v e ly  le s s  w e ll  
educated who use the candidate  as an in te r v e n in g  focus fo r  th e ir  
id eo lo g y" . A.H. Miller, e t  a l . 3 o p . c i t p . 71 .
7. The difficulty in conceptualising the contribution of individual 
variables to voting decisions may be applicable to issues just as 
much as to socio-demographic variables (see concluding comments to 
this chapter), but the former have been included in the AID analysis 
as separate entit ies because they constitute the focus of this thesis.
287
g
of the outside world. I f  so, i t  is l ike ly  to be a highly effective 
predictor of voting behaviour and i t  would be a mistake to conclude the 
multi-variate analysis without assessing its  contribution, in relation to 
those of the issues already studied.
A further AID analysis was therefore performed, with the inclusion 
of party identification as a predictor variable. I t  was expected that 
the sample would s p l i t  f i r s t  on party iden tif ica tion , and that this variable 
alone would explain most of the variance in 1969 vote. This expectation 
was fu l f i l le d  by the results, with the sample s p l i t t in g  twice on 
respondents' party iden tif ica tion , before the Vietnam war issue appeared 
in the analysis. No other issue was capable of explaining any further 
variance in the dependent variable.
The tree produced as a result of the second AID analysis is set out 
in Figure 10.2. At the f i r s t  stage, the sample was s p l i t  into two groups 
of re la tive ly  even numbers. One contained Labor party supporters, those 
who identified with other, small parties, and independents, of whom 80.4% 
voted for the A.L.P. in 1969 (N=936). The second group comprised a ll other 
categories of identifiers  (Liberal, Country Party, DLP), in addition to 
those who refused to answer the question, and recorded a Labor vote of 
only 7.5% (N=937). A further s p l i t  separated the Labor identif ie rs  (Y = 88.9% 
Labor; N=739) from those respondents who supported one of the minor parties 
and the independents (Y = 48.7% Labor; N=197).
The possession of a particular party loyalty explained so much of the 
variance in 1969 vote that neither of the two remaining groups of major 
party identifie rs  could be s p l i t  on any of the issue items included in the 
analysis. Sufficient variance in the voting behaviour of independents 
(including a small number of respondents who had identified with one of 
the minor po li t ica l parties) was, however, explained by the Vietnam war
8. See Chapter 6.
N=4
1
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issue for this group to be spli t  into those who wanted to retain troops, 
including conscripts, in the war (Y = 22.0% Labor; N=41) and those who 
were against the involvement of conscripts, or wanted all Australian troops 
withdrawn (Y = 55.8% Labor; N=156).
The analysis clearly showed that the best predictor of a Labor vote
in 1969 was the knowledge that a respondent identified with the Labor party
regardless of his opinions on the eight policy issues. 88.9% of Labor
identifiers voted for the A.L.P. in 1969, whereas only 55.8% of the group
of independents and minor party identifiers who opposed government policy
on Vietnam actually voted for Labor. The results upheld the earl ier finding
that the Vietnam war was the most effective of all the issue items in
gexplaining 1969 vote, whilst placing the contribution of issues to voting 
behaviour in a more real is t ic  perspective in relation to party identification. 
The overwhelming significance of party identification in this analysis 
corresponds with previous American research findings that the party 
identification variable "blocks ou t"  the possible contributions of any 
other variables to voting decisions because of its enormous predictive 
capacity.^  For this reason, i t  has proved extremely difficult  to identify 
the role played by issues in the voting process i f  the voters concerned are 
known to possess standing party loyalties. The Vietnam war was the only one 
of the eight issue items included in this study which could be shown, on 
the basis of quantitative tests ,  to have played a part in voting decisions in
9. Regardless of there being any other issue which explained a significant 
degree of variance in 1969 vote after the contribution of party ident­
ification and the Vietnam war had been taken into account, the group
of "independent"  or "other  p a r ty "  identifiers in favour of keeping 
troops, including conscripts, in Vietnam was of too small a size to be 
spli t  any further (see Figure 10.2 - N=41). The minimum size sub-group 
allowable under the constraints of the program was 25.
10. See Campbell, e t  aZ-.^The American Voter; Goldberg, "Social Determinism 
and Rationality as Bases of Party Identification"; Converse, e t  a l .  3 
"Continuity and Change in American Politics"; Boyd, o p . c i t . ;  Miller, 
e t  a l . 3 o p . c i t . ; Pomper, o p .c i t .
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1969 in addition to that played by party identification.
The diagrammatic presentation of the two AID analyses in Figures 
10.1 and 10.2 shows that the data included cases where respondents had 
failed to give an opinion on the particular issue and/or had not volunteered 
a description of their partisan affil ia tion. Likewise, the calculation of 
percentage Labor vote for the dependent variable included respondents who 
had failed to vote in the 1969 elections or who refused to divulge their 
vote. For ease of explanation, these cases were not always mentioned in 
the verbal description of the analyses. Their inclusion in the data 
analysed by the AID program was not s tr ic t ly  in keeping with the objectives 
for performing the multi-variate analysis and their presence did introduce 
unnecessary complications to the explanation of the output.
It was, therefore, decided to re-run the two analyses excluding cases 
of no answer, "don't know" and "didn't vote" from the program by classifying 
them as missing data. As the party identification variable in its  original 
form was also not consistent with the form of the dependent variable (per­
centage Labor vote in 1969), i t  was recoded to form three categories:
Labor, non-Labor and independent. Liberal, Country Party, DLP and other 
minor party identifiers were thus included within a single category. 
Unfortunately, the AID program did not allow the nomination of specific 
missing data cases for each predictor variable, so a respondent was 
eliminated completely from the analysis i f  he had failed to answer any one 
of the questions on 1969 vote, party identification or the eight issues.
The number of cases available for analysis by the program was thus reduced 
from the total sample of 1,873 respondents to only 834 cases.
The breakdown trees which resulted from the two re-runs of the program 
are reproduced in Figures 10.3 and 10.4. The elimination of missing data 
cases resulted in a t id ier  form of output which bore a closer logical r e la t ­
ionship to the dependent variable, 1969 Labor vote. The number of respondents 
involved was substantially reduced, however, and the form of the trees slightly
altered.
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The significant predictor variables of party identification, the
Vietnam war, conscription and Communist China remained the same as in the
original analyses, and their order of importance in explaining the
dependent variable was unchanged. The changes which did occur served to
demonstrate, however, that too much reliance should not be placed on the
2absolute levels of r recorded for each predictor variable, which determines 
the particular sequence in which the AID program spli ts the sample.
With missing data cases eliminated, the analysis using the eight issues as 
predictors spl i t  only onceon opinions towards the Vietnam war, and the 
issue of conscription appeared in the breakdown prior to that of Communist 
China (see Figure 10.3). Very l i t t l e  alteration in the meaning of the 
analysis was conveyed by these changes. A change of greater significance 
was apparent when party identification was included as a predictor - with 
fewer cases, and party identification recoded, the Vietnam war was used by 
the program to explain further variance in the 1969 vote of Labor party 
identifiers,  rather than of independents (see Figure 10.4). The over­
whelming abili ty of an identification with one of the major parties to 
predict voting behaviour in 1969, to the exclusion of all issue opinions, 
in the original analysis, was not replicated in the re-run of the program. 
This modification in the AID output demonstrated that the abili ty of an 
issue, such as Vietnam, to explain further variance in voting behaviour 
after the influence of party identification had already been accounted for, 
should not be dismissed, despite the apparently overwhelming significance of 
party identification as a predictor.
The AID program proved particularly suitable for an init ial  multi­
variate analysis of the ASP data because of i ts abili ty to choose the pre­
dictor variables on which to spl i t  the sample, and the order of the spl i t ,  
in addition to combining values of each predictor variable into different 
sub-groups to achieve the maximum explanation of variance which could be 
contributed by each predictor. Thus, for each run of the program, the most
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effective s p lit  on the Vietnam issue was found to be between those wanting 
the retention of a ll troops, including conscripts, in the war and those 
wanting some form of reduction in troop commitment; and, fo r conscription, 
the most f ru it fu l d ivision was to s p lit  between those who wanted some form 
of conscription and those who favoured i t s  abolition. In order to fu lly  
investigate the differences in percentage Labor vote in 1969 for each value 
of each predictor variable (or each of the d iffe ren t opinions included in 
the issue items), i t  was necessary to employ another form of hierarchical 
analysis which would s p lit  the sample on every variable in an order deter­
mined by the researcher. The Breakdown program provided in the S ta tis tica l 
Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) was used to perform th is analysis
of 1969 Labor vote with party id en tifica tio n , Vietnam, conscription and
12Communist China as predictor variables, in that order. The result was 
a symmetrical tree which gave the percentage Labor vote recorded for each 
of the successive combinations of iden tifica tion  and opinions, represented 
by d iffe ren t branches of the tree. The tree its e l f  incorporated a massive 
amount of information, parts of which were converted into tabular form for 
explanation in the following pages.
11. Nie, et  d l . ,  op.e i t .  Unfortunately, the Breakdown option in th is program 
did not allow for interaction effects, but i t  was used to analyse the 
ASP data in the absence of any sim ilar program which did make this 
allowance.
12. Vietnam, conscription and Communist China were the only three issues 
which could feasibly be included in the Breakdown analysis, as the 
remaining issues had not been chosen for s p lit t in g  in the AID analysis 
which used the 8 issues as the predictor variables. Their absence 
from the AID analysis meant that they could not be expected to add any 
further explanation of 1969 vote to the Breakdown tree which was forced 
to s p lit  on each value of each predictor variable. Two runs were act­
ually performed using the Breakdown program. On the second run, opinions 
on the two issues of Vietnam and conscription were recoded as follows: 
Vietnam war - alternatives A and B retained, but C and D combined toget­
her; conscription - alternatives A, B and C combined, with D retained 
separately. This re-coding, which was log ica lly  meaningful, was 
valuable in providing larger numbers for each of the sub-groups in the 
Breakdown tree.
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The Breakdown program was also used to perform a series of variance
analyses to ascertain the re la t ive  levels of variance in the 1969 vote
which could be accounted for by each of the issue items and by party
2
iden t i f ica t ion .  Table 10.1 presents the r ra t ios  for these variables 
without, at this  stage, controlling for in te rcorre la t ion  effects :
TABLE 10.1 ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE IN 1969 VOTE FOR 
PARTY IDENTIFICATION AND 8 ISSUES
F df
S ig n i f i - 
cance 
level 2r
% of 
variance
Party ident i f ica t ion  913.3 3 p .001 .598 59.8
Vietnam war 147.4 2 p .01 .140 14.0
Conscription 90.9 1 NS .047 4.7
Communist China 81.0 1 NS .047 4.7
U.S. relations 28.7 2 NS .030 3.0
Censorship 33.4 1 NS .018 1.8
Migration 5.9 4 NS .013 1.3
Foreign investment 4.8 2 NS .005 0.5
State aid - 3 - - -
Too much reliance should not be placed on the absolute levels of variance
included in the table ,  as; no attempt was made to control for the influence
of other variables. For th is  reason, the actual percentages are l ike ly  to
represent infla ted estimates of the amounts of variance in 1969 vote
a t t r ibu tab le  to each individual issue item. Viewing the percentages in
re la t ive  terms, however, the table does show that the Vietnam war accounted
for considerably more of the variation in voting behaviour than did any of
the other issues. The AID program's decision to s p l i t  between those 
respondents favouring the retention of volunteer troops in Vietnam and those 
wishing to withdraw all  troops, rather than on opinions towards conscription 
or Communist China, c lear ly  was not a choice amongst items whose contributions
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to the variance only differed because of errors in the sample.
As the percentages, i f  anything, overestimated the levels of variance
explained by the issue items, there was l i t t l e  point in proceeding to
refine the data for any item apart from Vietnam. As attitudes on the
Vietnam war were correlated with the direction of party loyalty (Cramer's
V=+.22, see Chapter 6), i t  was hypothesised that much of the 14.0% of
variance in 1969 vote attributed to the issue in the above table would
disappear when the analysis of variance was controlled for the contribution
of party identification. A two-stage analysis was necessary to test this
2hypothesis. Firstly, r was computed for Vietnam using the residuals 
from the mean values of 1969 vote associated with each value of party 
identification:
TABLE 10.2 VARIANCE IN 1969 VOTE EXPLAINED BY VIETNAM
OPINIONS (STAGE 1)
Source SS df MS r  LF r
Vietnam 4.1 2 2.0 21.2 .023
Error 172.8 1803 0.1
Total 176.9 1805
2Multiplying the r ratio of .023 by the residual remaining after party 
identification had explained 59.8% of the variance in 1969 vote (Residual 
= 1-.598 = .402) resulted in an r^ ratio of .009. Only 0.9% of the variance 
in 1969 vote was directly accounted for by the Vietnam war after the variance 
attributable to party identification had been explained. The full analysis 
of variance for both party identification and Vietnam is summarised in
Table 10.3
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TABLE 10..3 VARIANCE IN 1969 VOTE EXPLAINED BY VIETNAM OPINIONS
(STAGE 2 PARTY IDENTIFICATION CONTROLLED)
Source SS df MS F
2 % of
r variance
Party id e n ti­
fica tion 269.0 3 89.7 934.0 .598 59.8
Vietnam 4.1 2 2.0 21.2 .009 0.9
Error 172.8 1800 0.1
Total 445.9 1805
Controlling for party iden tifica tion  alone resulted in such a 
large reduction in the percentage of the variance in 1969 vote which could 
be explained by opinions on the Vietnam war, that i t  would have been a 
fru itle ss  exercise to perform a sim ilar two-stage analysis of variance 
with party iden tifica tion  and any of the other seven issues. The small 
amounts of variance attributed to conscription, Communist China, and U.S. 
relations in the in it ia l  analysis of variance would have vanished entire ly 
under such conditions.
The in a b ility  of the Vietnam war to add anything more than a further
0.9% of the variance in 1969 vote to that already explained by party
iden tifica tion  corresponded with the results of a comparable piece of
American research, which studied the contribution of Vietnam to the 1968
presidential election resu lt. Using a linear regression procedure, which
controlled fo r party id en tifica tio n , Page and Brody found that Vietnam
opinions alone accounted for only between one and two percent of the variation
13in voting behaviour. They suggested that the low impact of the issue on 
voting decisions in 1968 was due to the electorate's in a b ility  to perceive
13. Page and Brody, o p . c i t .> p.982. As Page and Brody used a d iffe ren t 
technique to estimate the variance in 1969 vote explained by the 
Vietnam war, comparisons between the ir findings and mine cannot be 
taken beyond the general observation that the percentage variance was 
approximately the same in each case.
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differences between the stances o f the two main contestants, Nixon and 
Humphrey, towards the war. Their reasoning was c le a r ly  not applicable 
to the Austra lian e lection a year la te r ,  as i t  has already been shown 
tha t voters included in the ASP survey perceived the differences between 
government and opposition po lic ies  on Vietnam with a high degree of 
accuracy (see Chapter 7). I t  has been pointed out, however, that concern 
with the issue was not nearly so widespread amongst Austra lian voters 
in 1969 as i t  had been amongst the American voters studied by Page and 
Brody (see Chapter 8).
Although the analyses performed here have not described the causal 
processes involved in voting behav iour^, the enormous explanatory power 
o f party id e n t i f ic a t io n  did suggest that the variable played a mediating 
ro le between the impact o f p o l i t ic a l  events on voters and th e ir  ultimate 
decisions at the po lls . This did not mean that po licy  issues had no 
in d ire c t  influence on voting decisions, but only tha t such influence would 
be e x tra o rd in a r i ly  d i f f i c u l t  to measure. The resu lts  o f th is  chapter 
have shown tha t,  where voters were not bound by any feelings o f party 
id e n t i f ic a t io n ,  th e i r  opinions on the Vietnam war issue were re lated to 
the way they voted. According to the second AID analysis (see Figure 10.2), 
7.5% of the variance in 1969 vote amongst independents could be explained 
by th e i r  a tt itudes  towards Vietnam. Table 10.4, extracted from the SPSS 
Breakdown tree , shows differences in the percentage Labor vote according to 
Vietnam opinion fo r  those with no party id e n t i f ic a t io n ,  as well as fo r  those 
who id e n t i f ie d  with one or other o f the p o l i t ic a l  part ies.
14. S ta t is t ic a l  techniques do e x is t fo r  erecting causal models o f voting 
behaviour. See Goldberg, "Discerning a Causal Pattern among Data on 
Voting Behaviour" and Just, op .o i t .
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TABLE 10.4 PERCENTAGE LABOR VOTE IN 1969 BY PARTY 
IDENTIFICATION AND VIETNAM OPINION 15
PARTY IDENTIFICATION
(A) Troops, in c lu d in g  
cons c r ip ts  in  
Vietnam
(B) Only vo lun tee r  
t roops
(C) & (D) Withdraw 
a l l  t roops from 
Vietnam
Lib/CP Labor Other None
2.2 73.5 8.7 24.1 15.0
(320) (68) (23) (29) (440)
7.5 90.7 16.7 52.9 46.0
(374) (324) (24) (85) (807)
15.7 90.7 25.0 59.7 65.3
(153) (332) (12) (62) (559)
7.0 89.1 15.3 50.6
(847) (724) (59) (176) 1806
Comparisons from top to  bottom o f  the ta b le  show the assoc ia t ion  
between Vietnam op in ion  and 1969 Labor vo te ,  w i th  pa r ty  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  
c o n t r o l l e d ,  and comparisons from l e f t  to r i g h t  show the s t rong in f luence  
o f  pa r ty  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  on 1969 vote ,  independent o f  Vietnam op in ion .  The 
high le v e ls  o f  vo t ing  suppor t  f o r  the ALP amongst Labor i d e n t i f i e r s ,  
in  c o n t ra s t  to  the low percentages recorded amongst those who i d e n t i f i e d  
w i th  the government p a r t ie s  or  o the r  p a r t i e s  exp la ined the f in d in g s  o f  
the ana lys is  o f  var iance.  The percentages entered in the l a s t  column 
o f  the t a b le ,  which d e a l t  w i th  independents,  accounted f o r  the r e s u l t s  o f
15. Figures in  t h i s  ta b le  are expressed in  percentages o f  the t o t a l  n f o r  
each c e l l  ( i n  b racke ts ) .  The n 's  can be summed, but the percentages 
cannot. Figures a t  the extreme r i g h t  and bottom o f  the tab le  are the 
percentage Labor votes f o r  values o f  each o f  the two v a r ia b le s ,  w i th  
the o the r  v a r ia b le  u nc o n t ro l led .  The t o t a l  n o f  1,806 in the bottom 
r igh t -hand  corner represents the t o t a l  sample minus 67 miss ing data 
cases (no answer or  "d o n 't  know" on e i t h e r  o f  the two v a r i a b le s ) .
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the AID analysis recorded in Figure 10.2. Very l i t t l e ,  or no difference, 
could be observed in the percentage Labor votes recorded by those who wanted 
volunteer troops retained in Vietnam and those who wanted all troops 
withdrawn when respondents either identified with the Labor Party or 
lacked a party identification. The decision of the AID program to spli t  
independents into a sub-group which amalgamated respondents holding both 
of these views in opposition to a sub-group consisting entirely of those 
favouring the retention of conscript troops in the war, was explained by 
the contrast in voting behaviour amongst independents, according to their 
Vietnam opinion (24.1% of independents supporting (A) voted Labor, 
whilst 52.9% of independents supporting (B) and 59.7% of independents 
favouring (C) and (D) voted for the Labor party in 1969).
The greater u t i l i ty  of Vietnam in accounting for voting behaviour 
amongst independents than amongst other categories of identifiers was of 
some importance in explaining the outcome of the 1969 election, owing to 
the links already established between the absence of party identification 
and the likelihood of voting change between 1966 and 1969. The main 
handicap in assessing the significance of Vietnam in the voting decisions 
of independents, however, lay in the small number of respondents involved. 
Although the rate  of voting change amongst independents was higher than 
for the rest of the sample, the actual numbers in this category were very 
small - of 186 respondents lacking any party identification, 43 swung from 
Liberal/Country Party in 1966 to Labor in 1969 and only 3 swung in the 
opposite direction. Allowing for a slight reduction in these numbers to 
account for those respondents who failed to give an opinion, the final 
number of cases would be too small for any reliable analysis of the 
distribution of attitudes towards the Vietnam war. Our inability to pursue 
the analysis any further, however, did not mean that the findings bore no 
significance for the 1969 election. As the proportion of respondents who 
reported switching to Labor in 1969 corresponded closely with the
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percentage increase in f i r s t  preference votes for Labor actually recorded 
at the election, there was no reason to expect that the ASP sample under­
estimated the proportion of independents in the total Australian electorate 
who switched their votes at the election. A much larger sample than the 
1,873 respondents obtained by Aitkin and Kahan would be needed to test  the 
hypothesis that Vietnam opinions accounted for a significant proportion 
of voting changes amongst those electors who did not identify with any of 
the political parties.
The two-stage analysis of variance reported in this chapter did
result in the finding that the Vietnam war, as a single issue, was only
of marginal assistance in explaining 1969 voting behaviour across the total
16sample. Similar results could be expected for the other seven issues, 
which contributed l i t t l e  or nothing to the variance in 1969 vote, even 
when no other factors were controlled. The combined influence of the 
eight issues, therefore, would have been unlikely to add a great deal to 
the 59.8% of the variance in voting behaviour explained by the single 
variable of party identification. I t  was possible that other, more salient 
issues could have accounted for a substantial proportion of the variance; 
but this was rendered unlikely by the finding, reported in the previous 
chapter, that the highly salient issues of education and pensions were not 
associated with particularly high rates of voting change. Apart from issues, 
other variables which may have helped to explain voting behaviour were
16. The seven remaining issues (except Communist China) were not as strongly 
correlated with party identification as was Vietnam (see earl ier chapter 
for Cramer's V correlation coefficients), and the r^ ratios obtained for 
each issue in the one-stage analysis of variance may therefore not have 
been reduced by quite so much in a two-stage analysis, controlling for 
party identification, as was the case with the Vietnam war. However, 
the percentage of the variance accounted for by each of the issues even 
in a one-stage analysis was so small that any reduction at all would 
have reduced the r^ ratios to near-zero. I t  was therefore pointless 
to pursue the analysis any further for these issues.
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17 18candidate preference , evaluations of the parties' past performance,
19and/or a composite measure of respondents' socio-economic status. The 
possibility that the remainder of the variance could be attributed to the 
influence of one or all of these factors was not pursued any further, however, 
as i t  fell beyond the scope of this thesis.
Only very limited conclusions have been made possible by the multi­
variate analysis performed here. Although the null hypothesis, that 
the policy issues surveyed in the ASP project had no relationship to 
voting behaviour in 1969 was not confirmed, i t  could not be replaced with 
any quantitative measure of the degree of variation in 1969 vote attributable 
to issue opinions, except in relation to the Vietnam war. The contribution 
of Vietnam to explaining the total vote recorded for the Labor party in 
1969 was extremely small (0.9% of the variance in 1969 vote, with party 
identification controlled), and the evidence in the data that opinions on 
the issue were associated with switches in the vote amongst those who did 
not identify with a political party could not be tested in quantitative
17. RePass, o p . c i t . 3 showed that a "candidate image" variable had a relatively 
high weighting in a multiple regression analysis of data on voting 
behaviour at the 1964 U.S. Presidential election. For similar results 
see R.W. Boyd, "Presidential Elections: An Explanation of Voting 
Defection", American Political Science Review, 63 (1969), pp.498-514. 
Candidate preferences may not be expected to figure so highly in 
Australian voting decisions, however, as elections in this country 
choose a governing political party and, only indirectly, a Prime 
Minister. In order to uti l ise the variable in an analysis of Aust­
ralian voting behaviour, distinctions would have to be made between 
images of the party leaders and of individual candidates for House of 
Representatives seats.
18. Downs o p . c i t . 3 stressed that a voter's assessment of the past 
performances of the competing parties was an essential component of 
his theoretical model of voting decisions.
19. The most common of such measures would be the respondents' class 
membership. Although at least two "c la ss"  variables were included 
in the ASP data, their interpretation i t s e l f  constituted such a 
challenging task (see D.Aitkin, Stability and Change in Australian 
Poli t ics) that i t  extended beyond the scope of this thesis.
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terms because of the small number of cases involved.
I t  was evident that a theory encompassing the role of issues in 
the dynamics of voting decisions could not be established on the basis 
of the issue questions included in the ASP survey. Although the 
preponderant position of party identification as a variable which 
mediated the influence of issue opinions appeared to have been confirmed, 
the data could not actually be used to support any inferences about 
causality. None of the individual issues, apart from Vietnam, exerted 
any measurable influence on voting behaviour, and the format of the items 
prevented the construction of any composite scale which might have been 
used to summarise, in quantitative form, respondents' stances on a variety 
of issues.
Research conducted in the United States which has made use of such
composite scales has come closer to estimating the overall role of issue
opinions in voting behaviour. Employing a scale of "issue partisansh ip "
based on a comparison between respondent and party positions on a series
of salient issues, RePass found that issue attitudes carried slightly less
weight than candidate image and party identification in a multiple regression
20analysis of 1964 presidential vote. Using a measure which incorporated
respondents' perceptions of the relative distances between their own
issue opinions and the candidates' stances on a variety of issues, A.H.
Miller found that "issue proxim ity "  accounted for an additional 31% of the
variance in 1972 presidential vote after party identification had been 
21control led.
In the absence of these more sophisticated data scaling techniques, 
i t  would have been futi le to attempt to erect a s ta t is t ica l  model of voting 
behaviour which included issue opinions as predictors of vote at the 1969
20. RePass, o p .a it ., p.400
21. Miller, e t  a t. 3 op. a i t p.68.
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Austra lian Federal e lec tion . Such models, using simultaneous equations,
and/or computer simulation techniques, have been employed to map the
causal sequences in voting decisions in re la t ion  to American and B r i t is h  
22elections and i t  was unfortunate that the ASP data on issues were not in 
a form suited to th is  type o f analysis.
22. See Goldberg, "Discerning a Causal Pattern among Data on Voting Behaviour 
Just, o p .a i t . ;  Nie and Anderson, o p . a i t . ;  Pomper, op .a i t .
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CHAPTER 11 
CONCLUSION
The analysis conducted in this study of the relationships between 
certain policy issues and voting behaviour at the 1969 Federal election 
has proceeded from an init ial  description of the patterns in voters' 
opinions and their variation along lines of cleavage in the electorate to 
the testing of certain hypotheses known to be necessary prerequisites for 
the existence of issue voting. As each stage of the analysis has been, to 
a certain extent, dependent on the previous stage, the process has been 
one of gradual accumulation of evidence, culminating in a multi-variate 
analysis which assessed the relative contributions of the eight ASP issue 
items and of party identification to explaining 1969 vote.
The final outcome of the study has been the rejection of the null 
hypothesis, that issues bore no relationship to voting behaviour at the 
1969 election. It has not been possible, however, to replace this 
hypothesis with a quantitative measure of the degree to which policy 
issues, as a whole, were associated with the electorate's voting decisions. 
The range of issues covered was not broad enough, nor was the form in 
which the data were collected sufficiently refined to support the complex 
sta tis t ical  procedures necessary for this type of assessment. The 
analysis should thus be regarded as an exploratory study, for i t  has 
raised more questions than have been conclusively answered.
In order to appreciate what has been achieved in the course of 
the study, in comparison with the further questions which the analysis has 
failed to answer, we need to summarise the findings reported in the 
preceding chapters.
Initial analysis of the distribution of opinions on each of the issue 
items showed only two, conscription and censorship, to be issues on which 
attitudes within the sample were evenly divided. Skewed distributions of 
opinion were recorded on two further issues, the Vietnam war and the
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provision of State aid for non-government schools. Although sim ilarly 
skewed patterns appeared on the remaining items, there were grounds for 
questioning whether the items represented valid measures of opinion distributed 
along an ordered scale. High levels of uncertainty were registered in responses 
to items covering Australia's future relations with Communist China and 
attitudes towards foreign investors, whilst the options provided to 
respondents in answering questions on the alliance with the United States 
and on migration did not appear to constitute any meaningful scale of 
policy alternatives.
Even assuming a simplified situation of two party competition in 
Australian p o li t ics , i t  was extremely d i f f ic u l t  to apply Butler and Stokes' 
hypothesis,1 that skewed distributions of opinion were necessary i f  issue 
opinions were to produce any alteration in the electoral balance of the 
parties, to the issues covered in the ASP survey. In addition to 
deficiencies in the format of some items, and uncertainty of opinions on 
others, the alternatives did not always correspond to actual differences 
in party policy stances on the issues. Only i f  opinions were ranged 
along a single dimension on which the policy position of each party could 
readily be located, could Butler and Stokes' hypothesis as to the possible 
electoral outcomes be f r u i t f u l ly  applied to the data. On the basis of 
making reasoned judgements about the proximity of various attitudes to 
actual party policies, i t  could be concluded that opinions were more 
favourably inclined towards the Government's stance on the issues of 
State aid, the U.S. alliance and Communist China, and towards the Labor 
party's stance on foreign investment, but the re l ia b i l i t y  of the results 
on each of these issues except State aid was questionable owing to the 
d i f f ic u l t ie s  outlined above. On the Vietnam war, a pronounced skew was 
recorded in the direction of an option which was not supported by either 
of the main po lit ica l parties in 1969, and opinions on migration favoured
1. Butler and Stokes, o p . a i t . ,  pp. 411-3.
307
an approach which was shared by both parties. Thus, i t  would have been 
fallacious to conclude that patterns of opinion on any of the issues 
surveyed markedly favoured one party over the other at the time of the 
1969 election. The analysis did, however, display clear divisions of 
opinion on some of the issues and showed that attitudes aroused intense 
feelings amongst some respondents on questions regarding Vietnam, 
conscription, censorship and migration policies.
Although no conclusions could be drawn as to the nature of the 
influence processes at work, the simplest step in examining the relation­
ships between opinions and voting behaviour lay in cross-tabulating the 
two variables. This procedure could be used to eliminate from further 
consideration those issues which displayed no significant association 
with 1969 vote. Such was not to be the case with the issue items in the 
ASP survey, all of which bore some sta t i s t ica l ly  significant relationship 
to the voting pattern of the sample, although the strength of the corre­
lation was particularly weak on a number of items. In preference to 
correlation s ta t i s t ics ,  a better idea of the implications of issue 
opinions for voting behaviour could be gained by deriving measures of
the degree of partisan cleavage within the sample from the cross-tabulations
2for each item. Using Goot's cr i teria of partisanship, opinion distribu­
tions on five of the eight issues - the U.S. alliance, foreign investment, 
migration, State aid and censorship - could be classified as bi-partisan, 
or recording only a "t r i v i a l " degree of partisanship. Issues which did 
score as moderately partisan were the Vietnam war, Communist China and 
conscription. Measures of the intensities of opinion on two of these 
issues, the Vietnam war and conscription, suggested that they were the 
policy areas with the greatest potential for conflict within the sample.
In both cases, partisan cleavages were roughly aligned with
2. Goot, o p .o i t . , pp.8-10 and 66-68.
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divisions of the sample into a relatively unconcerned majority, opposed by 
an intense minority.
An examination of the distribution of opinions on each of the 
issues by the four variables of education, occupation, age and sex with 
1969 vote controlled, showed a complex pattern of cross-cutting cleavages 
with interaction effects between some of these variables. Although some 
interesting relationships between issue opinions and socio-demographic 
background were discovered, none of the four variables chosen could account 
completely for the differences in opinion.
In the same way, the variable of party identification was unable 
to explain the different attitudes adopted by the respondents on the issue 
items. Opinions were, however, associated with the direction of voters' 
partisan loyalties, particularly on the issues of Vietnam and Communist 
China. In these two cases, the more strongly a respondent claimed to 
identify with a particular party, the more likely his opinion was to 
correspond with the stance of that party as approximated in the l i s t  of 
policy options provided for the question. The finding of a relatively 
strong association between the two issues and party identification meant 
that the correspondence between opinion distribution and the pattern of 
1969 vote already recorded may have been due purely to the influence of 
partisan aff i l ia t ion ,  i f ,  as indeed was the case, there was a strong 
correlation between party identification and 1969 vote. Although issue 
opinions were clearly not entirely derived from partisan loyalties, the 
influence of party identification needed to be controlled in all subsequent 
attempts to assess the contribution of issues to voting decisions.
The use of party identification as a guide to the perception of 
party stances was suggested by the respondents' choice of parties to solve 
the problems they had nominated as most urgently needing Federal government 
attention. Although some problems appeared to be seen as the province of 
the government parties and others as suitable for Labor to handle,
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controlling for party identification showed most of this apparent 
difference to have stemmed from a tendency for each bloc of party 
supporters to nominate rather different sorts of problems which they then 
saw as being best handled by the party with which they identified.
No substantial evidence for the operation of perceptual balance 
mechanisms was forthcoming, however, when the accuracy of respondents' 
perception of party policies was tested on the issue of Vietnam. A high 
level of knowledge of both government and opposition stances towards the 
war was evident within the sample. Only a maximum 31.8% of the sample 
could possibly have been using their partisan loyalty as a guide to their 
perception, whilst 43.4% recognised that their own opinion did not 
correspond with the policy adopted by either of the major parties. The 
la t ter  result showed that a substantial number of the ASP respondents were 
not basing their attitudes towards Vietnam on irrational perceptions of 
the political environment, according to the criteria  of inductive 
rationality. The form of questioning employed in the ASP survey failed 
to establish, however, that all respondents were successfully linking their 
own opinions on the war with the policies of one or other of the parties 
contesting the election. In the absence of information as to which party 
each respondent felt  most nearly approximated his own opinion on the issue, 
the linkage between self and party which was a necessary prerequisite for 
issue voting could not be demonstrated. It was unfortunate, also, that 
data were not available on the respondents' perceptions of party policies 
on the remaining seven issue items. It could be hypothesised that 
respondents would be more likely to use their partisan loyalties as 
perceptual cues in such cases, as the high degree of knowledge observed 
on the Vietnam issue would most probably not be replicated on other issues 
which had not been the subject of such intensive political debate,
In keeping with the suggestion that issue voting is most likely to 
occur on those issues which are subjects of personal concern to voters, the
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relative salience of different policy issues amongst members of the ASP 
sample was investigated. The issue areas arousing the most widespread 
concern in the sample - education, pensions - were not included in the 
selection of fixed-choice opinion items in the questionnaire. Vietnam, and 
to a much lesser extent, conscription, were the only items to register as 
salient issues, on which information was also available about voters' 
opinions. The distribution of opinions amongst those concerned with the 
Vietnam war was skewed towards a position more closely represented by the 
policy of the Labor party than by that of the government parties. Although 
the voting pattern of this sub-sample at the 1969 election also favoured 
the Labor party, i t  could not be assumed that issue voting had occurred 
in this instance without f i r s t  controlling for the influence of party 
identification. Partisan loyalties, rather than opinions on Vietnam, were 
in fact, found to account for the voting behaviour of most of those 
respondents who had expressed personal concern with the war. Investigation 
of the voting decisions of independents, who lacked any psychological 
commitment to the parties, was prevented by the small size of the group for 
whom Vietnam was salient (N=21). The results did not disprove the 
hypothesis that respondents concerned with Vietnam had cast their votes 
at the 1969 election on the basis of their opinions on the issue, but did 
demonstrate the difficulty of reaching any meaningful conclusions about 
issue voting, independent from the complicating influence of party 
identification.
Narrowing the focus of the analysis to the decisions of those who 
switched their votes between the elections of 1966 and 1969 proved to be 
the best way of exploring the possibility of issue voting, as independents 
were more likely to al ter their behaviour in this fashion than were strong 
identifiers. A comparison of the relative defection rates recorded amongst 
those holding different opinions on the eight issue items showed the 
largest swings to Labor to have occurred amongst those espousing certain
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views on the issues of Vietnam, Communist China, conscription, censorship 
and the U.S. alliance. As an opposing viewpoint on the Vietnam issue was 
associated with a high proportionate swing in the opposite direction, 
this , of all the issues, appeared to have been most closely associated 
with voting change. The issues of high salience within the sample were 
not necessarily associated with the greatest movement of votes between 
the parties. When salient, the Vietnam war, for instance, was character­
ised by higher rates of voting change than were the issues of education 
and pensions. The influence of party identification, although minimised, 
could not be entirely removed from the analysis of voting change, owing to 
the very small number of respondents remaining when i t  was utilised as a 
control variable.
The use of multi-variate techniques of analysis provided an 
opportunity to assess the contribution of the eight issues to 1969 voting 
behaviour, in relation to each other, and to the influence of party 
identification. An AID analysis of the vote recorded by the Labor party 
in 1969 showed the enormous predictive capacity of the party identification 
variable. The only policy issue which was able to explain sufficient 
variance in the vote to qualify for inclusion in this analysis was the 
Vietnam war, and then only as a secondary predictor, following party 
identification. Although Vietnam opinions had accounted for a great deal 
more of the variance in 1969 vote than opinions on each of the other ASP 
issue items, as shown in a succession of single-stage analyses of variance, 
the strong correlation between the Vietnam war issue and party identification 
meant that Vietnam opinions were only able to explain a tiny fraction of the 
additional variance remaining after partisan loyalties had been accounted 
for.
The multi-variate analysis conducted here provided a convincing 
demonstration that the existence of significant correlations between issue 
opinions and the vote could not be taken to constitute sufficient evidence
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for the occurrence of issue voting. The ability of the Vietnam issue to 
predict voting behaviour amongst independents, and the greater frequency 
of voting change within this category of respondents, suggested that a more 
fruitful mode of analysis would confine the exploration of issue voting 
within such boundaries. This would necessitate a sample of the electorate 
deliberately designed to include independents, or those who had switched 
their votes between elections, in sufficient numbers for reliable 
observations to be made of their attitudes towards selected policy issues.
The data chosen for this study proved only partially suitable for 
the testing of those conditions whose fulfillment was a necessary 
requirement for the existence of issue voting. The conditions, set down 
at the outset of the study, were as follows:
(a) voters must be able to express an opinion on the issue;
(b) voters must have some minimal commitment to that opinion;
(c) voters must perceive that one party represents their own 
position on the issue better than do the other parties.
On most of the policy issues included in the study we could be confident
that voters possessed opinions, but, whether they were even minimally
concerned about the issues or could link party policy stances to their own
opinions could not be established for most items. Although those issues
for which the questionnaire provided estimates of intensity of feeling did
appear to arouse strong feeling amongst some opinion holders, the findings
of the chapter on salience suggested that the ASP issue items were not, on
the whole, those issues which aroused the most widespread concern within
the electorate. The only information available on the voters' perceptual
links between the parties' stances and their own issue opinions was with
regard to the item on the Vietnam war. Even on this item, the existence
of such linkages could not be established for a significant proportion of
the sample who had supported an option which did not correspond with
policies adopted by either of the major parties towards the war.
Despite the patchy record of the ASP data in attempts to test  the
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preconditions for issue voting, various analytic techniques were employed 
to isolate possible instances of such voting behaviour amongst independents 
who switched their votes between 1966 and 1969. Although no proof could 
be established, i t  was highly likely that some independents who swung to 
the Labor party in 1969 based their decisions on their opposition to the 
continued commitment of Australian troops, particularly conscripts, to the 
Vietnam war. As the size of the swing actually recorded at the 1969 
Federal election was small, in proportion to the total voting population, 
the possibility that issue voting on the basis of opinions towards Vietnam 
could have explained a sizeable portion of that swing could not be dis­
counted .
Quantitative evidence of the extent of issue voting within the sample 
in 1969 would have necessitated a much more sophisticated data format than 
was provided for in the design of the ASP survey. Recognition of the 
methodological difficult ies inherent in the precise assessment of the 
effect of issue opinions on voting behaviour led the American researchers, 
Page and Brody, to conclude three years ago that the impact of issue
3voting had probably never been adequately measured. Their suggested 
procedure would not have been possible within the 1imitationsimposed by 
the ASP data, whose basic outline was established in 1967, well before 
the introduction of refinements in the format of the questions on issues 
posed by the regular University of Michigan voting studies.
Instead of assessing voters' opinions on issues, in addition to a 
separate measure of their abili ty to form perceptual links between their 
own opinions and party policies, recent studies have utilised composite 
indices of "issue proximity". Use of a "relative proximity" measure - 
"how close a voter is to a particular candidate or party on a given 
dimension3 relative to how close he sees himself as being to the other
3. Page and Brody, o p . c i t p.981.
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cand ida tes or p a r i te s  on the  same d im ension "  - on the dimension of Vietnam
war opinions in the United States showed the issue to have explained a
substantial proportion of the variance in the vote recorded, even at the
4
1968 presidential election. Additional refinements in measurement 
techniques have taken the form of fil tering opinion items through a test of 
issue salience, so that only those issues spontaneously mentioned by the 
respondents as being of concern to them are included in the analysis.
The use of more sophisticated techniques than the simple fixed- 
choice opinion item has allowed for the screening out of responses which 
do not fu lf i l l  the necessary preconditions for issue voting before analysis 
of the data has begun. Refinements in the process of measurement have not 
stopped here, however. Realising that issue voting cannot logically be 
taken to include the behaviour of those individuals "who are e i th e r  
persuaded by th e  candida te  to  take  a p a r t ic u la r  is su e  p o s i t io n  or those  
who r a t io n a l is e  th e i r  vo te  by p r o je c tin g  th e ir  own p o lic y  p re fe ren ce  onto  
t h e i r  p re fe r re d  ca n d id a te", American researchers have either taken to 
basing their measurements on individual attitude changes over time, or to 
utilising analysis methods which minimise the possibility of overstatement 
of issue voting arising out of projection or persuasion effects. Although 
the possibility of rationalisation occurring, through the perceptual 
mechanism of a respondent projecting his/her own opinion onto the party of 
his/her own choice was explicitly recognised in the course of this study, 
the ASP data did not allow for such cases to be identified (except on one 
issue, the Vietnam war), nor for the effects of projection to be controlled
g
through the measurement of individual attitude changes over time.
4. D.Kovenock, P. Beardsley and J. Prothro, "Status, Party Ideology, Issues 
and Candidate Choice", paper delivered at Congress of International Politica 
Seience Association (Munich 1970) as cited by Pomper, o p .c i t .  , p.192.
5. Miller et a l ., o p . c i t . ,  p.26. For a discussion of persuasion and projec­
tion effects also see R.A. Brody and B.I. Page "Comment: The Assessment of 
Policy Voting", American Political Science Review, 66 (1972), pp.452-8.
6. Although the 1969 A.S.P. survey constituted the second part of a two- 
wave study, panel data could not be used for this analysis.
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Similarly, there was no means in this study to minimise or control for the 
impact of persuasion on voters' opinions. Thus, the data used in the 
analysis did not match up to the level of sophistication now recognised 
to be essential if the direct influence of issues on voting behaviour is to 
be accurately measured.
The possibility that the issues surveyed here could have exerted an 
indirect influence on voting behaviour through precipitating changes in 
voters' partisan loyalties should not be ignored, although such effects 
would have been almost impossible to measure. Indirect influences on 
party identification could not have been studied without a much more 
detailed analysis of the circumstances governing both the formation of, 
and subsequent changes in the partisan loyalties of each respondent. In 
the course of a seminar on issue voting, Brody and Page pointed out that 
the cross-section sample survey could not easily be adapted to studying 
the effects of feedback from respondents' satisfaction or dissatisfaction 
with government policy on the strength and direction of partisan aff i l iat ion.^ 
Although most leading models of party identification do not conceive of i t
o
as being responsive to current issue concerns, this is an ar t i f icial
constraint which does not allow for the findings of causal path analysis,
g
that issue orientations can affect partisan attitudes.  The partisan 
loyalties of voters may be resistant to change (recall data in the A.S.P. 
survey showed very few respondents to have remembered altering their 
party identification in the past), but i t  would be conceptually inaccurate 
to relegate issues entirely to the status of short-term influences on 
voting behaviour, even i f  their longer term impact is extraordinarily
7. Brody and Page, o p .c it .  , p.450.
8. ib id . ,  pp.450-1.
9. Goldberg, "Discerning a Causal Pattern among Data on Voting Behaviour", 
pp.920-1.
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d i f f i c u l t  to measure.^
The results of this study have provided no evidence to question the 
common conception of party identi f ication as a mediating variable, more 
often influencing the way voters perceive issues than the reverse. I t  has 
been shown to explain a massive 59.8% of the variance in 1969 vote, although 
the failure of the ASP issue items to account for much of the remainder may 
have been due to the nature of the items, rather than to the complete 
absence of issue voting. The unsuccessful nature of attempts during this 
analysis to extricate the influence of issue opinions on voting decisions 
from the blanket-like effects of party identi f icat ion has led to the
11suggestion, previously advanced by V.0. Key in his Responsible Electorate, 
that a more f ru i t fu l  approach to the study of issues would be to concentrate 
on voting shifts between elections. In this way, the influence of party 
identi f icat ion would be largely removed from the analysis. Assuming that 
a general explanation of voting behaviour is required, however, and 
recognising the severe l imitations inherent in the ASP data, we are le f t  
with the conclusion that none of the eight issues surveyed had sufficient 
influence on the voting decisions of Australian electors in 1969 for a 
quantitative estimate of issue voting to be obtained.
10. This is the assumption made by normal vote analysis, see Converse,
"The Concept of a Normal Vote", in Campbell, et a l ., Elections and the 
Polit ical Order. This analytic technique has proved so f ru i t fu l  in the 
analysis of data on voting behaviour that i ts  departure from rea l i ty  
in this regard is jus t i f ied  for the insights i t  has provided into the 
determinants of voting decisions. See J.H. Kessel's reservations 
about the concept of the normal vote in J.H. Kessel, "Comment: The
Issues in Issue Voting", American Polit ical Science Review, 66 (1972),
p. 464.
11. V.0. Key, The Responsible Electorate.
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APPENDIX I
ISSUE ITEMS INCLUDED IN THE ANALYSIS
(Extracted from the Australian Survey Project Questionnaire,
2nd Wave, 1969.)
1. Vietnam War
As you know, there is a lot of discussion around Australia about 
what we should be doing about Vietnam. Which of these statements comes 
closest to what you yourself feel should be done? If you do not have any 
opinion about this, just say so.
(A) We should have troops fighting in Vietnam, including 
conscripts.
(B) We should have troops in Vietnam, but only volunteers.
(C) We should not have any troops in Vietnam, and only 
send civilian experts.
(D) We should stay out of Vietnam altogether.
(E) No opinion / don't know.
2. Migration
There's a good deal of talk these days about migration. Which of 
the statements comes closest to what you yourself feel should be done? If 
you do not have any opinion about this , just  say so.
(A) Asians should be allowed to enter Australia as migrants 
just like people of European descent.
(B) There should be a small quota of Asian migrants.
(C) Asians should not be allowed to enter Australia as migrants.
(D) We should only allow people from Britain and northern Europe 
to enter Australia as migrants.
(E) We should not have any more migrants at the present time.
(F) No opinion / don't know.
3. U.S. Alliance
Do you think Australia's links with the United States should be 
very close, fa ir ly  close or not very close?
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4. Censorship
Do you think that there should be some censorship of books and 
f i lm s ,  or do you think people should be able to read and see what they l ike?
5. State Aid
People have been ta lk ing a l o t ,  too, about government aid to schools. 
Which of these statements comes c losest  to what you yoursel f  feel should be 
done. I f  you do not have any opinion about th is ,  j u s t  say so.
(A) The government should not give any f inancia l  help at a l l  to 
pr ivate or church schools.
(B) The government should not give any f inancia l  help to these 
schools un t i l  state schools have been brought up to date.
(C) The government should give help, but only to re a l ly  needy 
church schools.
(D) The government should give as much help as possible to both 
pr ivate and church schools.
(E) No opinion /  don't  know.
6. Conscription
There has been a l o t  of discussion in the las t  few years about 
conscript ion or national service. Which of these statements comes closest 
to what you feel should be done? I f  you do not have an opinion about 
th is ,  j u s t  say so.
(A) We should have conscript ion fo r  m i l i t a r y  service and i t  
should be fo r  a l l  young men, not ju s t  some.
(B) The present system of the b a l lo t  fo r  conscript ion should 
be continued.
(C) We should have conscr ip t ion, but those who are opposed to 
f igh t ing  should be allowed to do th e i r  national service 
in other ways.
(D) We should not have any form of  conscript ion at a l l .
(E) No opinion /  don't  know.
7. Communist China
Looking into the fu ture ,  do you feel that Austra l ia w i l l  have a lo t  
to worry about in regard to Communist China, or do you feel that China 
probably won't be much of a problem fo r  us?
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8. Foreign Investment
Still  thinking about the future, do you feel that Australia needs 
to be on i ts guard against foreign investors, or do you feel that we 
should welcome anyone who wants to invest in Australia?
- Should be on guard.
- Should welcome.
- I t  depends.
- No opinion / don't know.
APPENDIX I I
CONTENT ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL LEADERS1 ELECTION POLICY SPEECHES (OCTOBER 1969) 
E.G. Whit lam - 1st  October 1969
1. I n t r o d u c t io n
Nominates 11 items o f  p o l i c y  d ispute  - a t t a c k  on pover ty ;  
means t e s t  a b o l i t i o n ;  na t iona l  superannuat ion scheme; 
pension increases;  housing ass is tance ;  educat ion ;  na t iona l  
hea l th  scheme; pr imary i n d u s t r i e s ;  water  conse rva t ion ;  
c o n s c r ip t i o n ;  Vietnam war.
Discusses three d i f fe re n c e s  in  p a r t i e s '  a b i l i t y  to govern - 
need f o r  a re juvenated government; f a i l u r e  o f  L ibe ra l  
government to  c rea te  o p p o r tu n i t i e s  f o r  i t s  c i t i z e n s ;  d i v i s i v e  
q u a l i t i e s  o f  L ibe ra l  r u le .
2. Educat ion
3. Health
4. Housing and Urban Development
5. Taxat ion
6. Welfare
7. Development
8. Pr imary Indus t ry
9. Defence and Re la t ions  w i th  our Neighbours
10. C i v i l  L i b e r t i e s
J. Gorton - 8th October 1969
1. I n t r o d u c t io n
Nominates 14 areas o f  L ibe ra l  government p o l i c y  achievement - 
defence; economic growth;  housing;  m ig ra t io n ;  h e a l th ;  pensions; 
means t e s t ;  t a x a t i o n ;  educa t ion ;  fo re ig n  inves tment;  company 
takeovers;  sh ipp ing ;  roads; US and UK a l l i a n c e s .
Discusses fou r  areas o f  d i f f e re n c e  in  pa r ty  s t y l e  -  L ibe ra l  
concern w i th  the i n d i v i d u a l ;  ra te  o f  progress under a L ibera l
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government; "responsible economic management" by the
Liberals; nationalization, union control and Communist 
influence as characteristics of a Labor government.
2. Defence
3. Vietnam
4. Malaysia/Singapore
5. Taxation Reform
6. National Development
7. Education
8. Social Welfare
9. Health
10. Housing
11. Immigration
12. Arts
13. Trade
14. Primary Industry
15. Shipping and Transport
16. Supplementary statements on aboriginal policy and primary industry.
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APPENDIX I I I
PERCEPTION OF PARTY POLICIES ON VIETNAM
(A) Troops ,  i n c l u d in g  c o n s c r i p t s ,  in Vietnam
(B) Only v o l u n t e e r  t r oops  in Vietnam
(C) Only c i v i l i a n  e x p e r t s  in Vietnam
(D) Stay out  o f  Vietnam a l t o g e t h e r
1. Accuracy o f  p e r ce p t i o n  o f  Lib/CP p o l i cy  on Vietnam by i n t e r e s t  in p o l i t i c s
Good
Deal
Some
I n t e r e s t
Not Much 
I n t e r e s t
No
I n t e r e s t
No
Answer
C o r r e c t
P e r ce p t i o n  * (A) 91.9 88.6 79.4 53.4 0.0
(B) 2.0 3.7 3.9 4.9 0.0
(C) 0.7 0 . 6 1.4 1.9 0.0
(D) 0.5 0.6 0 . 4 1.9 33.3
Don ' t  Know 
No Answer 4.9 6.5 14.9 37.9 66.7
100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
(407) (869) (491) (103) (3)
2. Accuracy of  p e r ce p t i o n  of  Lib/CP p o l i cy  on Vietnam by educa t i on  l eve l
None/ No
Primary Secondary T e r t i a r y Answer
Cor r e c t
P e r ce p t i o n  * (A) 78.2 86.9 94.3 71.4
(B) 4 . 4 3.3 0 . 0 7.1
(C) 1.3 0.7 0 . 8 0 . 0
(D) 0.9 0.6 0 . 0 0 . 0
Don ' t  Know 
No Answer 15.2 8.5 4. 9 21.5
100% 100% 100% 100%
(527) (1209) (123) (14)
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3. Accuracy of perception of Labor policy on Vietnam by in te res t  in po l i t ics
Good Deal 
of In terest
Some
In teres t
Not Much 
Interest
No
In teres t
No
Answer
(A) 1.0 2.6 2.4 4.9 0.0
(B) 6.9 8.9 11.6 14.6 0.0
Correct *  (C) 
Perceptions
* (D)
23.8 16.0 11.8 5.8 0.0
62.9 64.0 56.2 33.0 33.3
Don't Know 
No Answer 5.4 8.5 18.0 41.7 66.7
100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
(407) (869) (491) (103) (3)
4. Accuracy of perception of Labor policy on Vietnam by education level
None/ No
Primary Secondary Tertiary Answer
(A)
(B)
Correct * (C)
Perceptions
* (D)
Don 11 Know 
No Answer
(527) (1209) (123) (14)
2.7 2.4 0.8 0.0
10.4 9.3 5.7 14.3
12.3 16.3 28.5 21.4
58.6 61.0 57.7 42.9
16.0 11.0 7.3 21.4
100°/ 100% 100% 100%
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APPENDIX IV
DEMOGRAPHIC BREAKDOWN OF SALIENT PROBLEMS
1. F i r s t  mentioned problem by degree o f  in te re s t  in p o l i t i c s
Good Deal 
o f  In te re s t
Some
In te re s t
Not Much 
In te re s t
No
In te re s t
Don't Know 
No Answer
Education 24.6 47.4 23.7 4.3 0.0
Pensions 17.6 41.6 34.4 6.0 0.4
Vietnam 21.5 54.6 20.8 3.1 0.0
Defence 26.1 55.4 16.6 1.9 0.0
No Problem 5.4 28.3 45.8 19.3 1.2
Total  Sample 21.7 46.4 26.2 5.5 0.2
2. F i r s t  mentioned problem by educat ion level
None/ No
Primary Secondary T e r t ia ry  Answer
100%
( n=325)
100%
(n=250)
100%
(n=130)
100%
(n=157)
100%
(n=166)
100%
(n=1873)
Education 18.2 71.4 9.2 1.2
Pensions 38.8 58.4 1.6 1.2
Vietnam 24.6 65.4 9.2 0.8
Defence 17.2 67.5 14.0 1.3
No Problem 41.0 57.2 0.6 1.2
Total  Sample 28.1 64.5 6.6 0.8
100%
(n=325
100%
( n=250
100%
(n=130
100%
(n=157
100%
(n=166
100%
n=1873
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3. F i r s t  mentioned problem by occupation
Semi- Of f ice  S k i l le d  Semi- Unsk i l led No
Professional Professional & Sales Workers S k i l le d  Workers Answer
100% 
(n=325)
100% 
(n=250)
100%
( n=130)
100% 
(n=157)
100%
( n = 166)
100% 
(n=1873
4. F i r s t  mentioned problem by sex
Male Female
Education 
Pension s 
Vietnam 
Defence 
No Problem
Total Sample
43.1 56.9
41.2 58.8
59.2 40.8
59.2 40.8
38.6 61.4
52.1 47.9
100%
(n=325)
100%
(n=250)
100%
(n=130)
100%
(n=157)
100%
(n=166)
100%
( n=187 3)
Education 12.0 30.8 11.7 15.4 13.2 12.9 4.0
Pensions 4.8 15.6 16.8 16.8 21.2 20.4 4.4
Vietnam 6.2 21.5 18.5 18.5 17.7 14.6 3.0
Defence 17.2 31.2 14.0 12.1 10.8 10.2 4.5
No
Problem 4.2 20.5 9.6 15.7 18.1 21.1 10.8
Total
Sample 9.0 26.2 13.5 15.3 16.0 15.6 4.4
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5. F i r s t  mentioned problem by age
No
21-23 24-35 36-45 46-55 55-75 76-95 Answer
100%
(n=325)
100%
(n=250)
100%
(n=130)
100%
(n=157)
100%
( n=166)
100%
(n=1873
Education 
Pensions 
Vietnam 
Defence 
No Problem
Total Sample
9.5 27.1 28.0 13.2 14.8 2.5 4.9
4.8 16.0 17.2 23.2 33.6 3.2 2.0
15.4 23.1 16.2 20.0 16.2 2.3 6.8
13.4 18.5 17.8 17.2 19.1 5.7 8.3
13.9 20.5 15.7 16.3 24.1 8.4 1.1
9.3 22.3 21.6 18.4 20.2 3.4 4.8
6. D is t r ib u t io n  o f  sexes amongst those fo r  whom Vietnam or conscr ip t ion  
was most important problem
Male Female
Vietnam 
Conscription
Total  Sample
59.2 40.8
61.3 38.7
52.1 47.9
100%
(n=130)
100%
(n=31)
100%
( n=1873)
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7. Education levels of those for whom Vietnam or conscription was 
most important problem
None/ No
Primary Secondary Tertiary Answer
Vietnam
Conscription
Total Sample
24.6 65.4 9.2 0.8
29.0 67.7 0.0 3.3
28.1 64.5 6.6 0.8
100%
(n=130)
100%
(n= 31)
100%
(n=1873)
8. Ages of those for whom Vietnam or conscription was most 
important problem
Vietnam
Conscription
Total 
Sample
No
21-23 24-35 36-45 46-55 56-75 76-95 Answer
15.4 23.1 16.2 20.0 16.2 2.3 6.8
16.1 16.1 16.1 19.4 22.6 0.0 9.7
9.3 22.3 21.6 18.4 20.2 3.4 4.8
100%
(n=130)
100%
(n=31)
100%
(n=1873)
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